{"policies":[{"id":"1","title":"Conserve Forests","short":"Conserve Forests","category":"Climate","bcr_low":"0.03","bcr_high":"1.79","bcr_basis":"Anchor: the only randomized trial with a benefit-cost calculation. Jayachandran et al. (2017, Science) paid Ugandan forest owners not to clear forest in 60 of 121 villages; tree-cover loss was 4.2% in treatment vs 9.1% in control villages, with no detectable local leakage, and the value of delayed CO2 was 2.4 times programme cost. HIGH 2.4: the trial's published central ratio. Its cost already includes monitoring and administration of the at-scale programme; carbon-market certification costs do not apply to a government payments programme. The working paper gives the sensitivity range: programme cost ~$0.57/tCO2 delayed (payments plus administration), valued at a $39 SCC; 0.7 with immediate catch-up after payments stop, 12.3 with permanent delay, a case the authors call very tentative. LOW 0.09 (full-cost case for credit-based delivery, with leakage): programme cost per credited tonne = Kindermann et al.'s upper average cost $18.7/t (28.0/1.5) + MRV/certification $1.46/t (Merger et al. 2012) = $20.2/t; West et al. (2023, Science) find only ~6.1% of credits from voluntary REDD+ projects reflect additional reductions, so cost per real tonne = 20.2/0.061 = $331; at the $51 US IWG SCC, 51/331 = 0.15. Payments are counted as programme cost, as Jayachandran et al. do. Leakage: Gan & McCarl (2007) estimate 42-95% of one country's or region's conservation effort is displaced elsewhere (as summarised by Hu et al. 2024); payments flow to countries one at a time, so cross-border displacement applies, and at the lowest figure 0.15 x (1 - 0.42) = 0.09. Cross-checks: Kindermann's $6.4-18.7/t gives 2.7-8.0 at $51 and 9.9-29 at $185 (Rennert et al. 2022) if every paid tonne is real; Brazil's DETER enforcement breaks even at $0.76/t (Assuncao et al.); Copenhagen Consensus Post-2015 rated halving forest loss at ~10, McVittie 2-3. Tax finance: each $1 of public outlay costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven & Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999), as for the transfer policies; the whole cost behind the ratio is public outlay; LOW = 0.09 / 3.00 = 0.03; HIGH = 2.4 / 1.34 = 1.79.","grade":"A","grade_reason":"A randomized controlled trial published in Science reports a benefit-cost ratio (2.4, range 0.7-12.3), backed by a peer-reviewed quasi-experimental study of Brazilian enforcement (AEJ: Applied 2023) and a peer-reviewed global cost curve (PNAS 2008). The low end is built from a peer-reviewed synthetic-control evaluation of REDD+ credits (West et al. 2023, Science). Not A+ because only one RCT computes a BCR and the offset evidence is negative.","cost_bn":"32.7","cost_basis":"Full cost = results-based payments $28.0bn/yr (Kindermann et al. 2008, upper estimate for a 50% cut in deforestation; equal to landholders' opportunity costs) + MRV/transaction/capacity administration ~$4.7bn/yr (Merger et al. 2012, up to $1.46/tCO2 x 2.7 Gt; Eliasch Review $4bn over 5 years) + private compliance 0 (compensated opportunity cost, not added twice) + GDP loss null. See cost_components.","difficulty":"moderate","difficulty_reason":"A sustained funding scale-up with working precedents: Norway's results-based payments, the Amazon Fund, and Brazil's DETER enforcement system, which cut deforestation sharply after 2004-2008 (Assuncao et al. 2023). No new treaty is needed, but delivery depends on enforcement capacity in tropical-forest countries.","who_benefits":"pro-poor","who_benefits_reason":"Payments flow to rural forest-owning households in low-income tropical countries (Uganda trial); climate benefits are global. Caveat: Jayachandran et al. note reduced firewood access for landless neighbours and possible widening of within-village inequality.","summary":"Paying landowners or governments in tropical countries to keep forests standing is often presented as one of the cheapest ways to cut CO2. The best evidence, a randomized trial in Uganda, found $2.40 of climate benefit per $1 while payments lasted, and the authors call longer-lasting gains very tentative. Where the money buys carbon credits like those in voluntary REDD+ projects, only about 6% reflected real reductions, and 42-95% of protection in one place is offset by more clearing elsewhere, leaving about 9 cents per $1. Full cost of halving deforestation: about $33bn a year including monitoring and administration.","rated":"TRUE","gain_bn":"","mort_a":"-1","mort_b":"1","income_loss_bn":"32.7","emde_loss_lo":"","emde_loss_hi":"","base_bn":"32.7","lives_lo":"","lives_hi":"","lives_basis":"","selection_method":"Climate survey","selected_by":"Peoples' Climate Vote 2021 (#1 of 18, 54%); Dechezleprêtre et al. 2025"},{"id":"2","title":"Renewable Energy Subsidies","short":"Renewable Energy Subsidies","category":"Climate","bcr_low":"0.009","bcr_high":"0.58","bcr_basis":"Evaluated as the subsidy/mandate itself: BCR = social value of CO2 avoided (SCC) / social resource cost per tonne abated. The per-tonne abatement costs used are resource costs (generation, backup, transmission and fuel, or observed retail-price effects), so they already contain firms' and ratepayers' compliance costs; tax credits are transfers and are not added again. LOW 0.024: the highest published ex-post cost, Abrell, Kosch & Rausch (2019, J. Public Economics; weather-driven natural experiment): solar subsidies in Germany and Spain cost EUR 411-1,944 per tCO2 in the short run; 1,944 x ~1.1 $/EUR = $2,138; at the $51 US IWG SCC, 51/2,138 = 0.024. HIGH 0.75: Bistline, Mehrotra & Wolfram (2023, BPEA) IRA power-sector abatement cost when both costs and emissions are discounted (the consistent comparison with a per-tonne SCC), $88-94/t, valued at the DICE-2023 social cost of carbon, $66/t (Barrage & Nordhaus 2024): 66/88 = 0.75. Their headline $36-87/t discounts costs but not tonnes, and they note costs 'would be higher if distortions associated with financing the incentives were included'. Intermediate: RPS (Greenstone & Nath 2026, $86-211/t) 0.24-0.59 at $51; wind subsidies (Abrell, EUR 82-276 = $90-304/t) 0.17-0.57 at $51; Copenhagen Consensus rates doubling the renewable share below 1. Sensitivity: at Rennert et al.'s $185/t, the low end would be 0.087 and the high end 185/88 = 2.10 (RPS 0.88-2.15). System costs of intermittency: Gowrisankaran, Reynolds & Samano (2016, JPE) find intermittency adds $46/MWh to a $138.4/MWh social cost at 20% solar; Idel (2022) finds full-system costs of wind and solar serving a whole market far above LCOE. These costs are inside the ex-post estimates (observed prices) but can be understated in LCOE-based models. Tax finance: each $1 of public outlay costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven & Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999), as for the transfer policies. The credits are transfers, but the deadweight of the taxes that pay for them is a real cost (Bistline et al. note costs 'would be higher if distortions associated with financing the incentives were included'); weighted by the tax-financed share of cost_bn, (197 + 1.0) / 237.7 = 0.833 (the rest is ratepayers' mandate costs): LOW = 0.024 / (1 + 2.0 x 0.833) = 0.009; HIGH = 0.75 / (1 + 0.34 x 0.833) = 0.58.","grade":"B+","grade_reason":"The end points come from a peer-reviewed natural experiment (Abrell et al. 2019, weather variation) and a model-based estimate published in Brookings Papers (Bistline et al. 2023), with a quasi-experimental working paper (Greenstone & Nath, revised 2026) in between, converted to BCRs with published SCC values. Results differ in sign by technology and SCC, so not A-range.","cost_bn":"237.7","cost_basis":"Full cost = public outlay $197bn/yr (Cato PA 992 high-end IRA energy-subsidy cost, $1.97T over 2025-2034) + administration ~$1.0bn (IRS cost of collection 0.53%) + private compliance ~$39.7bn (RPS retail-price effect of 11%, Greenstone & Nath, on RPS states' ~70% share of $514bn US retail electricity revenue, EIA) + GDP loss: no estimate (null). Fiscal outlays are transfers whose resource content is the abatement cost, so they are not added to the BCR denominator (see bcr_basis). See cost_components.","difficulty":"moderate","difficulty_reason":"Moderate: needs ordinary budget or tax legislation (or state RPS statutes), with abundant precedent (IRA 2022, EU and German feed-in laws, 29 US state RPS laws). Durability is the weak point: the July 2025 OBBBA cut back most federal wind, solar and EV credits within three years of enactment.","who_benefits":"regressive","who_benefits_reason":"Borenstein & Davis (2016, Tax Policy and the Economy) find the top income quintile received ~60% of US clean-energy tax credits and the bottom three quintiles ~10%; mandates raise retail electricity prices 11-17% (Greenstone & Nath), a cost that weighs more on low-income households. Health co-benefits are broad.","summary":"Subsidies, tax credits and mandates for wind and solar cut emissions, but at very different costs per tonne of CO2. Solar subsidies in Germany and Spain cost up to about $2,100 per tonne, returning about 2 cents per dollar at the former US government carbon value, while US state mandates cost $86-211 per tonne and model estimates of the Inflation Reduction Act's power-sector credits about $88 per tonne on a consistent basis. Overall range: about 2 to 75 cents per dollar. Counting full costs, the federal credits (up to about $200bn a year) plus higher electricity bills from state mandates (about $40bn a year) cost around $238bn a year.","rated":"TRUE","gain_bn":"","mort_a":"-1","mort_b":"1","income_loss_bn":"237.7","emde_loss_lo":"","emde_loss_hi":"","base_bn":"237.7","lives_lo":"","lives_hi":"","lives_basis":"","selection_method":"Climate survey","selected_by":"Peoples' Climate Vote 53%; Dechezleprêtre et al. 69.5%"},{"id":"3","title":"Climate Adaptation","short":"Climate Adaptation","category":"Climate","bcr_low":"0.58","bcr_high":"7.46","bcr_basis":"Package = early-warning systems (EWS) plus flood defences, including nature-based ones (mangroves, marshes, reefs). Range: the Global Commission on Adaptation (2019, 'Adapt Now') finds benefit-cost ratios of 2:1 to 10:1 across its five priority adaptation investments ($1.8tn over 2020-2030 generating $7.1tn net benefits; average 'almost 4'), and both components of this package sit inside that span: EWS 'save lives and assets worth at least ten times their cost', mangrove preservation and restoration benefits are 'up to 10 times' costs. LOW 1.7: the published ratios are computed on project costs; adding programme management at FEMA's 15% cap lowers a ratio by 1/1.15, applied to the low end, where the highest cost estimate belongs: 2/1.15 = 1.74, rounded to 1.7. HIGH 10: the GCA's top ratio, which is stated on total investment. Central ~4: Mechler (2016, Natural Hazards), a peer-reviewed review of risk-based disaster-risk-management BCAs, finds benefits average about four times costs. Component checks: Hallegatte (2012, World Bank WP 6058) estimates that bringing hydro-met services and EWS in all developing countries to developed-country standard costs ~$1bn/yr and yields $4-36bn/yr (avoided asset losses $0.3-2bn, 23,000 lives/yr valued at $0.7-3.5bn, $3-30bn of wider economic benefits), BCR 4-36; GCA: $800m on EWS avoids $3-16bn/yr of losses (3.75-20). US flood mitigation: NIBS (2019) finds federal riverine-flood mitigation grants return ~7:1 and all federal mitigation grants 6:1. Coastal: Hinkel et al. (2014, PNAS) find dike costs of $12-71bn/yr by 2100 are far below the damages they avoid (0.3-9.3% of world GDP/yr without adaptation); Narayan et al. (2016, PLoS ONE) find marshes and mangroves 2-5 times cheaper than submerged breakwaters for low waves. The upper EWS figures (up to 36) are not used as the package high end because EWS are ~1-3% of package cost, so the blended ratio is dominated by the defences (2-10). Ward et al. (2017, Nature Climate Change) caution that dyke investment is economically attractive in many but not all urban areas. Tax finance: each $1 of public outlay costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven & Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999), as for the transfer policies; the whole cost behind the ratio is public outlay; LOW = 1.74 (2/1.15) / 3.00 = 0.58; HIGH = 10 / 1.34 = 7.46.","grade":"A-","grade_reason":"The central value comes from a peer-reviewed review of risk-based BCAs (Mechler 2016) and is consistent with peer-reviewed coastal (Hinkel et al. 2014 PNAS) and nature-based-defence (Narayan et al. 2016) studies; the range end points are official estimates (GCA, World Bank, NIBS). No randomized or quasi-experimental BCR for the package.","cost_bn":"46","cost_basis":"Built from component estimates: EWS ~$1bn/yr for all developing countries (Hallegatte 2012; the UN Early Warnings for All plan budgets $3.1bn over 2023-2027, ~$0.6bn/yr); coastal dikes $12-71bn/yr (Hinkel et al. 2014, end-century, midpoint ~$40bn) with river and nature-based defences partly overlapping. Bounds: the full five-area GCA programme is ~$180bn/yr ($1.8tn over 2020-2030) and UNEP (2023) puts all adaptation needs of developing countries at $215-387bn/yr, so this package is a subset of those. Programme management/administration at FEMA's statutory cap of 15% of grant awards (DRRA Section 1215) adds ~$6bn/yr, for a total of ~$46bn/yr. See cost_components.","difficulty":"moderate","difficulty_reason":"A sustained funding scale-up with clear precedents: Bangladesh's cyclone warning and shelter programme, FEMA mitigation grants, and the UN Early Warnings for All initiative endorsed by 50 countries. No treaty or constitutional change is needed, but large defences need multi-year capital budgets and maintenance.","who_benefits":"pro-poor","who_benefits_reason":"Disaster mortality falls hardest on low-income countries; the UN notes countries with limited early-warning coverage have disaster mortality eight times higher than those with high coverage, and Hallegatte's estimate targets developing countries. Mangrove protection also supports coastal fisheries livelihoods (GCA).","summary":"Early-warning systems and flood defences, including mangroves and marshes, protect people and property from storms and floods. Official and peer-reviewed reviews consistently find benefits of about $2 to $10 per $1 spent, with around $4 typical. Early warnings alone score higher, $4 to $36 per $1, because they are cheap (about $1bn a year for all developing countries). The case is strongest where exposure is high and protection is currently weak.","rated":"TRUE","gain_bn":"","mort_a":"-1","mort_b":"1","income_loss_bn":"46.0","emde_loss_lo":"","emde_loss_hi":"","base_bn":"46","lives_lo":"","lives_hi":"","lives_basis":"","selection_method":"Climate survey","selected_by":"Peoples' Climate Vote 45% + 45% (Protecting People group)"},{"id":"4","title":"Ocean Protection","short":"Ocean Protection","category":"Climate","bcr_low":"0.1","bcr_high":"2.61","bcr_basis":"Benefits counted: fisheries spill-over, tourism and recreation, coastal protection, biodiversity and carbon sequestration (blue carbon) from coral reefs, mangroves and coastal wetlands; costs: MPA establishment and management plus fisheries opportunity costs (~90% of total cost). Fisheries management outside MPAs is excluded by the policy definition. HIGH 2.7: the peer-reviewed global bio-economic model (Brander et al. 2020, Marine Policy) finds global benefits exceed costs by a factor of 1.4-2.7 across six expansion scenarios; its ratios already include establishment, management and fisheries opportunity costs. Brander's Copenhagen Consensus assessment of MPA expansion for the EEZs of Africa's 38 coastal countries ('Identifying best buys for Africa' series) gives 9.2 for protecting 10% of EEZs and 1.16 for 30% (5-year build, 30 years of benefits), the ratio falling as coverage expands into lower-value, higher-fishing-cost areas. A non-peer-reviewed version of the global model for WWF/IVM (Brander et al. 2015) reported 3.2-19.8 (PV costs $45-47bn for 10% and $223-228bn for 30% coverage, 2015-2050) and is superseded by the 2020 paper. Full-cost check: replacing Brander's management cost with Balmford's high-end $19bn/yr (PV 19 x 21.83 = $414.8bn) in the 2015 global 30% scenarios gives E2E30: 719.2/(227.0 - 23.8 + 414.8) = 1.16 and P2P30: 1,145.2/(228.0 - 24.4 + 414.8) = 1.85 (Balmford's cost covers 20-30% of all seas, more than 30% of EEZs, so this overstates cost). LOW 0.12: Brander's 1.16 for 30% coverage assumes protected areas work as designed; Edgar et al. (2014, Nature) find only 9 of 87 MPAs had four or five of the features that make them effective and 'most of the remainder of MPAs were ecologically indistinguishable from non-MPAs', and Gill et al. (2017, Nature) find only 9% had adequate staff. Benefits accruing only to effective MPAs (9/87 = 10%) give 1.16 x 0.10 = 0.12. The modelled benefits are also contested: Ovando et al. (2023, Nature) find a more realistic model cuts the food benefits of priority MPAs by 62%; Hilborn & Kaiser (2022) note that fishing effort moves rather than disappears; Hiddink et al. (2023) find trawling-carbon claims biased upward 'by several orders of magnitude'; and blue-carbon removal is 'uncertain and unreliable' (Williamson & Gattuso 2022). Fishers bear most of the cost: lost fishing access is about 90% of total costs in Brander's model, and Hawaii longline revenue per trip fell 9% after the Papahanaumokuakea expansion (Chan 2020). Blue carbon: GCA (2019) finds mangrove preservation and restoration benefits up to 10 times costs. Not used: Sala et al. (2021, Nature) map where protection would yield the most biodiversity, food (>8 Mt extra catch) and carbon benefits but report no BCR, and their trawling-carbon estimate is disputed by Hiddink et al. (2023, Nature), who argue it is 100-1,000 times too high. Waldron et al. (2020) find benefits at least 5:1 for 30% of land and sea combined (not ocean-specific, not peer-reviewed). Tax finance: each $1 of public outlay costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven & Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999), as for the transfer policies; in Brander's ratios about 90% of cost is fishers' lost access (private), so only the remaining ~10% (establishment and management) is tax-financed: LOW = 0.12 / (1 + 2.0 x 0.10) = 0.1; HIGH = 2.7 / (1 + 0.34 x 0.10) = 2.61.","grade":"B","grade_reason":"The range rests on one global bio-economic model (Brander et al. 2020, peer-reviewed), whose benefit inputs are disputed in Nature (Ovando et al. 2023; Hilborn & Kaiser 2022; Hiddink et al. 2023), and on field evidence that most MPAs do not deliver (Edgar et al. 2014; Gill et al. 2017). No randomized or ex-post global BCA exists.","cost_bn":"28.4","cost_basis":"Full cost = establishment ~$0.36bn/yr + management and enforcement $19bn/yr (Balmford et al. 2004 high end) + fisheries opportunity cost ~$9.0bn/yr (Brander et al. 2015, 30% scenario, PV $195.8bn over 2015-2050 at 3%) = ~$28.4bn/yr. Waldron et al. (2020) put all protected areas (land and sea, 30%) at ~$140bn/yr. See cost_components.","difficulty":"moderate","difficulty_reason":"Each country can designate and enforce MPAs in its own waters under ordinary law (many have, e.g. the US Papahanaumokuakea monument); the global 30x30 target is agreed under the 2022 Kunming-Montreal framework, but high-seas protection needs the multilateral BBNJ treaty, and enforcement against fishing is costly.","who_benefits":"broad","who_benefits_reason":"Benefits (coastal protection, tourism, fish spill-over, biodiversity, carbon) are widely shared, and Balmford et al. estimate a global network would support about one million jobs; but the main cost, lost fishing access, falls on fishing communities, some of them poor, so distribution is mixed.","summary":"Marine protected areas close parts of the ocean to fishing and other uses to protect reefs, mangroves and fish stocks. The most complete global cost-benefit model finds $1.40-2.70 of benefit per $1, but it assumes the protected areas work as designed: a Nature study of 87 of them found only 9 had the features that make them effective, and most were ecologically indistinguishable from unprotected waters. Counting benefits only where protection works gives about 12 cents per $1. Lost fishing access is about 90% of the cost, borne mostly by fishers, and the claimed food and carbon benefits have been cut sharply by later studies.","rated":"TRUE","gain_bn":"","mort_a":"-1","mort_b":"1","income_loss_bn":"28.4","emde_loss_lo":"","emde_loss_hi":"","base_bn":"28.4","lives_lo":"","lives_hi":"","lives_basis":"","selection_method":"Climate survey","selected_by":"Peoples' Climate Vote 45%"},{"id":"5","title":"Combustion Car Ban","short":"Combustion Car Ban","category":"Climate","bcr_low":"-0.07","bcr_high":"0.19","bcr_basis":"Scope: a global ban on sales of new combustion-engine cars (by 2030) and trucks, on the schedules of California's Advanced Clean Fleets/Advanced Clean Trucks rules (100% zero-emission truck sales) and the EU's 90% heavy-duty CO2 cut for 2040. No study evaluates it directly, so the ends come from the closest priced analyses. No published benefit-cost ratio covers trucks on the pessimistic side, so the range is anchored on the car evidence. LOW -0.07: Holland, Mansur, Muller & Yates (2016, AER) value the full environmental benefit of an EV over a gasoline car (CO2 plus power-plant and tailpipe local pollution) at a mean of -$1,095 per vehicle on the 2010-12 US grid (+$2,785 California to -$4,964 North Dakota). Their 2020 update (AEJ: Policy) finds EVs cleaner than gasoline cars on the 2017 US average grid, but a 2030 global ban puts most new EVs on grids like China's (58% coal) and India's (75%) (Ember 2025), and Ji et al. (2012, EST) find e-car PM2.5 health impacts in Chinese cities 3.6x those of gasoline cars. Full cost per forced EV: battery premium $10,000 (Mills 2023) + grid and charging $6,250 (Brattle: $75-125bn for 20m EVs = $3,750-6,250) = $16,250. -1,095 / 16,250 = -0.07 (-0.11 with the battery premium alone; a larger denominator moves a negative ratio toward zero). HIGH 0.19: the Cebr analysis for the APPG for Fair Fuel of the UK's 2030 car ban, benefits GBP 76bn against costs GBP 400bn: 76/400 = 0.19. Used-car leakage of 13-16% of expected fuel savings (Jacobsen & van Benthem 2015) would lower the high end further. Cross-checks: McKitrick (CJE 2024) general-equilibrium cost of Canada's mandate $2,700-4,700/t: 185/2,700 = 0.07, 51/2,700 = 0.02, 36/4,700 = 0.008; the same model finds Canada's mandate cuts real GDP by 2.8% in 2030 and 7.0% in 2035 when parity arrives in 2050; Gillingham & Stock static EV-subsidy cost 36/640 = 0.06 to 185/350 = 0.53. Trucks: a battery-electric Class 8 tractor costs over $400,000 against about $180,000 for diesel; electrifying the US commercial fleet needs nearly $1 trillion of charging ($620bn) and utility grid ($370bn) investment, about $145,000 of charging per heavy-duty vehicle, excluding vehicle costs (Roland Berger for the Clean Freight Coalition, 2024); ATRI (2022) puts the payload loss at about 13,800 lb per truck and finds an all-electric US fleet would need more than 40% of current US electricity generation, plus 6.3-34.9 years of current world output of cobalt, graphite, lithium and nickel. IEA (2024): announced projects meet only 70% of copper and 50% of lithium needs in 2035 under national climate goals. The regulators' own appraisals (UK DfT ZEV mandate 1.31; CARB ACF 1.5; EU heavy-duty impact assessment net savings) are listed as counter-evidence. Tax-finance check: each $1 of public outlay or public administration costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven & Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999); administration is $0.3bn of $1,043.2bn (0.03% of cost_bn); the penalty changes neither end at two decimals and is not applied (negligible).","grade":"B","grade_reason":"The low end rests on peer-reviewed environmental-damage models (Holland et al. 2016 AER, with the 2020 AEJ: Policy update; Ji et al. 2012 EST) and the main cross-check on a peer-reviewed CGE model of an actual mandate (McKitrick 2024 CJE); the high end is a government self-appraisal (B- alone), and the cost inputs are industry and think-tank figures (Brattle, Mills). No ex-post or quasi-experimental BCR of an ICE sales ban exists.","cost_bn":"1043.2","cost_basis":"Full cost, US$bn per year once the ban binds (high end): public outlay 0 + administration 0.3 (DfT administrative share 0.0275% of total cost) + private compliance 1,043.2 [cars, global: 56m ICE buyers outside China x $10,000 battery premium (Mills 2023) = 560; 68m extra EVs x $6,250 grid, storage and charging per EV (Brattle) = 425; trucks, US only: $990bn of charging and grid investment (Roland Berger 2024) over the 17 years to 2040 = 58.2] + GDP loss not estimated globally (national auto-sector losses: McKitrick, Canada, up to C$1.2T over 2025-2050; CLEPA/PwC, EU, net 275,000 jobs) = ~1,043. Low end of the car components: 280 + 255 = ~535 (593 with trucks). Fuel and maintenance savings are counted inside the ratio, not netted here.","difficulty":"moderate","difficulty_reason":"Each market can ban sales of new combustion-engine vehicles through ordinary legislation or regulation, with no treaty required, and the EU has adopted a 2035 rule. Meeting a 2030 date across major markets still needs zero-emission sales to rise from about 20% in 2024 to 100% within about five years, and precedents have slipped: the UK moved its 2030 ban to 2035 in 2023, and the US EPA moved in 2026 to rescind its 2024 vehicle standards.","who_benefits":"regressive","who_benefits_reason":"Up-front premiums fall on car buyers, and lower-income and rural households face the largest relative burden and the least access to home charging; Borenstein & Davis (2016) find ~90% of US EV tax credits went to the top income quintile. Offsetting: lower running costs (EPA: ~$6,000 lifetime fuel savings per vehicle) and cleaner urban air where grids are low-carbon are broadly shared; on coal-heavy grids local pollution shifts toward communities near power plants (Holland et al. 2016: 91% of EV local damages are exported across state lines).","summary":"Requiring every new car and truck sold to be zero-emission (cars by 2030 worldwide; trucks on California's and the EU's schedules) would cut oil use, but on coal-heavy grids, like most of Asia's, an electric car can do more pollution damage than the gasoline car it replaces (about minus 7 cents per dollar), and an analysis of the UK's 2030 car ban puts costs at five times benefits (19 cents per dollar). Battery trucks cost more than twice as much as diesel, carry about 13,800 lb less, and electrifying US trucking alone needs nearly $1 trillion of chargers and grid; a general-equilibrium model of Canada's mandate finds GDP up to 7% lower by 2035. Battery premiums, grid upgrades and chargers for cars cost about $535-985bn a year, plus about $58bn a year for US truck charging and grid.","rated":"TRUE","gain_bn":"","mort_a":"-1","mort_b":"1","income_loss_bn":"1043.5","emde_loss_lo":"","emde_loss_hi":"","base_bn":"1043.2","lives_lo":"","lives_hi":"","lives_basis":"","selection_method":"Climate survey","selected_by":"Only policy asked in all three surveys (PCV, Dechezleprêtre, EIB)"},{"id":"6","title":"Global Carbon Tax","short":"Global Carbon Tax","category":"Climate","bcr_low":"0.16","bcr_high":"0.55","bcr_basis":"$135/t in 2030 is the bottom of the IPCC SR1.5 price range for 1.5 C pathways ($135-5,500/t; Niskanen summary), so the range uses full-cost benefit-cost studies of Paris/1.5 C-strength policy. Their costs are general-equilibrium GDP losses, which already contain firms' compliance spending, so nothing is counted twice. Induced deaths are subtracted from benefits, as in the Green New Deal entry; costs are the GDP loss plus administration ($22bn). World GDP ~$105T. Energy-poverty mortality: IMF (2019) finds $75/t raises electricity prices ~45%, so $135 implies ~81% (linear); Chirakijja et al. (2024) find a 42% heating-price change shifts ~11,000 US winter deaths a year; 11,000 x 81/42 = ~21,200 deaths x HHS VSL $13.1m = ~$278bn/yr (US only). Poor-country infant deaths: Baird, Friedman & Schady (REStat 2011) find +0.24 to 0.40 infant deaths per 1,000 births per 1% fall in GDP per person, on ~119.9m births a year in low- and middle-income countries (World Bank), each valued at $198,000. HIGH 0.55: Tol (2023), central 1.5 C comparison against the SSP5-8.5 baseline, benefits 3.1% vs costs 5.6% of GDP: (3,255 - infant deaths 30.0) / 5,902 = 0.55. LOW 0.16: Tol's 1.5 C benefits of 2.2% of GDP ($2,310bn) when the no-policy baseline is SSP3-7.0 (3.9 C by 2100), with Tol's own statement that real-world policy imperfections such as unequal national carbon prices 'would readily double' costs, so costs become 11.2% of world GDP ($11,760bn) plus administration: (2,310 - energy-poverty deaths 278 - infant deaths 100.1 [world GDP -10.5% x 0.40 x 119.9m births = 505,498 deaths at $198,000]) / 11,782 = 0.16. A Paris-style global price is set and enforced country by country, so unequal prices are the realistic case. Sensitivities: Tol's least-cost 1.5 C costs (5.6%) against the SSP3-7.0 baseline, (2,310 - 278 - 50.0) / 5,902 = 0.34; Tol's most favourable pairing of his reported ranges (benefits 3.2% vs costs 3.8% of GDP), (3,360 - 21.7) / 4,012 = 0.83; Tol 2 C 2.8/3.8 = 0.74. Optimal-price comparison: DICE-2023 (Barrage & Nordhaus 2024) gives a social cost of carbon on the cost-benefit optimal path of $59/t in 2025 rising to $125 in 2050 (Table 2; about $69 in 2030 by geometric interpolation: 59 x (125/59)^(5/25)), while its optimal carbon price must rise to $115/t by 2050, so $135 in 2030 is roughly twice the optimal-path SCC and above the optimal price the model reaches only in 2050; the same model finds the 1.5 C limit 'infeasible' (SCC on that path $4,185/t in 2025). Revenue use is unspecified; Parry, Williams & Goulder (1999) show that spending rather than recycling revenue raises costs, which points toward the low end. Counter-evidence (counter_sources): DICE-2023 finds a 2 C-limited path raises global wealth by ~$107T versus current policy, and Rennert et al.'s $185/t SCC would pass a $135 tax. Lost-income mortality: income lost to a policy costs lives. Broughel & Viscusi (Mercatus 2017) put it at about one statistical death per $99.3m of cost imposed; valued at the HHS VSL of $13.1m, each $1 of net income lost carries 13.1/99.3 = $0.132 of mortality cost (and each $1 gained saves the same). This adjustment is applied uniformly to every policy after the published range is drawn. Tax-finance check: each $1 of public outlay or public administration costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven & Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999); the only public cost is tax collection, $22bn of $5,902bn (0.37% of cost_bn); the penalty changes neither end at two decimals and is not applied (negligible). Additional study (below the range, not used to set it): Tol's (2012) Copenhagen Consensus III paper models global carbon taxes in FUND; a tax of $250/tC ($68/tCO2) in 2010 rising at the 5% discount rate, which holds CO2 below 450 ppm (about the EU's long-term target), costs $47.6 trillion in present value with a benefit-cost ratio of 0.02 (Table 2), or 0.01-0.12 after Tol's own corrections for equity weighting, uncertainty and model bias (Table 3). Its price path ($68 x 1.05^20 = ~$181/tCO2 by 2030) is stricter than $135 in 2030 and its damages come from an older model version, so it brackets the low end from below rather than redefining it.","grade":"A-","grade_reason":"Peer-reviewed benefit-cost results for Paris/1.5 C-strength carbon pricing (Tol 2023, Climate Change Economics; Nordhaus DICE, AER 2019 and PNAS 2024) with the cost side taken from the high end of peer-reviewed and IPCC-assessed GDP-loss estimates, plus a peer-reviewed quasi-experimental mortality adjustment (Chirakijja et al. 2024). Not A: no controlled or quasi-experimental study of a global tax at this level, none scores $135/t exactly, and DICE-2023 reports that a 2 C path passes a cost-benefit test.","cost_bn":"5902","cost_basis":"Full cost = public outlay $0 (revenue is a transfer) + administration ~$22bn/yr (IRS cost of collection 0.53% applied to $4,185bn of revenue from 31 GtCO2e x $135 in IPCC AR6 1.5 C pathways) + GDP loss $5,880bn/yr (Tol 2023: 1.5 C target costs ~5.6% of GDP, the highest published central estimate; applied to ~$105T world GDP). Private abatement spending is inside the GDP-loss measure and is not added again. Lower published GDP-loss estimates: IPCC AR6 2.6-4.2% of 2050 GDP for 1.5 C pathways ($2.7-4.4T), Nordhaus (2019) ~1% of output for a 50% cut ($1.05T). See cost_components.","difficulty":"hard","difficulty_reason":"Hard: needs a binding agreement among many countries. Carbon pricing covers only ~24% of global emissions and prices 'continue to fall short' of Paris levels (World Bank 2024); the IMF's own proposal is a differentiated floor among large emitters only (Parry, Black & Roaf 2021), and the IMF put the global average price at $2/t in 2019.","who_benefits":"regressive","who_benefits_reason":"IMF (2019): a $75/t tax alone raises electricity prices ~45% and gasoline ~15% over a decade, hitting poorer households and fossil-dependent developing countries hardest; higher heating costs raise winter deaths (Chirakijja et al. 2024). Only lump-sum rebates reverse this (Tax Foundation: bottom quintile +6.8% after-tax income), and the policy as defined does not require them.","summary":"A $135-per-tonne global carbon tax by 2030 is a 1.5 C-strength price, about twice the social cost of carbon on the cost-benefit optimal path in the latest Nordhaus model and above the $115 optimal price that model reaches only by 2050, which also finds the 1.5 C path infeasible. Published cost-benefit studies put its cost at 5.6% of world output, roughly $5.9 trillion a year, and its author says uneven national implementation 'would readily double' that, against climate benefits of 2.2-3.1% of world output. Higher energy prices add winter deaths, and a world economy 5-11% smaller means an estimated 152,000-505,000 more infant deaths a year in poor countries. Each dollar returns about 0.16 to 0.55 dollars of benefit.","rated":"TRUE","gain_bn":"","mort_a":"-1","mort_b":"1","income_loss_bn":"5902","emde_loss_lo":"3.8","emde_loss_hi":"5.27","base_bn":"5902","lives_lo":"","lives_hi":"","lives_basis":"","selection_method":"Official proposal","selected_by":"Paris-aligned carbon price; IMF international carbon price floor"},{"id":"7","title":"Global Plastic Ban","short":"Global Plastic Ban","category":"Climate","bcr_low":"-0.42","bcr_high":"0.3","bcr_basis":"Net-damage construction: BCR = (regulator-monetised benefit per $ of cost) - (extra environmental damage from heavier substitutes per $ of cost), with cost = $869bn/yr (cost_components). HIGH 0.30: Canada's RIAS (2022) monetised benefits C$616m vs costs C$1,990m = 0.31; its costs already include administration, enforcement, substitution and manufacturers' costs, so no full-cost adjustment is needed. It does not monetise substitutes' emissions, so the smallest published substitution penalty is subtracted: Meng, Brandao & Cullen (2024) find plastics emit 10-90% less than alternatives in 15 of 16 applications, so alternatives emit at least 1/0.9 = 1.11x; plastics are ~4.5% of 57.1 GtCO2e = 2.57 Gt; 11% of that = 0.28 Gt x $36/t (Nordhaus) = $10bn; 10/869 = 0.012; 0.31 - 0.012 = 0.30. LOW -0.42: Defra's straw-ban IA lowest case 2.4/77.7 = 0.03 (already counts paper-straw CO2) minus the monetised environmental cost of replacing plastics: Trucost (2016, commissioned by the American Chemistry Council) values the natural-capital cost of plastics in consumer goods and packaging at $139bn/yr and of functionally equivalent alternatives at $533bn/yr; (533 - 139)/869 = 0.45; 0.03 - 0.45 = -0.42. Supporting life-cycle evidence: Franklin Associates (2018, for ACC) find substitutes for US plastic packaging weigh ~4.5x as much and plastic's global-warming potential is 26.2% of the substitutes' (substitutes ~3.8x); UK Environment Agency (2011): paper, LDPE, non-woven PP and cotton bags must be reused 3, 4, 11 and 131 times to match a single-use HDPE bag's global-warming potential; Danish EPA (2018): cotton 7,100-20,000 uses across all indicators; Taylor (2019, JEEM): ~30% of California's bag-ban plastic reduction offset by extra trash-bag purchases. Sensitivity with only the peer-reviewed Meng penalty at $185/t: 0.28 x 185 = $53bn; 0.03 - 53/869 = -0.03. Counter-evidence: UNEP (2023) and Lau et al. (2020) find net savings for reuse- and recycling-led packages, not bans. Tax-finance check: each $1 of public outlay or public administration costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven & Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999); government compliance and enforcement is C$0.9m of Canada's C$234m (0.4%; $0.12bn of $869bn globally, 0.01% of cost_bn); the penalty changes neither end at two decimals and is not applied (negligible).","grade":"B-","grade_reason":"Built from regulators' own impact analyses (Canada RIAS, UK Defra IA) adjusted with a peer-reviewed life-cycle study (Meng et al. 2024) and peer-reviewed substitution evidence (Taylor 2019); the low end uses an industry-commissioned natural-capital valuation (Trucost 2016), which on its own would rate C+. No study monetises a global ban.","cost_bn":"869","cost_basis":"Full cost = public outlay $0 + administration ~$0.12bn + private compliance ~$28.9bn (Canada RIAS per-capita cost of its single-use ban, ~C$5/person/yr, scaled to 8.0bn people) + GDP loss ~$840bn (OECD 2022: 0.8% of world GDP for its most ambitious plastics package, applied to ~$105T). See cost_components for arithmetic and the double-counting check.","difficulty":"hard","difficulty_reason":"Hard: needs a binding international agreement among many countries. UN plastics-treaty talks (INC-5.2, Geneva, August 2025) adjourned without consensus, with production limits among the contested issues (UNEP), and the resumed one-day INC-5.3 session on 7 February 2026 was organisational only (electing a new Chair after the previous Chair resigned), with no substantive negotiation.","who_benefits":"regressive","who_benefits_reason":"Bag bans and fees weigh most on low-income shoppers (Reason, Morris & Seasholes 2014), Defra expects 60% of the higher substitute costs to pass through to consumers, and the OECD (2022) finds costs of ambitious action concentrated in non-OECD countries.","summary":"Governments that have banned single-use plastics measured costs well above the benefits they could put a number on: Canada's ban returns about 31 cents per dollar and England's straw ban as little as 3 cents. Life-cycle studies find that the substitutes (paper, glass, metal, cotton) usually weigh more and emit more greenhouse gas, so a general ban can add environmental damage; one valuation puts the extra damage at about $394bn a year. Counting compliance and a GDP cost of about 0.8% of world output (~$870bn a year), the return ranges from about minus 42 cents to plus 30 cents per dollar.","rated":"TRUE","gain_bn":"","mort_a":"-1","mort_b":"1","income_loss_bn":"869.0","emde_loss_lo":"0.752","emde_loss_hi":"0.752","base_bn":"869","lives_lo":"","lives_hi":"","lives_basis":"","selection_method":"Official proposal","selected_by":"UN plastics treaty negotiations (UNEA resolution 5/14)"},{"id":"8","title":"Green New Deal","short":"Green New Deal","category":"Climate","bcr_low":"-1.38","bcr_high":"-1.19","bcr_basis":"Scored as if every Western nation (US, Canada, EU-27, UK, Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, Australia, New Zealand) adopts the US Green New Deal package. Their combined 2024 GDP is $58,287bn, 1.99x the US (World Bank WDI), and their fossil CO2 is 8,669 Mt, 1.77x the US (Global Carbon Project). US figures per year (AAF outlays, Heritage GDP loss, CEI compliance, Chirakijja et al. winter deaths) are scaled by 1.99. Cross-checks on the scaling: Canada's PBO finds 2030 real GDP 1.4% lower. Form: the same net-damage form as the UBI, student-loan and Social Security entries. Health-care outlays are transfers worth $1 to recipients per $1; job-guarantee pay is worth about half the gross wage to participants, because they give up other income and time (Jalan & Ravallion 2003, Argentina's Trabajar public-works programme). The deadweight of the taxes that fund all outlays, the GDP loss, induced deaths and poor-country infant deaths are subtracted from benefits. Financing at this scale: at the peak of the Laffer curve the US can raise at most about 7.4% of GDP in extra tax revenue and the EU-14 about 3.1% (Trabandt & Uhlig 2012, Table 7). New tax-financed outlays larger than that cannot be raised at the 34-cent marginal burden measured for small changes (Ballard, Shoven & Whalley 1985). Policies whose new tax-financed outlays exceed 7.4% of GDP therefore use Feldstein's (1999) estimate, which 'may exceed $2 per $1 of revenue', at both ends of the range. The Green New Deal's outlays are about 32% of Western GDP, over four times the US Laffer maximum and ten times the EU-14's. Climate benefit: Western-only cuts leak to other countries through trade and lower world fuel prices. Leakage estimates run from a 12% mean (EMF 29, Böhringer, Balistreri & Rutherford 2012) to 130% (Babiker 2005), where global emissions rise. The low end uses Babiker's 130% at Nordhaus's $36/t; the high end uses the 12% mean at the DICE-2023 social cost of carbon of $66/t (Barrage & Nordhaus 2024), the most recent estimate from the model's authors. LOW = (health transfers 7,164 + job-guarantee value 4,438 [0.5 x 4,460 x 1.99] + climate -93.6 [8.669 Gt x $36 x (1 - 1.30)] - winter deaths 204.8 - GDP loss 1,421 [Heritage 714 x 1.99] - deadweight 36,974 [2.0 x outlays 9,290 x 1.99] - infant deaths 32.4) / (outlays + admin + compliance 20,220) = -1.34. HIGH = (health transfers 7,164 + job-guarantee value 677 + climate 503.5 [8.669 Gt x $66 x 0.88] - winter deaths 204.8 - deadweight 20,338 [2.0 x 5,110 x 1.99]) / (10,227) = -1.19. Infant deaths: the GDP loss is 2.44% of Western GDP; a 1 pp US growth shock moves developing-country growth by 0.6 pp (Kose et al. 2017) and a G7 shock by about 1.4 pp (Huidrom, Kose & Ohnsorge 2017, Figure 3), so developing-country GDP falls 1.5-3.4%; at 0.24-0.40 extra infant deaths per 1,000 births per 1% fall in GDP per person (Baird, Friedman & Schady, REStat 2011) on ~119.9m births a year in low- and middle-income countries (World Bank), that is 42,088-163,676 infant deaths a year, valued at $198,000 each. Output produced by job-guarantee workers is not valued; no published estimate exists for a national job guarantee. Lost-income mortality: income lost to a policy costs lives. Broughel & Viscusi (Mercatus 2017) put it at about one statistical death per $99.3m of cost imposed; valued at the HHS VSL of $13.1m, each $1 of net income lost carries 13.1/99.3 = $0.132 of mortality cost (and each $1 gained saves the same). This adjustment is applied uniformly to every policy after the published range is drawn. Tax finance (net-damage form): each $1 of public administration costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven & Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999); as for the other net-damage entries, the burden is subtracted from benefits; the outlays already carry Feldstein's $2 per $1 at both ends, but administration ($382bn a year at the low end, 1.25% of cost_bn) did not; adding it: LOW = (-27,123.8 - 2.0 x 382) / 20,220 = -27,887.8 / 20,220 = -1.38. The high end's non-outlay cost is at most 10,227 - 10,169 (5,110 x 1.99) = $58bn; even if all of it were administration, 2.0 x 58 = 116 would move the high end only from -1.19 to -1.20, so it is left at -1.19.","grade":"B","grade_reason":"The parameters that drive the ratio are peer-reviewed (SCC: Nordhaus 2019, Barrage & Nordhaus 2024; mortality elasticity: Chirakijja et al. 2024; marginal deadweight of taxation: Ballard, Shoven & Whalley 1985, Feldstein 1999), combined in a published-model framework (Tol 2023). The cost quantities themselves (AAF, Heritage, CEI) are think-tank estimates (C+ level), and no study computes a BCR for the GND, so B is the ceiling.","cost_bn":"30515.0","cost_basis":"Full cost for all Western nations, US$bn a year (US high-end components x 1.99): public outlays 18,487 + administration 382 + private compliance 1,351 + GDP and welfare loss 10,295 (Heritage GDP loss plus tax deadweight at 48 cents per $1) = 30,515, about half of Western GDP. Most of the outlay is health-care and job-guarantee transfers.","difficulty":"hard","difficulty_reason":"Hard: no precedent anywhere; it would replace the US fossil-fuel energy system and add federal outlays of $5-9 trillion a year (AAF), and the resolution failed 0-57 in the Senate on 26 March 2019 (NBC News).","who_benefits":"regressive","who_benefits_reason":"The energy core raises household electricity spending ~30% (Heritage 2019) and costs a typical household >$70,000 in year one in most states studied (CEI 2019); cheaper heating measurably saves lives among the poor and elderly (Chirakijja et al. 2024), so higher energy prices fall hardest on them. The job guarantee, health care, worker-transition payments and foreign clean-energy finance are transfers toward lower-income groups, and Galvani et al. (2020) find single-payer financing would give the most relief to lower-income households; no study models the net distribution once the energy costs and the taxes that fund the package are included.","summary":"The Green New Deal bundles a crash net-zero energy programme with a job guarantee, universal health care, worker-transition support and clean-energy money for poor countries; here every Western nation adopts it. Its outlays alone come to about a third of Western GDP, more than four times the most extra tax revenue the US could raise at the peak of its Laffer curve, so it cannot be financed without very large losses from taxation. Because only Western nations cut, part or all of the reduction leaks abroad: published estimates run from 12% to 130%, the last meaning world emissions rise. Job-guarantee pay is worth about half its cost to the workers, and the GDP loss slows developing economies, which means an estimated 42,000-164,000 more infant deaths a year. Each dollar spent destroys about $1.19-1.38 of value.","rated":"TRUE","gain_bn":"","mort_a":"-1","mort_b":"1","income_loss_bn":"14475.6","emde_loss_lo":"1.463","emde_loss_hi":"3.413","base_bn":"14380","lives_lo":"","lives_hi":"","lives_basis":"","selection_method":"Official proposal","selected_by":"H.Res.109, US Congress 2019"},{"id":"9","title":"15-Minute Cities","short":"15-Minute Cities","category":"Climate","bcr_low":"-12.03","bcr_high":"-0.92","bcr_basis":"Annual flows at C40 scale (523m people in 2017, ~25% of world GDP = $26,250bn; 240 private vehicles per 1,000 = 125.5m), C40/Arup/Leeds (2019) ambitious targets as mandates. Form: the caps are rationing, so they are scored in the same net-damage form as price controls: lost consumer value, lost output and induced deaths are subtracted from benefits, and the cost base is the money spent to carry the rule out (administration plus mandatory retrofits). Benefits. Climate: the report's ambitious interventions save ~32 GtCO2e over 2017-50 (0.97 Gt/yr); the low end counts only the mandated categories (food 10.5, clothing 4.3, private transport 3.8, aviation 1.9 = 20.5 Gt, Fig. 15) less the report's one-third rebound = 0.41 Gt/yr x $36/t (Nordhaus 2019) = $15bn; the high end values 0.97 Gt at the DICE-2023 $66/t (Barrage & Nordhaus 2024) = $64bn, plus operational CO2 of banned cars 125.5m x 4.6 t (EPA) x $66 = $38bn (excluded at the low end because the C40 baseline already electrifies cars). Car externalities (Parry et al. 2007): 125.5m x 11,026 mi (FHWA) x 5-10 c/mi = $69-138bn. Retrofits: Fowlie et al. (2018) BCR 0.37-0.94 x $571bn = $211-536bn. Total benefits $295bn (low) and $776bn (high). Diet changes are not credited with any health benefit. Costs (cost_basis) run from $1,896bn (low) to $8,042bn (high), including the loss of city productivity from slower travel once private cars are removed. LOW = (benefits 295 - meat 3,420 - car access 1,405 - slower travel 1,932 - aviation 130 - trade 560 - infant deaths 5.1) / (admin 23.8 + retrofits 571) = -12.03. HIGH = (benefits 776 - meat 273 - car access 276 - slower travel 708 - aviation 21 - trade 36 - infant deaths 0.20) / (admin 11.6 + retrofits 571) = -0.92. Unpriced items would lower both ends: dairy and restaurant-meat welfare, the clothing consumer-surplus loss, leisure-flight consumer surplus, replacement transit capital, and trips other than the journey to work. Flows are steady-state annual values, so the ratio of flows approximates the ratio of present values. Infant deaths: lost trade lowers world income by 0.034-0.53% (560/105,000 at the high end); at 0.24-0.40 extra infant deaths per 1,000 births per 1% fall in GDP per person (Baird, Friedman & Schady, REStat 2011) on ~119.9m births a year in low- and middle-income countries (World Bank), that is 987-25,563 infant deaths a year, valued at $198,000 each. Scope: C40's report states the consumption interventions come on top of the cities' Deadline 2020 sector commitments (zero-carbon buildings, renewable energy, zero-emission transport): 'A more explicit focus on urban emissions from a consumption perspective does not supplant previous C40 efforts to reduce production-based emissions; the two agendas are complementary' (pp. 60-61). Those sector plans are scored separately under the Green New Deal entry, so they are not added here. The main published estimate for cities' sector plans (Coalition for Urban Transitions 2019) projects savings above investment, but measured programmes realise only about half of projected energy savings (Christensen et al. 2023, 51%; Fowlie et al. 2018, 38%), which turns its projected saving into a net cost of about $0.4-0.8tn a year (see counter_sources). Measured local effects of car restrictions: Madrid Central cut affected consumers' in-person spending in the zone by 21% (Galdon-Sanchez et al. 2023, JEEA). Lost-income mortality: income lost to a policy costs lives. Broughel & Viscusi (Mercatus 2017) put it at about one statistical death per $99.3m of cost imposed; valued at the HHS VSL of $13.1m, each $1 of net income lost carries 13.1/99.3 = $0.132 of mortality cost (and each $1 gained saves the same). This adjustment is applied uniformly to every policy after the published range is drawn. Tax-finance check: each $1 of public outlay or public administration costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven & Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999); administration of the allowance system is $23.8bn of $8,042bn (0.30% of cost_bn); the penalty changes neither end at two decimals and is not applied (negligible).","grade":"C-","grade_reason":"No study prices this bundle and per-person caps on meat, dairy, clothing, flights and car ownership have never been applied at scale outside wartime rationing, so the ratio is built by scaling component estimates to the C40 network. The dominant cost terms come from peer-reviewed work but are extrapolations: Lusk & Norwood (2009) describe their 100% meat-removal figure as far outside the data, and Moody et al. (2021) is a stated-preference survey in four US metros. The travel-speed loss applies a cross-city productivity elasticity (Prud'homme & Lee 1999) to a change far larger than those observed. Aviation and auto footprints come from industry-commissioned studies (ATAG/Oxford Economics, CAR), the trade term applies cross-country elasticities (Frankel & Romer 1999; Feyrer 2019) to a demand shock, and the emission savings are the proposer's own model. Individual components have stronger evidence (Fowlie et al. 2018 retrofit BCA from a randomized encouragement design; Wolff 2014 LEZ natural experiments), which would grade A-/B+ on their own.","cost_bn":"8042.0","cost_basis":"Full cost, US$ bn a year at C40 scale; HIGH-end sum shown. Admin $23.8bn (Defra 2008 personal carbon allowance, scaled per person). Private compliance $5,396bn: meat elimination $3,420bn (Lusk & Norwood 2009, 13.0% of GDP applied to C40's ~$26.25T GDP), car-ownership ban $1,405bn (Moody et al. 2021, $11,197 per vehicle x 125.5m vehicles), mandatory retrofits $571bn (EU Renovation Wave, 2.17% of GDP). GDP loss $2,622bn: slower travel without private cars $1,932bn (Prud'homme & Lee 1999 productivity-speed elasticity; Census commute times; Prieto-Curiel & Ospina 2024 car share), aviation $130bn (ATAG/Oxford Economics $4.1T footprint x C40 share 10.2% x 31% cut) and lost trade $560bn (Frankel & Romer 1999 upper elasticity on lost clothing and meat exports). Public outlay: none estimated (replacement transit not priced). Low-end readings give $1,896bn.","difficulty":"hard","difficulty_reason":"Hard: low-emission zones and building renovation rules have precedents (German LEZs, EU building directives), but binding personal caps on meat and dairy (0 kg), clothing (3 items a year), flights (one short-haul return trip every 3 years) and private car ownership (zero) have no modern peacetime precedent and would need a ration-tracking system; Defra's 2008 pre-feasibility study put even a simpler personal carbon allowance at GBP 1-2bn a year to run for the UK alone, and the scheme was not pursued. C40 itself 'does not advocate' the ambitious targets (C40/Arup/Leeds 2019), and the median US resident makes only 14% of consumption trips locally (Abbiasov et al. 2024).","who_benefits":"regressive","who_benefits_reason":"Abbiasov et al. (2024) find that higher local-trip usage goes with higher experienced segregation for low-income residents; travel confined to the neighbourhood cuts access to city-wide job markets (Prud'homme & Lee 1999); LEZs and car bans force owners of older vehicles to replace them first (Wolff 2014). Outside the cities, lost clothing and meat demand falls on exporters .","summary":"The 15-minute city is a planning idea (daily needs within a short walk); this version adds the C40 'ambitious' consumption targets as mandates (no meat or dairy, 3 new clothing items a year, no private cars, one short-haul return flight every three years) plus low-emission zones and mandatory retrofits, targets C40 itself does not advocate. Priced at C40-city scale, the full cost runs from about $1.9 trillion to $8.0 trillion a year: lost consumer value from removing meat (Lusk & Norwood 2009) and private cars (Moody et al. 2021), retrofit spending, output lost from smaller aviation, tourism and trade, and up to $1.9 trillion of lost productivity as commutes that took 24 minutes by car take 48 by transit. Benefits from avoided emissions, cleaner and safer streets and fewer energy-wasting buildings come to about $0.3 trillion to $0.8 trillion a year. Priced as rationing, in the same way as price controls, every dollar spent carrying it out destroys between $0.92 and $12 of value, before about 81,000 deaths a year from lost income and up to 26,000 infant deaths a year in poor countries from lost trade. These caps come on top of the cities' own energy and building plans.","rated":"TRUE","gain_bn":"","mort_a":"-1","mort_b":"1","income_loss_bn":"8041.7","emde_loss_lo":"0.034","emde_loss_hi":"0.533","base_bn":"589","lives_lo":"","lives_hi":"","lives_basis":"","selection_method":"Official proposal","selected_by":"C40 Cities 'Future of Urban Consumption' (city governments)"},{"id":"10","title":"Innovation Prizes","short":"Innovation Prizes","category":"Climate","bcr_low":"11.8","bcr_high":"348","bcr_basis":"No study measures the return on privately funded prizes, so each sub-area takes the best published R&D return. Energy technology: Galiana & Green (Copenhagen Consensus 2012) find more low-carbon R&D yields benefits '3 to 11 times' its cost; their 2009 Copenhagen Consensus paper put ~$100bn/yr of R&D at ~11 (Lomborg 2009). Agricultural yields: low 7.5, the lowest ex-ante BCR across the three adoption/technology scenarios for an advance market commitment aimed at either of the two most cost-effective targets, West African maize (8.7/22.6/7.5) and East African sorghum (10.4/25.7/7.7) (Glennerster et al. 2024, Table 3, PDF p.11; weaker targets run as low as 0.3, Table A9, PDF p.26); high 33, Rosegrant et al. (2023, JBCA) for +$5.2bn/yr of Global South ag R&D (bracketed by Alston et al. 2011, 21-32). Geoengineering research: low 25 (Bickel & Lane 2009, stratospheric aerosols, deployment: 'on the order of 25 to 1', as reported by Pielke 2009, p.6), high ~1,000 per research dollar (Bickel & Lane 2012) for a programme 'on the order of a billion dollars' in total. Weighting: the three sub-areas are weighted equally, because a prize pool is an expected-return allocation: the money is paid only for results, so it flows to whichever innovations succeed, and a funder can direct it toward the highest-return areas rather than in proportion to existing R&D budgets. LOW = (3 energy + 7.5 agriculture + 25 geoengineering)/3 = 11.8. HIGH = (11 + 33 + 1,000)/3 = 348. The high end is driven by Bickel & Lane's ~1,000:1 return on geoengineering research, a Copenhagen Consensus estimate that other researchers dispute (Pielke 2009, 'precision without accuracy'; Goes et al. 2011); the evidence grade (B) shrinks the range toward 1:1 in the ranking. Sensitivity: weighting by the size of each source's R&D programme ($100bn energy, $5.2bn agriculture, ~$0.1bn geoengineering) gives LOW = (100 x 3 + 5.2 x 7.5 + 0.1 x 25)/105.3 = 3.2 and HIGH = (100 x 11 + 5.2 x 33 + 0.1 x 1,000)/105.3 = 13.0; the raw span is 3-1,000. Prize mechanism: historical prizes raised high-quality patenting (Brunt, Lerner & Nicholas 2012); the $1.5bn pneumococcal AMC saved ~700,000 lives at ~$83/DALY (Kremer, Levin & Snyder 2020). Williams (2012) warns prizes are hard to evaluate and best seen as a complement to grants. Administration: the source ratios are per research dollar; competing teams typically spend far more than the purse (Ansari X Prize: $10M purse, >$100M of team spending, McKinsey 2009), so administration equal to the purse adds roughly 10/110 = ~9% to the social resource cost, which would give 11.8/1.1 = 10.7 to 348/1.1 = 316. If instead the purse were treated as the only research input, administration equal to the purse would halve the ratios (5.9-174). The range is stated per research dollar.","grade":"B","grade_reason":"The weighted range rests mainly on Galiana & Green's Copenhagen Consensus models (published in the Cambridge University Press volume 'Global Problems, Smart Solutions'), with a peer-reviewed JBCA estimate for ag R&D (Rosegrant et al. 2023) and peer-reviewed evidence that prizes and AMCs induce innovation (Brunt et al. 2012; Kremer et al. 2020). Not A-: no study measures the return on prize money itself, and the geoengineering figures are contested think-tank estimates.","cost_bn":"0.14","cost_basis":"Full cost = public outlay $0 + private prize administration ~$0.14bn/yr (XPRIZE rule of thumb: operating costs equal the purse, applied to ~$0.14bn/yr of current private climate prize and AMC funding). Voluntary private prize money, so no government spending or mandate: $0 public cost. For scale, existing private pull funding: XPRIZE Carbon Removal $100M awarded April 2025 (Musk Foundation); Frontier advance market commitment $925M over eight years from Stripe, Alphabet, Shopify, Meta and McKinsey (April 2022, ~$0.12bn/yr); a heat-resilient-crop AMC costs $50-376M per crop target (Glennerster et al. 2024). Large-prize philanthropy totalled only ~$375M over the decade to 2009 (McKinsey 2009).","difficulty":"easy","difficulty_reason":"Easy: a single philanthropic or corporate funder can do it under existing law, and it has been done many times (Ansari X Prize, XPRIZE Carbon Removal 2025, Frontier AMC 2022, pneumococcal AMC).","who_benefits":"broad","who_benefits_reason":"Agricultural-yield prizes are pro-poor (Rosegrant et al. 2023 project 35% less hunger and 16% lower food prices in the Global South after 35 years, 2022-2056), while cheaper clean energy and climate-risk research benefit everyone; no source measures the distribution across the combined programme.","summary":"Privately funded prizes and advance market commitments pay out only when someone delivers a defined result: higher crop yields, cheaper clean energy, or answers about geoengineering. No study measures the return on prize money itself, but the research they would fund has some of the best returns in the literature: about $3-11 per dollar for clean-energy R&D (Copenhagen Consensus), $9-33 for agricultural R&D, and very high but contested figures for geoengineering research. Weighting the three areas equally, on the view that prize money flows to the highest-return results, gives about $11.80 to $348 of benefit per dollar, with no cost to taxpayers; weighting by the size of each research programme gives about $3 to $13.","rated":"TRUE","gain_bn":"","mort_a":"-1","mort_b":"1","income_loss_bn":"0.1","emde_loss_lo":"","emde_loss_hi":"","base_bn":"0.14","lives_lo":"","lives_hi":"","lives_basis":"","selection_method":"Official proposal","selected_by":"Mission Innovation (governments' clean-energy R&D pledge, Paris 2015); Copenhagen Consensus R&D findings"},{"id":"11","title":"Rent Control","short":"Rent Control","category":"Popular","bcr_low":"0.04","bcr_high":"0.62","bcr_basis":"No study publishes a single benefit-cost ratio for rent control, so the ratio is built from two peer-reviewed or NBER natural experiments as: value reaching protected tenants, net of the harm the rule does to everyone else, of administration and of misallocation, per $1 taken from property owners and other renters. Supply effects, LOW base 0.34: Diamond, McQuade & Qian (2019, AER), San Francisco's 1994 expansion. The NBER conference draft puts benefits to the covered 1994 tenant cohort at $7.62bn over 1995-2012 (about $423m a year, 2010 dollars, of which roughly a third are landlord buyout payments, i.e. transfers). The 15% cut in rental supply by treated landlords raised citywide rents (7% in the draft; 5.1% in the NBER abstract) and caused about $5bn of welfare losses to all renters, which the authors say is 'almost as large' as the gains. (7.62 - 5.0) / 7.62 = 0.34: only about 34 cents of each $1 of tenant benefit survives as a net gain for renters as a class, before counting landlords' own losses (which would push it lower). Supply effects, HIGH base 0.67: Ahern & Giacoletti (2022, NBER w30083), St. Paul's 2021 rent-control law: property values fell 6-7%, an aggregate $1.57bn, of which their model attributes 67% to direct capitalisation (the transfer to tenants) and 33% (at least $518m) to deadweight externalities. 1 - 0.33 = 0.67 is an upper bound, since even the 'transfer' share reaches tenants only to the extent they stay. Cross-check: Autor, Palmer & Pathak (2014, JPE) find that ending rent control in Cambridge, MA added about $1.8bn to property values over 1994-2004, nearly a quarter of the city's total residential price appreciation, mostly on never-controlled properties, confirming that controls depress neighbouring values (an externality not counted in the high case). Administration: San Francisco's Rent Board costs $13.8m a year (FY2024-25) against the $423m a year of benefits to the 1994 cohort alone, so administration is at most 13.8 / 423 = 3.3% of the transfer (an upper bound, since the board also serves earlier-controlled units and the budget is in 2024 dollars while the transfer is in 2010 dollars). HIGH: 0.67 - 0.033 = 0.64. LOW, using the high-end published per-unit cost (Berkeley ~$324 vs SF ~$59.5 per unit, 5.4 times higher): 3.3% x 5.44 = 17.8% of the transfer, so 0.34 - 0.18 = 0.16. Landlords' own compliance time is not counted (no estimate), so the true ends are slightly lower. Misallocation: Glaeser & Luttmer (NBER w6220, 1997; AER 2003) put the cost of controlled apartments going to the wrong households in New York City (1993 Housing and Vacancy Survey) at a best estimate of $200 per regulated apartment a year, with a lower bound of more than $40 (observable characteristics only) and an upper range of $200-2,000. Scale of the transfer: Mildner (1987 data, as tabulated by Turner & Malpezzi 2003) puts the landlord's cost of the subsidy on a New York rent-controlled unit at $122 a month, $1,464 a year; at 1993 prices (CPI-U 144.475 / 113.617 = 1.272) that is $1,862. Misallocation as a share of the transfer: LOW, best estimate 200 / 1,862 = 10.7%; HIGH, lower bound 40 / 1,862 = 2.1%. LOW = 0.16 - 0.107 = 0.05. HIGH = 0.64 - 0.021 = 0.62. Both ends are below 1. Dividing by the rent-controlled subsidy (the largest category; Mildner finds stabilized units at or above market rent in 1987) keeps these shares conservative. No double counting: Diamond et al. measure the supply cut and its effect on market rents, and Ahern & Giacoletti measure property-value externalities; neither measures which households occupy the controlled units. The transfer from owners is counted at $1 for $1, with no extra weight for tenants. Not added (no conversion to dollars per $1 of transfer): Gyourko & Linneman (1990) find Manhattan units under the older controls had a 9 percent higher probability of being in unsound condition; Sims (2007) finds Massachusetts controls moved units out of the rental market (condominium conversion) and lowered quality; and Early (2000), as summarised by Turner & Malpezzi, finds that once higher uncontrolled rents are counted the average benefit to tenants in regulated New York units was negative, which would place the low end below zero (about -0.83); it is not used because the figures come from a review table and the tenant-benefit measure may already include part of Diamond et al.'s rent effect. Glaeser & Luttmer's upper misallocation range ($200-2,000) would also push the low end well below zero. Cross-check: Olsen (1972) finds New York tenants valued a $406 a year subsidy at $213, a transfer efficiency of 0.52, and Turner & Malpezzi's cross-country table shows 0.45-0.99, so a large share of each $1 is lost even before effects on other renters. Tax finance (net-damage form): each $1 of public administration costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven & Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999); as for the other net-damage entries, the burden is subtracted from benefits; rent boards are funded by registration fees charged to landlords (San Francisco: 'funded by the Rent Board fee'; Berkeley: about $6.88m + 5,700 x $212 = $8.09m of fees against an $8.33m budget, 97%), and fees are part of the transfer already counted, so at most 2.9% of administration is tax-financed. HIGH (San Francisco, fee-funded): no change, 0.62. LOW (Berkeley cost level): 0.34 - 0.178 - 0.107 - 2.0 x (0.029 x 0.178) = 0.055 - 0.010 = 0.04.","grade":"B+","grade_reason":"The numbers come from peer-reviewed and NBER natural experiments that measure the size of gains and losses (Diamond, McQuade & Qian 2019 AER; Autor, Palmer & Pathak 2014 JPE; Ahern & Giacoletti 2022 NBER), converted into a ratio by direct arithmetic. No published benefit-cost study exists, so A-level grades do not apply. Expert consensus (Clark Center 2012 and 2024) and a 2024 peer-reviewed literature review (Kholodilin, JHE) point the same way. The misallocation term uses a peer-reviewed estimate (Glaeser & Luttmer 2003 AER) converted with a published subsidy figure; the conversion mixes data years (1987 subsidy, 1993 misallocation) and cities, which keeps the grade at B+.","cost_bn":"15.2","cost_basis":"Full cost. Public outlay: $0 (no budget transfer; rent boards are usually fee-funded). Administration: rent boards' budgets per covered unit, scaled to the 46.8m US renter-occupied units (Census HVS, Q2 2026). Berkeley's FY2024-25 Rent Board budget ($8.33m, ~25,700 units, ~$324 per unit) gives $15.2bn a year, the high end used here; San Francisco's FY2024-25 budget ($13.83m, 232,263 units, ~$59.5 per unit) gives $2.8bn. Private compliance: no published estimate (landlords' registration fees are the board budgets already counted). GDP loss: supply and welfare losses are inside the ratio and are not published at national scale. The transfer from owners to tenants is not a cost and stays inside the ratio. cost_bn = 0 + 15.2 = $15.2bn a year.","difficulty":"moderate","difficulty_reason":"Ordinary legislation at city or state level, with many precedents (New York, San Francisco, St. Paul 2021; Clark Center's 2024 poll concerns a proposed national 5% cap on corporate landlords). A national cap would need an act of Congress, but no constitutional change.","who_benefits":"regressive","who_benefits_reason":"Ahern & Giacoletti (2022) find the St. Paul tenants who gained most had higher incomes and were more likely white, while the owners who lost most had lower incomes and were more likely minorities. Diamond, McQuade & Qian (2019) find the lost rental supply raised market rents for later (often younger, poorer) renters and fuelled gentrification. Benefits go to incumbent tenants regardless of need.","summary":"Rent control caps how fast rents can rise on covered apartments. It is very popular: over 85% of about 5,000 voters supported capping rents in Elmendorf, Nall & Oklobdzija's 2024 survey experiment (and 73.9% of US GSS/ISSP respondents say government should 'keep prices under control'). Economists disagree: 89% of the Clark Center panel in 2012 and 80% in 2024 rejected the claim that rent caps help. Natural experiments in San Francisco and St. Paul show covered tenants gain, but landlords pull 15% of units off the rental market, raising rents for everyone else and destroying a third or more of the value transferred; New York evidence adds that controlled apartments end up with the wrong households (about $200 a unit a year) and decay faster. Rent boards also cost about $60-324 per covered unit a year, roughly $3-15bn a year nationally. Counting these costs, each $1 taken from owners and renters yields roughly $0.04-0.62 of net benefit, a ratio below 1.","rated":"TRUE","gain_bn":"","mort_a":"-1","mort_b":"1","income_loss_bn":"15.2","emde_loss_lo":"","emde_loss_hi":"","base_bn":"15.2","lives_lo":"","lives_hi":"","lives_basis":"","selection_method":"Public-opinion survey","selected_by":"~85% support (survey experiment n≈5,000); ISSP price-control items"},{"id":"12","title":"Price Controls","short":"Price Controls","category":"Popular","bcr_low":"-1.29","bcr_high":"-0.44","bcr_basis":"A binding price ceiling transfers money from sellers to buyers who still get the good, and destroys value three ways: the Harberger triangle (trades that no longer happen), misallocation (goods go to people or places that value them less), and queuing (buyers burn time to get the cheap goods). Ratio = (transfer - queuing - Harberger - misallocation - administration and compliance) / transfer, i.e. net value to buyers per $1 taken from sellers, the same net-damage form used for other transfer policies. Calibration from Albrecht, Tabarrok & Whitmeyer (2026, arXiv working paper), using station-level data from the 1973-74 US gasoline controls: ceiling 20% below baseline price, 9% quantity shortfall, Harberger triangle 2.0% of baseline spending, misallocation 2.2-17.7% of spending (1.09-8.75 times the triangle). Transfer = 0.20 x 0.91 = 18.2% of spending. Queuing: Deacon & Sonstelie (1989, Economic Inquiry), using the US gasoline controls, estimate that rent seeking (time in queues plus the waste from buying more per purchase) 'exhausts an estimated 116 percent of the rent transferred'. Buyers' net gain is then 18.2 - 1.16 x 18.2 = 18.2 - 21.11 = -2.91 points of baseline spending. Frech & Lee (1987, QJE) and Deacon & Sonstelie (1985, JPE), as summarised by Albrecht et al., likewise find queuing costs could exceed the whole transfer. Administration and compliance: Blinder & Newton (1981) find the 1971-74 controls had cut the non-food, non-energy price level by 3-4%; applied to 1973 GDP ($1,425bn) the transfer was at most $43-57bn a year (an upper bound on the base, since controls did not cover all output, so the cost share is if anything understated). Admin $0.08bn + compliance $2.0bn a year = $2.08bn / $42.8bn = 4.9% of the transfer, or 0.89 points on the 18.2-point gasoline scale. LOW = -1.29, with the highest misallocation: (-2.91 - 2.0 - 17.7 - 0.89) / 18.2 = -23.50 / 18.2 = -1.29. Albrecht et al. state that their misallocation (stations or regions receiving nothing) is a distinct loss that 'exists even in a hypothetical world with zero queuing costs', so the two are added. HIGH = -0.44, with the lowest misallocation: (-2.91 - 2.0 - 2.2 - 0.89) / 18.2 = -0.44. Albrecht et al. note that their upper-bound shadow prices correspond to queuing equilibria, so some overlap between queuing and misallocation is possible; pairing the measured queuing loss with the lowest misallocation allows for it. No measured case shows zero queuing cost. Cross-checks: Henderson's 1979 arithmetic (controlled price 80c, DOE market-clearing price $1.00, effective price including waiting $1.20) gives buyers -20c per gallon against a 20c transfer, about -1.0. Davis & Kilian (2011, JPE) find allocative losses from US natural-gas ceilings averaged $4.6bn a year (1950-2000) and 'effectively triple' the net welfare loss: MacAvoy's $6.9bn transfer against $9.3bn deadweight plus $5.9bn allocative cost a year in 1968-77 gives (6.9 - 9.3 - 5.9) / 6.9 = -1.20. Tarr (1994, World Bank Economic Review) finds that Polish price controls on colour televisions, with rents dissipated, cost 0.46% of GDP, 112% of producers' sales, and about ten times the Harberger triangle (rectangle 116bn zlotys, triangle 14bn), i.e. (116 - 116 - 14) / 116 = -0.12 per $1 transferred before any misallocation term. Short, disaster-only price-gouging laws sit inside this range: the CRA International study for ACCF estimated a $1.9bn welfare loss had a federal law applied after Katrina and Rita (Sept-Oct 2005). Enforcement scale: the WWII Office of Price Administration imposed 259,966 sanctions in 1941-47, and one business in fifteen was charged with illicit transactions (Higgs 2009, citing Rockoff 1984 and Lingeman); Rockoff notes black markets left poor statistical records, so they are not priced here. Tax finance (net-damage form): each $1 of public administration costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven & Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999); as for the other net-damage entries, the burden is subtracted from benefits; only the Cost of Living Council's administration ($80m a year, 0.19% of the transfer, 0.034 points on the 18.2-point scale) is tax-financed; compliance is private. LOW = (-23.50 - 2.0 x 0.034) / 18.2 = -1.295, still -1.29; HIGH = (-8.00 - 0.34 x 0.034) / 18.2 = -0.440, still -0.44. Negligible at two decimals.","grade":"B+","grade_reason":"Peer-reviewed historical natural experiments measure the losses (Frech & Lee 1987 QJE; Deacon & Sonstelie 1985 JPE; Davis & Kilian 2011 JPE; Blinder & Newton 1981 JME; Cavallo et al. 2014 RIW), and a 2026 working paper (Albrecht, Tabarrok & Whitmeyer) supplies the bounds used in the arithmetic. No published benefit-cost ratio exists. Expert consensus is strong (Clark Center 2012 and 2024). Both ends use a peer-reviewed queuing estimate (Deacon & Sonstelie 1989), with Tarr (1994, WBER) as a cross-check.","cost_bn":"45.0","cost_basis":"Full cost, for general price controls on the 1971-74 model. Public outlay: $0. Administration: Dunlop's estimate that the 1971-74 controls cost taxpayers nearly $200m over about 2.5 years ($80m a year, 0.0056% of 1973 GDP) scales to $1.7bn a year at 2025 GDP ($30.9T, FRED). Private compliance: Dunlop's industry estimate was $721m-$2bn for the whole period, while other sources cited by Bleiberg put it at about $2bn a year; the high end, 0.14% of 1973 GDP, scales to $43.3bn a year (the low end would be $6.2bn). GDP loss: shortages, queues and misallocation sit inside the ratio and have no modern economy-wide estimate. Seller-to-buyer price cuts are transfers. cost_bn = 0 + 1.7 + 43.3 = $45.0bn a year. Disaster-only anti-gouging laws would cost a small fraction of this.","difficulty":"moderate","difficulty_reason":"Ordinary legislation. Many US states already have price-gouging statutes (CRS R47072 reviews federal and state authority), and the 1971-74 Nixon programme shows economy-wide controls under an act of Congress. No constitutional change needed.","who_benefits":"broad","who_benefits_reason":"The transfer goes to whoever obtains the price-capped good, not specifically to the poor. Queuing favours people with low time costs, misallocation sends goods to lower-value users, and Cavallo et al. (2014) show that stable prices after disasters came with 17-32% fewer goods on shelves. No source shows a clear progressive or regressive tilt.","summary":"Price Controls & Price Gouging caps prices, either during emergencies (anti-price-gouging laws) or generally (economy-wide or grocery price controls). It polls well: 65% of likely voters backed cracking down on grocery price gouging (Data for Progress, April 2026), and 73.9% of US GSS/ISSP respondents say government should keep prices under control. Economists are close to unanimous against it: 88% of the Clark Center panel in 2024 agreed that widespread price controls create substantial distortions, and most opposed Connecticut's 2012 anti-gouging bill. Evidence from the 1970s US gasoline controls shows queues alone burning about 116% of the money moved from sellers to buyers, on top of shortages and misallocation, and the 1971-74 controls cost about $45bn a year in today's economy to run and comply with. Counting all of this, each $1 shifted from sellers to buyers destroys between 44 cents and $1.29 of value.","rated":"TRUE","gain_bn":"","mort_a":"-1","mort_b":"1","income_loss_bn":"45.0","emde_loss_lo":"","emde_loss_hi":"","base_bn":"45.0","lives_lo":"","lives_hi":"","lives_basis":"","selection_method":"Public-opinion survey","selected_by":"Data for Progress 2026: 65%"},{"id":"13","title":"Open Borders","short":"Open Borders","category":"Popular","bcr_low":"2.14","bcr_high":"3.34","bcr_basis":"Benefit = the rise in world output when workers can move to where they are most productive; cost = the real resources spent on moving, as in the free-trade entry, where the denominator is the adjustment cost. Borjas (2015, JEL) gives both from one model. With pre-migration world GDP of $70tn and a North/South productivity ratio of 4, Table 2 reports the gross gain and the gain net of migration costs (cost = 10 times a Southern worker's initial salary, 5% discount) for different shares (lambda) of origin-country productivity carried by migrants. HIGH: lambda = 0, gross gain $40.1tn, net $28.1tn, so migration costs are $12.0tn: 40.1 / 12.0 = 3.34. LOW: lambda = 0.25, gross $24.2tn, net $12.9tn, costs $11.3tn: 24.2 / 11.3 = 2.14. Lambda of 0.5 cuts the gross gain to $8.8tn (as quoted by Clemens & Pritchett 2019), below the migration costs, so the net gain turns negative in Borjas's table; Clemens & Pritchett (2019, JDE) find that evidence for migrants carrying large fractions of origin productivity is unsupported, which bounds lambda at about 0.25 and sets the low end. Scaled to 2025 world GDP of $118,350bn (World Bank), migration costs are 12.0 / 70 x 118,350 = $20,289bn a year at the high-cost end and $19,105bn at the low-cost end; the gross gain is $40.9-67.8tn. Cross-checks: Clemens (2011, JEP) reports full-removal gains 'often in the range of 50-150 percent of world GDP' before moving costs; Docquier, Machado & Sekkat (2015, SJE), with estimated migration and visa costs and about 400 million movers, find world GDP rises 7.0-17.9%; Kennan (2013, RED) finds a net gain of $11,046 per worker a year against average income of $8,382 in 40 less-developed countries. Context, not part of the range: the reverse policy, strict border controls applied by every country, scores as the mirror image. Counting everyone affected, including the people kept out, per migrant kept out and per $ of enforcement: US natives +$20,500 (low-skill +$9/yr) and -$79,000 (high-skill -$21/yr) from the 2006-10 wall that deterred about 311,000 migrants (Allen, Dobbin & Morten 2024); the migrant's lost earnings of PPP$10,523/yr over a 20-year working life, $156,600 (or $285,200 at 2024 prices) (Clemens, Montenegro & Pritchett 2019); a fiscal saving of $231,000 (Hall 2016, reading NAS 2017) or a forgone contribution of $57,000 (Nowrasteh, Eckhardt & Howard 2023); enforcement of $10,600 per migrant deterred for the wall to $533,400 under H.R. 1 ($170.7bn / CBO's 320,000 fewer residents in 2035); and the lost-income mortality step of $0.132 per $1 (Broughel & Viscusi 2017; HHS VSL $13.1m). Each $1 of enforcement destroys between 97 cents and $1.31 (ratio -1.31 to -0.97), on a cost of about $143.4bn a year (US 2025-26 build-up: H.R. 1 and the Secure America Act). This does not change the open-borders range.","grade":"B","grade_reason":"The range comes from a peer-reviewed general-equilibrium model (Borjas 2015, JEL) that prices both the gain and the moving cost, cross-checked by peer-reviewed estimates (Clemens 2011, JEP; Kennan 2013, RED; Docquier, Machado & Sekkat 2015, SJE). All are calibrated simulations of a policy never tried at world scale, and the result depends on how much productivity migrants carry, so B.","cost_bn":"20288.6","cost_basis":"Full cost, $bn a year: migration costs of 12.0 / 70 of world output (Borjas 2015, Table 2, lambda = 0) applied to 2025 world GDP of $118,350bn = $20,289bn. Repealing entry restrictions needs no new public outlay; administration and private compliance fall rather than rise.","difficulty":"hard","difficulty_reason":"Requires every high-income country to repeal entry and work restrictions, with no modern precedent outside regional zones such as the EU single market.","who_benefits":"pro-poor","who_benefits_reason":"Most of the gain goes to migrants and their origin countries: Borjas (2015) finds Southern wages rise 143% while Northern wages fall 39.3% and capital owners gain $12.0tn; Docquier, Machado & Sekkat (2015) find sending-country natives gain 26-79% and natives of the US and EU 0.3-2.1%. Restriction runs the other way: the 2006-10 US border wall raised low-skill US workers' pay by $9 a year and cut high-skill workers' pay by $21 a year (Allen, Dobbin & Morten 2024), while the migrants kept out give up at least PPP$10,500-13,600 a year (Clemens, Montenegro & Pritchett 2019).","summary":"Letting people live and work in any country moves workers to where they are far more productive; identical low-skill workers earn about four times as much in the US as at home. Published models put the gain at roughly 35-57% of world output before moving costs, the largest of any policy on this list. Moving several billion people is also very costly, about $19-20 trillion a year, so each $1 spent returns about $2.14 to $3.34. Most of the gain goes to migrants and poor countries, while wages of workers already in rich countries fall in the largest-scale model. The reverse policy, strict border controls in every country, scores as the mirror image: counting the people kept out, each $1 of enforcement destroys between 97 cents and $1.31, on a cost of about $143.4 billion a year.","rated":"TRUE","gain_bn":"","mort_a":"-1","mort_b":"1","income_loss_bn":"20288.6","emde_loss_lo":"","emde_loss_hi":"","base_bn":"20288.6","lives_lo":"","lives_hi":"","lives_basis":"","selection_method":"Public-opinion survey","selected_by":"Gallup World Poll 2021: nearly 900 million adults would like to migrate permanently (opposite view: CES 2024, 79% of Americans backed more border patrols)"},{"id":"14","title":"Student Loan Forgiveness","short":"Student Loan Forgiveness","category":"Popular","bcr_low":"-1.39","bcr_high":"0.67","bcr_basis":"Forgiveness is a transfer from taxpayers to borrowers, so it uses the same net-damage form as the UBI entry: ratio = (value to recipients - excess burden x net fiscal cost) / net fiscal cost. Value to recipients: $1 per $1 of present-value debt cancelled (CBO and PWBM already score cancellation in present value, which accounts for loans that would never have been repaid; Catherine & Yannelis 2023 show balances overstate present value most for low earners). Net fiscal cost per $1: administration and lender paperwork add about $0.02bn a year, 0.05% of the $40bn outlay. In the low case it also includes the extra borrowing that expected future forgiveness induces, a fiscal externality, the same way the Social Security (15) and UBI (18) entries add behavioural responses. Penn Wharton Budget Model (Chen & Smetters, July 2023) estimate the SAVE repayment plan's 10-year cost at $342bn with no behavioural response, $475bn with its medium borrowing response and $559bn with its maximum response; induced borrowing therefore adds (475 - 342) / 342 = 39% to (559 - 342) / 342 = 63% of the static cost. HIGH = 0.67: no induced borrowing, excess burden at Ballard, Shoven & Whalley's (1985) central 33 cents per $1 raised: (1 - 0.33 x 1.0005) / 1.0005 = 0.67. LOW = -1.39: Feldstein (1999) finds a proportional rise in all income-tax rates costs nearly $2 of deadweight loss per extra $1 of revenue; with the maximum induced-borrowing response, net fiscal cost = 1 + 0.63 + 0.0005 = 1.635, and (1 - 2.0 x 1.635) / 1.635 = -1.39. With the medium 39% response the low end is (1 - 2.0 x 1.39) / 1.39 = -1.28; with no induced borrowing it is (1 - 2.0 x 1.0005) / 1.0005 = -1.00. Applying a permanent repayment plan's borrowing response to a one-off cancellation is reasonable only to the extent borrowers expect forgiveness to recur; Sallie Mae's 2024 survey found 48% of student borrowers expect their debt to be forgiven. Lucca, Nadauld & Shen (2019) indicate where much of the induced borrowing goes: about 60 cents of each $1 of extra subsidised loan capacity passes into tuition; that share is part of the same fiscal externality and is not added again. Catherine, Perez Clanton & Yannelis (2024) warn of school-level moral hazard. The financing deadweight (the GDP-loss cost component) is counted in the ratio only, not twice. Debt financing: CBO's $400bn is a present value, so interest on the borrowing that funds it is not added separately; the financing distortion is covered by the excess-burden term. Not added: the behavioural gains found by Di Maggio, Kalda & Yao (NBER 2019/2020), where borrowers whose private loans were voided became more mobile and earned about $3,000 more over three years, which would nudge the high end up slightly via extra taxes. No study publishes a BCR or MVPF for broad forgiveness. Additional study (inside the range, corroboration): Dinerstein, Earnest, Koustas & Yannelis (2025, NBER w33462) follow the $132bn of federal student loans actually cancelled from 2021 and find forgiven borrowers' earnings fell, with a marginal propensity to earn of -0.49 and a marginal change in labour-income taxes (MPT) of -0.117 per $1 of the annuitized wealth shock (Table 9; -0.088 without their expectations adjustment). Treating the lost tax as a fiscal externality of 0.117 per $1 forgiven, in this entry's form: (1 - 0.33 x 1.1175) / 1.1175 = 0.56 and (1 - 2.0 x 1.1175) / 1.1175 = -1.11, both inside the range. Adding it to the induced-borrowing response at the low end would give (1 - 2.0 x 1.7475) / 1.7475 = -1.43; that combination is shown only as a sensitivity.","grade":"B","grade_reason":"Built from peer-reviewed estimates of the excess burden of taxation (Ballard, Shoven & Whalley 1985 AER; Feldstein 1999 REStat) applied to official cost estimates (CBO 2022; PWBM 2022), with peer-reviewed distributional evidence (Catherine & Yannelis 2023 JFE). There is no direct benefit-cost study or experiment on broad forgiveness, so B+ or above does not apply. The low end adds a think-tank estimate of induced borrowing (PWBM 2023) applied by analogy from a repayment plan to one-off cancellation.","cost_bn":"120.0","cost_basis":"Full cost. Public outlay: CBO (Sept 2022) ~$400bn present value for the 2022 plan, ~$40bn a year over a 10-year window (PWBM: $47-52bn a year). Administration: the Education Department's own regulatory impact analysis for its 2024 debt-relief rule put one-time administrative costs at $31m ($13.0m systems and contractors + $18.0m waiver processing) for about $147bn of relief, or 0.021%; at $400bn that is ~$84m, about $0.008bn a year. Private compliance: that RIA's paperwork cost for guaranty agencies and FFEL lenders, $0.012bn a year. GDP loss: the excess burden of the taxes needed, at Feldstein's ~$2 per $1 (the high end used for the ratio's low end), $80bn a year. cost_bn = 40 + 0.008 + 0.012 + 80 = $120.0bn a year.","difficulty":"moderate","difficulty_reason":"Biden v. Nebraska (June 30, 2023, 6-3) held that the HEROES Act does not authorise mass cancellation, so broad forgiveness now needs ordinary legislation from Congress. Narrower discharges (income-driven repayment, Public Service Loan Forgiveness) show precedent for the mechanism.","who_benefits":"regressive","who_benefits_reason":"Catherine & Yannelis (2023, JFE), measuring debt in present value, find full or partial forgiveness is regressive: the top income decile gains as much as the bottom three deciles combined. PWBM's balance-based table for the capped 2022 plan is more even (about two-thirds of benefits to households earning $88,000 or less; top 5% almost nothing), which is noted as the main counter-reading.","summary":"Broad student-loan forgiveness cancels federal student debt for most borrowers, as in the 2022 plan of up to $10,000-20,000 each. It has majority support: 55.1% backed forgiving up to $20,000 per person in the 2024 Cooperative Election Study (weighted, researcher-computed). CBO put the 2022 plan at about $400bn, roughly $40bn a year over a decade; running it costs very little extra, but the taxes needed to fund it could cost the economy up to about $80bn a year more. If borrowers come to expect more forgiveness, they borrow more: a Penn Wharton model of a related plan finds this adds 39-63% to the cost, and other work shows much of extra student lending ends up in higher tuition. Peer-reviewed work finds the benefits tilt toward higher earners. As a transfer, each $1 is worth $1 to borrowers but costs taxpayers $1 or more plus the economic drag of raising it, so the ratio runs from about -1.39 to 0.67.","rated":"TRUE","gain_bn":"","mort_a":"-1","mort_b":"1","income_loss_bn":"80.0","emde_loss_lo":"0.164","emde_loss_hi":"0.164","base_bn":"40","lives_lo":"","lives_hi":"","lives_basis":"","selection_method":"Public-opinion survey","selected_by":"CES 2024: 55%"},{"id":"15","title":"Block Social Security and Medicare Changes","short":"Block Social Security and Medicare Changes","category":"Popular","bcr_low":"-1.27","bcr_high":"0.66","bcr_basis":"Blocking any rise in eligibility ages or cut in benefits means paying scheduled benefits after the trust funds run out (OASDI 2034, HI 2033), so the extra money must be raised by taxes or borrowing. Benefits are a transfer, valued at $1 per $1 to retirees, so the net-damage form of the UBI entry applies: ratio = (1 - excess burden x net fiscal cost) / net fiscal cost, where net fiscal cost includes administration and the fiscal externality (FE) of lower work. FE from age changes: CBO (2012) finds raising the full retirement age from 67 to 70 cuts Social Security spending about 13% and enlarges the economy by slightly more than 1% in the long run; 13% of today's 5.3%-of-GDP programme (2026 Trustees) is 0.69% of GDP; CBO's rule of thumb (as reported by CRFB) is about 0.25 of extra GDP returning as revenue (0.5% of GDP on 2% more GDP), so blocking the age rise forgoes 0.25 x 1.0 = 0.25% of GDP of taxes per 0.69% of GDP of benefits kept: FE = 0.36. Mastrobuoni (2009, JPubE) confirms the behaviour: when the 1983 law raised the normal retirement age, mean retirement ages rose by about half the increase. Administration adds 0.53% of benefits. HIGH = 0.66: blocking across-the-board benefit-formula cuts (little labour-supply response, FE about 0) with the Ballard-Shoven-Whalley central excess burden of 0.33: (1 - 0.33 x 1.0053) / 1.0053 = 0.66. LOW = -1.27: blocking an age rise (FE 0.36, net fiscal cost 1.365) financed at Feldstein's (1999) nearly $2 marginal deadweight loss: (1 - 2.0 x 1.365) / 1.365 = -1.27. Middle case (age rise blocked, BSW 0.33): (1 - 0.33 x 1.365) / 1.365 = 0.40. The financing deadweight is subtracted in the ratio and the work-loss effect enters through the FE, so neither is added again; the GDP-loss figure in cost_components is output, which overstates the welfare loss. The choice of cost base (75-year gap, current annual deficit or post-2034 shortfall) changes cost_bn but not the ratio. Poverty-reduction value (Engelhardt & Gruber) is not weighted.","grade":"B","grade_reason":"Combines a peer-reviewed natural experiment on retirement behaviour (Mastrobuoni 2009, JPubE), CBO macro estimates and the Trustees' official fiscal gap, with peer-reviewed excess-burden estimates (Ballard, Shoven & Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999). No published benefit-cost ratio exists for keeping current-law benefits, and the labour-supply feedback is from CBO's model rather than a measured welfare change, so the grade is below B+.","cost_bn":"1927.8","cost_basis":"Full cost. Public outlay: the 2026 Trustees' 75-year actuarial deficits (OASDI 4.42% and HI 0.56% of payroll) come to about 1.67% of GDP, ~$535bn a year. Administration: SSA spends 0.4% of OASDI cost on administration (CY2025, $6.95bn) and Medicare HI 1.3% ($5.9bn of $444.2bn, CRS 2026); applied to the extra benefits that is about $2.8bn a year (an upper bound). Private compliance: none identified. GDP loss: (a) CBO (2012) finds raising the full retirement age to 70 would enlarge the economy by slightly more than 1%, so blocking it gives up about $320bn a year of output (output, not welfare, since retirees gain leisure); (b) the excess burden of the taxes needed at Feldstein's ~$2 per $1, $1,070bn a year. cost_bn = 535 + 2.8 + 1,390 = $1,927.8bn a year (75-year average). With only the 2026 cash deficit (0.8% of GDP) and Ballard-Shoven-Whalley's 33 cents, the total would be far smaller (about $340bn).","difficulty":"moderate","difficulty_reason":"Keeping current benefit rules needs no change, but paying full scheduled benefits after 2034 (OASDI) and 2033 (HI) needs ordinary legislation to raise payroll taxes or transfer general revenue; Congress has done this before (1977 and 1983 amendments). No constitutional change.","who_benefits":"broad","who_benefits_reason":"Benefits go to nearly all retirees and disabled workers; Engelhardt & Gruber find a roughly unitary elasticity of elderly poverty with respect to benefits, so cuts would raise poverty, which favours the poor. But benefits rise with lifetime earnings and the cost falls on current workers through payroll taxes, so the net effect is broad rather than clearly pro-poor.","summary":"This policy blocks any rise in the Social Security or Medicare eligibility ages and any cut in scheduled benefits, so the trust-fund shortfalls must be filled with new taxes or borrowing. It is among the most popular ideas tested: 87.5% of US GSS/ISSP respondents say government should provide a decent living for the old, and protecting both programmes from cuts or age increases had net support of +72 in a 2024 YouGov poll of 4,038 voters. The 2026 Trustees put the gap at about $535bn a year on average over 75 years; at the high end, the taxes to fill it and the work forgone could cost the economy more than twice that again. As a transfer, each $1 is worth $1 to retirees, but raising it costs $1 plus the drag of higher taxes, and blocking higher retirement ages also forgoes extra work and tax revenue. The ratio runs from about -1.27 to 0.66.","rated":"TRUE","gain_bn":"","mort_a":"-1","mort_b":"1","income_loss_bn":"1392.8","emde_loss_lo":"2.847","emde_loss_hi":"2.847","base_bn":"535","lives_lo":"","lives_hi":"","lives_basis":"","selection_method":"Public-opinion survey","selected_by":"ISSP 88-99%; YouGov net +72"},{"id":"16","title":"Billionaire Wealth Tax","short":"Billionaire Wealth Tax","category":"Popular","bcr_low":"-1.2","bcr_high":"0.59","bcr_basis":"A 2% global minimum tax on billionaires' wealth (Zucman 2024) moves money from about 2,800 billionaires to governments. That money is a transfer, counted at $1 on both sides, so the ratio takes the net-damage form used for the other transfer policies: ratio = (transfer - excess burden - administration - private compliance) / transfer, all per $1 of wealth tax collected. Base: billionaires owned $14.2 trillion in 2024 and already pay tax equal to 0.3% of wealth, so the minimum tax adds 1.7% of wealth: $242bn with perfect enforcement (Zucman, Table 1). Excess burden: the same convention as the student-loan (14) and Social Security (15) entries, whatever the size of the transfer. HIGH uses Ballard, Shoven and Whalley's (1985) marginal welfare cost of 34 cents per $1 of revenue (range 34-48 cents); LOW uses Feldstein's (1999) 'nearly two dollars per incremental dollar of revenue'. Feldstein's measure is built on the response of the taxable base, which is the same channel through which wealth is hidden, moved or valued down, and on the resulting loss of revenue, so the wealth-tax base response and the revenue lost from other taxes are not added on top. Revenue is about 0.22% of world GDP, far inside the capital-tax Laffer limit (Trabandt and Uhlig: US 2.3% of GDP), so the convention that applies Feldstein at both ends to very large programmes does not apply. Administration (wealth-specific, both ends): Wealth Tax Commission, government cost for a one-off 5% UK tax scaled to a 1.7% rate (fixed costs over a smaller take): HIGH Burgherr's central 1% x 5/1.7 = 0.029; LOW 1.4% at the GBP 10m threshold x 5/1.7 = 0.041. Private compliance (valuation, filing, disputes): HIGH 0.06% of taxable assets at GBP 10m / 1.7% = 0.035; LOW 0.13%, the highest in the Commission's Table 6, / 1.7% = 0.076. HIGH = 1 - 0.34 - 0.029 - 0.035 = 0.60. LOW = 1 - 2.0 - 0.041 - 0.076 = -1.12. No double counting: the GDP loss (Penn Wharton 2021: -1.2% of GDP in 2050 for revenue of 0.735% of GDP, 1.63 per $1) is the output counterpart of the excess burden, so it is reported in cost_components and not subtracted again, as in entries 14, 15, 17 and 18. Sensitivity, built from wealth-tax evidence instead of the income-tax excess burden (exponential base W = W0 x e^(-s x 0.017)): HIGH, Advani and Tarrant's (2021) 7% base loss for a 1% tax (s = 7.26, revenue $213.9bn, average excess burden 0.064) plus Penn Wharton's macro feedback ((2,390 - 2,025)/2,390 = 0.153): 1 - 0.064 - 0.153 - 0.029 - 0.035 = 0.72. LOW, Brülhart et al.'s (2022) Swiss response net of the 21% due to house prices (s = ln(1.43) x 0.79/0.01 = 28.3, revenue $149.7bn, marginal excess burden x/(1 - x) = 0.924) plus Trabandt and Uhlig's (2011) 51% US capital-tax self-financing: 1 - 0.924 - 0.51 - 0.041 - 0.076 = -0.55; with the average excess burden 0.09, with the EU-14 share (79%) -0.83, and with Penn Wharton's full output loss in place of both terms -0.75. Cross-check: Jakobsen et al.'s long-run elasticity of 1.15 for the very wealthy, with the net return cut from 7.2% to 5.5%, implies a long-run base of (5.5/7.2)^1.15 = 0.73 of its untaxed level. Lost-income mortality: income lost to a policy costs lives. Broughel and Viscusi (Mercatus 2017) put it at about one statistical death per $99.3m of cost imposed; valued at the HHS VSL of $13.1m, each $1 of net income lost carries 13.1/99.3 = $0.132 of mortality cost. This adjustment is applied to every policy after the range shown here is computed. Poor-country infant deaths from lower world income use Baird, Friedman and Schady (REStat 2011): +0.24 to 0.40 infant deaths per 1,000 births per 1% fall in GDP per person, on about 119.9m births a year in low- and middle-income countries (World Bank). Tax finance (net-damage form): each $1 of public administration costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven & Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999); as for the other net-damage entries, the burden is subtracted from benefits; the wealth-tax revenue is counted in full as the transfer, so the government's administration cost must be funded from other taxes and carries the same penalty. LOW = 1 - 2.0 - 0.041 - 0.076 - 2.0 x 0.041 = -1.20; HIGH = 1 - 0.34 - 0.029 - 0.035 - 0.34 x 0.029 = 0.59. Additional study (above the headline range, not used to set it): Londoño-Vélez & Ávila-Mahecha (2024, NBER w32134) find Colombian taxpayers' reported wealth has an elasticity of 2 with respect to the net-of-tax rate (3.1-4.0 in alternative estimates), costing up to a fifth of revenue under Colombia's higher, recurrent rates. In this entry's exponential-base form (s = 2/(1 - 0.017) = 2.03, x = 0.035) the marginal excess burden of a 1.7% tax is x/(1 - x) = 0.036 (0.074 at an elasticity of 4); with the high-end administration and compliance: 1 - 0.036 - 0.029 - 0.035 - 0.34 x 0.029 = 0.89 (0.85 at an elasticity of 4). This is above the high end and close to the Advani-Tarrant sensitivity case above; the headline keeps the income-tax excess-burden convention shared with entries 14, 15 and 18, and Colombia's moderately wealthy filers had fewer cross-border options than billionaires (Brülhart et al.; offshoring in the same paper), so the range is not extended.","grade":"B","grade_reason":"The two ends rest on peer-reviewed estimates of the cost of raising tax revenue (Ballard, Shoven and Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999), the same as the other transfer entries, applied to the proposal's own revenue estimate. The wealth-tax responses behind the sensitivity come from peer-reviewed natural experiments in Switzerland, Denmark and Sweden and a peer-reviewed review that reconciles them (Brülhart et al. 2022; Jakobsen et al. 2020; Advani and Tarrant 2021); administration and compliance costs come from a UK commission's costing. No peer-reviewed benefit-cost study of a wealth tax exists, and no country has taxed billionaires at this scale, so the grade is B.","cost_bn":"423.6","cost_basis":"Full annual cost = $0 public outlay (the tax collects revenue, a transfer) + $10.0bn administration (4.1% of revenue, the Wealth Tax Commission's highest government cost scaled to a 1.7% rate) + $18.5bn private compliance (0.13% of $14.2 trillion of billionaire wealth for valuation, filing and disputes) + $395.1bn lost output (Penn Wharton 2021: 1.63 of GDP per $1 of US wealth-tax revenue by 2050, x $242bn) = $423.6bn a year, all at full enforcement. The output loss is an upper bound and is the counterpart of the excess burden in the ratio, so it is not subtracted twice.","difficulty":"hard","difficulty_reason":"It needs a binding agreement among many countries, and the 2024 G20 declaration commits only to 'engage cooperatively ... with full respect to tax sovereignty'. Twelve OECD countries had net wealth taxes in 1990 and only four in 2017, with repeals justified by efficiency costs, capital flight and high administrative costs (OECD 2018). No country has applied a 2% annual tax to billionaires.","who_benefits":"broad","who_benefits_reason":"The tax is paid by about 2,800 billionaires, whose effective tax rate would rise from about 22% to 39% of pre-tax income (Zucman 2024). The $193-242bn a year of revenue (depending on how much is lost to avoidance and evasion) can be spent on anything, so its benefits are as broad as the spending. Part of the cost reaches workers: Penn Wharton (2021) projects average hourly wages 1.2% lower by 2050 as less capital is accumulated.","summary":"A coordinated 2% minimum tax on the wealth of the world's roughly 3,000 billionaires, as proposed to the G20 in 2024, would raise $242bn a year if perfectly enforced. The revenue is a transfer; the costs are the extra burden of raising it, the costs of valuing and collecting the tax, and the output lost as less capital is built. Scored like the other transfer policies, each $1 collected delivers between a net loss of $1.20 and a net 59 cents of value; lost-income mortality lowers both ends. Evidence specific to wealth taxes gives a similar range, -0.55 to 0.72.","rated":"TRUE","gain_bn":"","mort_a":"-1","mort_b":"1","income_loss_bn":"423.6","emde_loss_lo":"0.354","emde_loss_hi":"0.354","base_bn":"181.8","lives_lo":"","lives_hi":"","lives_basis":"","selection_method":"Public-opinion survey","selected_by":"Ipsos 2024 G20 survey (Earth4All): 68%"},{"id":"17","title":"Medicare for All","short":"Medicare for All","category":"Popular","bcr_low":"-0.76","bcr_high":"-0.57","bcr_basis":"No published BCR exists for single payer. It is scored in the same transfer form as the UBI and Social Security entries: new federal spending replaces premiums and out-of-pocket costs, so it counts $1 to households per $1 in both benefit and cost; the excess burden of tax financing and the waiting-time cost are subtracted from benefits; the cost base adds any rise in national health spending. Life-years are valued at ICER's $100,000-150,000 per QALY thresholds. Financing at this scale: at the peak of the Laffer curve the US can raise at most about 7.4% of GDP in extra tax revenue and the EU-14 about 3.1% (Trabandt & Uhlig 2012, Table 7). New tax-financed outlays larger than that cannot be raised at the 34-cent marginal burden measured for small changes (Ballard, Shoven & Whalley 1985); near or past the peak the marginal burden rises without limit (Browning 1987: up to more than 300% of marginal revenue). Policies whose new tax-financed outlays exceed 7.4% of GDP therefore use Feldstein's (1999) estimate, which 'may exceed $2 per $1 of revenue', at both ends of the range. New federal spending of $1.5-2.8T is 5-10% of US GDP, at or beyond the 7.4% maximum, so both ends use Feldstein's $2 per $1. The CEA's (2018) estimate that tax financing would cut GDP by 9% ($2,778bn at 2025 GDP) measures the same tax distortion and is not added; it is an output measure and assumes about $2.4T of new taxes in 2022. Waiting: Blahous (2019 testimony) notes that first-dollar coverage would raise demand by about 11% for the privately insured and 16% for the uninsured while provider payments would be cut by more than 40% in the lower-bound design, the setting in which queues arise. Canada's single-payer system had a median wait of 30.0 weeks from GP referral to treatment in 2024 (Fraser Institute, Waiting Your Turn), and Moir & Barua (Fraser Institute 2024) value patients' lost time at C$10.6bn a year (all waking hours). Scaled per person to the US and converted at 1.3973 C$ per US$: $65.0bn a year, subtracted at both ends. LOW = -0.76: Urban Institute (2019) finds its comprehensive single payer raises national health spending by $720bn and federal spending by $2.8T in 2020 (administration is inside these figures). Lives saved: Galvani's 1.73m life-years at $100,000 = $173bn, which generously assumes Galvani's mortality gain. LOW = (2,800 + 173 - 2.0 x 2,800 - 65.0) / (2,800 + 720) = -0.76. HIGH = -0.57: Galvani et al. (2020, Lancet) estimate single payer saves 13%, about $450bn a year (net of single-payer administration), and 1.73 million life-years (68,000 lives) a year, valued at $150,000 = $259.5bn; federal cost $1.5T, the low end of CBO's 2030 range for new federal subsidies (which includes administration). HIGH = (1,500 + 450 + 259.5 - 2.0 x 1,500 - 65.0) / 1,500 = -0.57. CBO's five options span national-spending changes of -$0.7T to +$0.3T in 2030, which falls between these cases. Blahous (Mercatus 2018) puts added federal spending at $32.6T over 2022-31 and says even that assumes providers accept payment cuts of more than 40%, which points to the low end; his alternative estimate without provider cuts ($38.8T) is an outlay figure, a transfer in this ratio, so it does not change the ends. Not priced: health losses from delayed treatment (no published US-applicable dollar estimate found) and physician-supply responses to 40% payment cuts (Blahous: 'We do not know how providers would respond'), both of which would lower the ends further. Benefit and cost years differ (2017-2030 dollars); that is a stated simplification. Lost-income mortality: income lost to a policy costs lives. Broughel & Viscusi (Mercatus 2017) put it at about one statistical death per $99.3m of cost imposed; valued at the HHS VSL of $13.1m, each $1 of net income lost carries 13.1/99.3 = $0.132 of mortality cost (and each $1 gained saves the same). This adjustment is applied to every policy after the range shown here is computed. Poor-country infant deaths from lower world income use Baird, Friedman & Schady (REStat 2011): +0.24 to 0.40 infant deaths per 1,000 births per 1% fall in GDP per person, on ~119.9m births a year in low- and middle-income countries (World Bank).","grade":"B-","grade_reason":"The range rests on official CBO estimates and think-tank models (Urban Institute, Mercatus), plus one peer-reviewed modelling study (Galvani et al., Lancet) whose savings CBO and Urban do not replicate. Health effects of coverage are backed by quasi-experimental and randomized evidence (Miller et al. 2021 QJE; Oregon experiment), but no peer-reviewed BCA of single payer exists. The waiting-list cost is a think-tank estimate for Canada applied by analogy.","cost_bn":"5843.0","cost_basis":"Full cost. Public outlay: CBO (Dec 2020) finds federal subsidies rise by $1.5-3.0T in 2030; the design closest to current bills (Option 5) is about $3.0T, used here (Urban Institute: +$2.8T in 2020; Blahous 2018: $32.6T over 2022-31). Most of this replaces private premiums and out-of-pocket spending (a transfer). Administration: shown separately within the $3.0T, at Medicare fee-for-service's ~2% administrative rate, about $60bn (CBO assumes 1.5-1.6%; critics say that is too low, supporters say billing savings shrink total admin). Private compliance: provider billing is inside national health spending, already in the ratio. GDP loss: the CEA (2018) estimates tax-financed Medicare for All would cut GDP by 9%, about $2,778bn a year at 2025 GDP, the high-end published estimate. Private cost of waiting: Canada's waiting-list time cost (Fraser Institute 2024, all waking hours, C$10.6bn) scaled per person to the US, $65.0bn a year. cost_bn = 2,940 + 60 + 65.0 + 2,778 = $5,843.0bn a year.","difficulty":"moderate","difficulty_reason":"Moderate by the rubric: ordinary federal legislation, with modern precedents abroad (e.g., Canada, Taiwan's 1995 single payer). Politically it is near the hard end, because it replaces employer insurance for about 150 million people and needs roughly $1.5-3T a year in new federal revenue.","who_benefits":"pro-poor","who_benefits_reason":"Gains go mostly to the uninsured and underinsured, who are disproportionately low-income: covering low-income adults through Medicaid cut their mortality (Miller, Johnson & Wherry 2021) and cut their medical debt (Oregon experiment). Financing through broad taxes is typically more progressive than premiums.","summary":"Medicare for All would replace private insurance with one government plan covering everyone. It is popular, with 66% support in the CES 2022. Official and think-tank estimates agree it would add $1.5-3.0 trillion a year in federal spending, but they disagree about whether total national health spending would rise or fall, and one government estimate says the taxes to pay for it could shrink GDP by 9%. If US waiting lists grew to Canadian levels (a 30-week median wait), patients' lost time would cost about $67bn a year. Counting lives saved, waiting time and the economic drag of the extra taxes leaves each $1 destroying 0.57 to 0.77 dollars of value, because taxes on this scale sit at or past the peak of the Laffer curve: the optimistic end uses a Lancet study projecting $450bn in savings and 68,000 lives saved a year, and the pessimistic end uses an Urban Institute estimate that national spending rises by $720bn, with taxes on this scale costing about $2 of lost output per $1 raised (Feldstein 1999).","rated":"TRUE","gain_bn":"","mort_a":"-1","mort_b":"1","income_loss_bn":"2905.3","emde_loss_lo":"5.689","emde_loss_hi":"5.689","base_bn":"2300","lives_lo":"","lives_hi":"","lives_basis":"","selection_method":"Public-opinion survey","selected_by":"CES 2022: 66%"},{"id":"18","title":"Global Universal Basic Income","short":"Global Universal Basic Income","category":"Popular","bcr_low":"-1.26","bcr_high":"-1.09","bcr_basis":"Treated as a full, permanent, tax-financed global UBI. Net-damage construction per $1 paid out: BCR = (value to recipients - excess burden x net fiscal cost) / net fiscal cost. Value to recipients: $1 (a transfer is worth its face value to the person receiving it). Net fiscal cost = $1 + the fiscal externality of reduced earnings + delivery cost. Fiscal externality: the NBER version of the OpenResearch trial (Vivalt et al. 2024, w32719) finds treated households received an extra $950 a month ($11,400 a year) over the control group; household income excluding transfers fell by $4,215 a year in the raw survey measure (0.37 per $1) and by $3,228 in the authors' preferred adjusted measure (0.28 per $1); partners cut hours about as much as participants. Daruich & Fernández find a labour-tax-financed UBI raises the average labour tax from 22% to about 27.8%. Delivery cost per $1 delivered (excluded from the ILO costing): $0.041 (PROGRESA, Caldes, Coady & Maluccio) to $0.25 (GiveDirectly). Financing at this scale: at the peak of the Laffer curve the US can raise at most about 7.4% of GDP in extra tax revenue and the EU-14 about 3.1% (Trabandt & Uhlig 2012, Table 7). New tax-financed outlays larger than that cannot be raised at the 34-cent marginal burden measured for small changes (Ballard, Shoven & Whalley 1985); near or past the peak the marginal burden rises without limit (Browning 1987: up to more than 300% of marginal revenue). Policies whose new tax-financed outlays exceed 7.4% of GDP therefore use Feldstein's (1999, REStat) estimate, which 'may exceed $2 per $1 of revenue', at both ends of the range. A global UBI costs about 32.7% of world GDP, so both ends use $2 per $1. HIGH: preferred household response 0.28 at the pre-reform 22% rate, FE = 0.28 x 0.22 = 0.062; net fiscal cost = 1.062 + 0.041 = 1.103; BCR = (1 - 2.0 x 1.103) / 1.103 = -1.09. LOW: raw household response 0.37 at the post-reform 27.8% rate, FE = 0.370 x 0.278 = 0.103; net fiscal cost = 1.103 + 0.25 = 1.353; BCR = (1 - 2.0 x 1.353) / 1.353 = -1.26. A universal, untargeted government scheme would probably deliver at nearer PROGRESA's 4 cents, which would give a low end of about -1.13. A global scheme costing 32.7% of world GDP would need far higher tax rates than Daruich & Fernández's US scheme, so the low end's fiscal externality is likely understated. The Daruich-Fernández GDP loss is the output counterpart of the excess-burden term already in the ratio, so it is reported in cost_components but not subtracted again. Cross-checks: Hendren & Sprung-Keyser (2020, QJE) score the randomized US Negative Income Tax at an MVPF of -0.01; Daruich & Fernández's dynamic GE model finds a labour-tax-financed UBI cuts steady-state GDP 12.9% and costs future generations over 9% of lifetime consumption, i.e. net damage. Excluded (the counter-evidence list): the GiveDirectly Kenya UBI RCT (Banerjee et al. 2023), which is donor-funded with no financing distortion; the Kenya local multiplier (~2.4) for a one-off transfer into poor villages, and Finland's unemployed-only pilot, neither of which is a permanent tax-financed universal payment. Additional study (just above the range, not used to set it): Jones & Marinescu (2022, AEJ: Economic Policy) find Alaska's universal, permanent dividend had no effect on employment and raised part-time work by 1.8 points; with no fiscal externality and the lowest delivery cost in this entry, (1 - 2.0 x 1.041) / 1.041 = -1.04, slightly above the high end of -1.09. The dividend is paid from oil-fund returns rather than taxes and is a few percent of income, far smaller than a full basic income, so it does not test the labour response or the financing this entry prices; the range is not extended.","grade":"A-","grade_reason":"Built from a modern RCT (Vivalt et al. 2024), a peer-reviewed MVPF for the randomized NIT experiments (Hendren & Sprung-Keyser 2020, QJE) and peer-reviewed excess-burden and dynamic GE estimates (Feldstein 1999; Ballard, Shoven & Whalley 1985; Daruich & Fernández 2024); no study scores a global UBI directly.","cost_bn":"56420","cost_basis":"Full cost. Public outlay: ILO (Ortiz et al. 2018) puts a global poverty-line UBI at 32.7% of GDP, about $34.3T a year at ~$105T world GDP; the ILO excludes administration. Administration: delivery costs per $1 delivered range from $0.041 (PROGRESA's steady-state cost-transfer ratio, Caldes, Coady & Maluccio) to $0.25 (GiveDirectly, ~80% of large-programme spending reaching recipients; GiveWell finds ~83% overall); the high end gives $8,575bn a year. Private compliance: none identified. GDP loss: Daruich & Fernandez's dynamic model finds a labour-tax-financed UBI cuts steady-state GDP 12.9%, $13,545bn a year on world GDP. cost_bn = 34,300 + 8,575 + 13,545 = $56,420bn a year (with low-end admin, $35,706bn before GDP loss).","difficulty":"hard","difficulty_reason":"Hard: a global scheme needs binding commitments across many countries, and the ILO puts a poverty-line UBI at 32.7-39.4% of GDP on average and 62-79% of GDP in low-income countries.","who_benefits":"broad","who_benefits_reason":"Payments go to everyone rather than being targeted, so most spending reaches the non-poor, and financing creates high implicit marginal tax rates on middle earners (Henderson 2019). Daruich & Fernandez (2024) find the long-run losses fall on future generations through lower capital and human capital.","summary":"A universal basic income pays every adult a regular, unconditional cash amount. It splits opinion: 45% of Americans favoured a $1,000-a-month UBI in Pew's 2020 survey, while 68% of EU respondents said they would vote for one in Dalia's 2017 poll. A randomized US trial (OpenResearch) found every $1 paid out cut recipients' household earnings by 28-37 cents, with partners cutting work as much as recipients, and delivering the money costs about 4-25 cents per $1 on top. Once that and the excess burden of the taxes needed to fund it are counted, each $1 returns between about minus $1.26 and minus $1.09, because a scheme costing a third of world GDP is far beyond what taxes can raise without very large losses, and a dynamic model finds such a scheme would shrink GDP by about 13%. Kenya's 12-year GiveDirectly UBI trial shows strong local gains in poor villages, but it is donor-funded, so the ILO's estimate of roughly a third of world GDP for a global poverty-line UBI (before delivery costs) is the relevant scale.","rated":"TRUE","gain_bn":"","mort_a":"-1","mort_b":"1","income_loss_bn":"22120","emde_loss_lo":"12.13","emde_loss_hi":"12.13","base_bn":"42875","lives_lo":"","lives_hi":"","lives_basis":"","selection_method":"Public-opinion survey","selected_by":"Pew 2020: 45% US support for $1,000/month UBI; Dalia 2017: 68% EU"},{"id":"19","title":"Digital ID Mandate","short":"Digital ID Mandate","category":"Popular","bcr_low":"-1.94","bcr_high":"0.78","bcr_basis":"Built from the two randomized evaluations of biometric ID in welfare delivery (both Muralidharan, Niehaus & Sukhtankar, India). LOW before tax finance (-1.0): making Aadhaar biometric authentication compulsory for food rations in Jharkhand (NBER 2020; RESTAT 2025). Benefit = change in leakage, which rose by an insignificant Rs 14 per ration card per month. Cost = extra transaction costs to government, dealers and beneficiaries, Rs 13.6 per card per month (+7.8%). BCR = -14 / 13.6 = -1.03, about -1.0. HIGH before tax finance (1.05): the Andhra Pradesh biometric smartcard payment system (AER 2016), which was rolled out carefully alongside the old system. Beneficiaries' time savings alone ($4.3m) exceed the government's cost of implementation and operation ($4.1m), so BCR = 4.3/4.1 = 1.05. Its large leakage reductions (NREGS leakage down $32.8m a year, eight times the cost) are mostly a transfer from corrupt officials to the state and are not counted. The spread reflects the authors' own conclusion that results depend on how the mandate and transition are managed. Platform costs: the Jharkhand low end already counts the extra costs to government, ration dealers and beneficiaries of compulsory authentication; adding the platform's own running cost to the denominator would mechanically pull a negative ratio toward zero, which would understate the harm, so it is not done. The Andhra Pradesh high end compares time savings with the smartcard system's full delivery cost, which paid for enrolment and payments through the bank commission; a share of a national ID platform's recurrent cost (0.06-0.1% of GDP) is not included and would lower the high end somewhat. Exclusion: in the Jharkhand trial the 23% of households not 'seeded' at baseline lost Rs 49 a month (12.6%), an average of 0.23 x 49 = Rs 11.3 per ration card a month, and nearly 300,000 people lost benefits; but value received by the average household was unchanged and disbursement rose slightly, so these losses are already inside the measured Rs 14 rise in leakage (disbursed minus received), and adding them again would double count. With an equity weight on excluded poor households (losses not offset by small gains to others), they would add, giving -(14 + 11.3) / 13.6 = -1.86. Not priced: surveillance and data-breach risk (Cato, EFF) and business identity-verification (KYC) costs; no published estimate attributes these to a digital ID mandate per $1 of programme cost, and all would lower both ends. Excluded (the counter-evidence list): McKinsey's 3-13% of GDP projection for consent-based 'good ID'; India's correlational DBT savings claim; and Defra's 2008 appraisal of carbon-allowance tracking (BCR 0.07-0.22), which applies only if the ID is used for personal carbon tracking. Additional study (outside the range, different basis, not used to set it): the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy's cost-benefit analysis of Aadhaar (NIPFP 2012, Table 1, constant prices) puts costs of building Aadhaar and linking it to welfare schemes at Rs 37,187 crore and benefits at Rs 109,806 crore over 2010-11 to 2020-21 (real IRR 52.85%), a ratio of 59,517 / 23,351 = 2.55 at an 8% discount rate (2.95 undiscounted). Its benefits are fiscal savings from reduced leakage, which this entry treats as transfers (as with the Andhra Pradesh leakage figures above), so the ratio is on a fiscal rather than a social basis; it is above the high end and does not set the range. Tax finance: each $1 of public outlay costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven & Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999), as for the transfer policies; the cost behind each end is partly or wholly public. HIGH: the Andhra Pradesh government's $4.1m implementation and operating cost is all public (share 1.0): HIGH = 1.05 (4.3/4.1) / (1 + 0.34 x 1.0) = 0.78. LOW: in the Jharkhand trial the government's share of the Rs 13.6 extra transaction cost is the ePOS deployment cost, Rs 6.2 per ration card per month (0.456 of the total; the rest falls on beneficiaries, Rs 7, and dealers). Because the low end is negative, the excess burden is subtracted from the benefit in the net-damage form used for entries 14-16 rather than added to the denominator, which would pull a negative ratio toward zero: with -14 ÷ 13.6 = -1.03 before tax finance and a public share of 0.456 (Rs 6.2 of Rs 13.6), LOW = (-14 - 2.0 x 6.2) ÷ 13.6 = -1.03 - 2.0 x 0.456 = -1.94.","grade":"B+","grade_reason":"Both ends are converted directly from peer-reviewed randomized evaluations (RESTAT 2025; AER 2016) that report costs and benefits. Applying evidence from Indian welfare delivery to a worldwide mandate is by analogy, and the two trials point in opposite directions, so the grade is B+ rather than A.","cost_bn":"88.8","cost_basis":"Full cost, illustrative global extrapolation, using the median of published estimates. Build/enrolment: published per-registrant costs are $1.16 (Aadhaar), ~$5 (poor-country schemes), $7 (Gelb's low-income model) and $4-11 (Gelb & Diofasi Metz, midpoint $7.5); median $6.0 for ~8.0bn people over 10 years = $4.8bn a year. Operation and administration: published recurrent costs are 0.06-0.1% of GDP (midpoint 0.08%), 0.065% (Peru's RENIEC) and 0.11% (Gelb's steady state); median 0.08% of ~$105T world GDP = $84bn a year. Cross-check: the OBR's provisional UK cost (GBP 1.8bn over three years, ~GBP 0.6bn a year) scales per person to ~$90bn a year globally. Mostly budget-financed, so treated as tax-financed. Private compliance: no published estimate. GDP loss: none published. cost_bn = 4.8 + 84 = $88.8bn a year. If the ID were also used for personal carbon-allowance tracking, Defra's GBP 52 per person a year implies about $420bn more.","difficulty":"moderate","difficulty_reason":"Each country can mandate a digital ID through ordinary legislation, and India's Aadhaar shows enrolment of more than a billion people is possible. A worldwide mandate still needs action in nearly every country, and rich democracies have retreated: the UK dropped compulsory right-to-work use in January 2026, and the incoming prime minister moved to scrap the scheme in July 2026.","who_benefits":"regressive","who_benefits_reason":"Exclusion risk falls on the poor. About 45% of the poorest quintile in low-income countries lack ID, against 28% of the richest (ID4D 2019), and 1.5-2 million Indian welfare beneficiaries lost access at some point during the biometric authentication rollout (Muralidharan, Niehaus & Sukhtankar 2025).","summary":"A digital ID mandate would require everyone to hold and use a government digital identity. Public support is lukewarm: a September 2025 YouGov poll found 42% of Britons for and 45% against the UK plan. The best evidence comes from two randomized trials in India. When biometric checks were made compulsory for food rations, corruption did not fall, costs rose about 8% and hundreds of thousands of legitimate recipients lost benefits, a return of about minus $1 per dollar before tax costs. A carefully managed biometric payment system in Andhra Pradesh roughly paid for itself through time savings alone (about $1.05 per $1). Building and running a national ID costs governments real money (a median of about $6 per person to enrol and 0.08% of GDP a year to run, roughly $89bn a year worldwide), and counting the excess burden of the taxes that pay the public share puts the range at about -1.94 to 0.78, before counting privacy and surveillance risks.","rated":"TRUE","gain_bn":"","mort_a":"-1","mort_b":"1","income_loss_bn":"113.8","emde_loss_lo":"","emde_loss_hi":"","base_bn":"88.8","lives_lo":"","lives_hi":"","lives_basis":"","selection_method":"Public-opinion survey","selected_by":"YouGov 2025: 42% support (UK); Ipsos UK 2025: 57% support a national ID card"},{"id":"20","title":"Medicare Drug Price Negotiation","short":"Medicare Drug Price Negotiation","category":"Popular","bcr_low":"0.54","bcr_high":"2.79","bcr_basis":"Lower negotiated prices are mainly a transfer from drug makers to Medicare and its enrollees. They are scored in the same form as the other transfer policies: savings to taxpayers and enrollees, plus health gains from lower out-of-pocket costs, are the benefit; lost innovation is subtracted as a health harm; the transfer from manufacturers plus administration is the cost base. BCR = (savings + health gains - lost innovation) / (manufacturer revenue loss + administration). Savings: CBO puts negotiation's deficit reduction at $98.5bn over 2022-31 and $25bn in 2031, which is also the manufacturers' revenue loss. Cogan, Heil & Mulligan (Hoover 2025) model a fully phased-in IRA in which brand revenue falls $10.9bn a year after manufacturers' launch-price response. Administration: the $3bn appropriation spread over 10 years is $0.3bn a year; manufacturer reporting (about $0.013bn a year) does not change either end at two decimals. Lost innovation: CBO expects 13 fewer of about 1,300 new drugs over 30 years (about 1%), or 0.43 a year; valuing each lost drug at the $2.5bn of revenue needed to bring one new chemical entity to market (Dubois et al. 2015, peer-reviewed) gives $1.1bn a year. This treats revenue as the value of a drug, a floor, since patients usually gain more than the seller's revenue. The Hoover paper's own (Mulligan) method gives $4.5bn a year. The Philipson & Durie method ($196.3bn a year; 135 fewer drugs and 331.5m US life-years lost through 2039 under H.R. 5376) implies about ten times CBO's projected loss of drugs and is not used. Health gains: lower out-of-pocket costs keep patients on their medicines. Chandra, Flack & Obermeyer (2024, QJE) find Medicare patients facing smaller drug budgets 'consume fewer drugs and die more: 0.0164 percentage points per month (13.9%) for each $100 per month budget decrease', i.e. about one death per $610,000 of out-of-pocket cost (1.64e-4 / $100 a month). CMS estimates enrollees save $1.5bn in out-of-pocket costs in 2026 on the first 10 drugs and $685m in 2027 on the next 15 ($2.185bn a year). $2.185bn / $610,000 = 3,583 deaths averted a year, valued at the HHS VSL of $13.1m = $46.9bn. Chandra et al. study a sharp loss of coverage at age 65; applying it to lower negotiated prices is an extrapolation. LOW = (10.9 - 4.5) / (10.9 + 0.3) = 0.57, with no health gains, because CBO has not assessed patients' health outcomes. HIGH = (25 + 46.9 - 1.1) / (25 + 0.3) = 2.80. Without the health gains the high end would be (25 - 1.1) / (25 + 0.3) = 0.94. Lost innovation is valued as a health harm, so the lost-income mortality adjustment applies only to the administration cost. Tax finance: each $1 of public outlay costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven & Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999), as for the transfer policies; CMS's implementation appropriation ($0.3bn a year) is tax-financed; manufacturers' reporting cost is private. The tax-financed share of the cost base is 0.3 of 11.2 (0.0268) at the low end and 0.3 of 25.3 (0.0119) at the high end. Applied conservatively: the policy saves Medicare far more than it costs to run, and the savings are not credited with the same excess burden. LOW = 0.571 (6.4/11.2) / (1 + 2.0 x 0.0268) = 0.54; HIGH = 2.80 (70.8/25.3) / (1 + 0.34 x 0.0119) = 2.79.","grade":"B-","grade_reason":"The high end rests on official CBO and CMS estimates, converted with peer-reviewed estimates (Dubois et al. 2015, RAND Journal, for the value of a lost drug; Chandra, Flack & Obermeyer 2024, QJE, for health gains, applied by extrapolation). The low end rests on think-tank modelling (Hoover), so the best sources are official estimates, which makes it B-.","cost_bn":"4.81","cost_basis":"Full cost, US$bn a year: administration $0.3bn (IRA appropriation of $3bn over 10 years) + manufacturer reporting $0.013bn + lost innovation $4.5bn a year (Cogan, Heil & Mulligan 2025, Mulligan method; CBO's projection of ~13 fewer drugs in 30 years implies about $1.1bn a year at Dubois et al.'s $2.5bn per new drug). Lower prices are a transfer of about $10.9-25bn a year from manufacturers to Medicare and enrollees, so they are not a cost to society.","difficulty":"moderate","difficulty_reason":"Moderate: it needed ordinary federal legislation (the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022) and is now run by CMS. Expanding the number of drugs, or extending negotiation to commercial insurance, would again need legislation.","who_benefits":"broad","who_benefits_reason":"Savings are spread across Medicare enrollees and taxpayers. Hoover's modelling finds Part D households save about $51 (middle income) to $65 (upper income) a year, under 0.1% of income. Costs from fewer future drugs fall on future patients generally.","summary":"Medicare negotiates prices for some high-spend drugs, and about 85% of Americans support it (KFF 2024; CES 2022 85.9%). Lower prices move money from drug makers to Medicare and its enrollees, and enrollees save about $2.2bn a year out of pocket on the first 25 drugs (CMS). A Quarterly Journal of Economics study finds Medicare patients who face higher drug costs take fewer medicines and die sooner; applied to these savings, that is about 3,583 deaths averted a year. Against CBO's small estimated loss of new drugs (13 of 1,300 over 30 years), each $1 returns between 54 cents and $2.79 once the excess burden of the taxes that pay for CMS administration is counted.","rated":"TRUE","gain_bn":"","mort_a":"-0.02","mort_b":"0","income_loss_bn":"0.3","emde_loss_lo":"","emde_loss_hi":"","base_bn":"16.8","lives_lo":"0","lives_hi":"3583","lives_basis":"High: Chandra, Flack & Obermeyer (2024, QJE) find one extra death per about $610,000 of out-of-pocket drug cost (0.0164 percentage points a month per $100 a month); applied to CMS's estimated enrollee savings of $2.185bn a year ($1.5bn in 2026 on the first 10 drugs + $685m in 2027 on the next 15) = 3,583 deaths averted a year, as in bcr_basis. Low: 0, because the low end of the ratio counts no health gains (CBO has not assessed patients' health). This is an extrapolation from a loss of coverage at age 65 to lower negotiated prices. Fewer new drugs are valued in dollars ($1.1-4.5bn a year) in the sources, not in deaths, so no death count is added for them; deaths caused stay the lost-income deaths on the $0.3bn administration cost.","selection_method":"Public-opinion survey","selected_by":"CES 2022 85.9%; KFF 85%"},{"id":"21","title":"Childhood Immunization","short":"Childhood Immunization","category":"Health","bcr_low":"4.81","bcr_high":"72.4","bcr_basis":"All figures are aid-programme scale-ups in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). The Copenhagen Consensus 2023 'Halftime' package raises 2022 coverage to 2030 targets for 9 vaccines (pentavalent, HPV, JE, measles, MR, MenA, PCV, rotavirus, yellow fever) in 80 LMICs; Patenaude, Sriudomporn & Mak (2023, JBCA) give benefits $762.2bn / costs $7.58bn (present value, 8% discount, VSLY valuation) = 100.5, reported as 101 in Best Things First. Ozawa et al. (2016, Health Affairs) find a net return about 16 times cost for 10 vaccines in 94 LMICs when only cost of illness (treatment costs and lost productivity) is counted, a benefit-cost ratio of 16 + 1 = 17; their full-income value of life gives a net return of 44, a ratio of 45. Sim et al. (2020, Health Affairs) get 19.8 (cost of illness) and 52.2 (value of statistical life) for 2021-30. The Post-2015 Consensus panel gave expanded immunization $60 per $1, and Copenhagen Consensus 2012 (Jamison et al.) gave 20. Cost-of-illness methods therefore give 17-26 and value-of-life methods 45-101. US programme studies (BCR 7.5-10.9) are a different setting and are listed as counter-sources. Full-cost adjustment: the source costs already include country-level delivery and programme management (see cost_components), so only the international channel overhead is added to the denominator. LOW = 14.4: Ozawa et al. (16 + 1) / 1.178 = 14.4 (all of its cost is programme spending, so the full 17.8% Gavi non-direct share is added). HIGH = 94 (lower overhead rate): CCC 100.5 / (1 + 0.075 x 0.882) = 94.3, rounded 94, where 0.882 = 1.5/1.7 is the programme (non-time) share of the CCC cost. The adjustment applies to costs only; benefits are not adjusted. Tax finance: each $1 of public outlay costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven & Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999), as for the transfer policies. LOW (Ozawa et al., all programme spending) = 14.43 (17/1.178) / 3.00 = 4.81. HIGH: only the programme share of the CCC cost (0.882, plus its 7.5% overhead) is tax-financed; parents' time is not: 100.5 / (1 + 0.075 x 0.882 + 0.34 x 0.882 x 1.075) = 100.5 / 1.3885 = 72.4.","grade":"A+","grade_reason":"Several independent peer-reviewed benefit-cost/ROI studies (Patenaude et al. 2023 JBCA; Ozawa et al. 2016 and Sim et al. 2020 in Health Affairs) agree that benefits are many times costs, and each vaccine's efficacy rests on randomized controlled trials. The results are consistent across methods, datasets and decades.","cost_bn":"1.97","cost_basis":"Copenhagen Consensus Best Things First leaflet (2025 web version): $1.7bn a year, of which $0.2bn is parents' time. The government/donor programme cost is therefore about $1.5bn a year; parents' time belongs inside the BCR, not in cost_bn. Cross-check: Patenaude et al. (2023) give a present-value cost of $7.58bn for 2023-2030 (8% discount), about $0.95bn a year in discounted terms. GiveWell's New Incentives programme costs about $146 per vaccinated infant at the margin in northern Nigeria, which shows the last children are expensive to reach. cost_bn = public outlay $1.5bn + administration/overhead $0.27bn + private (household) cost $0.2bn = $1.97bn/yr. Patenaude et al. (2023) cost vaccines (procurement, injection supplies, freight) plus immunization delivery costs that explicitly include labour, cold chain and its overheads, transport, buildings/utilities overheads and 'program management, short-term training, IEC/social mobilization, disease surveillance' (Section 4.1.1); Ozawa/Sim also cost vaccines, supply chain and service delivery. Country-level administration is therefore already included. The added administration is the overhead of the donor channel (Gavi: Secretariat implementation, partners' (WHO/UNICEF/CSO) technical assistance and overhead). Funding status: this programme is currently financed by national governments and donors (bilateral aid and multilateral funds); costs here are aid-programme (government/donor) costs, not market transactions.","difficulty":"moderate","difficulty_reason":"Moderate: a sustained donor and government funding scale-up through national immunization programmes on the proven Gavi model. Nothing new has to be invented, but global DTP3 coverage has stalled at 85% with 14.3 million zero-dose infants in 2024 (WHO/UNICEF), and those children are in conflict-affected and remote areas.","who_benefits":"pro-poor","who_benefits_reason":"Zero-dose children are concentrated in the poorest households and fragile states (WHO/UNICEF 2025). The averted deaths, which dominate the benefits, are mostly young children in low-income countries (Patenaude et al. 2023).","summary":"Paying for routine childhood vaccines (measles, pneumococcal, rotavirus, HPV and others) in poor countries is one of the best-documented high-return investments in health. Every major study finds benefits far above costs: about 17-26 times when only medical costs and lost work are counted, and 45-101 times when lives saved are valued. The Copenhagen Consensus 2023 package costs about $1.5bn a year in programme spending and saves about 523,000 lives a year. The hard part is reaching the last 10-15% of children in conflict zones and remote areas. Counting the donor channel's own overhead and any household time costs, the full cost is about $1.97bn a year and the ratio range is 14.4-94.","rated":"TRUE","gain_bn":"","mort_a":"-1","mort_b":"0","income_loss_bn":"2.0","emde_loss_lo":"","emde_loss_hi":"","base_bn":"1.97","lives_lo":"523000","lives_hi":"523000","lives_basis":"Copenhagen Consensus 2023 immunization package (9 vaccines, 80 low- and lower-middle-income countries, 2023-2030 average), costing $1.7bn a year including $0.2bn of parents' time, the same programme as cost_bn: 'saves 523,000 lives each year' (Best Things First leaflet); Lomborg (2023) Table 3.1 gives 0.5 million.","selection_method":"Health best buys","selected_by":"Copenhagen Consensus + DCP3 + WHO/GiveWell"},{"id":"22","title":"Blood Pressure and Heart Drugs","short":"Blood Pressure and Heart Drugs","category":"Health","bcr_low":"1.02","bcr_high":"44.0","bcr_basis":"WHO 'Saving lives, spending less' (2018), using the Bertram et al. (2018, Lancet) method, gives $3.29 per $1 for drug therapy and counselling for people at high cardiovascular risk in low- and lower-middle-income countries. This counts only economic output and averted health spending, not the value of lives saved, so it is a floor. Nugent's Post-2015 paper gives 3-17 for multi-drug secondary prevention (DALY at $1,000 vs $5,000, 3% discount). The Copenhagen Consensus Post-2015 expert panel put aspirin therapy for heart attacks at $63 per $1. The same panel gave high-blood-pressure medication $47 and a stroke/heart-attack pill (polypill) $7. Nugent's Post-2015 assessment gives aspirin for heart attack 31-153 and hypertension management 7-34. The full 'best investment' NCD package scored 23. So cheap acute aspirin is the top item, routine antihypertensives sit around 7-47, and multi-drug or polypill regimens sit lowest (3-17). Before overhead, the policy's components span 3.3-63. Full-cost adjustment: the source costs already include country-level delivery and programme management (see cost_components), so only the international channel overhead is added to the denominator. LOW = 3.1: WHO 3.29 / 1.08 = 3.05, rounded 3.1. HIGH = 59 (lower overhead rate): Post-2015 panel 63 / 1.07 = 58.9, rounded 59. The adjustment applies to costs only; benefits are not adjusted. Tax finance: each $1 of public outlay costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven & Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999), as for the transfer policies; the whole cost behind the ratio is public outlay; LOW = 3.05 (3.29/1.08) / 3.00 = 1.02; HIGH = 58.9 (63/1.07) / 1.34 = 44.0.","grade":"A","grade_reason":"Peer-reviewed benefit-cost estimates (Watkins et al. 2023 in JBCA; Bertram et al. 2018 in the Lancet; Nugent & Brouwer 2015 in Global Heart), with effect sizes taken from randomized-trial meta-analyses of aspirin, antihypertensives and statins, and polypill RCTs (TIPS-3, PolyIran). It is not A+ because the published BCRs for each component vary by an order of magnitude and depend heavily on the DALY value.","cost_bn":"2.59","cost_basis":"Watkins, Ahmed & Pickersgill (2023, JBCA): scaling up the 'best-investment' NCD interventions in LICs and LMCs (including aspirin for heart attack, CVD primary prevention and heart-failure care in LMCs, plus near-zero-cost taxes and regulations) costs US$19bn over 2023-2030, about US$2.4bn a year. This is used as the annual government cost for the CVD drug scale-up. It is a rough proxy: it also covers a few non-CVD clinical items (e.g., early breast cancer, epilepsy) but leaves out lower-BCR CVD drugs. Cross-checks: the WHO HEARTS package costs about US$18-44 per person treated per year (Moran et al. 2022). The CCC NCD bundle is $4.4bn/yr (leaflet), and Nugent's five Post-2015 NCD interventions cost about $8.5bn/yr. cost_bn = public outlay $2.4bn + administration/overhead $0.19bn + private (household) cost $0bn = $2.59bn/yr. Watkins et al. (2023) clinical unit costs already carry a 17% above-facility (programme management) markup plus ancillary facility costs (replication data: cost-adjustment multipliers 1.17, 1.257 and 1.488 by platform). WHO's $3.29 return uses the OneHealth Tool, which costs drugs/supplies plus related health-system costs (WHO/UNDP 2019 guidance note). A larger programme markup (70% of direct service costs, used for TB by Pretorius et al. 2023) was not applied because it is specific to vertical TB programmes. The added administration is the overhead of the donor channel (UN agency (WHO/UNICEF/UNDP) standard cost-recovery charge on earmarked donor funds). Funding status: this programme is currently financed by national governments and donors (bilateral aid and multilateral funds); costs here are aid-programme (government/donor) costs, not market transactions.","difficulty":"moderate","difficulty_reason":"Moderate: needs a sustained funding scale-up of primary-care hypertension and CVD treatment, with precedent in the WHO HEARTS programme in dozens of countries. The drugs are generic and cheap. The hard parts are screening, follow-up and adherence (in TIPS-3, 43% of participants had stopped taking the pill by the end of the trial).","who_benefits":"broad","who_benefits_reason":"Benefits go to adults with hypertension or heart disease across all income groups in LICs and LMICs. Programmes funded by government or donors help poorer patients who cannot pay for drugs, but diagnosis and continuing care reach better-off, urban patients first, so the sources do not show the benefits are concentrated on the poorest.","summary":"Cheap generic drugs (aspirin at the time of a heart attack, blood-pressure pills, and combination 'polypills' with a statin) prevent heart attacks and strokes, now the leading killers in many poor countries. Copenhagen Consensus panels put aspirin for heart attacks at about $63 per $1 and blood-pressure medication at about $47. WHO's narrower economic-only estimate is $3.29, and long-term multi-drug regimens score lower (about 3-17). A primary-care scale-up costs roughly $2.4bn a year across poor countries. Counting the donor channel's own overhead and any household time costs, the full cost is about $2.59bn a year and the ratio range is 3.1-59.","rated":"TRUE","gain_bn":"","mort_a":"-1","mort_b":"0","income_loss_bn":"2.6","emde_loss_lo":"","emde_loss_hi":"","base_bn":"2.59","lives_lo":"1129000","lives_hi":"1314000","lives_basis":"Watkins, Ahmed & Pickersgill (2023) best-investment NCD package, LICs + LMCs, annual average over 2023-2030, from the paper's replication output (output/cost_outputs.csv). Low: the cardiovascular drug items only (aspirin for suspected heart attack, CVD primary prevention in LMCs, chronic heart-failure treatment in LMCs) = 9,035,849 deaths over 8 years = 1,129,000 a year. High: the whole best-investment package that cost_bn pays for (12.14m deaths over 2023-2030; the paper's Table 2 gives 12 million), less tobacco and alcohol excise taxes, which are counted under #25 = 10,510,011 / 8 = 1,314,000 a year. Copenhagen Consensus's chronic-disease item gives 1.5 million a year for the package including taxes.","selection_method":"Health best buys","selected_by":"Copenhagen Consensus + DCP3 + WHO Best Buys"},{"id":"23","title":"Malaria Prevention","short":"Malaria Prevention","category":"Health","bcr_low":"5.81","bcr_high":"33.6","bcr_basis":"Shretta & Anye (2023, JBCA) cost a 10-percentage-point scale-up of insecticide-treated nets in 29 African countries at $5.7bn present value (8% discount) for 2023-2030. Benefits are $275.4bn (mortality $225.9bn, productivity $41.7bn, health-system savings $7.7bn), giving BCR 48, which is the Copenhagen Consensus 2023 figure. Middle: the Post-2015 Consensus panel put 'halve malaria infections' at $36 per $1, and Copenhagen Consensus 2012 (Jamison, Jha, Laxminarayan & Ord) gave the ACT treatment subsidy a BCR of about 35. Hallett et al. (2025, Lancet) find that an optimal HIV/TB/malaria investment returns up to $19 of health value per $1. This is a whole-portfolio figure across three diseases, so it is a conservative floor for malaria's highest-value tools. The same paper gives $3.50 if only direct economic benefits are counted (see counter-sources). Seasonal malaria chemoprevention has no published BCR in these sources. Its cost-effectiveness is similar to nets: GiveWell estimates about $4,000 per life saved for SMC versus $5,500 for nets. ACCESS-SMC (2020, Lancet) found 88% protective effectiveness within 28 days at about $3.63 per child per season. Full-cost adjustment: the source costs already include country-level delivery and programme management (see cost_components), so only the international channel overhead is added to the denominator. LOW = 17.4: Hallett et al. 19 / 1.090 = 17.4. HIGH = 45 (lower overhead rate): Shretta & Anye 48 / 1.067 = 45.0. The adjustment applies to costs only; benefits are not adjusted. Tax finance: each $1 of public outlay costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven & Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999), as for the transfer policies; the whole cost behind the ratio is public outlay; LOW = 17.43 (19/1.090) / 3.00 = 5.81; HIGH = 45.0 (48/1.067) / 1.34 = 33.6.","grade":"A","grade_reason":"Peer-reviewed benefit-cost estimates (Shretta & Anye 2023 in JBCA; Hallett et al. 2025 in the Lancet) built on randomized-trial evidence for nets, SMC and ACTs, with large-scale observational confirmation (Bhatt et al. 2015; ACCESS-SMC 2020). It is not A+ because there is essentially one BCA per component rather than several independent BCAs.","cost_bn":"1.53","cost_basis":"Costed scale-ups behind the BCRs: Copenhagen Consensus 2023 net scale-up $1.1bn a year (leaflet), plus about $0.3bn a year for the ACT treatment subsidy (Jamison et al. 2012) = about $1.4bn a year. SMC adds little: about $3.63 per child per season (ACCESS-SMC). The full funding gap is larger: WHO World Malaria Report 2025 says US$3.9bn was spent in 2024 against a US$9.3bn target, a shortfall of about US$5.4bn a year. Filling all of it would likely have a lower marginal BCR than the costed scale-ups. cost_bn = public outlay $1.4bn + administration/overhead $0.13bn + private (household) cost $0bn = $1.53bn/yr. Shretta & Anye (2023) cost nets, their distribution and social-behaviour-change communication from country and literature unit costs (Table 3); the authors state that active-surveillance costs are not included. Jamison et al. (2012) price the ACT subsidy at delivered cost. National programme management is not itemised separately, so only the funder overhead is added. The added administration is the overhead of the donor channel (Global Fund Secretariat operating expenses). Funding status: this programme is currently financed by national governments and donors (bilateral aid and multilateral funds); costs here are aid-programme (government/donor) costs, not market transactions.","difficulty":"moderate","difficulty_reason":"Moderate: a sustained donor funding scale-up (only 42% of the required funding was attained in 2024) through proven channels: the Global Fund, PMI, national malaria programmes, AMF and Malaria Consortium. Precedent: SMC grew from 170,000 to 54 million children per cycle between 2012 and 2024, and several countries have been certified malaria-free.","who_benefits":"pro-poor","who_benefits_reason":"About 95% of malaria deaths are in the WHO African Region and about 75% of those are children under five (World Malaria Report 2025). The burden falls on the poorest rural households. Sarma et al. (2019) find larger income effects from reduced malaria in poorer, high-burden countries.","summary":"Insecticide-treated bed nets, seasonal preventive drugs for young children in the Sahel, and cheap combination treatment are the core tools against malaria, which still kills about 610,000 people a year, mostly African children. Peer-reviewed benefit-cost studies put the return at about $19-48 per dollar when lives saved are valued, and GiveWell estimates $4,000-5,500 per life saved. Costed scale-ups need about $1.4bn a year, while the global funding gap is about $5.4bn a year. Counting the donor channel's own overhead and any household time costs, the full cost is about $1.53bn a year and the ratio range is 17.4-45.","rated":"TRUE","gain_bn":"","mort_a":"-1","mort_b":"0","income_loss_bn":"1.5","emde_loss_lo":"","emde_loss_hi":"","base_bn":"1.53","lives_lo":"167000","lives_hi":"467000","lives_basis":"Low: bed-net scale-up, Shretta & Anye (2023): 1,337,069 deaths averted over 2023-2030 = 167,000 a year at $1.1bn a year (Copenhagen Consensus leaflet: 'saving 167,000 lives'). High: adds the ACT treatment subsidy costed in cost_bn, Jamison, Jha, Laxminarayan & Ord (2012): 'spending $300 million a year would save 300,000 child deaths' = 467,000 a year. The ACT figure is older and was estimated when drug resistance was rising, so it is the upper end.","selection_method":"Health best buys","selected_by":"Copenhagen Consensus + DCP3 + GiveWell"},{"id":"24","title":"Micronutrient Supplementation","short":"Micronutrient Supplementation","category":"Health","bcr_low":"1.85","bcr_high":"26.2","bcr_basis":"Component BCRs: (1) Multiple micronutrient supplements (MMS) replacing iron-folic acid for pregnant women: BCR 37.5 at 8% discount (Larsen, Hoddinott & Razvi 2023, JBCA). This sets the high end. MMS plus calcium is 19-24 (the CCC leaflet's nutrition item), and the whole CCC nutrition package (MMS, calcium, complementary feeding, SQ-LNS) is 18. (2) Staple-food fortification: iron fortification of flour about 8 (Horton, Alderman & Rivera 2008: 8 at 3% discount, 7 at 6%; Copenhagen Consensus guide: $1,336M benefits / $167M cost = 8.0). Horton & Ross (2003, Food Policy) give a median of 6 for iron fortification counting physical productivity only, which sets the low end, rising to 36 with cognitive benefits. Salt iodization is about 30 ($570M / $19M; GAIN cites 28). GAIN (Garrett et al. 2019) gives 27 for fortification overall. (3) Child vitamin A supplementation: no published BCR was found. A Cochrane review of 19 trials (Imdad et al. 2022) shows 12% lower all-cause child mortality, and GiveWell estimates about $3,500 per life saved, its most cost-effective top charity. The Post-2015 panel's 45 for 'reduce child malnutrition' is a broader stunting package and is not used. Before overhead the range is 6 (iron fortification, productivity only) to 37.5 (MMS). Full-cost adjustment: the source costs already include country-level delivery and programme management (see cost_components), so only the international channel overhead is added to the denominator. LOW = 5.6: Horton & Ross 6 / 1.08 = 5.6. HIGH = 35 (lower overhead rate): Larsen et al. 37.5 / 1.07 = 35.0. The adjustment applies to costs only; benefits are not adjusted. Tax finance: each $1 of public outlay costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven & Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999), as for the transfer policies; the whole cost behind the ratio is public outlay; LOW = 5.56 (6/1.08) / 3.00 = 1.85; HIGH = 35.05 (37.5/1.07) / 1.34 = 26.2.","grade":"A","grade_reason":"Peer-reviewed benefit-cost estimates (Larsen et al. 2023 in JBCA; Horton & Ross 2003 in Food Policy) backed by randomized trials and meta-analyses (Cochrane review of vitamin A supplementation, 19 trials, 1.2 million children, high-certainty evidence). It is not A+ because a large trial (DEVTA) found a non-significant mortality effect for vitamin A, and no BCA covers the exact iron-zinc-vitamin A fortification bundle.","cost_bn":"0.54","cost_basis":"Sum of costed components: iron flour fortification at 50% coverage in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa $167M/yr, plus salt iodization at 80% coverage $19M/yr (Copenhagen Consensus guide), plus MMS for pregnant women about $84M/yr and calcium about $216M/yr (Larsen et al. 2023). Total = 0.167 + 0.019 + 0.084 + 0.216 = $0.486bn, rounded to $0.5bn a year. Not included: zinc/vitamin A in fortification (no separate cost found) and scaling up child vitamin A supplementation (~$2 per child-year per GiveWell; existing programmes already reach many children). Much of fortification's cost is borne by millers and passed to consumers rather than paid by government. The CCC nutrition package as a whole is $1.4bn/yr including $0.2bn of time costs. cost_bn = public outlay $0.5bn + administration/overhead $0.04bn + private (household) cost $0bn = $0.54bn/yr. Larsen, Hoddinott & Razvi (2023) include an incremental delivery cost of US$0.50-1.45 per pregnant woman for MMS through antenatal care. The fortification cost lines (Copenhagen Consensus guide; Horton et al. 2008) are total resource costs, including the share borne by millers and salt producers, so industry compliance cost is already counted in public outlay rather than added again. The added administration is the overhead of the donor channel (UN agency (UNICEF/WFP/WHO) standard cost-recovery charge on earmarked donor funds). Funding status: this programme is currently financed by national governments and donors (bilateral aid and multilateral funds); costs here are aid-programme (government/donor) costs, not market transactions.","difficulty":"easy","difficulty_reason":"Easy: one health ministry or food regulator can mandate fortification under existing food-standards law, and over 60 countries already have 70%+ household coverage of iodized salt. Supplements in pregnancy and vitamin A capsules can be funded by a single donor or health ministry through existing antenatal and child-health days. The total cost is about $0.5bn a year.","who_benefits":"pro-poor","who_benefits_reason":"Micronutrient deficiency is concentrated among poor households that rely on cheap, nutrient-poor staples. 80% of undernourished children are in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa (Copenhagen Consensus), and vitamin A and pregnancy supplements are delivered through public programmes that reach low-income mothers and children.","summary":"Adding iron, zinc and vitamin A to flour, salt and oil, giving pregnant women a daily multiple-micronutrient tablet, and giving young children vitamin A capsules all cost cents to a few dollars per person a year. Peer-reviewed benefit-cost studies put the return at about 6-8 per dollar for iron fortification counting only productivity, about 30 for iodized salt, and about 37 for prenatal multiple micronutrients. Vitamin A capsules cut child deaths by about 12% in trials and are among GiveWell's most cost-effective programmes. The costed package is about $0.5bn a year. Counting the donor channel's own overhead and any household time costs, the full cost is about $0.54bn a year and the ratio range is 5.6-35.","rated":"TRUE","gain_bn":"","mort_a":"-1","mort_b":"0","income_loss_bn":"0.5","emde_loss_lo":"","emde_loss_hi":"","base_bn":"0.54","lives_lo":"0","lives_hi":"8470","lives_basis":"Larsen, Hoddinott & Razvi (2023) Table 12: calcium for pregnant women averts 0-8,470 maternal deaths a year (pre-eclampsia/eclampsia; Hofmeyr et al. 2018 find no significant effect on maternal mortality, hence the low end of 0); multiple micronutrients show no significant effect on neonatal or infant mortality and none is counted. The 127,785 stillbirths a year the two supplements avert (46,857 + 80,928) are not counted as deaths in that source. Iron flour fortification and salt iodization are valued by productivity and cognition, with no death count in their sources.","selection_method":"Health best buys","selected_by":"Copenhagen Consensus + GiveWell (+DCP3)"},{"id":"25","title":"Tobacco and Alcohol Taxes","short":"Tobacco and Alcohol Taxes","category":"Health","bcr_low":"1.47","bcr_high":"98.2","bcr_basis":"HIGH = 100: Watkins, Ahmed & Pickersgill (2023, JBCA, Copenhagen Consensus Halftime), replication data, 8% discount, 2023-30, LICs+LMCs: tobacco excise tax gross benefits $51.31bn PV against incremental implementation cost $0.045bn and a forgone-consumer-surplus charge of $0.462bn = 101.2 (LMCs 102, LICs 94). Alcohol excise tax: $2.94bn / ($0.029bn + $0.026bn) = 53.3 (LICs 53). The implementation cost includes tax administration (WHO/UNDP 2019 costing convention: programme costs at the administrative level), and the marginal administrative cost of raising an existing excise rate is reported to be small (India: US$5.7m/yr), so no further cost is added at the high end. Without any consumer-surplus charge the tobacco BCR would be 620 (LICs) to 1,300 (LMCs); that is not used. Middle: the Post-2015 panel gave 'increase tobacco prices 125%' $22 per $1; Nugent (Post-2015) gave tobacco tax 10-52; WHO 'Saving lives, spending less' (2018) gives $7.43 (tobacco package) and $9.13 (alcohol) counting only output and averted health spending. LOW = 2.9: base-case tobacco-tax benefits reduced by 10% for illicit substitution (World Bank 2019: illicit trade is about 10% of global consumption; tax increases add little to it) divided by Watkins' cost and surplus charge plus the upper-bound annual costs in cost_components (collection $0.80bn + enforcement $0.45bn + secure stamps $1.21bn = $2.46bn/yr) over 8 years: 0.9 x 51.31 / (0.045 + 0.462 + 6.206 x 2.46) = 46.18 / 15.79 = 2.9. WHO's 7.4 lies inside the range. Note on the consumer-surplus charge: the paper text describes offsets of 0.9 (tobacco/alcohol) and 0.5 (salt) of health benefits, but the replication code applies 0.009 and 0.001; if the paper's stated 90% offset were subtracted from benefits, the tobacco BCR would be 0.1 x 1,134 = 113, above the published 101, so the high end is not overstated on that account. Tax revenue is a transfer and is not a benefit. Elasticities behind the health effects: tobacco about -0.4 (Jha & Peto 2014); alcohol -0.51 (Wagenaar et al. 2009). Tax finance: each $1 of public outlay costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven & Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999), as for the transfer policies; the public costs are Watkins et al.'s implementation cost ($0.045bn PV) and, at the low end, tax collection ($0.80bn a year) and illicit-trade enforcement ($0.45bn a year); consumer surplus and industry-paid tax stamps are private. The tax-financed share of the cost base is 7.80 (0.045 + 6.206 x 1.25) of 15.79 (0.494) at the low end and 0.045 of 0.507 (0.0888) at the high end. Applied conservatively: the tax raises far more revenue than it costs to collect. LOW = 2.92 (46.18/15.79) / (1 + 2.0 x 0.494) = 1.47; HIGH = 101.2 (51.31/0.507) / (1 + 0.34 x 0.0888) = 98.2.","grade":"A","grade_reason":"Peer-reviewed benefit-cost estimates (Watkins et al. 2023 in JBCA; Bertram et al. 2018 in the Lancet, underlying WHO's ROI figures), built on price elasticities from meta-analyses of many quasi-experimental and econometric studies (Wagenaar et al. 2009; Jha & Peto 2014). It is not A+ because the BCR depends heavily on how lost consumer surplus is treated (100 vs 1,300) and no RCTs exist.","cost_bn":"2.47","cost_basis":"cost_bn = public outlay $0 + administration/enforcement $1.26bn + industry compliance $1.21bn = $2.47bn/yr (upper bound; details in cost_components). Tax revenue is a transfer, so only administrative, enforcement and compliance costs count. Watkins et al. (2023) put full implementation of India's tobacco tax increase at US$5.7m a year, and their replication data give a PV implementation cost of $0.045bn (tobacco) + $0.029bn (alcohol) for all LICs and LMCs over 2023-30 (~$0.012bn/yr). Chisholm et al. (2018) put alcohol excise tax implementation below I$0.10 per capita. Tax collection, illicit-trade enforcement and secure tax stamps are costed from WHO (2021) and World Bank (2019) ratios. Funding status: tax administration and enforcement are carried out and paid for by national governments; donors (e.g., Bloomberg Philanthropies, WHO FCTC programmes) fund technical assistance. Costs here are government administration plus industry compliance.","difficulty":"moderate","difficulty_reason":"Moderate: needs ordinary tax legislation in each country, with many precedents (the Philippines, Turkey, South Africa and others have raised tobacco excise sharply). Industry lobbying and smuggling concerns are the main obstacles. Progress on tobacco taxes has stalled partly because of tobacco-industry political influence.","who_benefits":"pro-poor","who_benefits_reason":"Global Tobacco Economics Consortium (2018, BMJ): in 13 middle-income countries, a 50% cigarette price rise gives the poorest 20% 6.7 times more life-years than the richest 20%, averts 8.8 million men's falls into extreme poverty, and the poorest pay only about 10% of the extra tax. Measured as a share of cash spent, the tax is regressive for poor smokers who do not quit (Remler 2004).","summary":"Raising excise taxes on cigarettes and alcohol pushes up prices, which cuts smoking and heavy drinking, especially among the young and the poor, and raises revenue. Copenhagen Consensus analysis puts the return at about 53-100 per dollar of social cost; WHO's narrower economic-only estimates are $7.43 for tobacco and $9.13 for alcohol. Counting the full cost of collecting the tax, policing smuggling and secure tax stamps (up to about $2.47bn a year across poor countries) a 10% loss of benefit to illicit cigarettes, and the excess burden of the taxes that pay the public collection and enforcement costs, lowers the bottom of the range to about 1.5; the top is about 98. Jha and Peto estimate that doubling real cigarette prices could cut smoking by about a third.","rated":"TRUE","gain_bn":"","mort_a":"-1","mort_b":"0","income_loss_bn":"2.5","emde_loss_lo":"","emde_loss_hi":"","base_bn":"2.47","lives_lo":"203000","lives_hi":"443000","lives_basis":"Watkins, Ahmed & Pickersgill (2023) replication output (output/cost_outputs.csv), LICs + LMCs. Low: tobacco and alcohol excise taxes average 203,000 deaths averted a year over 2023-2030 while the tax rises (1,553,547 + 72,253 over 8 years). High: 443,000 a year in 2030 at full implementation (425,916 + 17,298). The paper's India example: 'saving 910,000 lives in India'.","selection_method":"Health best buys","selected_by":"Copenhagen Consensus + DCP3 + WHO Best Buys"},{"id":"26","title":"School Deworming","short":"School Deworming","category":"Health","bcr_low":"2.0","bcr_high":"74.6","bcr_basis":"LOW = 6: Copenhagen Consensus best-practice paper (Hall & Horton), 'each dollar spent results in about $6 of benefits' for preschool children. HIGH = 100: DCP3 (Ahuja et al., Vol. 8 Ch. 29) reports the long-run benefits from the Kenyan Primary School Deworming Project (Baird et al. 2016, QJE) as 'more than 100 times the cost', with an annualised internal rate of return of 32-51%; Copenhagen's own high-prevalence figure is 'up to 60 times' the costs. The 20-year follow-up (Hamory et al. 2021, PNAS) gives a conservative annualised social internal rate of return of 37% (40.7% on earnings gains, 36.7% on consumption gains); at a 10% discount rate the social net present value is US$ PPP 230.71 (earnings) to 467.90 (consumption) per child. Cost is about $0.30 per child per treatment; treating most of the 870 million at-risk children costs under $0.3bn a year (DCP3 p. 419). The evidence is disputed: the Cochrane review (Taylor-Robinson et al. 2015) finds no effect on many outcomes from mass drug administration, which is why the low end uses the conservative Copenhagen figure. Tax finance: each $1 of public outlay costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven & Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999), as for the transfer policies; the whole cost behind the ratio is public outlay; LOW = 6 / 3.00 = 2.0; HIGH = 100 / 1.34 = 74.6.","grade":"B+","grade_reason":"Built on a long-run cluster-randomized trial with peer-reviewed economic returns (Baird et al. 2016, QJE; Hamory et al. 2021, PNAS) and a Copenhagen Consensus best-practice paper, but the wider trial evidence is contested (Cochrane review), so B+ rather than A.","cost_bn":"0.3","cost_basis":"About $0.30 per child per treatment; under $0.3bn a year to treat most of the 870 million at-risk children in low- and middle-income countries (DCP3 Vol. 8 Ch. 29, p. 419). Drugs are largely donated.","difficulty":"easy","difficulty_reason":"Delivered through existing schools once or twice a year with cheap, largely donated drugs.","who_benefits":"pro-poor","who_benefits_reason":"Children in poor, high-infection areas; the Kenyan trial's long-run gains in earnings and consumption accrue to them as adults.","summary":"Giving schoolchildren a cheap pill once or twice a year clears intestinal worms that sap nutrition and school attendance. A long-running randomized trial in Kenya found the treated children earned and consumed more as adults twenty years later, an annual social return of 37%, and the development-economics handbook DCP3 puts the long-run benefits at more than 100 times the cost. Copenhagen Consensus's conservative figure is about $6 per $1. The wider evidence is disputed, so the range is wide, but at about $0.30 per child the whole programme costs under $0.3bn a year.","rated":"TRUE","gain_bn":"","mort_a":"-1","mort_b":"1","income_loss_bn":"0.3","emde_loss_lo":"","emde_loss_hi":"","base_bn":"0.3","lives_lo":"0","lives_hi":"0","lives_basis":"No deaths averted are counted. The Cochrane review (Taylor-Robinson et al. 2015; three trials, 1,005,135 children) finds 'May be little or no effect on death' (risk ratio 0.95, low-quality evidence); the ratio's benefits are adult earnings and consumption (Hamory et al. 2021), not lives.","selection_method":"Health best buys","selected_by":"Copenhagen Consensus + DCP3"},{"id":"27","title":"Contraception & Family Planning","short":"Contraception & Family Planning","category":"Health","bcr_low":"6.79","bcr_high":"83.7","bcr_basis":"Main policy = universal access to modern contraception. Kohler & Behrman (Copenhagen Consensus Post-2015) give 120 for meeting the unmet need of 214 million women at ~$3.6bn/yr; about 40 of this comes from health benefits (640,000 fewer newborn and 150,000 fewer maternal deaths a year) and the rest from a $288bn/yr demographic dividend (Lomborg 2019). Madise et al. (2023, JBCA, 8% discount) give 22 for the 'family planning' package alone in 55 LICs/LMICs (Figure 3). In between, Ghana Priorities (Amporfu et al. 2020, 8%) gives 33.6 (married women, +10 pp contraceptive prevalence) and 29.3 (unmarried women). The spread reflects how much demographic-dividend benefit is counted and the discount rate (Post-2015 work used lower rates than the 8% of the Halftime/Ghana studies). Sub-policy (girls' full secondary education) is not folded into the range because its returns are lower and differently measured: the Ghana scholarship RCT (Duflo, Dupas & Kremer 2021; Duflo, Dupas, Spelke & Walsh 2026, AER) gives a conservative $4.1 per $1 of long-run government cost, rising to 10-110x when targeted at girls and counting their children's survival (VoxDev summary); Copenhagen Post-2015 puts secondary completion at ~4 and girls' schooling/later marriage programmes at ~5. If the sub-policy were bundled at its cost (~$15bn/yr upper bound) the combined ratio would fall to roughly (3.6x22 + 15x4.1)/18.6 = 7.6 at the low end and (3.6x120 + 15x10)/18.6 = 31 at the high end. Full-cost adjustment: the source costs already include country-level delivery and programme management (see cost_components), so only the international channel overhead is added to the denominator. LOW = 20.4: Madise et al. 22 / 1.08 = 20.4. HIGH = 112 (lower overhead rate): Kohler & Behrman 120 / 1.07 = 112.1, rounded 112. The adjustment applies to costs only; benefits are not adjusted. Tax finance: each $1 of public outlay costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven & Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999), as for the transfer policies; the whole cost behind the ratio is public outlay; LOW = 20.37 (22/1.08) / 3.00 = 6.79; HIGH = 112.1 (120/1.07) / 1.34 = 83.7.","grade":"A","grade_reason":"Peer-reviewed benefit-cost estimate including family planning (Madise et al. 2023, JBCA) consistent with Copenhagen Post-2015 and Ghana Priorities BCRs, backed by quasi-experimental evidence (Matlab, Bangladesh: Joshi & Schultz 2013 Demography; Colombia: Miller 2010 Economic Journal). The girls'-education sub-policy rests on a 15-year randomized trial with a peer-reviewed BCR (Duflo et al. 2026, AER).","cost_bn":"3.89","cost_basis":"$3.6bn a year to provide modern contraception to the 214 million women with unmet need (Kohler & Behrman, Copenhagen Consensus, as reported by Lomborg 2019); donor funding for family planning was only ~$1.27bn in 2017. Funding: government/donor spending. The girls' secondary-education sub-policy is costed separately and not included: ~$505 per girl for four years of senior high school including forgone wages (VoxDev summary of the Ghana trial) = ~$126/yr; x 122 million out-of-school girls (UNESCO) = ~$15bn/yr, an upper bound since many are primary-age. cost_bn = public outlay $3.6bn + administration/overhead $0.29bn + private (household) cost $0bn = $3.89bn/yr. The $3.6bn/yr Kohler & Behrman figure comes from the Guttmacher 'Adding It Up' costing, whose method adds 'programs and systems costs' (program management, supervision, M&E, training, outreach, supply systems, HMIS) to direct costs; Madise et al. (2023) cost staff, consumables, overheads and supervision. The added administration is the overhead of the donor channel (UNFPA standard cost-recovery charge on earmarked donor funds). Funding status: this programme is currently financed by national governments and donors (bilateral aid and multilateral funds); costs here are aid-programme (government/donor) costs, not market transactions.","difficulty":"moderate","difficulty_reason":"Needs a sustained donor/government funding scale-up (~$3.6bn a year vs ~$1.27bn donor funding in 2017; Lomborg 2019) with working precedents, e.g. Bangladesh's Matlab outreach programme (Joshi & Schultz 2013) and Colombia's Profamilia (Miller 2010). The girls'-education sub-policy is a larger, budget-heavy scale-up with a tested model in Ghana's scholarships.","who_benefits":"pro-poor","who_benefits_reason":"Unmet need is concentrated among poorer women in high-fertility low-income countries (Kohler & Behrman; Madise et al. 2023 cover 55 LICs/LMICs). Matlab showed long-run gains in women's and children's health in rural Bangladesh (Joshi & Schultz 2013). The Ghana scholarships were means-tested; female recipients gained 20-30% in earnings and their children's mortality fell (J-PAL; Duflo et al. 2026).","summary":"Fund modern contraception (pills, injectables, implants, IUDs, counselling) for the roughly 214 million women in poor countries who want to avoid pregnancy but lack access, at about $3.6bn a year. Copenhagen Consensus estimates $22-120 of benefit per $1, depending on how much of the 'demographic dividend' from smaller families is counted; health benefits alone give about $40. A sub-policy, paying for girls to finish secondary school, is backed by a 15-year randomized trial in Ghana (Duflo, Dupas, Kremer and co-authors): it delayed childbearing, raised women's earnings and halved infant mortality among their children, returning at least $4 per $1 of government cost, more if targeted at girls. The headline ratio is for family planning; the schooling sub-policy is valuable but lower-return and costs far more. Counting the donor channel's own overhead and any household time costs, the full cost is about $3.89bn a year and the ratio range is 20.4-112.","rated":"TRUE","gain_bn":"428","mort_a":"-1","mort_b":"0","income_loss_bn":"3.9","emde_loss_lo":"","emde_loss_hi":"","base_bn":"3.89","lives_lo":"790000","lives_hi":"790000","lives_basis":"Kohler & Behrman (Copenhagen Consensus Post-2015), as reported by Lomborg (2019): universal access to modern contraception for 214 million women at about $3.6bn a year 'would result each year in 640,000 fewer newborn deaths, 150,000 fewer maternal deaths' = 790,000.","selection_method":"Health best buys","selected_by":"Copenhagen Consensus + DCP3"},{"id":"28","title":"Maternal and Newborn Care","short":"Maternal and Newborn Care","category":"Health","bcr_low":"28.5","bcr_high":"66.5","bcr_basis":"To avoid double counting with #27, this item is defined as facility obstetric and newborn care only (no family planning). Madise et al. (2023, JBCA, 55 LICs/LMICs, 8% discount, coverage raised from 68% to 90%) report by package (Figure 3): BEmONC alone = 83 and comprehensive emergency obstetric and newborn care (CEmONC, adds caesarean capacity) = 65; these set the high and low ends before overhead. The CCC headline of 87 (Lomborg 2023; leaflet) is BEmONC + family planning and includes a $25bn/yr demographic dividend, so it is not used. Wider packages score lower (entire continuum of care 36; antenatal 7) and are reported as counter-evidence. Benefits are mostly newborn lives: the BEmONC+FP package averts 1.20m newborn and 161,000 maternal deaths a year (newborn lives worth $238bn of $281bn benefits, VSLY $2,983). Valuing stillbirths averted would raise the bundle's BCR to 159. On the '65%' target: universal coverage of existing interventions would avert 71% of neonatal deaths, 82% of that through facility-based care (Bhutta et al. 2014); Madise's 1.2m of 2.16m LIC/LMIC neonatal deaths is about 56%. Full-cost adjustment: the source costs already include country-level delivery and programme management (see cost_components), so only the international channel overhead is added to the denominator. LOW = 62: 65 / (1 + 0.08 x 0.571) = 62.2, rounded 62, where 0.571 = 2.8/4.9 is the financial share of the CCC cost (the rest is mothers' time). HIGH = 80 (lower overhead rate): 83 / (1 + 0.07 x 0.571) = 79.8, rounded 80. The adjustment applies to costs only; benefits are not adjusted. Tax finance: each $1 of public outlay costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven & Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999), as for the transfer policies; only the financial share of the cost (0.571, plus its overhead) is tax-financed, mothers' time is not: LOW = 65 / (1 + 0.08 x 0.571 + 2.0 x 0.571 x 1.08) = 65 / 2.2790 = 28.5; HIGH = 83 / (1 + 0.07 x 0.571 + 0.34 x 0.571 x 1.07) = 83 / 1.2477 = 66.5. Additional study (below the range, not used to set it): the Malawi Priorities cost-benefit analysis of basic emergency obstetric and newborn care (National Planning Commission, Copenhagen Consensus Center and AFIDEP 2021; Madise is a co-author), at the same 8% discount rate, finds a benefit-cost ratio of 15 for the full 15-intervention BEmONC package and 31 for a targeted five-intervention package (Table 14). With this entry's overhead and tax-finance adjustments these become 15 / 2.2790 = 6.6 and 31 / 1.2477 = 24.8, below the low end. Benefits are valued for Malawi, one of the poorest countries, whereas the range uses the 55-country estimate, so the single-country result is reported but the range is not extended. Other single-country Copenhagen Consensus studies of facility births are also lower (Bangladesh facility births 8; Ghana EmONC 5.6-8.3 at 8%).","grade":"A","grade_reason":"Peer-reviewed benefit-cost analysis (Madise et al. 2023, JBCA; Lomborg 2023 JBCA summary) whose intervention effects come from the trial-based Lives Saved Tool evidence summarised in the Lancet Every Newborn series (Bhutta et al. 2014).","cost_bn":"4.69","cost_basis":"Lomborg (2023) Table 3.1 / CCC leaflet: maternal & newborn package costs $4.9bn/yr (2023-30 average), of which $2.1bn is mothers' time (non-financial), leaving $2.8bn of financial (government/donor) cost. That package includes family planning; Madise et al. (2023) Table 2 costs FP at 68.6m extra women x ($2.89 + $2.14 + $0.65 + $0.75 = $6.43) = ~$0.44bn/yr. Facility care excluding FP therefore ~$2.8bn - $0.4bn = ~$2.4bn/yr (approximate, since it mixes 2020 and 2023 dollar bases). Cross-check: Bhutta et al. (2014) put facility-based care at $3.66bn of a $5.65bn/yr incremental running cost for universal coverage. cost_bn = public outlay $2.4bn + administration/overhead $0.19bn + private (household) cost $2.1bn = $4.69bn/yr. Madise et al. (2023) include provider costs (staff, consumables, equipment, overheads), a 15% supervision add-on, beneficiary costs (travel) and demand-generation costs. The added administration is the overhead of the donor channel (UN agency (UNICEF/UNFPA/WHO) standard cost-recovery charge on earmarked donor funds). Funding status: this programme is currently financed by national governments and donors (bilateral aid and multilateral funds); costs here are aid-programme (government/donor) costs, not market transactions.","difficulty":"moderate","difficulty_reason":"Needs a sustained government/donor scale-up to staff, equip and supply birth facilities in 55 countries (Madise et al. 2023), plus demand-generation payments for facility births on the model of India's Janani Suraksha Yojana, which Madise et al. use for costing. Precedent exists, but it is a health-system build-out, not a single-agency switch.","who_benefits":"pro-poor","who_benefits_reason":"The 55 low- and lower-middle-income countries modelled carry about 90% of global maternal and neonatal deaths; the welfare loss from these deaths is ~5.5% of their GDP (Madise et al. 2023).","summary":"Upgrade basic hospitals and health centres in poor countries so every birth has trained staff, clean delivery, drugs to stop bleeding, antibiotics, newborn resuscitation and steroids for preterm labour. Peer-reviewed Copenhagen Consensus analysis finds $65-83 of benefit per $1 for these facility packages, mainly from newborn lives saved, at roughly $2.4bn a year in public cost. Existing interventions could prevent about 71% of newborn deaths, most of them through better care at birth. The often-quoted ratio of 87 also includes family planning, which is counted separately under policy 27. Counting the donor channel's own overhead and any household time costs, the full cost is about $4.69bn a year and the ratio range is 62-80.","rated":"TRUE","gain_bn":"","mort_a":"-1","mort_b":"0","income_loss_bn":"4.7","emde_loss_lo":"","emde_loss_hi":"","base_bn":"4.69","lives_lo":"1361000","lives_hi":"1361000","lives_basis":"Madise, Nandi, Wong & Razvi (2023): raising basic emergency obstetric and newborn care from 68% to 90% coverage in 55 countries averts '1.20 million newborn deaths and 161,000 maternal deaths' a year = 1,361,000 (Copenhagen Consensus leaflet: 161,000 maternal deaths and 1.2 million newborns; Lomborg 2023 Table 3.1: 1.4 million). These figures are for the package with family planning added; the source does not report deaths for facility care alone, so some of these deaths overlap with #27.","selection_method":"Health best buys","selected_by":"Copenhagen Consensus + DCP3"},{"id":"29","title":"Tuberculosis Treatment","short":"Tuberculosis Treatment","category":"Health","bcr_low":"9.54","bcr_high":"61.7","bcr_basis":"Pretorius et al. (2023, JBCA, Copenhagen Consensus Halftime) cost-benefit analysis of the Stop TB Global Plan 2023-2030 (modern diagnostics, screening, treatment, prevention) in LICs/LMICs, without new vaccines, vs standard baseline, 8% discount, effects to 2050: incremental costs $56.4bn and benefits $2,595bn (PV, 2020 US$) = 46.0; 27.3m deaths averted (~1m/yr) at ~$2,063 per death averted. The paper's own sensitivity range is 28-84: about 28 with vaccines and R&D costs included (27.7) and about 84 against the disruption baseline at a 5% discount (83.9); these set the low and high ends before overhead. Other cells: 55.4 at 5%, 36.6 at 12%, 34.0 including R&D, 71.0 vs the COVID-disruption baseline. Consistent with Copenhagen Post-2015 (Vassall): cut TB deaths 95% and incidence 90% for $8.1bn/yr, BCR 43. The older World Bank estimate of 9-15 (Laxminarayan et al. 2007) is below this range and listed as counter-evidence. Full-cost adjustment: the source costs already include country-level delivery and programme management (see cost_components), so only the international channel overhead is added to the denominator. LOW = 26: 27.7 / (1 + 0.090 x 0.839) = 25.8, rounded 26, where 0.839 = 5.2/6.2 is the financed share of the total cost. HIGH = 79 (lower overhead rate): 83.9 / (1 + 0.067 x 0.839) = 79.4, rounded 79. The adjustment applies to costs only; benefits are not adjusted. Tax finance: each $1 of public outlay costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven & Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999), as for the transfer policies; only the financed share of the cost (0.839, plus its overhead) is tax-financed, the $1.0bn non-financial enabler cost is not: LOW = 27.7 / (1 + 0.090 x 0.839 + 2.0 x 0.839 x 1.090) = 27.7 / 2.9045 = 9.54; HIGH = 83.9 / (1 + 0.067 x 0.839 + 0.34 x 0.839 x 1.067) = 83.9 / 1.3606 = 61.7. Additional study (below the range before adjustment, not used to set it): Vassall's (2016) Bangladesh Priorities analysis for the Copenhagen Consensus Center prices treating 90% of all TB cases in Bangladesh (expanded case detection through community and private-sector channels plus treatment), about 120,000 extra cases a year: BCR 20.60 at 3%, 17.86 at 5% and 12.91 at 10% (results table, p.10). These are below the 27.7-83.9 that set this range before overhead and tax finance (12.91 / 2.9045 = 4.4 and 20.60 / 1.3606 = 15.1 with this entry's adjustments). They value one country's low-income DALYs and do not use the 8% Halftime convention, like the World Bank estimate in the counter list, so the range is not extended; the Andhra Pradesh study (Arinaminpathy, 108-117 at 5%) lies far above it, so single-country results bracket the global range on both sides.","grade":"A","grade_reason":"Peer-reviewed Copenhagen Consensus benefit-cost analysis (Pretorius et al. 2023, JBCA), consistent with Post-2015 (43) and with positive older World Bank estimates, built on the trial-established efficacy of standard TB treatment and diagnostics.","cost_bn":"6.67","cost_basis":"Lomborg's Best Things First Table 3.1 lists TB 'Total cost $6.2 billion' and, in a separate column 'whereof non-financial cost', '$1.0 billion enabler cost'. Total social cost = $6.2bn/yr (2023-30 average; used in the BCR) and the part that governments/donors must finance = $6.2bn - $1.0bn = $5.2bn/yr. This matches Pretorius et al.'s year-by-year incremental costs: $4.4bn in 2023, peaking at $7.1bn in 2027, $5.2bn in 2030. Post-2015 (Vassall) costed a 95%-death / 90%-incidence target at $8.1bn/yr. cost_bn = public outlay $5.2bn + administration/overhead $0.47bn + private (household) cost $1.0bn = $6.67bn/yr. Pretorius et al. (2023) state that costs 'include health system costs and substantial markups beyond patient costs such as program costs and enablers'; programme (above-patient) costs are a 70% markup on direct service costs, based on expenditure data reported to WHO. The added administration is the overhead of the donor channel (Global Fund Secretariat operating expenses). Funding status: this programme is currently financed by national governments and donors (bilateral aid and multilateral funds); costs here are aid-programme (government/donor) costs, not market transactions.","difficulty":"moderate","difficulty_reason":"A sustained funding scale-up with precedent: national TB programmes already treat 8.3m people a year with 88% success for drug-susceptible TB, but only US$5.9bn was available in 2024 against a US$22bn annual target for 2027 (WHO 2025).","who_benefits":"pro-poor","who_benefits_reason":"TB deaths (over 1.2m in 2024; WHO 2025) are concentrated in low- and lower-middle-income countries, and the modelled ~1m deaths averted a year are in LICs/LMICs (Pretorius et al. 2023).","summary":"Find and treat far more TB cases in poor countries: rapid molecular tests, screening of high-risk groups, full treatment courses, prevention for contacts, and work with private clinics. A peer-reviewed Copenhagen Consensus study puts the return at about $46 per $1 (range 28-84), saving close to a million lives a year at roughly $2,000 per death averted. Governments and donors would need to find about $5.2bn a year (about $6.2bn including patients' non-financial costs). Counting the donor channel's own overhead and any household time costs, the full cost is about $6.67bn a year and the ratio range is 26-79.","rated":"TRUE","gain_bn":"","mort_a":"-1","mort_b":"0","income_loss_bn":"6.7","emde_loss_lo":"","emde_loss_hi":"","base_bn":"6.67","lives_lo":"554000","lives_hi":"975000","lives_basis":"Low: Copenhagen Consensus leaflet, $6.2bn a year 'saves 554,000 lives per year' (2023-2030 average; Lomborg 2023 Table 3.1: 0.6 million). High: Pretorius et al. (2023): 27.3 million deaths averted 'over the 28-year period between 2023 and 2050 inclusive: almost 1 million averted deaths per year' (27.3m / 28 = 975,000), since treatment and prevention keep cutting deaths after 2030.","selection_method":"Health best buys","selected_by":"Copenhagen Consensus + DCP3"},{"id":"30","title":"HIV Prevention","short":"HIV Prevention","category":"Health","bcr_low":"2.26","bcr_high":"39.4","bcr_basis":"Geldsetzer, Bloom, Humair & Bärnighausen (2015, Copenhagen Consensus Post-2015) model raising male circumcision coverage to 90% of HIV-negative adult men in the five hyperendemic countries (Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa, Swaziland, Zimbabwe), 2015-2030. Their BCR tables: 7.4 (5% discount, $1,000 per life-year), 11.3 (3%, $1,000), 37.0 (5%, $5,000) and 56.4 (3%, $5,000); the lowest and highest set the range before overhead. The Copenhagen summary headline is 28 (annual benefits $818m / annual costs $30m = 27.3). These value only life-years gained; health-system savings alone are also large: scaling VMMC to 80% in 13 countries costs $2bn (2011-2025) and yields $16.51bn net savings in averted HIV care (Njeuhmeli et al. 2011), and each circumcision at age 20 in South Africa saves a net $617 at 5% (Haacker et al. 2016). Returns fall as HIV incidence falls: a five-model comparison found continued VMMC cost-effective in 68% of settings (Bansi-Matharu et al. 2023), so the low end is the safer guide where incidence is now lower. Full-cost adjustment: the source costs already include country-level delivery and programme management (see cost_components), so only the international channel overhead is added to the denominator. LOW = 6.8: Geldsetzer et al. 7.4 / 1.090 = 6.8. HIGH = 53 (lower overhead rate): Geldsetzer et al. 56.4 / 1.067 = 52.9, rounded 53. The adjustment applies to costs only; benefits are not adjusted. Tax finance: each $1 of public outlay costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven & Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999), as for the transfer policies; the whole cost behind the ratio is public outlay; LOW = 6.79 (7.4/1.090) / 3.00 = 2.26; HIGH = 52.86 (56.4/1.067) / 1.34 = 39.4.","grade":"A","grade_reason":"Peer-reviewed economic evaluations (Njeuhmeli 2011 and Haacker 2016, PLOS Medicine; Bansi-Matharu 2023, Lancet Global Health) and a Copenhagen Consensus BCR, all built on randomized controlled trials showing ~60% protection against HIV acquisition (Auvert et al. 2005, ANRS 1265; Kenya and Uganda trials).","cost_bn":"0.033","cost_basis":"Copenhagen Post-2015 summary: $30m a year (outcome document $35m). Geldsetzer et al. (2015) Table 1: additional cost over maintaining current coverage = $451.9m (3% discount) to $524.7m (5%) over 2015-2030, i.e. ~$30-35m a year. Unit cost $65.85-$95.15 per circumcision (Njeuhmeli et al. 2011). Funding: government/donor spending (PEPFAR, Global Fund). cost_bn = public outlay $0.03bn + administration/overhead $0.0027bn + private (household) cost $0bn = $0.033bn/yr. Njeuhmeli et al. (2011) unit costs, used by Geldsetzer et al. (2015), include direct costs (consumables, staff, training) and indirect costs (capital, maintenance, utilities, support overhead and management overhead) plus waste-management and supply-chain costs; they exclude demand-creation costs, for which no global estimate was found. The added administration is the overhead of the donor channel (Global Fund Secretariat operating expenses (used as the rate for the PEPFAR/Global Fund channel)). Funding status: this programme is currently financed by national governments and donors (bilateral aid and multilateral funds); costs here are aid-programme (government/donor) costs, not market transactions.","difficulty":"moderate","difficulty_reason":"A sustained donor-funded scale-up with precedent (national VMMC programmes across 13 eastern and southern African countries modelled by Njeuhmeli et al. 2011). Cost is small, but prevention depends on aid: international assistance funds 80% of HIV prevention programmes in LMICs, and 2025 cuts put it at risk (UNAIDS 2025). Demand creation among adult men is the practical bottleneck.","who_benefits":"pro-poor","who_benefits_reason":"Targets hyperendemic Southern African countries (adult HIV prevalence >15%) where HIV is a leading cause of lost life and income; women also benefit over time as fewer male partners are infected (Geldsetzer et al. 2015).","summary":"Offer free, voluntary medical circumcision to HIV-negative adult men in the Southern African countries with the highest HIV rates. Three randomized trials found it cuts men's risk of acquiring HIV by about 60%, and it is a one-off procedure costing under $100. Copenhagen Consensus puts the return at about $28 per $1 (range 7-56 depending on discount rate and how a life-year is valued), for only $30-35 million a year; it also saves more on future HIV treatment than it costs. Returns are falling where HIV incidence has declined. Counting the donor channel's own overhead and any household time costs, the full cost is about $0.033bn a year and the ratio range is 6.8-53.","rated":"TRUE","gain_bn":"0.79","mort_a":"-1","mort_b":"0","income_loss_bn":"0.0","emde_loss_lo":"","emde_loss_hi":"","base_bn":"0.033","lives_lo":"7250","lives_hi":"9520","lives_basis":"Derived from the same source. Geldsetzer, Bloom, Humair & Barnighausen (2015) Table 1: raising male circumcision coverage to 90% gains 3,886,000 (5% discount) to 5,101,000 (3%) life-years over 2015-2030; the paper states an average of 33.5 undiscounted life-years gained per death averted. 3,886,000 / 33.5 / 16 years = 7,250 and 5,101,000 / 33.5 / 16 = 9,520 deaths averted a year. Because the life-years are discounted and the 33.5 is not, this understates deaths averted.","selection_method":"Health best buys","selected_by":"Copenhagen Consensus + GiveWell"},{"id":"31","title":"Privatize Social Security","short":"Privatize Social Security","category":"Freedom","bcr_low":"1.0","bcr_high":"2.0","bcr_basis":"The ratio compares what later generations gain from funded personal accounts with what the transition generations pay to keep honouring benefits already promised. HIGH = 2.0: Feldstein & Samwick (1998, NBER volume Privatizing Social Security) simulate a shift to Mandatory Individual Retirement Accounts. In the long run, about 2.04-2.1% of payroll in accounts replaces the 12.4% payroll tax, and deadweight loss falls by 1.57% of payroll (a combined gain of 11.92% of payroll). In the early decades, workers pay an extra 0.82% of payroll in year 1, rising to 1.58% by year 15. In their worked family example (3% discount rate), two 45-year-old parents lose $11,680 in present value and their two children gain more than $23,000: 23,000 / 11,680 = 1.97, rounded to 2.0. Feldstein (1996, AER P&P) puts the net present-value gain above $15 trillion, about 3% of future GDP a year. LOW = 1.0: Geanakoplos, Mitchell & Zeldes (1998) show that once the debt to current retirees and workers is paid (about a permanent 3% of payroll), the higher return on accounts disappears; without extra saving, privatization moves money between generations rather than creating it. Kotlikoff (1998) finds the pure efficiency gain, after fully compensating transition generations, ranges from 7.23% of lifetime income (cold-turkey) and 4.33% (consumption-tax financing) down to 1.08% (payroll-tax financing). It turns into a 1.22% loss with income-tax financing and strong benefit-tax linkage, so the ratio can dip slightly below 1 under some designs. Caveats: Feldstein & Samwick credit accounts with the return on capital, and their own sensitivity case (5.4% return) raises the long-run contribution to 3.31% of payroll. Feldstein & Samwick also find the summed present value for everyone aged 20-65 at the switch is negative, so the gains go mainly to the young and the unborn. Both ends already include the costs counted in cost_bn. The transition financing is the denominator of the high end (the parents' $11,680 present-value loss in Feldstein & Samwick's worked example) and of the low end (Geanakoplos, Mitchell & Zeldes net the legacy debt out of the account return). Feldstein & Samwick also deduct account administration: they assume a 9.0% return against the 9.30% actually reported, i.e. 0.30 points of assets a year for administrative costs. Diamond's $40-50 per worker is a level estimate of the same cost and is not added again. A discussant of the Feldstein & Samwick chapter notes that Latin American account systems cost at least 1% of assets; that higher cost is not modelled in the published family example and is a downside risk to the high end.","grade":"B","grade_reason":"The numbers come from published theory quantified in peer-reviewed or academic-press models: Feldstein (1996, AER P&P); Feldstein & Samwick and Kotlikoff (1998, University of Chicago Press/NBER); Kotlikoff, Smetters & Walliser and Cooley & Soares (1999, Review of Economic Dynamics). They are supported by a historical case (Chile 1981; Schmidt-Hebbel 1998 credits the reform with about a quarter of Chile's growth increase). It is not B+ because no peer-reviewed natural experiment measures the gain and turns it into a BCR. The rate-of-return gain is also disputed in peer-reviewed-quality work (Geanakoplos, Mitchell & Zeldes).","cost_bn":"186.9","cost_basis":"Full cost. Public outlay: transition financing of 0.82-1.58% of taxable payroll (Feldstein & Samwick 1998) on 2025 taxable payroll of about $10,670bn (2026 Trustees Report) = $87-169bn a year; the $169bn high end is used. This is the extra amount current workers pay while benefits already promised (closed-group unfunded obligation $55.6 trillion in present value, Trustees Table VI.F2) continue; much of it is saving credited to their own accounts. Administration: Diamond (1999) puts a government-organised account system at $40-50 per worker per year; inflated to 2025 prices and applied to 185 million covered workers this is $14.3-17.9bn a year ($17.9bn used). Private compliance: none identified. GDP loss: no published estimate. cost_bn = 169.0 + 17.9 = $186.9bn a year.","difficulty":"moderate","difficulty_reason":"Moderate under the rubric: it needs ordinary federal legislation, and full or partial privatization has precedents (Chile 1981 and other Latin American countries, World Bank 2005). It is politically among the hardest moderate items: the 2005 US personal-accounts proposal never reached a vote, and Cooley & Soares (1999) find no majority supports a transition in its first periods.","who_benefits":"broad","who_benefits_reason":"In the long run, gains reach all income classes. Kotlikoff (1998) finds poorer classes gain more (about 10.1%) than richer ones (about 8.1%) under consumption-tax financing. The transition generations lose, though: without compensation, the oldest cohorts lose up to about 26% of remaining lifetime welfare, and all those aged 20-65 lose in aggregate (Feldstein & Samwick). Without a progressive floor, the loss of Social Security's progressive benefit formula and coverage gaps (World Bank 2005, Latin America) could make the outcome regressive for low earners.","summary":"This policy would replace pay-as-you-go Social Security with funded personal retirement accounts, phasing the old system out. Simulation studies find large long-run gains: about 2% of payroll in accounts eventually replaces the 12.4% payroll tax, and the economy's capital stock and wages rise. Those gains go mostly to young and future workers, while today's workers must also keep paying for benefits already promised. Counting both sides gives roughly $1.00 to $2.00 of benefit per $1 of transition cost, and critics argue that the higher return is mostly a transfer rather than a net gain.","rated":"TRUE","gain_bn":"","mort_a":"-1","mort_b":"1","income_loss_bn":"17.9","emde_loss_lo":"","emde_loss_hi":"","base_bn":"186.9","lives_lo":"","lives_hi":"","lives_basis":"","selection_method":"Fraser Economic Freedom of the World index","selected_by":"Fraser Economic Freedom of the World, Area 1"},{"id":"32","title":"Abolish the Income Tax","short":"Abolish the Income Tax","category":"Freedom","bcr_low":"1.24","bcr_high":"3.2","bcr_basis":"The ratio is the benefit to taxpayers per $1 of income-tax revenue given up, assuming the revenue is replaced by cutting government (the 'shrink the size of government' sub-policy) and the forgone spending is valued at $1 per $1: BCR = 1 + DWL/R (deadweight loss removed per $) + C/R (compliance cost removed per $). Revenue at stake is FY2025 individual income tax $2,656bn plus corporate $452bn = $3,108bn, 59% of federal receipts ($5,235bn) or 44% of outlays ($7,010bn) (CBO). C/R counts the full avoided income-tax compliance cost (Tax Foundation 2024, from OIRA/IRS paperwork-burden estimates) plus avoided IRS administration A/R (0.59 x $19.0bn FY2025 IRS operations = $11.2bn). LOW = 1.24: DWL/R = 0.13, the lower bound of Ballard, Shoven & Whalley's (AER 1985) gain from replacing the whole tax system with lump-sum taxes (13-22 cents per $). C/R = $328.9bn income-tax forms (individual $145.4bn + business income-tax returns $118.9bn + depreciation $25.4bn + estates and trusts $20.2bn + QBI deduction $19.0bn) / $3,108bn = 0.106; A/R = 11.2 / 3,108 = 0.004. 1 + 0.13 + 0.106 + 0.004 = 1.24. HIGH = 3.2: DWL/R = 2.0, Feldstein's (1999, REStat) 'nearly two dollars' of deadweight loss per extra $ raised by a proportional rate rise. C/R = $501.3bn (all federal tax paperwork $546.1bn less the $44.8bn employer quarterly return still needed for payroll taxes) / $3,108bn = 0.161; A/R = 0.004. 1 + 2.0 + 0.161 + 0.004 = 3.17, rounded to 3.2. The high end applies a marginal figure to the whole tax (an upper bound). Central: Saez, Slemrod & Giertz's (JEL 2012) illustrative $0.38 excess burden gives 1 + 0.38 + 0.134 (midpoint compliance, $415bn / $3,108bn) + 0.004 = 1.52, between Hendren & Sprung-Keyser's (QJE 2020) MVPFs of 1.16 and 1.85. Corporate sub-policy: Chodorow-Reich, Zidar & Zwick (JEP 2024) find the 2017 cut lowered corporate revenue about 40% (0.63% of GDP a year) and raised long-run GDP about 0.9% and labour income by under $1,000 per worker. Output per $ of revenue: 0.9/0.63 = 1.4 long-run, 0.44/0.63 = 0.7 in the first decade. Shrinking government: Bergh & Henrekson (2011) find that 10 points more government size goes with 0.5-1 pp slower growth in rich countries. If cut spending is worth over $1 per $, the ratio falls toward 1.","grade":"B+","grade_reason":"Peer-reviewed welfare-cost estimates: natural-experiment MVPFs (Hendren & Sprung-Keyser 2020, QJE); a quasi-experimental study of the 2017 corporate cut (Chodorow-Reich, Zidar & Zwick 2024, JEP); Feldstein's TAXSIM deadweight-loss estimate (1999, REStat); and Ballard-Shoven-Whalley general-equilibrium results (AER 1985). These are converted into a BCR and extrapolated to full repeal, which no study observes, so it is not A-range.","cost_bn":"0","cost_basis":"Full cost. Repealing a tax needs no new spending, and revenue returned to taxpayers is a transfer; the fiscal hole is $3,108bn a year (FY2025 individual $2,656bn + corporate $452bn, CBO), closed under the headline sub-policy by shrinking government (44% of FY2025 outlays of $7,010bn). Administration: no new bureaucracy; about $11.2bn a year of IRS income-tax administration is avoided (0.59 x $19.0bn FY2025 IRS operations). No published one-time wind-down cost was found. Private compliance: none created; $328.9-501.3bn a year of income-tax compliance is avoided (Tax Foundation 2024, OIRA/IRS paperwork-burden data). These avoided costs enter the ratio's numerator. If a replacement tax were used instead (a revenue-neutral FairTax needs a 27.8%+ tax-inclusive rate, American Action Forum 2023), its collection and compliance costs would offset part of this saving. cost_bn = 0 + 0 + 0 = $0.","difficulty":"moderate","difficulty_reason":"Ordinary federal legislation can abolish the personal and corporate income taxes: the 16th Amendment permits an income tax but does not require one, and repealing it would only stop a future reinstatement. Precedents exist in the United States before 1913, in states without an income tax such as Texas and Florida, and in the Gulf states. The difficult part is the size of the change: the tax raises about 59% of federal receipts, so it must be matched by spending cuts of about 44% or by other taxes.","who_benefits":"regressive","who_benefits_reason":"The income tax is the progressive part of the federal system. Tax Foundation finds a FairTax replacement less progressive than current law, and Altig et al. (2001) find that removing progressivity lowers the welfare of the poorest. Chodorow-Reich, Zidar & Zwick (2024) find that most of the corporate cut's gains went to capital, with labour income up under $1,000 per worker. Jokisch & Kotlikoff (2007) find a prebated consumption tax could still leave the poor better off in the long run, so the design of the replacement matters.","summary":"This policy would abolish the personal income tax (via repeal of the 16th Amendment) and the corporate income tax, replacing about $3.1 trillion a year mainly by shrinking government. Economists estimate that each dollar of income tax costs between about 13 cents and 2 dollars extra in lost work, saving and investment. Filing and paperwork add another $329-501bn a year (11-16 cents per dollar raised), and the IRS spends about $11bn a year on the income taxes; repeal removes both. Repeal therefore returns about $1.24-3.20 per dollar of revenue given up (central about $1.50). The 2017 corporate tax cut raised investment and long-run GDP by about 0.9%, but recovered little of its revenue cost.","rated":"TRUE","gain_bn":"","mort_a":"-1","mort_b":"1","income_loss_bn":"0","emde_loss_lo":"","emde_loss_hi":"","base_bn":"3108","lives_lo":"","lives_hi":"","lives_basis":"","selection_method":"Fraser Economic Freedom of the World index","selected_by":"Fraser Economic Freedom of the World, Area 1"},{"id":"33","title":"Privatize Government Land","short":"Privatize Government Land","category":"Freedom","bcr_low":"1.66","bcr_high":"10.0","bcr_basis":"No study computes a welfare BCR for selling all federal land, so the headline range uses published revenue-per-management-dollar ratios for land run for income rather than by federal agencies. Both published ratios count annual management costs but not the one-time cost of transferring title, which is added at the measured 3.3% of sale value (GAO 2008, BLM FLTFA sales: $3.17m administration / $95.7m proceeds). Land value is taken as what a buyer would pay, the present value of net income: V = 12.46 x (R - C) (20 years at 5%). Ratio = 12.46R / (12.46C + 0.033 x 12.46 x (R - C)) = R / (C + 0.033(R - C)). LOW = 1.66: in the peer-reviewed Utah transfer model (Jakus et al. 2017, Land Economics; figures from Stambro 2014), Utah manages 31.2m acres and bears all federal costs; in the high-energy-price case, $422.0m revenue / $248m cost = 1.70 before transaction costs; with them, 422.0 / (248 + 0.033 x 174.0) = 422.0 / 253.7 = 1.66. HIGH = 10.0: in Fretwell & Regan (PERC 2015, 2009-2013 averages), Montana, Idaho, New Mexico and Arizona trust lands earn $14.51 per $1 of management cost, vs $0.73 for the Forest Service and BLM; with transaction costs, 14.51 / (1 + 0.033 x 13.51) = 14.51 / 1.446 = 10.0. Transaction costs lower the high end most because trust-land management costs are small relative to the land's value. Sensitivity at FLTFA's 20% statutory ceiling: 1.49 and 3.9. In the low-price Utah case the ratio is 0.72, shown in the counter list. Spectrum sub-policy (not in the headline because it is extrapolated): Hazlett & Munoz (2009, RAND J. Econ.) estimate that 60 MHz more licensed mobile spectrum in the US cuts prices about 8% and raises consumer surplus about $8.8bn a year. The real cost of freeing spectrum, scaled from the 2021 C-band auction (280 MHz; $3.3bn relocation + $9.7bn accelerated-clearing payments), is 13.0 x 60/280 = $2.8bn per 60 MHz. Ten years of benefit at 5% (annuity factor 7.72): 8.8 x 7.72 = $68bn; 68 / 2.8 = 24. Using only relocation costs ($0.71bn per 60 MHz) gives about 96. Hazlett & Munoz also find consumer-surplus losses from withholding spectrum are 15-20 times the social value of auction revenue (Belgium, Greece). Not netted out in the land ratio: non-market recreation and existence value. Haefele, Loomis & Bilmes (2016) value the National Park Service at $92bn a year, and outdoor recreation is $639.5bn of value added (BEA). Private and trust owners can keep much of this value, but no source measures how much. Tax-finance check: each $1 of public outlay or public administration costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven & Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999); not applicable here: the title-transfer administration (3.3% of sale value) is paid from sale proceeds under FLTFA, and the management costs in both published ratios are paid from the land's own revenue, so no extra taxes are raised. Additional study (below the range, not used to set it): O'Laughlin (2014, University of Idaho Policy Analysis Group) costs the Idaho Department of Lands' proposed transfer of 6.9m acres of national forest and 9.5m acres of BLM land to the state (Tables 6-7). Low scenario (500m board feet at $150): timber revenue $75m against $186.1m of costs (timber management 40 + other management 1.0 + wildfire 40 + recreation 7 + highways 12 + county payments 33.1 + BLM lands net of grazing and mineral receipts 53) = 0.40; high scenario (1bn board feet at $250): $250m against $225.2m = 1.11, or 250 / (225.2 + 0.033 x 24.8) = 1.11 with transfer costs. Like the Utah low-price case in the counter list, it is a state takeover that keeps federal-style payments to counties rather than a sale to private owners, so it supports the downside case and the range is not extended.","grade":"B","grade_reason":"The low end comes from a peer-reviewed fiscal model (Jakus et al. 2017, Land Economics) and the high end from PERC's think-tank comparison of official agency accounts. Property-rights theory of resource management in academic books (Anderson & Leal) and peer-reviewed spectrum welfare estimates (Hazlett & Munoz 2009, RAND J. Econ.; Hazlett 2008, JEP) support them. No study prices full privatization including non-market values, so it is not higher.","cost_bn":"3.0","cost_basis":"Full cost. Public outlay: none net; sales raise money (the 2021 C-band auction alone brought $80.9bn in clock-phase bids, MITRE 2021), and the policy ends federal land-agency net losses (BLM/NPS/FWS spent $7.8bn vs $5.2bn revenue in 2010; Edwards & O'Toole 2012). Administration: the measured cost of running federal land sales is 3.3% of proceeds (GAO 2008: BLM FLTFA administration $3.17m on $95.7m of sales). Applied to BEA's $1.8 trillion value of federal land (Larson 2015, 2009 values) this is $59.4bn one-time, or $3.0bn a year over an assumed 20-year disposal programme. Private compliance and GDP loss: no published estimates (null). cost_bn = 0 + 3.0 = $3.0bn a year. Spectrum relocation costs are paid by buyers and sit inside the spectrum ratio.","difficulty":"hard","difficulty_reason":"It dismantles the federal land agencies, which manage about one-third of US land, with no modern precedent; Cato's own blueprint phases auctions over 20-40 years (Anderson, Smith & Simmons 1999). The spectrum part alone would be moderate, since the FCC has run auctions since 1994 and has flexible-use licences, but full property rights in all bands, including government bands, would need major legislation.","who_benefits":"broad","who_benefits_reason":"Under the Anderson-Smith-Simmons (Cato 1999) design, every citizen gets equal 'public land share certificates', spreading the gains. A plain auction would favour wealthy and extractive buyers and could cut free recreational access. Spectrum gains go mostly to consumers through lower wireless prices (Hazlett & Munoz: consumer surplus at least 10 times producer surplus).","summary":"This policy would sell or transfer federal land, parks and natural resources to private (or trust) owners and give radio spectrum full, tradable property rights. Land run for income earns far more than federal land: four western states earn $14.51 per $1 of management cost on trust lands, against 73 cents for the Forest Service and BLM. Counting the cost of running the sales (3.3% of proceeds in BLM's recent land sales) as well as management, the ratio is about 1.7 (a Utah takeover bearing every federal cost, high energy prices) to 10. Spectrum liberalization looks even better: 60 MHz more mobile spectrum is worth about $8.8bn a year to US consumers. The main uncounted cost is recreation and conservation value (the national parks alone are valued at about $92bn a year).","rated":"TRUE","gain_bn":"","mort_a":"-1","mort_b":"1","income_loss_bn":"3.0","emde_loss_lo":"","emde_loss_hi":"","base_bn":"3.0","lives_lo":"","lives_hi":"","lives_basis":"","selection_method":"Fraser Economic Freedom of the World index","selected_by":"Fraser Economic Freedom of the World, Area 2"},{"id":"34","title":"Tradable Fishing Quotas","short":"Tradable Fishing Quotas","category":"Freedom","bcr_low":"0.93","bcr_high":"15.6","bcr_basis":"Built from the World Bank's 'Sunken Billions Revisited' (2017) global bio-economic model (5% discount rate, 20 years). Benefit = PV of fishery net benefits on a reform path minus the current path (2012 effort held constant: PV $514bn). Cost = transition losses plus PV of the cost of running a rights-based management regime, which the report puts at 1-14% of the value of landings; optimal landings revenue is $140.6bn a year (Table 3.1), and the 20-year annuity factor at 5% is 12.46. Before tax finance: LOW = 2.8 (moderate path, effort cut 5% a year): PV $1,196bn - $514bn = $682bn gain; first-year loss $0.3bn; management at 14%: 0.14 x 140.6 = $19.7bn/yr x 12.46 = $245bn. 682.3 / (0.3 + 245) = 2.8. HIGH = 16 (rapid path, effort cut sharply until stocks recover): PV $1,465bn - $514bn = $951bn net, after a $44bn cumulative loss in the first four years; management at 1%: $1.4bn/yr x 12.46 = $17.5bn. (951 + 44) / (44 + 17.5) = 16.2. The range keeps the lowest and highest published management-cost shares (1% and 14%); cost_bn uses the median of the published estimates (5.4%). The annual prize is $83.3bn (95% CI $49.7-104.9bn): net benefits rise from $3.0bn to $86.3bn as effort falls about 44%. Corroboration: Mangin et al. (2018, PLOS ONE) compare 2050 profit gains with the extra management cost of reform country by country; moving all fisheries to catch shares has a global benefit-cost ratio of 9.3 (7.0 when costs scale with revenue), and 2.8 even if every country paid the average cost of the five most expensive managers ($489 per tonne), inside this range before tax finance. Cross-checks: Costello et al. (2016, PNAS) find rights-based reform raises 2050 profits by $53bn a year over business-as-usual, with the median fishery recovering in under 10 years. Costello, Gaines & Lynham (2008, Science) find catch-share fisheries were about half as likely to collapse across more than 11,000 fisheries. The World Bank does not prescribe ITQs specifically; it lists catch shares among tools that work, sometimes alongside community management. So this ratio applies to ITQ-type reform as the main route to the effort cut. The ratio is global; US federal fisheries already use catch shares widely, so the US increment is smaller. Combining the worst of each (rapid-path loss with 14% management, no cost recovery, $3.00 per $1) gives (951 + 44) / (44 + 735) = 1.28, inside the range. Tax finance: each $1 of public outlay costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven & Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999), as for the transfer policies; only the management cost is public, and only the part not recovered from fishers through levies is tax-financed (levies are transfers, so they carry no penalty); the transition loss falls on fishers. LOW: no cost recovery, as in most countries (Mangin et al. 2018), so the tax-financed share of the cost base is 245 of 245.3 (0.999): LOW = 2.78 (682.3/245.3) / (1 + 2.0 x 0.999) = 0.93. HIGH: New Zealand's 63% recovery (Wyatt 2000), the highest published full-programme share, leaves 0.37 of the $17.5bn tax-financed, a share of 6.48 (17.5 x 0.37) of 61.5 (0.105) of the cost base: HIGH = 16.18 (995/61.5) / (1 + 0.34 x 0.105) = 15.6.","grade":"B+","grade_reason":"Peer-reviewed natural comparisons measure the gain from catch shares: Costello, Gaines & Lynham 2008, Science, on collapse across 11,000+ fisheries; Grafton, Squires & Fox 2000, J. Law & Econ., on the BC halibut natural experiment. A peer-reviewed global model gives the size of the prize (Costello et al. 2016, PNAS: +$53bn/yr profit). The BCR itself is built from the World Bank's official model (B- on its own). Mangin et al. (2018, PLOS ONE) add peer-reviewed BCRs for catch-share reform net of extra management costs (global 7.0-9.3; 2.8 in an extreme-cost case) that corroborate the range, but the range itself is still built from the World Bank model, so the grade is left at B+.","cost_bn":"18.6","cost_basis":"Full cost, global. Administration, monitoring and enforcement: the median of 14 published estimates is 5.4% of the value of landings (range 0.5-20%, mean 7.1%; GAO, FAO, OECD, Arnason et al., World Bank, Mangin et al.); on the optimal $140.6bn of global landings that is $7.6bn a year, about half of it recovered from fishers through levies (median of published recovery shares) and half tax-financed. Private compliance: no separate estimate (null). GDP loss: temporary catch cuts while stocks rebuild, $44bn over four years on the rapid path = $11.0bn a year during the transition ($0.3bn in year 1 on the moderate path). Public outlay: none beyond management. cost_bn = 7.6 + 11.0 = $18.6bn a year (transitional years; $7.6bn a year thereafter).","difficulty":"moderate","difficulty_reason":"Ordinary legislation or regulation in one country, with many precedents (New Zealand, Iceland, US catch-share programmes such as BC/Alaska halibut). Globally, though, it requires fishing effort to fall about 44% (World Bank 2017), with 'very high adjustment costs' for displaced fishers.","who_benefits":"regressive","who_benefits_reason":"The World Bank (2017) notes the benefits concentrate on the relatively few fishers who stay in, while displaced vessel owners and crews bear most adjustment costs and the public sector bears much of the management cost. Pinkerton & Edwards (2009) find quota leasing transfers rents from active fishers to quota owners. Auctioned or community-held quotas could make it broad, but the evidence here is for grandfathered ITQs.","summary":"Tradable fishing quotas give fishers a secure, sellable share of the total allowed catch, ending the race to fish. Across more than 11,000 fisheries, those with catch shares were about half as likely to collapse. The World Bank estimates that cutting global fishing effort to a sustainable level would raise fishery net benefits by about $83bn a year. Running the system is not free: published management costs have a median of 5.4% of the catch value (about $7.6bn a year worldwide), roughly half recovered from fishers through levies. Counting the temporary catch cuts, those costs and the excess burden of the taxes that pay the public share, each $1 of cost returns about $0.93 to $15.60.","rated":"TRUE","gain_bn":"83.3","mort_a":"-1","mort_b":"1","income_loss_bn":"30.7","emde_loss_lo":"","emde_loss_hi":"","base_bn":"18.6","lives_lo":"","lives_hi":"","lives_basis":"","selection_method":"Fraser Economic Freedom of the World index","selected_by":"Fraser Economic Freedom of the World, Area 2"},{"id":"35","title":"End the Fed & Implement Neutral Reserve Currency","short":"End the Fed & Implement Neutral Reserve Currency","category":"Freedom","bcr_low":"6.4","bcr_high":"144","bcr_basis":"Abolish central-bank fiat money and return to a neutral reserve standard (gold, bitcoin or a floating commodity basket) with free banking, adopted by the major economies. All figures are % of US GDP a year; the perspective is global, so the exorbitant privilege the US earns on dollar reserves and lower interest paid to foreign lenders are transfers between countries rather than gains or costs to the world. Benefits come through four channels. (1) Inflation: a sustained 4% inflation costs 0.41% of output a year when money is currency (Dotsey & Ireland 1996, JME); Lagos & Wright (2005, JPE) find 3-5% for 10% inflation, scaled to the Fed-era average of about 3.4% (a 24-fold price rise 1913-2008; Selgin, Lastrapes & White 2012) = about 1.0%; and the interaction of inflation with the tax code adds about 1% of GDP a year going from 2% inflation to price stability (Feldstein 1997, 1999). (2) Banking crises: crises since 1973 have been twice as frequent as under the classical gold standard (Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel & Martinez-Peria 2001); halving the Basel Committee's 4.5% annual crisis probability, at 0.2-0.6% of output per point (BCBS 2010), is worth 0.45-1.35% of GDP. (3) Trade: countries sharing the gold standard traded 18-57% more with each other (Mitchener & Weidenmier 2008, Economic Journal), 60% more in Lopez-Cordova & Meissner (2003, AER), and adopting gold raised trade about 42% (Estevadeordal, Frantz & Taylor 2003, QJE; applying the 1913 standard in 1870 would have raised trade volumes about 30%). On the US trade share of 25.0% of GDP (World Bank 2024), an 18% rise adds 4.5 points of trade and a 30% rise 7.5 points; at Frankel & Romer's (1999) lower bound of 0.5% of income per point, that is 2.25-3.75% of GDP. (4) Borrowing costs: gold adherence lowered sovereign spreads by about 40 basis points (Bordo & Rockoff 1996); on foreign-held federal debt of 29.3% of GDP that is 0.12% of GDP. Cost is the real resource cost of the commodity or free-banking system (Watts & Snyder 2015, Cato Journal): Meltzer 0.5% of GDP; the measured US classical gold standard 1879-1913, 0.249%; White's free banking with 2% gold reserves, 0.05%. Fiat money carries its own resource cost in private gold hoarding (Friedman 1986), measured at 0.014% of GDP a year since Bretton Woods (Watts & Snyder 2015, Table 1), which is netted off. LOW = (inflation 0.41 + crises 0.45 + trade 2.25 + borrowing 0) / (0.5 - 0.014) = 3.11 / 0.486 = 6.4. HIGH = (inflation 1.0 + tax interaction 1.0 + crises 1.35 + trade 3.75 + borrowing 0.12) / 0.05 = 7.22 / 0.05 = 144. With the measured classical gold-standard cost the central case is about 25. Downside risks kept in the counter-evidence: the IMF finds exchange-rate volatility has at most a small effect on trade (Clark, Tamirisa & Wei 2004), which with no trade gain gives (0.41 + 0.45) / 0.486 = 1.8; Friedman's (1960) 2.5%-of-GDP cost for a full 100% commodity standard gives about 0.3; output growth was more volatile under the classical gold standard (Bordo 1981); and countries that left gold early in the 1930s recovered faster (Bernanke 1995).","grade":"B","grade_reason":"Peer-reviewed historical estimates of the gold standard's effects on trade (Lopez-Cordova & Meissner 2003 AER; Estevadeordal, Frantz & Taylor 2003 QJE), borrowing costs (Bordo & Rockoff 1996 JEH), crises (Bordo et al. 2001) and inflation (Lagos & Wright 2005 JPE; Lucas 2000 Econometrica). Not tried in a modern economy, and the Depression-era evidence cuts the other way, so B.","cost_bn":"154.3","cost_basis":"Public outlay and administration: $0; closing the Fed needs no budget outlay, supervision passes to existing regulators, and lost seigniorage is a transfer. Private resource cost of holding commodity reserves: Meltzer's 0.5% of GDP (the high end of the estimates reviewed by Watts & Snyder 2015, Cato Journal) x 2025 GDP $30,861bn = $154.3bn a year; the measured 1879-1913 US gold standard cost 0.249% ($76.8bn) and White's free banking 0.05% ($15.4bn). The ratio's denominator uses these same percentages of GDP.","difficulty":"hard","difficulty_reason":"It dismantles a major entrenched institution with no modern precedent. No advanced economy has run without a central bank since Canada created the Bank of Canada in 1935 (Bordo, Redish & Rockoff 2015). The competing-currencies sub-policy alone would be moderate (ordinary legal-tender and tax changes; El Salvador 2021 precedents).","who_benefits":"broad","who_benefits_reason":"Inflation is a tax on all money holders (Lucas 2000). Savers and cash-dependent households gain most; debtors and the Treasury lose the inflation and seigniorage transfer. Banking crises hit output and jobs economy-wide.","summary":"This policy would abolish the Federal Reserve and return money to a neutral standard (gold, bitcoin or a basket of commodities) issued by competing banks, the system most major economies used before 1914. Stable money removes the hidden tax of inflation and its interaction with the tax code, banking crises under the classical gold standard were half as frequent as since 1973, and countries sharing gold traded 18-60% more with each other, which raises incomes; governments that kept to gold also borrowed more cheaply. Counting those gains against the cost of holding gold or running free banks gives about $6.40 to $144 of benefit per dollar. The risk is a rigid money supply in a deep slump, as in the 1930s.","rated":"TRUE","gain_bn":"","mort_a":"-1","mort_b":"1","income_loss_bn":"154.3","emde_loss_lo":"","emde_loss_hi":"","base_bn":"154.3","lives_lo":"","lives_hi":"","lives_basis":"","selection_method":"Fraser Economic Freedom of the World index","selected_by":"Fraser Economic Freedom of the World, Area 3"},{"id":"36","title":"End Bailouts and Deposit Insurance","short":"End Bailouts and Deposit Insurance","category":"Freedom","bcr_low":"0.5","bcr_high":"5.5","bcr_basis":"Constructed from published inputs; no published benefit-cost ratio for abolishing deposit insurance exists. Benefit of abolition = crises avoided because guarantees no longer weaken market discipline. Cost = welfare lost from removing depositor protection (more runs and failures). HIGH = 5.5: Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache (JME 2002; IMF WP 00/3) estimate that cutting US deposit-insurance coverage to Swiss levels would have lowered the predicted probability of the 1980 US banking crisis from 4.3% to 2.5%, i.e. by 1.8 points a year. Laeven & Valencia (IMF WP 18/206) put the output loss of the 2007 US crisis at 30% of trend GDP. Expected avoided loss = 0.018 x 0.30 = 0.54% of GDP a year (about $167bn at 2025 GDP of $30.9tn, FRED). Cost: Dávila & Goldstein (JPE 2023) estimate that raising coverage from $100,000 to $200,000 was worth $13.2bn a year in 2008 (9.46 bp of $14tn bank assets), i.e. 13.2/14,770 = 0.089% of 2008 GDP; taking this as the welfare value of the first $100,000 of cover gives 0.54/0.089 = 6.1 before administration. Adding the operating cost of private replacement insurance, $2.9bn a year (0.248 NAIC expense ratio x $11.6bn FDIC 2024 assessments), in 2025 dollars (GDP $30,861bn, FRED): benefit 0.0054 x 30,861 = $166.6bn; cost 0.00089 x 30,861 + 2.9 = 27.5 + 2.9 = $30.4bn; 166.6 / 30.4 = 5.5. This is an upper bound: Dávila & Goldstein say marginal gains are highest at low coverage, so full abolition costs more, and DD find the destabilising effect is insignificant where institutions are strong, as in the US. LOW = 0.5: direct resolution costs that guarantees created since 1934, S&L crisis $153bn (Curry & Shibut 2000) + 2008 bailouts ~$500bn (Lucas 2019) + SVB/Signature $16.3bn (FDIC 2023) = ~$669bn over ~90 years = $7.4bn a year, against the same $13.2bn a year plus the $2.9bn private-insurance operating cost: 7.4 / (13.2 + 2.9) = 0.46, rounded to 0.5 (0.56 before administration). The sign is contested: Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt & Zhu (2014) find deposit insurance raised risk before 2007 and lowered it during the crisis, with a net destabilising effect. Tax-finance check: each $1 of public outlay or public administration costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven & Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999); not applicable: the $2.9bn administration is the operating cost of private insurers paid from premiums, and there is no public outlay.","grade":"B","grade_reason":"Peer-reviewed cross-country panel (Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache 2002, JME), peer-reviewed historical studies (Calomiris & Jaremski 2019, JF; Calomiris 1990, JEH) and peer-reviewed models (Diamond & Dybvig 1983; Dávila & Goldstein 2023, JPE) quantify each input. The ratio itself is assembled here rather than published, and the inputs disagree on sign, so it cannot rate B+ or above.","cost_bn":"2.9","cost_basis":"Full cost. Repeal needs no new public spending; the FDIC is premium-funded. Transition to private deposit insurance: private insurers' operating cost at the property-casualty underwriting expense ratio (24.8%, NAIC 2024) on premiums equal to the FDIC's 2024 assessment revenue ($11.6bn) = $2.9bn a year (FDIC's own 2024 DIF operating expenses were $2.43bn; not credited because supervision continues elsewhere). Private compliance and GDP loss: the welfare cost of weaker depositor protection and more runs (depositors lost about 30% in a typical pre-FDIC failure, Correia, Luck & Verner) is the ratio's denominator, not repeated here. cost_bn = 0 + 2.9 = $2.9bn a year.","difficulty":"hard","difficulty_reason":"Hard: it dismantles a major federal institution in place since 1933 and ends the implicit too-big-to-fail guarantee (worth up to $70bn a year to US banks, IMF 2014). No large advanced economy runs without deposit insurance today. New Zealand, the last OECD holdout, introduced a NZ$100,000 Depositor Compensation Scheme on 1 July 2025.","who_benefits":"broad","who_benefits_reason":"Mixed. Ending bailouts removes transfers that mostly went to bank creditors and shareholders (Lucas 2019: ~$500bn in 2008-09) and the too-big-to-fail funding subsidy to large banks (IMF 2014). Ending deposit insurance shifts risk onto ordinary depositors, who are least able to monitor banks. Neither effect is clearly concentrated on the poor or the rich.","summary":"This policy would close federal deposit insurance and bar government rescues of failed banks, so that depositors and creditors carry their own risk. Cross-country evidence finds explicit deposit insurance makes banking crises more likely where institutions are weak, and historical US state schemes encouraged risk-taking that ended in collapse. Bank-run theory and a recent calibrated model, however, find deposit insurance very valuable, especially its first dollars of cover. Putting published crisis costs against the modelled value of insurance gives a ratio of about 0.5 to 5.5 once the running cost of private replacement insurance (about $2.9bn a year) is included, which straddles 1.","rated":"TRUE","gain_bn":"","mort_a":"-1","mort_b":"1","income_loss_bn":"2.9","emde_loss_lo":"","emde_loss_hi":"","base_bn":"2.9","lives_lo":"","lives_hi":"","lives_basis":"","selection_method":"Fraser Economic Freedom of the World index","selected_by":"Fraser Economic Freedom of the World, Area 3/5"},{"id":"37","title":"Free Trade","short":"Free Trade","category":"Freedom","bcr_low":"90","bcr_high":"2800","bcr_basis":"Both ends use Copenhagen Consensus estimates of full global liberalisation that include growth (dynamic) effects. LOW = 90: Anderson (2012, CC III), completing the Doha agenda gives PV benefits of $12-64tn against PV adjustment costs below $400bn; Anderson's reported global BCR is 90-180 (140-250 for developing countries), and 90 is the floor. HIGH = 2,800: Anderson (2015 Post-2015 Consensus; Cambridge UP 2018), Doha with growth effects, global BCR 1,300-2,800 at 5% and 3% discount rates (developing countries 2,100-4,700). Anderson & Winters (2008) give 269-1,121 with dynamic gains (17-80 without). The dynamic assumption rests on quasi-experimental evidence: liberalisers grew ~1.5 points a year faster (Wacziarg & Welch 2008), and a 1-point rise in trade share raises income per person 0.5-2% (Frankel & Romer 1999). One country acting alone captures a smaller share of these global gains. The narrow static Halftime estimate (Feyrer et al. 2023: global 11, high-income 5-7) is kept as counter-evidence. Sub-policies, reported but not averaged in: anti-dumping repeal 2-14 (USITC 1995; Gallaway, Blonigen & Flynn 1999 JIE) and trade facilitation 11-640 (Feyrer et al. 2023; WTO 2015 benefits vs OECD costs of EUR 3.5-19M per country). Current US stakes (2026): Tax Foundation (Sept 2026) finds remaining tariffs cut long-run GDP 0.4% (~$120bn a year) and cost $820 per household in 2026. Yale Budget Lab (Aug 2026) finds an average statutory tariff rate of 11.0% (11.8% by end-2026) and household costs of about $1,100 a year. These are recurring losses that repeal removes at near-zero budget cost. Anderson's ratios already put the adjustment costs (the GDP-loss component of cost_bn) in the denominator, and trade-facilitation administration is inside the sub-policy ratio. Tax-finance check: each $1 of public outlay or public administration costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven & Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999); trade-facilitation administration is $0.02bn of $32.1bn (0.06% of cost_bn); the penalty changes neither end at two decimals and is not applied (negligible).","grade":"A","grade_reason":"Peer-edited Copenhagen Consensus benefit-cost estimates (Anderson 2012, 2015; Cambridge UP 2018 chapter) backed by peer-reviewed quasi-experimental and instrumental-variable evidence on growth (Wacziarg & Welch 2008 WBER; Frankel & Romer 1999 AER; Fajgelbaum et al. 2020 QJE). Even the narrowest peer-reviewed estimate (Feyrer et al. 2023, JBCA) is above 1. The sub-policies rate B (anti-dumping: peer-reviewed GE model) and A- (trade facilitation: one peer-reviewed BCA).","cost_bn":"32.1","cost_basis":"Full cost. Public outlay: $0; repealing tariffs and quotas needs no budget outlay, and lost tariff revenue is a transfer. Administration: trade facilitation about $0.02bn a year for the US (OECD, Moise 2013). Private compliance: no published estimate (null). GDP loss: adjustment costs for displaced workers and firms, below $400bn in present value for full global liberalisation (Anderson 2012), annualised over 20 years at 5% = $32.1bn a year (global). cost_bn = 0.02 + 32.1 = $32.1bn a year. These adjustment costs are already the denominator of the Copenhagen Consensus ratios, so they are not added again.","difficulty":"moderate","difficulty_reason":"Moderate: one country acting alone needs only ordinary tariff legislation, with working precedents in Hong Kong (no tariff on any import or export, HK Trade and Industry Department), Singapore, New Zealand's unilateral tariff cuts and Britain's 1846 Corn Law repeal. Anti-dumping repeal needs Congress to repeal Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930. Customs reform can be done under existing authority (WTO TFA in force since 2017). In Learning Resources v. Trump (20 Feb 2026) the Supreme Court struck down IEEPA tariffs, but other statutory authorities (Sections 122, 232, 301, 338) remain (Tax Foundation 2026).","who_benefits":"pro-poor","who_benefits_reason":"Anderson (2015) finds developing-country BCRs of 2,100-4,700 versus 1,300-2,800 globally and ~160 million fewer people in extreme poverty by 2030; Feyrer et al. (2023) find ~100 for low/lower-middle-income countries versus ~5 for high-income; Fajgelbaum et al. (2020) show 2018 US tariffs fell fully on domestic buyers. In the US, tariffs act as a consumption tax (~$1,100 per household a year, Yale Budget Lab 2026), so removing them helps lower-income households most relative to income.","summary":"Unilaterally abolishing all tariffs and quotas, repealing anti-dumping duties, and simplifying border paperwork is among the best-evidenced policies in economics. Copenhagen Consensus estimates for full trade liberalisation, counting growth effects, return about $90 to $2,800 per $1 of adjustment cost, and liberalisers grow about 1.5 percentage points a year faster. The sub-policies also pay: anti-dumping repeal returns about 2-14 to 1 and trade facilitation about 11-640 to 1. In 2026 the remaining US tariffs cost households about $1,100 a year (Yale Budget Lab) and lower long-run GDP by 0.4% (Tax Foundation).","rated":"TRUE","gain_bn":"","mort_a":"-1","mort_b":"1","income_loss_bn":"32.1","emde_loss_lo":"","emde_loss_hi":"","base_bn":"32.1","lives_lo":"","lives_hi":"","lives_basis":"","selection_method":"Fraser Economic Freedom of the World index","selected_by":"Fraser Economic Freedom of the World, Area 4"},{"id":"38","title":"Energy Without Subsidies","short":"Energy Without Subsidies","category":"Freedom","bcr_low":"0.78","bcr_high":"2.16","bcr_basis":"Annual global flows, $bn. Subsidies removed are transfers counted at $1 on both sides, as in the income-tax entry: taxpayers gain each dollar recipients lose, so the ratio is (subsidies + efficiency gains + other gains - damages) / (subsidies + other costs). Subsidies: $634bn in 2017 (IRENA 2020: fossil fuels $447bn, renewable power $128bn, biofuels $38bn, nuclear $21bn) to $1,447bn (IMF explicit fossil-fuel subsidies in 2022, 18% of $7tn = $1,260bn, plus IRENA's $166bn for renewables and $21bn for nuclear). Net emissions (MtCO2e/yr): ending fossil-fuel subsidies -500 to -2,200 by 2030 (Jewell et al. 2018); ending renewable subsidies, with the $166bn treated as the abatement it pays for, +166/88 = +1,886 at the lowest per-tonne cost ($88/t, Bistline, Mehrotra & Wolfram 2023) to +166/2,138 = +78 at the highest ($2,138/t, Abrell, Kosch & Rausch 2019); open federal leasing +100 (Prest 2022, after leakage); unconstrained LNG exports +22.9 (DOE 2024). Net: +1,509 (low) and -1,999 (high), valued at $66/t (Barrage & Nordhaus 2024) plus $57.5/t of local air-pollution damage (Parry, Veung & Heine 2014) = $123.5/t. LOW: benefits = 634 + fossil-subsidy deadweight loss 44 (Davis 2014, road fuels only) + excess burden of the taxes that fund subsidies 0.17 x 634 = 107.8 (lowest Ballard, Shoven & Whalley 1985 figure) + federal royalties 5 (Prest 2022) + LNG GDP 13 (NERA 2018, 2040) - emission damages 1,509 x 123.5 = 186.4, total 617.4. Costs = 634 + US GDP loss from ending clean-energy credits 160 (Energy Innovation 2025, 2030, including about 790,000 fewer jobs) + replacement nuclear licensing at the NRC's FY2025 budget 0.995 = 795.0. LOW = 617.4 / 795.0 = 0.78. HIGH: benefits = 1,447 + deadweight loss 0.40 (Davis's 44/110) x 1,260 = 504 + excess burden 0.56 x 1,447 = 810.3 (highest Ballard, Shoven & Whalley figure) + shale-gas welfare 48 (Hausman & Kellogg 2015) + LNG GDP 80 (DOE 2024, 2050) + emission cut 1,999 x 123.5 = 246.9, total 3,136.2. Costs = 1,447 + displaced-worker losses 790,000 x 1.4 years x $49,504 = $54.8bn, / 12.46 = 4.39 + 0.995 = 1,452.4. HIGH = 3,136.2 / 1,452.4 = 2.16. The high end uses 2022 subsidies, a price-spike year. Cross-check: the Copenhagen Consensus Post-2015 assessment rates phasing out fossil-fuel subsidies at 15 per $1, measured against the efficiency and environmental gains only, without counting the subsidy as a transfer. Nuclear licensing reform and lifting development-bank bans on fossil-fuel finance are not priced: no published estimate links either to measured output or emissions. Moss & Leo (2014) find a $10bn gas-only portfolio could connect about 90 million people against 20-27 million for renewables only. Tax-finance check: each $1 of public outlay or public administration costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven & Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999); the NRC's tax-financed share is $0.995bn - $0.824bn fee-recovered = $0.171bn of $347.4bn (0.05% of cost_bn); the penalty changes neither end at two decimals and is not applied (negligible).","grade":"B","grade_reason":"The priced parts rest on peer-reviewed estimates (Davis 2014 AER; Jewell et al. 2018 Nature; Abrell et al. 2019 J. Public Econ; Prest 2022 JAERE) with a Copenhagen Consensus ratio of 15 for fossil-subsidy phase-out as a cross-check, combined with official and think-tank figures for LNG exports, subsidy totals and the GDP effect of ending clean-energy credits (DOE, NERA, IRENA, Energy Innovation). The ratio is assembled from several separate studies with an assumed equality of renewable subsidies and the resource costs they finance, and two of the four components (nuclear licensing and development-bank finance) are unpriced, so the grade is B rather than B+.","cost_bn":"347.4","cost_basis":"Full cost, $bn a year, excluding the subsidies themselves, which are transfers counted at $1 on both sides of the ratio. Public outlay: $0; ending subsidies lowers public spending. Administration: a replacement nuclear licensing system at the NRC's FY2025 budget request, $0.995bn (NRC 2024); no published estimate exists for oil, gas and LNG permitting administration. Private compliance: none estimated. GDP loss: $160bn in 2030 from ending US clean-energy tax credits (Energy Innovation 2025), which includes the loss of about 790,000 jobs; the scenario also rescinds other federal programmes, so it is an upper bound. External damage: the low-end net emission increase of 1,509 MtCO2e a year at $66/t plus $57.5/t of local air-pollution damage, $186.4bn. cost_bn = 0.995 + 160 + 186.4 = $347.4bn.","difficulty":"moderate","difficulty_reason":"Each country can act alone through ordinary legislation, and fuel-subsidy reform has precedents in Indonesia (2015) and India (2014). Nuclear licensing reform and permitting and leasing changes are ordinary statutes, and lifting development-bank bans on fossil-fuel finance is a decision of each bank's board. No treaty is needed; the obstacle is that most governments must act, after G20 members pledged in 2009 to phase out inefficient fossil-fuel subsidies yet explicit subsidies reached $1.3 trillion in 2022.","who_benefits":"broad","who_benefits_reason":"Ending subsidies removes transfers that go mostly to better-off households (about 60% of US clean-energy tax credits went to the top income quintile, Borenstein & Davis 2016), and the Copenhagen Consensus finds particularly high benefits for developing countries when revenues are recycled; lifting development-bank bans could connect about 60 million more people per $10bn invested (Moss & Leo 2014). Poor households in subsidising countries lose price support in the short run, and US gas consumers pay about 4% more under unconstrained LNG exports (DOE 2024).","summary":"This policy ends subsidies for every energy source, from fossil fuels to renewables and nuclear, speeds nuclear licensing, opens oil, gas and coal permitting, leasing and LNG export approval, and lets development banks finance gas and coal plants in poor countries. Ending fossil-fuel subsidies removes large deadweight losses and cuts emissions slightly, ending renewable subsidies saves money but adds emissions, and more drilling and gas exports add output. Counting the subsidies removed as transfers, each $1 returns $0.78 to $2.16; below 1 when renewable subsidies are treated as cheap abatement and the GDP loss from ending them is counted. Nuclear licensing reform and development-bank lending are described but not priced.","rated":"TRUE","gain_bn":"","mort_a":"-1","mort_b":"1","income_loss_bn":"347.4","emde_loss_lo":"","emde_loss_hi":"","base_bn":"347.4","lives_lo":"","lives_hi":"","lives_basis":"","selection_method":"Fraser Economic Freedom of the World index","selected_by":"Fraser Economic Freedom of the World, Areas 1 and 5"},{"id":"39","title":"Deregulate the Economy (Top Ten)","short":"Deregulate the Economy (Top Ten)","category":"Freedom","bcr_low":"1.28","bcr_high":"26.37","bcr_basis":"One reform package of ten US deregulation items; the ratio is total yearly benefits over total yearly full costs, $bn, 2025 dollars. LOW pairs the lowest credible benefits with the highest costs; HIGH uses the most favourable credible published estimates (highest benefits, lowest costs). (1) Occupational licensing: consumer costs of $184bn (Kleiner & Vorotnikov 2018) to $203bn (Kleiner 2015); forgone quality from Kleiner & Soltas's (2023, REStud) finding that buyers' willingness to pay offsets 80% of licensing-induced price increases and wages offset 60% of training costs: 184/1.25 = 147.2 and 203/1.67 = 121.6. (2) Minimum wage: reversing CBO's (2019) $15 scenario, families above the poverty line gain about $16bn in real income and families below it lose $8bn (2025); low benefit 0.69 x 8 = 5.5 (Cengiz et al. 2019, QJE). (3) Zoning: Greaney (2026, AEJ: Macro) finds the gain from easing housing constraints about two orders of magnitude smaller than Hsieh & Moretti (2019, AEJ: Macro), 0.037% of GDP or $11.4bn (low). Hsieh & Moretti's headline, with imperfect labour mobility (Table 5, p.27), is US GDP 3.7% higher with New York, San Jose and San Francisco at median regulation, $1,141.9bn on 2025 GDP of $30,861bn; their perfect-mobility case (Table 4, p.26) is 8.9%, 0.089 x 30,861 = $2,746.7bn (high). (4) FDA drug approval: faster reviews under PDUFA added $14-31bn of social surplus (Philipson et al. 2008, J. Public Econ), $3.2bn a year at the low end; Peltzman (1973, JPE) finds the 1962 amendments act like a 5-10% tax on drug purchases, 10% x $467bn of 2024 drug spending (CMS) = $46.7bn. High: Gieringer (1985, Cato Journal) puts the cost of FDA delay at 21,000 to 120,000 lives per decade against about 5,000 (10,000 worst case) casualties per decade avoided by FDA safety review; (120,000 - 5,000)/10 = 11,500 lives a year x $13.1m (HHS value of a statistical life) = $150.65bn, used in place of Peltzman, not added to it. Cost: 0 to $1.0bn a year (upper bound on safety harm, Philipson et al. 2008). (5) Sugar program: consumers pay $2.5bn (GAO low) to $4bn a year (Beghin 2022, AEI: $2.4-4bn); producers lose $1.5-2.5bn; net cost to the economy about $1bn (GAO). (6) Bank compliance: community banks spent $4.5bn on compliance in 2014 (St. Louis Fed/CSBS); high: CEA (2019, pp.14-15) puts the annual net benefits of the 2018 relief act for small banks at almost $5bn (no price year stated, not deflated); CBO scores the 2018 act's crisis risk at $671m over ten years ($0.067bn a year). (7) Jones Act: repeal raises national welfare by $0.656bn (USITC 2002) to $9.8bn a year (USITC range cited by Cato PA 845); about 10,800 displaced workers at BLS median pay of $71,860 lose 1.4-2.8 years of earnings (Davis & von Wachter 2011), $0.087-0.174bn a year over 20 years at 5%. (8) EPA rules that fail their own benefit-cost test: of the EPA major rules issued FY2007-2016 listed in OMB's 2017 report (Table A-2, millions of 2001 dollars), three have agency-estimated costs above even their high benefit estimate: Florida numeric nutrient water-quality standards (2010; benefits 23, costs 111-169), Coal Combustion Residuals (2015; benefits 182-226, costs 399-576) and Cooling Water Intake Structures (2014; benefits 24-27, costs 223-241). Repealing them saves compliance costs of 733-986 and gives up health and environmental benefits of 229-276; at 128.893/74.360 = 1.733 (GDP deflator 2001 to 2025), benefits $1.27-1.71bn and costs (lost benefits) $0.40-0.48bn. Compliance capital already installed is sunk, so the saving is an upper bound. (9) Compulsory collective bargaining (NLRA; national right-to-work and an end to compulsory exclusive bargaining): LOW 0, since Oklahoma's 2001 right-to-work law changed neither employment nor private-sector wages (Eren & Ozbeklik 2016, JPAM). HIGH: the deadweight loss of union wage-setting, 0.11% of wages in 2000 (Rees method; Vedder & Gallaway 2002, J. Labor Research, Table 1), doubled for a labour-supply response as the authors suggest, and scaled from 2000 union density (13.5%, BLS) to 2025 private-sector members as a share of employment (7.4m/146.7m = 5.05%, BLS): 0.0011 x 2 x 0.374 x $12,976bn of 2025 wages and salaries (BEA) = $10.67bn. The union wage premium is a transfer and is left out of both sides; lost worker voice and safety representation are not priced. (10) Antitrust: benefit = enforcement budgets saved, FTC competition mission $239.6m (FY2023 request) + DOJ Antitrust Division $288.0m (FY2025 request) = $0.53bn; HSR filing fees fund these budgets and are not added. Cost (lost consumer savings), high end from the agencies' own performance measures: FTC $3.8bn (FY2018) and $4.8bn (FY2019), mean 4.3 x 1.250 = $5.37bn; DOJ civil $1.65bn and criminal $0.34bn a year (FY2016-23 means), 1.99 x 1.223 = $2.43bn; total $7.81bn. These omit deterrence, which Baker (2003) argues is the larger benefit and which is not priced. Low cost 0: Crandall & Winston (2003, JEP) find no evidence that monopolization, collusion or merger policy has provided much benefit to consumers. Item sums: benefits $213.6bn (low) to $3,148.1bn (high); costs $131.7bn (low) to $167.2bn (high). LOW = 213.6 / 167.2 = 1.28. Item-by-item HIGH = 3,148.1 / 131.65 = 23.9. HIGH from the aggregate study, used because it is the more favourable credible route: Coffey, McLaughlin & Peretto (2020, RED, pp.1, 14) find that federal regulatory growth since 1980 left GDP nearly 25%, about $4 trillion, lower in 2012; 4,000 / 16,254 (2012 GDP) = 24.61% x 30,861 = $7,594.8bn. It replaces the post-1980 federal items it covers (sugar program, bank compliance, EPA rules) and is not added to them. Items outside it (state and local rules and pre-1980 statutes) are added at their high values: licensing 203 + minimum wage 16 + zoning 2,746.7 + FDA 150.65 + Jones Act 9.8 + NLRA 10.67 + antitrust 0.53 = 3,137.35. Benefits: 7,594.8 + 3,137.35 = 10,732.2. The study measures GDP and says it is not a weighing of regulation's benefits, so the non-market benefits of the post-1980 federal rules it removes are counted as a cost, at the lowest credible estimate: (a) 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments: EPA (2011, p.28) finds that even if fine particles and ozone had no effect on premature mortality, non-fatal health and visibility benefits reach $137bn in 2020 (2006 dollars); Cox (2012, Risk Analysis) argues the mortality benefits that make up most of EPA's estimate are unproven; 137 x 128.893/84.071 = $210.0bn. (b) Non-EPA major rules FY2007-2016 (OMB 2017, Table 1-1, low, 2015 dollars): USDA 0.6 + HHS 5.9 + DHS 0.5 + DOJ 1.9 + DOL 9.8 + DOT 22.3 = 41.0, plus DOE 20.3 and joint DOT-EPA fuel-economy rules 44.6 cut to 15%, since Gayer & Viscusi (2013, J. Regulatory Economics) find 85-87% of the benefits of fuel-economy and energy-efficiency rules are buyers' private energy savings (0.15 x 64.9 = 9.7); 50.7 x 128.893/97.316 = $67.2bn. Lost-benefit floor: 210.0 + 67.2 = 277.2. It omits non-EPA rules before FY2007 and rules below the major threshold, so it is a lower bound. Costs: licensing 121.6 + minimum wage 8 + Jones Act 0.087 + 277.2 = 406.9. HIGH = 10,732.2 / 406.9 = 26.37. Cross-checks: with Hsieh & Moretti's 3.7% in place of 8.9%, 22.4 on the aggregate route and 1,543.3 / 131.65 = 11.7 item by item; with Coffey et al.'s $4 trillion deflated (x 1.383 = $5,533bn) rather than scaled to 2025 GDP, 21.3; with agency estimates of lost benefits (1990 CAAA low benefits about 3 x $65bn = $299bn plus non-EPA rules $105.9bn in 2015 dollars = $140bn), 18.9; with no lost benefits at all, which breaks the full-cost rule, 82.8. Wholesale repeal of all 39 EPA major rules of FY2007-2016 in place of item 8 would save $54.1-64.8bn of compliance (2015 dollars; plus the Greenstone, List & Syverson 2012 TFP cost of $20.8bn in 2010 dollars at the high end) and give up $195.8-705.7bn of benefits on OMB's figures, which pulls LOW to 0.26. Not used: Crain & Crain (2023, NAM), $3.079 trillion (2023 dollars) a year, and CEI's Ten Thousand Commandments (2025), $2.155 trillion, are lower than Coffey et al. and count costs only; Dawson & Seater's (2013) counterfactual of 1949 regulation levels covers pre-1980 statutes and its working-paper versions differ widely (output 90% of counterfactual in 2005 in the 2005 draft, 56% in the 2008 draft).","grade":"B+","grade_reason":"Most items rest on peer-reviewed natural experiments or structural models that measure the gain (Kleiner & Soltas 2023; Cengiz et al. 2019; Hsieh & Moretti 2019; Peltzman 1973; Philipson et al. 2008), with official estimates for the sugar program, bank compliance, the EPA rules and antitrust (GAO, CBO, OMB, FTC, DOJ). The high end rests on a peer-reviewed growth model (Coffey et al. 2020) whose regulation measure has been challenged (Goldschlag & Tabarrok 2018), on Hsieh & Moretti's perfect-mobility case, which a replication and a separate calculation put far lower, and on a 1985 estimate of lives lost to drug delay. The union item rests on a dated deadweight-loss calculation scaled by the author's arithmetic. B+.","cost_bn":"167.2","cost_basis":"Full cost, $bn a year: forgone licensing quality 121.6-147.2 (Kleiner & Soltas 2023 ratios), income lost by families below the poverty line after minimum-wage repeal 8 (CBO 2019), FDA safety bound 0-1.0 (Philipson et al. 2008), sugar producers' lost surplus 1.5-2.5 (GAO), bank-crisis risk 0.067 (CBO 2018), displaced Jones Act workers 0.087-0.174 (USITC 2002; Davis & von Wachter 2011), lost health and environmental benefits of the three EPA rules 0.40-0.48 (OMB 2017, Table A-2), lost consumer savings from antitrust enforcement 0-7.81 (FTC and DOJ performance reports; Crandall & Winston 2003), NLRA reform 0 (wage premium is a transfer; voice effects not priced). Item sums: low 131.7, high 167.2. At the HIGH end the aggregate route replaces the sugar, bank and EPA costs with the lowest credible non-market benefits of all post-1980 federal rules, 277.2 (EPA 2011 non-mortality benefits of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments; OMB 2017 non-EPA rules, net of private energy savings per Gayer & Viscusi 2013), for a cost of 406.9 against benefits of 10,732.2. Repeal needs no new spending; winding down antitrust enforcement saves $0.53bn of budgets, counted as a benefit.","difficulty":"moderate","difficulty_reason":"Each item needs ordinary legislation, rule repeal or federal pre-emption of state licensing and local zoning, with strong precedents: the airline, trucking and rail deregulation of 1978-80, Arizona's 2019 universal licence recognition, Auckland's 2016 upzoning, 26 state right-to-work laws, and repeal of rules under the Congressional Review Act. The obstacle is the number of separate laws and entrenched beneficiaries: incumbent homeowners, licensed professions, sugar growers, unions and the regulated industries' competitors.","who_benefits":"broad","who_benefits_reason":"Zoning and licensing reform favour lower-income entrants and renters; FDA, sugar and Jones Act reform help consumers widely; minimum-wage repeal and NLRA reform lower some wages, and ending antitrust enforcement may raise some prices.","summary":"Ten federal, state and local regulations are removed or scaled back: occupational licensing, minimum wages, restrictive zoning, slow FDA drug approval, the sugar program, community-bank compliance rules, the Jones Act's limits on coastal shipping, EPA rules whose own cost estimates exceed their benefits, compulsory collective bargaining, and antitrust enforcement. Licensing sets the low end; at the high end, zoning and an aggregate estimate of the growth cost of federal regulation since 1980 carry the gain, net of the lowest credible estimate of the health and environmental benefits those rules provide. The package gives $1.28 to $26.37 of benefit per dollar of cost.","rated":"TRUE","gain_bn":"","mort_a":"-1","mort_b":"1","income_loss_bn":"167.2","emde_loss_lo":"","emde_loss_hi":"","base_bn":"167.2","lives_lo":"","lives_hi":"","lives_basis":"","selection_method":"Fraser Economic Freedom of the World index","selected_by":"Fraser Economic Freedom of the World, Area 5"},{"id":"40","title":"Secure Property Rights","short":"Secure Property Rights","category":"Freedom","bcr_low":"1.97","bcr_high":"17.5","bcr_basis":"Copenhagen Consensus analysis of land tenure security in Sub-Saharan Africa (Byamugisha & Dubosse 2023, Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis; 8% discount rate, 30 years): rural titling benefits $395.71bn against costs $21.72bn (BCR 18); urban titling $236.93bn (average house price) or $159.89bn (population-weighted) against $5.29bn (BCR 45 or 30). Benefits rest on a 15% household wealth effect for rural land and a 25% rise in urban property values. HIGH = (395.71 + 236.93) / (21.72 + 5.29) = 23.4, shown as 23. The paper's headline is 21 (population-weighted urban prices). LOW = 6: urban benefits only, with rural benefits set to zero following the systematic reviews that find no consistent income or productivity effect of rural titling in Africa (Higgins et al. 2018; Lawry et al. 2017; Jacoby & Minten 2007), and all costs kept: 159.89 / 27.01 = 5.9. Quasi-experimental evidence on the mechanism: titling in Peru raised household work hours 17% and cut child labour 28% (Field 2007, QJE); titled families in Buenos Aires built 12% more and their children got 0.69 more years of schooling (Galiani & Schargrodsky 2010); Rwanda's land regularisation raised soil-conservation investment about 10 percentage points, 19 for female-headed households (Ali, Deininger & Goldstein 2014). Other Copenhagen Consensus country studies find higher ratios (Malawi 73, range 18-138). Tax finance: each $1 of public outlay costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven & Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999), as for the transfer policies; the whole cost behind the ratio is public outlay; LOW = 5.92 (159.89/27.01) / 3.00 = 1.97; HIGH = 23.44 (632.64/27.01) / 1.34 = 17.5. Additional study (above the range, not used to set it): the Ghana Priorities analysis of customary land titling (Adjasi & Adiaba 2020, Copenhagen Consensus Center and Ghana's National Development Planning Commission) values titling as a 25% rise in rural land values and finds a benefit-cost ratio of 91 at its central 25% probability of successful implementation (GHS 86,123m / 942m), 182 at 75% and 5 at 1% (Table 3), with sensitivities from 4 to 219. Like the Malawi study (73) already noted, this single-country result lies above the high end, so the range is not extended.","grade":"A-","grade_reason":"One peer-reviewed benefit-cost analysis (Byamugisha & Dubosse 2023, JBCA) backed by quasi-experimental and natural-experiment studies (Field 2007; Galiani & Schargrodsky 2010; Ali, Deininger & Goldstein 2014); systematic reviews find mixed income effects, so A-.","cost_bn":"2.7","cost_basis":"$82.4bn over 30 years for Sub-Saharan Africa (rural $68.6bn, urban $13.8bn, undiscounted; Byamugisha & Dubosse 2023, Table 4) = $2.7bn a year, mostly registry operation and upkeep. Per-parcel titling costs of $5-25 have been achieved in Rwanda, Malawi and Tanzania. A global programme would cost more; no sourced global total exists.","difficulty":"moderate","difficulty_reason":"A sustained funding scale-up with working precedents: Rwanda's nationwide land tenure regularisation demarcated 4.8 million parcels in its first year (Ali et al. 2014), and Peru's urban titling programme issued titles to over a million households in the 1990s (Field 2007). The practical obstacles are land administration capacity, elite capture and keeping registries up to date where customary tenure is common.","who_benefits":"pro-poor","who_benefits_reason":"Targets squatters, smallholders and female-headed households, who gained most in Rwanda; about 1.1 billion adults report insecure land or property rights (Prindex).","summary":"Giving the world's poor formal, tradable titles to the land and homes they already occupy lets them invest, borrow against and sell what they own. A peer-reviewed Copenhagen Consensus analysis for Sub-Saharan Africa finds $18 back per dollar for rural titling and $30-45 for urban titling, at costs of $5-25 a parcel, and field studies find titled families work more, build more and keep children in school longer. Because reviews find weaker effects on rural incomes, the range runs from about $6 to $23 per dollar.","rated":"TRUE","gain_bn":"","mort_a":"-1","mort_b":"1","income_loss_bn":"2.7","emde_loss_lo":"","emde_loss_hi":"","base_bn":"2.7","lives_lo":"","lives_hi":"","lives_basis":"","selection_method":"Fraser Economic Freedom of the World index","selected_by":"Fraser Economic Freedom of the World, Area 2"}],"sources":[{"policy_id":"1","authors":"Jayachandran, S.; de Laat, J.; Lambin, E. F.; Stanton, C. Y.; Audy, R.; Thomas, N. E.","year":"2017","title":"Cash for carbon: A randomized trial of payments for ecosystem services to reduce deforestation","venue":"Science 357(6348):267-273","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://collaborate.princeton.edu/en/publications/cash-for-carbon-a-randomized-trial-of-payments-for-ecosystem-serv/","doi":"10.1126/science.aan0568","reported_estimate":"RCT in 121 Ugandan villages: tree cover fell 4.2% in treatment vs 9.1% in control villages; no evidence of leakage; value of delayed CO2 emissions 2.4 times programme cost.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"1","authors":"Jayachandran, S.; de Laat, J.; Lambin, E. F.; Stanton, C. Y.","year":"2016","title":"Cash for Carbon: A Randomized Controlled Trial of Payments for Ecosystem Services to Reduce Deforestation (IPR Working Paper WP-16-25)","venue":"Institute for Policy Research, Northwestern University","type":"working_paper","url":"https://www.ipr.northwestern.edu/documents/working-papers/2016/WP-16-25.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Cost at scale ~$0.57 per tCO2 delayed; SCC $39; BCR ~2 in base case, 0.7 if immediate catch-up, 12.3 if permanent delay; take-up 32%; equity caveats (landless households).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"1","authors":"Kindermann, G.; Obersteiner, M.; Sohngen, B.; Sathaye, J.; Andrasko, K.; Rametsteiner, E.; Schlamadinger, B.; Wunder, S.; Beach, R.","year":"2008","title":"Global cost estimates of reducing carbon emissions through avoided deforestation","venue":"Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 105(30):10302-10307","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.rti.org/publication/global-cost-estimates-reducing-carbon-emissions-avoided-deforestation","doi":"10.1073/pnas.0710616105","reported_estimate":"10% cut in deforestation 2005-2030: 0.3-0.6 GtCO2/yr for $0.4-1.7bn/yr; 50% cut: 1.5-2.7 GtCO2/yr for $17.2-28.0bn/yr.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"1","authors":"Assuncao, J.; Gandour, C.; Rocha, R.","year":"2023","title":"DETER-ing Deforestation in the Amazon: Environmental Monitoring and Law Enforcement","venue":"American Economic Journal: Applied Economics (2023)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/app.20200196","doi":"10.1257/app.20200196","reported_estimate":"IV design using cloud cover: satellite-targeted monitoring and enforcement significantly reduced Amazon deforestation. CPI summary of the research: avoided ~59,500 km2 of clearing 2007-2011; any carbon price above $0.76/tCO2 covers the cost of monitoring and enforcement.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"1","authors":"Copenhagen Consensus Center (Markandya et al.)","year":"2015","title":"Biodiversity: Post-2015 Consensus","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center","type":"think_tank","url":"https://copenhagenconsensus.com/post-2015-consensus/biodiversity","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Reduce global forest loss by at least 50%: BCR ~10 (highlight); McVittie's re-estimate $2-3 per $1; Markandya's own assessment $30-100+.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"1","authors":"Resources for the Future","year":"2023","title":"Social Cost of Carbon 101","venue":"Resources for the Future","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.rff.org/publications/explainers/social-cost-carbon-101/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"US IWG interim SCC $51/tCO2; EPA (Nov 2023) $190/tCO2.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"1","authors":"West, T. A. P.; Wunder, S.; Sills, E. O.; Borner, J.; Rifai, S. W.; Neidermeier, A. N.; Frey, G. P.; Kontoleon, A.","year":"2023","title":"Action needed to make carbon offsets from forest conservation work for climate change mitigation","venue":"Science 381(6660):873-877","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://news.mongabay.com/2023/08/redd-projects-falling-far-short-of-claimed-carbon-cuts-study-finds/","doi":"10.1126/science.ade3535","reported_estimate":"Synthetic-control evaluation of 18 voluntary REDD+ projects (26 sites): only ~6.1% of credits tied to additional emission reductions; 68% of credits from projects with no significant reduction.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"1","authors":"Merger, E.; Held, C.; Tennigkeit, T.; Blomley, T.","year":"2012","title":"A bottom-up approach to estimating cost elements of REDD+ pilot projects in Tanzania","venue":"Carbon Balance and Management 7:9","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3441278/","doi":"10.1186/1750-0680-7-9","reported_estimate":"MRV and carbon-market compliance (transaction) costs: US$0.9/ha/yr or US$1.46/tCO2 (Masito Ugalla); US$0.3/ha/yr (Lindi); US$0.2/ha/yr or US$0.21/tCO2 (Kilosa).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"1","authors":"Hu, J.; Jastad, E. O.; Bolkesjo, T. F.; Rorstad, P. K. (citing Gan, J. & McCarl, B. A. 2007, Ecological Economics 64(2):423-432)","year":"2024","title":"The Quantification and Tracing of Leakage in the Forest Sector in Nordic Countries","venue":"Forests 15(2):254","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.mdpi.com/1999-4907/15/2/254","doi":"10.3390/f15020254","reported_estimate":"Reports Gan & McCarl (2007): 'between 42% and 95% of forest conservation efforts within a country or region may be redirected elsewhere'; other studies 50-100% for harvest reductions in the EU and Norway.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"1","authors":"International Forest Industries (reporting the Eliasch Review, UK Government)","year":"2008","title":"Eliasch Review on international deforestation published","venue":"International Forest Industries (14 Oct 2008)","type":"media","url":"https://internationalforestindustries.com/2008/10/14/eliasch-review-on-international-deforestation-published/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Capacity building for forest nations estimated at up to $4bn over five years for 40 forest nations; without action, deforestation could add climate damages of $1 trillion a year by 2100.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"1","authors":"Ballard, C. L.; Shoven, J. B.; Whalley, J.","year":"1985","title":"General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States","venue":"American Economic Review 75(1): 128-138","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v75y1985i1p128-38.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Marginal excess burden centres around 33 cents per $1 of revenue, range 17-56 cents (per Fullerton & Henderson 1987, NBER w2353).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"1","authors":"Feldstein, M.","year":"1999","title":"Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax","venue":"Review of Economics and Statistics 81(4): 674-680","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w5055","doi":"10.1162/003465399558391","reported_estimate":"Deadweight loss of nearly $2 per extra $1 of revenue from a proportional rise in all personal income tax rates.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"1","authors":"McVittie, A. (in Copenhagen Consensus Post-2015 biodiversity assessment)","year":"2015","title":"Biodiversity Perspective / alternative estimate","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center","type":"think_tank","url":"https://copenhagenconsensus.com/post-2015-consensus/biodiversity","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Adjusted BCR for halving forest loss of only $2-3 per $1.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Falls inside the adopted range; not a separate end point."},{"policy_id":"1","authors":"Rennert, K.; Errickson, F.; Prest, B. C.; et al.","year":"2022","title":"Comprehensive evidence implies a higher social cost of CO2","venue":"Nature 610:687-692","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-022-05224-9","doi":"10.1038/s41586-022-05224-9","reported_estimate":"Mean SCC $185/tCO2 (5-95%: $44-413) at a 2% near-term discount rate; used for the cross-check.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Highest published social cost of carbon ($185/t); used only in the cross-check."},{"policy_id":"2","authors":"Greenstone, M.; Nath, I.","year":"2019","title":"Do Renewable Portfolio Standards Deliver Cost-Effective Carbon Abatement? (BFI Working Paper 2019-62, revised 24 June 2026)","venue":"Becker Friedman Institute / Energy Policy Institute, University of Chicago","type":"working_paper","url":"https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3374942","doi":"","reported_estimate":"June 2026 revision (SSRN abstract): electricity prices 11% higher seven years after RPS passage; CO2 emissions 8-17% lower; cost per abated tCO2 $86-211. The 2019 working-paper version (EPIC summary, https://epic.uchicago.edu/research/do-renewable-portfolio-standards-deliver): prices +11% after 7 years and +17% after 12; cost exceeds $130/t in all specifications, up to $460.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"2","authors":"Abrell, J.; Kosch, M.; Rausch, S.","year":"2019","title":"Carbon abatement with renewables: Evaluating wind and solar subsidies in Germany and Spain","venue":"Journal of Public Economics 169:172-202","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/pubeco/v169y2019icp172-202.html","doi":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.11.007","reported_estimate":"Short-run abatement cost of solar subsidies EUR 411-1,944/tCO2; wind EUR 82-276/tCO2; consumers bear 4-7x larger costs when solar is promoted and benefit when wind is promoted.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"2","authors":"Bistline, J.; Mehrotra, N.; Wolfram, C.","year":"2023","title":"Economic Implications of the Climate Provisions of the Inflation Reduction Act","venue":"Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2023 (NBER WP 31267)","type":"working_paper","url":"https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w31267/w31267.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Power-sector average abatement cost of IRA tax credits $36-87/tCO2 with discounted costs and undiscounted emissions, $88-94 if both are discounted; 'would be higher if distortions associated with financing the incentives were included'; tax-credit expenditures to 2031 $244bn (lower), $781bn (central), $1,070bn (higher); total fiscal costs $365-1,190bn.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"2","authors":"Copenhagen Consensus Center","year":"2015","title":"Energy: Post-2015 Consensus","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center","type":"think_tank","url":"https://copenhagenconsensus.com/post-2015-consensus/energy","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Doubling the share of renewables in the global energy mix: BCR below 1 (excessively costly until intermittency/storage solved); doubling energy RD&D: 11; phasing out fossil-fuel subsidies: 15.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"2","authors":"Fisher, T.; Loucks, J. L.","year":"2025","title":"The Budgetary Cost of the Inflation Reduction Act's Energy Subsidies (Policy Analysis No. 992)","venue":"Cato Institute","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/budgetary-cost-inflation-reduction-acts-energy-subsidies","doi":"","reported_estimate":"IRA energy subsidies $936bn-$1.97 trillion over 2025-2034 ($2.04-4.67 trillion through 2050); CBO/JCT ~$786bn over 2024-2033; also reports Goldman Sachs $1.2T and Penn Wharton just over $1T.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"2","authors":"Kirkland & Ellis LLP","year":"2025","title":"'One Big Beautiful Bill Act' Brings Big Changes to Green Energy Tax Credits","venue":"Kirkland & Ellis","type":"media","url":"https://www.kirkland.com/publications/kirkland-alert/2025/08/one-big-beautiful-bill-act-brings-big-changes-to-green-energy-tax-credits","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Wind/solar 45Y/48E credits end unless construction begins by July 4, 2026 or in service by Dec 31, 2027; EV credits eliminated after 2025.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"2","authors":"Borenstein, S.; Davis, L. W.","year":"2016","title":"The Distributional Effects of US Clean Energy Tax Credits","venue":"Tax Policy and the Economy 30 (NBER WP 21437)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w21437","doi":"10.1086/685597","reported_estimate":"Top income quintile received ~60% of clean-energy tax credits, bottom three quintiles ~10%; ~90% of EV credits went to the top quintile.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"2","authors":"Resources for the Future","year":"2023","title":"Social Cost of Carbon 101","venue":"Resources for the Future","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.rff.org/publications/explainers/social-cost-carbon-101/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"US IWG interim SCC $51/tCO2; EPA 2023 $190/tCO2.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"2","authors":"Idel, R.","year":"2022","title":"Levelized Full System Costs of Electricity","venue":"Energy 259:124905","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/energy/v259y2022ics0360544222018035.html","doi":"10.1016/j.energy.2022.124905","reported_estimate":"Introduces Levelized Full System Costs of Electricity (LFSCOE): the cost of serving an entire market with one source plus storage (abstract, RePEc); in Germany and ERCOT Texas, wind and solar LFSCOE exceed the most expensive dispatchable technology, and even a 90% fall in storage costs does not make them competitive. Fraser Institute commentary (2025) reports from a study in Energy that solar costs rise from $36/MWh to as much as $1,548/MWh and wind from $40 to up to $504/MWh on this basis.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"2","authors":"Gowrisankaran, G.; Reynolds, S. S.; Samano, M.","year":"2016","title":"Intermittency and the Value of Renewable Energy","venue":"Journal of Political Economy 124(4):1187-1234 (NBER WP 17086)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w17086","doi":"10.1086/686733","reported_estimate":"Southeastern Arizona: social cost of $138.4/MWh for 20% solar generation (excluding CO2 offset), of which intermittency overall accounts for $46 and unforecastable intermittency $6.1; 20% solar would be welfare neutral at $1.52/W installation cost and a $39/t CO2 social cost.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"2","authors":"Johnston, S.","year":"2019","title":"Nonrefundable Tax Credits versus Grants: The Impact of Subsidy Form on the Effectiveness of Subsidies for Renewable Energy","venue":"Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists 6(3):433-460","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jaerec/doi10.1086-702736.html","doi":"10.1086/702736","reported_estimate":"Wind developers valued $1 of nonrefundable tax credits the same as $0.85 of a grant; credits favour incumbents with tax liability.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"2","authors":"U.S. Energy Information Administration","year":"2025","title":"United States Electricity Profile 2024; Revenue from Sales to Ultimate Customers by State (revenue_annual.xlsx)","venue":"EIA","type":"government","url":"https://www.eia.gov/electricity/state/unitedstates/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"2024 US retail sales 3,975,381,832 MWh at an average 12.94 c/kWh (= ~$514bn revenue); state revenue file (https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/state/revenue_annual.xlsx), 2020: US total $393.6bn, of which the 31 RPS jurisdictions listed in cost_components $276.0bn (70.1%).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"2","authors":"USAFacts (citing IRS Data Book)","year":"2025","title":"What does it cost the IRS to collect taxes?","venue":"USAFacts","type":"media","url":"https://usafacts.org/articles/what-does-it-cost-the-irs-to-collect-taxes/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"IRS cost of collecting $100: 36 cents in FY2024; recent peak 53 cents in FY2010 (used as the administration rate).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"2","authors":"Barrage, L.; Nordhaus, W.","year":"2024","title":"Policies, projections, and the social cost of carbon: Results from the DICE-2023 model","venue":"Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 121(13): e2312030121","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2312030121","doi":"10.1073/pnas.2312030121","reported_estimate":"'The SCC in the baseline run is $66/tCO2 for the 2020 period (in 2019 international $).'","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"2","authors":"Ballard, C. L.; Shoven, J. B.; Whalley, J.","year":"1985","title":"General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States","venue":"American Economic Review 75(1): 128-138","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v75y1985i1p128-38.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Marginal excess burden centres around 33 cents per $1 of revenue, range 17-56 cents (per Fullerton & Henderson 1987, NBER w2353).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"2","authors":"Feldstein, M.","year":"1999","title":"Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax","venue":"Review of Economics and Statistics 81(4): 674-680","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w5055","doi":"10.1162/003465399558391","reported_estimate":"Deadweight loss of nearly $2 per extra $1 of revenue from a proportional rise in all personal income tax rates.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"2","authors":"Wiser, R.; Mai, T.; Millstein, D.; Barbose, G.; Bird, L.; Heeter, J.; Keyser, D.; Krishnan, V.; Macknick, J.","year":"2017","title":"Assessing the costs and benefits of US renewable portfolio standards","venue":"Environmental Research Letters 12(9):094023","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2b65r2nz","doi":"10.1088/1748-9326/aa87bd","reported_estimate":"Existing RPS: system costs up to $31bn (PV 2015-2050); health benefits $97bn and climate benefits $161bn (central); lower bounds $48bn and $37bn. Expanded RPS: costs $23-194bn, health $558bn, climate $599bn (central). Authors: RPS not the most cost-effective route but cost-effective nationally once externalities counted.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Modelled ex ante by DOE national laboratories (LBNL, NREL), which also carry out DOE renewable-energy programmes; uses projected costs from the laboratories' own capacity-expansion model rather than observed prices, and its ratio is driven by health co-benefits; ex-post studies of the same mandates (Greenstone & Nath) find higher costs per tonne. Kept as the optimistic counter-estimate (8.3; 2.7 with lower-bound benefits)."},{"policy_id":"2","authors":"Barbose, G. et al. (Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory)","year":"2025","title":"State Electricity Resource Standards: 2025 Data Update","venue":"LBNL Electricity Markets & Policy","type":"government","url":"https://emp.lbl.gov/sites/default/files/2025-08/State%20Electricity%20Resource%20Standards-2025%20Data%20Update.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"RPS compliance costs averaged roughly 4% of retail electricity bills across states (less than 1% in 5 states, more than 10% in 3), based on REC prices and utility/PUC data.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"DOE-laboratory estimate built from REC prices and utility-reported compliance costs, which omit wider price effects; Greenstone & Nath's observed 11% retail-price effect is used for the private-compliance component (LBNL's 4% would give ~$14.4bn/yr)."},{"policy_id":"2","authors":"Rennert, K.; Errickson, F.; Prest, B. C.; et al.","year":"2022","title":"Comprehensive evidence implies a higher social cost of CO2","venue":"Nature 610:687-692","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-022-05224-9","doi":"10.1038/s41586-022-05224-9","reported_estimate":"SCC $185/tCO2 (5-95%: $44-413), 2% discount rate.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Highest published social cost of carbon ($185/t); the range uses DICE-2023 ($66/t) as the upper carbon value."},{"policy_id":"3","authors":"Global Commission on Adaptation","year":"2019","title":"Adapt Now: A Global Call for Leadership on Climate Resilience","venue":"Global Center on Adaptation / World Resources Institute","type":"intl_org","url":"https://gca.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/GlobalCommission_Report_FINAL.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"$1.8tn invested 2020-2030 in five areas yields $7.1tn net benefits; BCRs 2:1 to 10:1; 24 hours' warning cuts damage 30%; $800m on EWS in developing countries avoids $3-16bn/yr; EWS benefits at least 10x cost; mangroves avoid >$80bn/yr of coastal flood losses, benefits up to 10x costs.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"3","authors":"Hallegatte, S.","year":"2012","title":"A Cost Effective Solution to Reduce Disaster Losses in Developing Countries: Hydro-Meteorological Services, Early Warning, and Evacuation (Policy Research Working Paper 6058)","venue":"World Bank","type":"working_paper","url":"https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2051341","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Upgrading hydro-met and EWS in all developing countries: avoided asset losses $0.3-2bn/yr, ~23,000 lives/yr ($0.7-3.5bn), wider benefits $3-30bn/yr; total $4-36bn/yr for ~$1bn/yr; BCR 4-36.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"3","authors":"Mechler, R.","year":"2016","title":"Reviewing estimates of the economic efficiency of disaster risk management: opportunities and limitations of using risk-based cost-benefit analysis","venue":"Natural Hazards 81(3):2121-2147","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/nathaz/v81y2016i3d10.1007_s11069-016-2170-y.html","doi":"10.1007/s11069-016-2170-y","reported_estimate":"Disaster risk management benefits outweigh costs on average by about four times (risk-based studies); evidence base limited.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"3","authors":"Multihazard Mitigation Council, National Institute of Building Sciences","year":"2019","title":"Natural Hazard Mitigation Saves: 2019 Report (federal grants - riverine flood)","venue":"National Institute of Building Sciences","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.nibs.org/files/pdfs/ms_v3_grants_flood.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Federal riverine-flood mitigation grants: average BCR ~7:1 (~$82bn savings on $11.5bn); all federal mitigation grants since 1995 $27bn saving $160bn, ~6:1.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"3","authors":"Hinkel, J.; Lincke, D.; Vafeidis, A. T.; Perrette, M.; Nicholls, R. J.; Tol, R. S. J.; Marzeion, B.; Fettweis, X.; Ionescu, C.; Levermann, A.","year":"2014","title":"Coastal flood damage and adaptation costs under 21st century sea-level rise","venue":"Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 111(9):3292-3297","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/361928","doi":"10.1073/pnas.1222469111","reported_estimate":"Without adaptation 0.2-4.6% of world population flooded annually in 2100 and losses 0.3-9.3% of GDP; dike investment and maintenance $12-71bn/yr in 2100, much smaller than avoided damages.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"3","authors":"Narayan, S.; Beck, M. W.; Reguero, B. G.; Losada, I. J.; van Wesenbeeck, B.; Pontee, N.; Sanchirico, J. N.; Ingram, J. C.; Lange, G.-M.; Burks-Copes, K. A.","year":"2016","title":"The Effectiveness, Costs and Coastal Protection Benefits of Natural and Nature-Based Defences","venue":"PLoS ONE 11(5):e0154735","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0hx193wq","doi":"10.1371/journal.pone.0154735","reported_estimate":"Salt marshes and mangroves are 2-5 times cheaper than submerged breakwaters for wave heights up to 0.5 m; coral reefs and marshes have the highest wave-reduction potential.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"3","authors":"United Nations (UN News / WMO)","year":"2022","title":"COP27: $3.1 billion plan to achieve early warning systems for all by 2027","venue":"UN News","type":"intl_org","url":"https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/11/1130277","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Early Warnings for All: $3.1bn of new targeted investment 2023-2027 (~50 cents per person per year); countries with limited EWS coverage have disaster mortality 8x higher.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"3","authors":"United Nations Environment Programme","year":"2023","title":"Adaptation Gap Report 2023: Underfinanced. Underprepared.","venue":"UNEP","type":"intl_org","url":"https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/43866/AGR23_KMEN.pdf?sequence=8","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Adaptation needs of developing countries $215-387bn/yr this decade; finance gap $194-366bn/yr.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"3","authors":"Federal Emergency Management Agency","year":"2019","title":"Section 1215 | Management Costs (Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018)","venue":"FEMA policy guidance fact sheet","type":"government","url":"https://fema.gov/assistance/public/policy-guidance-fact-sheets/section-1215-management-costs","doi":"","reported_estimate":"HMGP management costs: 'not more than 15 percent of the total amount of the grant award', of which not more than 10% by the grantee and 5% by the subgrantee.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"3","authors":"Ballard, C. L.; Shoven, J. B.; Whalley, J.","year":"1985","title":"General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States","venue":"American Economic Review 75(1): 128-138","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v75y1985i1p128-38.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Marginal excess burden centres around 33 cents per $1 of revenue, range 17-56 cents (per Fullerton & Henderson 1987, NBER w2353).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"3","authors":"Feldstein, M.","year":"1999","title":"Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax","venue":"Review of Economics and Statistics 81(4): 674-680","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w5055","doi":"10.1162/003465399558391","reported_estimate":"Deadweight loss of nearly $2 per extra $1 of revenue from a proportional rise in all personal income tax rates.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"3","authors":"Kelman, I.; Shreve, C. M.","year":"2014","title":"Does mitigation save? Reviewing cost-benefit analyses of disaster risk reduction","venue":"International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 10(A):213-235","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.preventionweb.net/quick/43700","doi":"10.1016/j.ijdrr.2014.08.004","reported_estimate":"Many results support the economic effectiveness of DRR, but studies often lack sensitivity analysis, ignore climate change and disbenefits, and results are highly context-specific.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Does not give a pooled ratio; used as a caution that published BCRs may be optimistic and context-dependent."},{"policy_id":"3","authors":"Ward, P. J.; Jongman, B.; Aerts, J. C. J. H.; Bates, P. D.; Botzen, W. J. W.; Diaz Loaiza, A.; Hallegatte, S.; Kind, J. M.; Kwadijk, J.; Scussolini, P.; Winsemius, H. C.","year":"2017","title":"A global framework for future costs and benefits of river-flood protection in urban areas","venue":"Nature Climate Change 7:642-646","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.preventionweb.net/publication/global-framework-future-costs-and-benefits-river-flood-protection-urban-areas","doi":"10.1038/nclimate3350","reported_estimate":"Dyke investment may be economically attractive in many regions, but not everywhere.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"No single global ratio in the abstract; supports the point that some defences fall below 1, consistent with the low end of 2 being an average rather than a floor for every project."},{"policy_id":"4","authors":"Brander, L. M.; van Beukering, P.; Nijsten, L.; McVittie, A.; Baulcomb, C.; Eppink, F. V.; Cado van der Lelij, J. A.","year":"2020","title":"The global costs and benefits of expanding Marine Protected Areas","venue":"Marine Policy 116:103953","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/the-global-costs-and-benefits-of-expanding-marine-protected-areas/","doi":"10.1016/j.marpol.2020.103953","reported_estimate":"Global benefits of MPA expansion exceed costs by a factor of 1.4-2.7, depending on location and extent (six scenarios).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"4","authors":"Brander, L.","year":"2019","title":"Expansion of Marine Protected Areas (Copenhagen Consensus assessment, 'Identifying best buys for Africa')","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/expansion_of_marine_protected_areas.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Africa, 38 coastal countries: BCR 9.2 for 10% EEZ coverage and 1.16 for 30%; MPA management ~7% of total costs, fisheries opportunity cost ~90%; 5 years to establish, benefits over a further 30 years.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"4","authors":"Brander, L.; Baulcomb, C.; van der Lelij, J. A. C.; Eppink, F.; McVittie, A.; Nijsten, L.; van Beukering, P.","year":"2015","title":"The benefits to people of expanding Marine Protected Areas (summarised in WWF 'Marine Protected Areas: Smart Investments in Ocean Health')","venue":"IVM, VU Amsterdam / WWF","type":"think_tank","url":"https://files.worldwildlife.org/wwfcmsprod/files/Publication/file/8u8uxvczvw_Smart_Investments_in_Ocean_Health.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"BCR 3.17-19.77 across six scenarios; PV costs 2015-2050 $45-47bn (10%) and $223-228bn (30%); PV benefits $622-923bn (10%) and $719-1,145bn (30%); net benefits $490-920bn. Table 14 (PV, 3%, 2013 $bn), P2P30: management 24.374, establishment 7.854, fisheries 195.8, total 228.0, benefits 1,145.2; E2E30: management 23.768, establishment 5.980, fisheries 197.3, total 227.0, benefits 719.2.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"4","authors":"Balmford, A.; Gravestock, P.; Hockley, N.; McClean, C. J.; Roberts, C. M.","year":"2004","title":"The worldwide costs of marine protected areas","venue":"Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 101(26):9694-9697","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/id/eprint/472/","doi":"10.1073/pnas.0403239101","reported_estimate":"A global MPA network covering 20-30% of the seas would cost ~$5-19bn/yr to run and support ~1 million jobs.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"4","authors":"Global Commission on Adaptation","year":"2019","title":"Adapt Now: A Global Call for Leadership on Climate Resilience","venue":"Global Center on Adaptation / WRI","type":"intl_org","url":"https://gca.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/GlobalCommission_Report_FINAL.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Mangroves avoid >$80bn/yr of coastal flood losses and provide $40-50bn/yr of non-market benefits; preservation and restoration benefits up to 10x costs.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"4","authors":"Sala, E.; Mayorga, J.; Bradley, D.; et al.","year":"2021","title":"Protecting the global ocean for biodiversity, food and climate","venue":"Nature 592:397-402","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://bren.ucsb.edu/news/globally-coordinated-efforts-protect-ocean-offer-lasting-benefits-humanitys-most-pressing","doi":"10.1038/s41586-021-03371-z","reported_estimate":"Only 2.7% of the ocean highly protected; well-placed protection could raise catches by >8 Mt; protecting ~4% would remove 90% of carbon-disturbance risk from bottom trawling.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"4","authors":"Waldron, A.; et al.","year":"2020","title":"Protecting 30% of the planet for nature: costs, benefits and economic implications","venue":"Campaign for Nature / Cambridge Conservation Initiative","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.cambridgeconservation.org/news/economic-benefits-of-protecting-30-of-planets-land-ocean-outweigh-the-costs-at-least-5-to-1/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Benefits outweigh costs at least 5:1 for protecting 30% of land and ocean; ~$140bn/yr investment needed by 2030 vs ~$24bn/yr current; +$250bn/yr output and +$350bn/yr ecosystem services.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"4","authors":"Edgar, G.J. et al. (via Reef Resilience summary)","year":"2014","title":"Global conservation outcomes depend on marine protected areas with five key features","venue":"Nature 506:216-220","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://reefresilience.org/article-summaries/global-conservation-outcomes-depend-on-marine-protected-areas-with-five-key-features/","doi":"10.1038/nature13022","reported_estimate":"87 MPAs in 40 countries: 'Only 9 of the 87 MPAs had 4 or 5 of those characteristics'; 'most of the remainder of MPAs were ecologically indistinguishable from non-MPAs'.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"4","authors":"Ovando, D.; Liu, O.; Molina, R.; Parma, A.; Szuwalski, C.","year":"2023","title":"Global effects of marine protected areas on food security are unknown","venue":"Nature 621:E34-E36","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-023-06493-8","doi":"","reported_estimate":"'using a more realistic model markedly changes the map of priority MPAs and reduces potential food benefits by 62%'.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"4","authors":"Hilborn, R.; Kaiser, M.J.","year":"2022","title":"A path forward for analysing the impacts of marine protected areas","venue":"Nature 607:E1-E2","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-022-04775-1","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Sala et al. 'made inconsistent assumptions about how fishing fleets would respond to closed areas'; 'fishing effort moves but does not disappear'.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"4","authors":"Hiddink, J. G.; van de Velde, S. J.; McConnaughey, R. A.; et al.","year":"2023","title":"Quantifying the carbon benefits of ending bottom trawling","venue":"Nature 617: E1-E2 (Matters Arising)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-023-06014-7","doi":"10.1038/s41586-023-06014-7","reported_estimate":"Sala et al.'s assumptions 'result in an upward bias in the estimated CO2 release by several orders of magnitude'.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"4","authors":"Gill, D.A. et al. (via ScienceDaily)","year":"2017","title":"Capacity shortfalls hinder the performance of marine protected areas globally","venue":"Nature 543:665-669","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://doi.org/10.1038/nature21708","doi":"","reported_estimate":"'Only 9 percent of MPAs reported having adequate staff'; 'only 35 percent of MPAs reported acceptable funding levels'.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"4","authors":"Williamson, P.; Gattuso, J.-P.","year":"2022","title":"Carbon Removal Using Coastal Blue Carbon Ecosystems Is Uncertain and Unreliable, With Questionable Climatic Cost-Effectiveness","venue":"Frontiers in Climate 4:853666","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fclim.2022.853666/full","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Warns of 'potential over-crediting'; median cost about US$560/t CO2e for mangroves and US$469,100/t for saltmarsh (citing Taillardat et al.).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"4","authors":"Chan, H.L.","year":"2020","title":"Economic impacts of Papahanaumokuakea Marine National Monument expansion on the Hawaii longline fishery","venue":"Marine Policy 115:103869","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2020.103869","doi":"","reported_estimate":"For vessels that fished heavily in the area, catch per unit effort fell 7%; 'Revenue per trip decreased by 9%, $3.5 million, during the first 16 months'.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"4","authors":"Ballard, C. L.; Shoven, J. B.; Whalley, J.","year":"1985","title":"General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States","venue":"American Economic Review 75(1): 128-138","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v75y1985i1p128-38.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Marginal excess burden centres around 33 cents per $1 of revenue, range 17-56 cents (per Fullerton & Henderson 1987, NBER w2353).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"4","authors":"Feldstein, M.","year":"1999","title":"Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax","venue":"Review of Economics and Statistics 81(4): 674-680","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w5055","doi":"10.1162/003465399558391","reported_estimate":"Deadweight loss of nearly $2 per extra $1 of revenue from a proportional rise in all personal income tax rates.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"4","authors":"Copenhagen Consensus Center (Markandya et al.)","year":"2015","title":"Biodiversity: Post-2015 Consensus","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center","type":"think_tank","url":"https://copenhagenconsensus.com/post-2015-consensus/biodiversity","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Protect 17% of land and inland water and 10% of coastal and marine areas by 2020: BCR 0.85 ('relatively ineffective or highly uncertain'); stem coral reef loss by 50%: >24.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Combines terrestrial and marine protection in one target, so the 0.85 is not ocean-specific; the coral-reef figure (>24) is for reef-loss reduction generally, not MPAs."},{"policy_id":"4","authors":"Hiddink, J. G.; van de Velde, S. J.; McConnaughey, R. A.; et al.","year":"2023","title":"Quantifying the carbon benefits of ending bottom trawling","venue":"Nature 617: E1-E2 (Matters Arising)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-023-06014-7","doi":"10.1038/s41586-023-06014-7","reported_estimate":"Sala et al.'s trawling-carbon release is 'vastly' overestimated, plausibly by 100-1,000x; of 49 studies, ~60% found no significant effect of trawling on sediment organic carbon.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Not a BCR; it removes most of the seabed-carbon benefit claimed by Sala et al., which is why no blue-carbon credit from trawling bans is added to the range."},{"policy_id":"4","authors":"Hilborn, R.","year":"2016","title":"Policy: Marine biodiversity needs more than protection","venue":"Nature 535:224-226","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.washington.edu/news/2016/07/13/opinion-closing-parts-of-the-ocean-to-fishing-not-enough-to-protect-marine-ecosystems/","doi":"10.1038/535224a","reported_estimate":"Argues EEZ-wide fisheries management protects biodiversity better than closures; MPAs can displace fishing effort elsewhere.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Qualitative argument without a ratio; fisheries management is outside this policy's scope, but displacement would lower the MPA ratios."},{"policy_id":"5","authors":"McKitrick, R.","year":"2023","title":"Economic Implications of a Phased-in EV Mandate in Canada (Working Paper 2023-01; published Canadian Journal of Economics 2024)","venue":"University of Guelph Department of Economics / Canadian Journal of Economics","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.uoguelph.ca/economics/repec/workingpapers/2023/2023-01.pdf","doi":"10.1111/caje.12745","reported_estimate":"CGE results: parity by 2035, deadweight costs 'over $2,700 per tonne', emissions 1.3% below baseline in 2032, real GDP ~1.3% below baseline in 2030; parity by 2050, 'nearly $4,700 per tonne', emissions 3.2% below baseline, real GDP 7.0% below baseline in 2035.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"5","authors":"International Energy Agency","year":"2025","title":"Global EV Outlook 2025 (press release: More than 1 in 4 cars sold worldwide this year is set to be electric)","venue":"IEA","type":"intl_org","url":"https://www.iea.org/news/more-than-one-in-four-cars-sold-worldwide-this-year-is-set-to-be-electric-as-ev-sales-continue-to-grow","doi":"","reported_estimate":"2024: >17m electric cars sold, >20% of global sales; China >11m, almost half its market, two-thirds priced below ICE equivalents; BEVs ~20% dearer in Germany and ~30% in the US; >40% share expected by 2030.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"5","authors":"Holland, S. P.; Mansur, E. T.; Muller, N. Z.; Yates, A. J.","year":"2020","title":"Decompositions and Policy Consequences of an Extraordinary Decline in Air Pollution from Electricity Generation","venue":"American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 12(4):244-274 (NBER WP 25339)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w25339","doi":"10.1257/pol.20190390","reported_estimate":"US power-plant damages fell from $245bn to $133bn a year over 2010-2017; EVs are 'now cleaner than gasoline vehicles on average, though substantial heterogeneity remains'. Update to the 2016 estimate; applies to the cleaner US grid, not to coal-heavy Asian grids.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"5","authors":"Borenstein, S.; Davis, L. W.","year":"2016","title":"The Distributional Effects of US Clean Energy Tax Credits","venue":"Tax Policy and the Economy 30 (NBER WP 21437)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w21437","doi":"10.1086/685597","reported_estimate":"Top income quintile received ~90% of EV tax credits.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"5","authors":"Rennert, K.; Errickson, F.; Prest, B. C.; et al.","year":"2022","title":"Comprehensive evidence implies a higher social cost of CO2","venue":"Nature 610:687-692","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-022-05224-9","doi":"10.1038/s41586-022-05224-9","reported_estimate":"SCC $185/tCO2 (5-95%: $44-413) at 2%.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"5","authors":"Resources for the Future","year":"2023","title":"Social Cost of Carbon 101","venue":"Resources for the Future","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.rff.org/publications/explainers/social-cost-carbon-101/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"US IWG interim SCC $51/tCO2.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"5","authors":"Mills, M. P.","year":"2023","title":"Electric Vehicles for Everyone? The Impossible Dream","venue":"Manhattan Institute report (July 2023)","type":"think_tank","url":"https://manhattan.institute/article/electric-vehicles-for-everyone-the-impossible-dream","doi":"","reported_estimate":"'Today, the battery adds at least $10,000 to the price of an EV'; battery costs up 20% since 2021; Boston Consulting Group puts utility grid upgrade costs at $1,700-5,800 per EV ($400bn to >$1T for an all-EV US fleet); replacing ~1m US gasoline pumps needs >$100bn of superchargers; IMF projects metals at historic peaks for about a decade; EV life-cycle emissions vary widely with grid and materials.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"5","authors":"Holland, S.P.; Mansur, E.T.; Muller, N.Z.; Yates, A.J.","year":"2016","title":"Are There Environmental Benefits from Driving Electric Vehicles? The Importance of Local Factors","venue":"American Economic Review 106(12):3700-3729","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20150897","doi":"10.1257/aer.20150897","reported_estimate":"Second-best EV subsidy (= environmental benefit of an EV over a gasoline car, CO2 plus local pollution) ranges from $2,785 in California to -$4,964 in North Dakota, mean -$1,095 on the 2010-12 US grid; 91% of EV local pollution damages are exported to other states. Sets the low end.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"5","authors":"Ji, S.; Cherry, C.R.; Bechle, M.J.; Wu, Y.; Marshall, J.D.","year":"2012","title":"Electric Vehicles in China: Emissions and Health Impacts","venue":"Environmental Science & Technology 46(4):2018-2024","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://experts.umn.edu/en/publications/electric-vehicles-in-china-emissions-and-health-impacts/","doi":"10.1021/es202347q","reported_estimate":"PM2.5 emission factors are generally lower for conventional vehicles than comparable EVs in China; primary PM2.5 health impacts per passenger-km are greater for e-cars than gasoline cars in most cities (3.6x on average).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"5","authors":"Ember","year":"2025","title":"Global Electricity Review 2025: Major countries and regions","venue":"Ember","type":"think_tank","url":"https://ember-energy.org/latest-insights/global-electricity-review-2025/major-countries-and-regions/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"2024 coal share of electricity generation: China 58%, India 75%, world 34%, US <15%, EU 9.8%.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"5","authors":"Hagerty, J.M.; Sergici, S.; Lam, L.","year":"2020","title":"Electric Power Sector Investments of $75-125 Billion Needed to Support Projected 20 Million EVs by 2030, According to Brattle Economists","venue":"The Brattle Group publication summary (report: Hagerty, Sergici & Lam, 2020)","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.brattle.com/insights-events/publications/electric-power-sector-investments-of-75-125-billion-needed-to-support-projected-20-million-evs-by-2030-according-to-brattle-economists/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"$75-125bn of US electric power sector investment needed for 20m EVs by 2030: generation and storage $30-50bn, T&D upgrades $15-25bn, EV chargers and customer-side infrastructure $30-50bn (1-2m public chargers). = $3,750-6,250 per EV (arithmetic).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"5","authors":"PwC Strategy& for CLEPA","year":"2021","title":"An Electric Vehicle-only approach would lead to the loss of half a million jobs in the EU, study finds","venue":"CLEPA (European Association of Automotive Suppliers) press release, 6 Dec 2021","type":"think_tank","url":"https://clepa.eu/mediaroom/an-electric-vehicle-only-approach-would-lead-to-the-loss-of-half-a-million-jobs-in-the-eu-study-finds/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"EV-only phase-out by 2035: 501,000 EU supplier jobs in ICE powertrain at risk (70%, 359,000, lost in 2030-2035); 226,000 new EV-powertrain jobs; net loss 275,000 (-43%) by 2040.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"5","authors":"Jacobsen, M.R.; van Benthem, A.A.","year":"2015","title":"Vehicle Scrappage and Gasoline Policy","venue":"American Economic Review 105(3):1312-1338","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v105y2015i3p1312-38.html","doi":"10.1257/aer.20130935","reported_estimate":"Scrap elasticity about -0.7; when new-vehicle standards raise used-car values and delay scrappage, 13-16% of expected fuel savings leak away through the used-vehicle market (Gruenspecht effect).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"5","authors":"International Energy Agency","year":"2023","title":"Critical Minerals Market Review 2023: Key market trends","venue":"IEA report","type":"intl_org","url":"https://www.iea.org/reports/critical-minerals-market-review-2023/key-market-trends","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Broad-based price increases for critical minerals in 2021 and early 2022, especially volatile for nickel and lithium; market for key transition minerals doubled in five years to $320bn in 2022; clean-energy share of demand 56% lithium, 40% cobalt, 16% nickel.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"5","authors":"Nordhaus, W.D.","year":"2019","title":"Climate Change: The Ultimate Challenge for Economics (Nobel Prize Lecture)","venue":"American Economic Review 109(6):1991-2014","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/aer.109.6.1991","doi":"10.1257/aer.109.6.1991","reported_estimate":"DICE-2016R3 cost-benefit optimal SCC ~$36/tCO2 (2020); low-end carbon value in the cross-check.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"5","authors":"Centre for Economics and Business Research (for the APPG on Fair Fuel), as reported by Forecourt Trader","year":"2023","title":"Banning sales of new ICE cars from 2030 will cost five times as much as the benefits, says report","venue":"Forecourt Trader (trade press)","type":"media","url":"https://forecourttrader.co.uk/latest-news/banning-sales-of-new-ice-cars-from-2030-will-cost-five-times-as-much-as-the-benefits-says-report/672411.article","doi":"","reported_estimate":"UK 2030 ban: environmental benefits GBP 76bn vs costs GBP 400bn (ratio ~0.19), incl. GBP 188bn extra vehicle costs, GBP 47bn charging time, GBP 99bn electricity and charging infrastructure. Sets the high end.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"5","authors":"Roland Berger for the Clean Freight Coalition (as reported by Trucking Dive)","year":"2024","title":"Electrifying trucking would cost nearly $1 trillion, study finds","venue":"Trucking Dive","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.truckingdive.com/news/electrifying-trucking-costs-clean-freight-coalition-american-trucking-associations-roland-berger/710731/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Nearly $1 trillion for infrastructure alone: about $620bn for charging and $370bn for utility grid upgrades; about $145,000 of charging per heavy-duty vehicle; vehicle costs excluded.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"5","authors":"American Transportation Research Institute (as reported by FleetOwner)","year":"2022","title":"Charging Infrastructure Challenges for the U.S. Electric Vehicle Fleet","venue":"FleetOwner","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.fleetowner.com/emissions-efficiency/article/21255957/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"All-electric US fleet would need >40% of current US generation; ~13,800 lb payload loss per truck; BEV tractor at least $380,000; 6.3-34.9 years of current world output of key minerals.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"5","authors":"International Energy Agency","year":"2024","title":"Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2024 (press release)","venue":"IEA","type":"intl_org","url":"https://www.iea.org/news/sharp-declines-in-critical-mineral-prices-mask-risks-of-future-supply-strains-as-energy-transitions-advance","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Announced projects meet 'only 70% of copper and 50% of lithium requirements in 2035' under national climate pledges.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"5","authors":"US Environmental Protection Agency","year":"2026","title":"Regulatory Impact Analysis for rescinding the GHG endangerment finding and light-, medium- and heavy-duty vehicle GHG standards (EPA-420-R-26-002)","venue":"US EPA","type":"government","url":"https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2026-02/420r26002.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Removing the standards, 2027-2055 (2024$): scenario A1 at 3% a net cost of ~$180bn (savings $1,290bn vs costs $1,470bn); net savings of $89-680bn in the other scenario/discount-rate combinations (lower oil prices, consumers valuing only 2.5 years of fuel savings).","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Evaluates repeal of a gradual standard rather than a ban, and the visible text does not show whether forgone climate benefits are monetized; shows that the official sign depends on fuel-price and consumer-valuation assumptions."},{"policy_id":"5","authors":"Gillingham, K.; Stock, J. H.","year":"2018","title":"The Cost of Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions","venue":"Journal of Economic Perspectives 32(4):53-72","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.32.4.53","doi":"10.1257/jep.32.4.53","reported_estimate":"Static cost of battery-EV subsidies $350-640/tCO2e; argues dynamic (learning) costs can be much lower than static ones.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Prices voluntary purchase subsidies, not a binding ban; at $185 SCC it would give 0.29-0.53, inside the adopted range."},{"policy_id":"5","authors":"UK Department for Transport","year":"2023","title":"Zero Emission Vehicle Mandate and CO2 Regulations: Joint Government Response Cost Benefit Analysis","venue":"UK Government (October 2023)","type":"government","url":"https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6554be55544aea000dfb2d59/zev-mandate-consultation-final-cost-benefit-analysis.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"80% ZEV cars / 70% vans by 2030: PV benefits GBP 166.5bn, PV costs GBP 127.3bn incl. rebound (GBP 50.4bn excluding it), NPV GBP 39bn (range -40 to +183bn; PV costs 99-138, benefits 98-282); BCR 1.31. Costs: vehicle capital GBP 27bn, chargepoint capital GBP 11bn, opex ~GBP 2bn, congestion GBP 78bn, accidents GBP 7bn, administration <GBP 35m; grid reinforcement inside electricity price forecasts. Benefits include later BEV capital-cost savings; carbon valued at ~GBP 245/t.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Government appraisal of its own mandate; assumes electric cars become cheaper than conventional ones and a near coal-free grid. Its administrative cost share is used in cost_components."},{"policy_id":"5","authors":"California Air Resources Board","year":"2022","title":"Advanced Clean Fleets Standardized Regulatory Impact Assessment (Appendix C)","venue":"CARB","type":"government","url":"https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/barcu/regact/2022/acf22/appc.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Total costs $84.6bn, savings $97.0bn, health benefits $61.7bn, BCR 1.5 (Table 40); GSP -0.12% and employment -43,138 in 2038 (Table 55).","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Regulator's appraisal of its own rule."},{"policy_id":"5","authors":"European Commission","year":"2023","title":"Impact assessment: CO2 emission standards for heavy-duty vehicles, SWD(2023) 88","venue":"European Commission","type":"government","url":"https://cdn.qualenergia.it/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/policy_transport_hdv_20230214_impact_assessment_en_0.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Manufacturer cost EUR 6,500-13,100 per vehicle in 2040; first-user net savings EUR 29,100-47,000; GDP +0.06-0.11% in 2040.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Regulator's appraisal of its own rule."},{"policy_id":"6","authors":"Tol, R.S.J.","year":"2023","title":"Costs and Benefits of the Paris Climate Targets","venue":"Climate Change Economics 14(4) (preprint arXiv:2209.00900)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S2010007823400031","doi":"10.1142/S2010007823400031","reported_estimate":"Abstract: costs of climate policy, assuming least-cost implementation, 3.8-5.6% of GDP in 2100; benefits 2.8-3.2% of GDP; Paris targets fail the cost-benefit test unless risk aversion is high and the discount rate low. Text (arXiv v1): 2 C target costs just below 4% of GDP and 1.5 C just above 5.5%; benefits ~2.8% (2 C) and ~3.1% (1.5 C) against an SSP5-8.5 baseline, 1.8% and 2.2% against SSP3-7.0; 'simple policy imperfections... would readily double the costs'; citing Riahi et al. (2022), 1.5 C would cost 0.5-6.0% of GDP in 2030 and up to 10% in 2100.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"6","authors":"Nordhaus, W.D.","year":"2019","title":"Climate Change: The Ultimate Challenge for Economics (Nobel Prize Lecture)","venue":"American Economic Review 109(6):1991-2014","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/aer.109.6.1991","doi":"10.1257/aer.109.6.1991","reported_estimate":"DICE-2016R3: cost-benefit optimal SCC ~$36/tCO2 (2020), yielding >3 C by 2100; 2 C limits require $158-279/t in 2020; 1.5 C 'essentially infeasible'; abatement ~1% of output for 50% cut, ~3.5% for zero emissions.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"6","authors":"Chirakijja, J.; Jayachandran, S.; Ong, P.","year":"2024","title":"Inexpensive Heating Reduces Winter Mortality","venue":"The Economic Journal 134(657):402-417 (NBER WP 25681)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/25681.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"The 42% fall in relative natural-gas heating prices in 2005-2010 averted ~11,000 US winter deaths a year; higher heating prices raise winter mortality, concentrated in cardiovascular and respiratory causes.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"6","authors":"Parry, I.W.H.; Williams, R.C.; Goulder, L.H.","year":"1999","title":"When Can Carbon Abatement Policies Increase Welfare? The Fundamental Role of Distorted Factor Markets","venue":"Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (1999); NBER WP 5967","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w5967","doi":"","reported_estimate":"General-equilibrium models: 'tax interactions significantly raise the costs' of carbon policies; a revenue-neutral carbon tax is efficiency-improving so long as marginal benefits are positive, but policies that do not recycle revenue into cuts in distortionary taxes lose that advantage (a non-auctioned quota needs benefits of at least $25/t carbon just to break even). Mechanism for why re-investing revenue pushes the ratio down.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"6","authors":"Sobhani, N. (summarising IPCC SR1.5)","year":"2019","title":"Unpacking the IPCC's Estimated Carbon Prices","venue":"Niskanen Center","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.niskanencenter.org/unpacking-the-ipccs-estimated-carbon-prices/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"IPCC SR1.5: 1.5 C pathways require carbon prices of $135-5,500/tCO2 in 2030 -- source of the $135 figure.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"6","authors":"Parry, I.W.H.; Black, S.; Roaf, J.","year":"2021","title":"Proposal for an International Carbon Price Floor Among Large Emitters (Staff Climate Note 2021/001)","venue":"IMF Staff Climate Notes","type":"intl_org","url":"https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/staff-climate-notes/Issues/2021/06/15/Proposal-for-an-International-Carbon-Price-Floor-Among-Large-Emitters-460468","doi":"10.5089/9781513583204.066","reported_estimate":"Closest real global proposal: differentiated price floors among large emitters (1.5-2 C requires cutting emissions by a quarter to a half this decade); allows emissions-equivalent alternatives.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"6","authors":"International Monetary Fund","year":"2019","title":"Fiscal Monitor: How to Mitigate Climate Change (October 2019), Executive Summary","venue":"IMF Fiscal Monitor","type":"intl_org","url":"https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/fiscal-monitor/2019/october/english/execsum.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"A $75/tCO2 tax in 2030 is needed for 2 C in large emitters; the global average carbon price is currently $2/t; such a tax would raise electricity prices ~45% and gasoline ~15% cumulatively over 10 years; revenue ~1.5% of GDP in G20 countries in 2030.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"6","authors":"World Bank","year":"2024","title":"State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2024 (Executive Summary)","venue":"World Bank, Washington DC","type":"intl_org","url":"https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/d14ff4b1-823f-4d70-927c-456449772089/content","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Carbon pricing covers ~24% of global emissions; prices 'continue to fall short' of Paris ambition; 1.5 C-consistent 2030 prices USD 226-385/t; 2030 range for well below 2 C USD 63-127/t; revenues exceeded USD 100bn in 2023.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"6","authors":"Pomerleau, K.; Asen, E.","year":"2019","title":"Carbon Tax and Revenue Recycling: Revenue, Economic, and Distributional Implications","venue":"Tax Foundation Fiscal Fact (updated 2024)","type":"think_tank","url":"https://taxfoundation.org/research/all/federal/carbon-tax/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"US $50/t rising 5%/yr: $1.87T net revenue 2020-29; GDP -0.4%, -421,000 FTE jobs in isolation; payroll-tax recycling +102,000 jobs; lump-sum rebate raises bottom-quintile after-tax income 6.8%.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"6","authors":"U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, ASPE","year":"2024","title":"Standard Values for Regulatory Analysis, 2024","venue":"HHS Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation","type":"government","url":"https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cd2a1348ea0777b1aa918089e4965b8c/standard-ria-values.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Value per statistical life for 2024: central $13.1m (2023 dollars).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"6","authors":"Visual Capitalist (citing IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2023)","year":"2023","title":"Visualizing the $105 Trillion World Economy in One Chart","venue":"Visual Capitalist, summarising IMF WEO April 2023","type":"media","url":"https://www.visualcapitalist.com/visualizing-the-105-trillion-world-economy-in-one-chart/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"World GDP ~ $105 trillion in 2023.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"6","authors":"IPCC Working Group III","year":"2022","title":"Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. Summary for Policymakers","venue":"Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, AR6 WGIII","type":"intl_org","url":"https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/chapter/summary-for-policymakers/","doi":"10.1017/9781009157926.001","reported_estimate":"SPM C.12.2: versus continuation of 2020 policies, global GDP in 2050 is 1.3-2.7% lower in 2 C (>67%) pathways and 2.6-4.2% lower in C1 (1.5 C, no or limited overshoot) pathways (models exclude climate damages); Table SPM.2: C1 GHG emissions in 2030 31 [21-36] GtCO2e/yr. SPM C.12: the global economic benefit of limiting warming to 2 C 'is reported to exceed the cost of mitigation in most of the assessed literature (medium confidence)'.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"6","authors":"Barrage, L.; Nordhaus, W.","year":"2024","title":"Policies, projections, and the social cost of carbon: Results from the DICE-2023 model","venue":"Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 121(13): e2312030121","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2312030121","doi":"10.1073/pnas.2312030121","reported_estimate":"SCC (2019$/tCO2): C/B optimal $50 (2020), $59 (2025), $125 (2050); 2 C path $75/$89/$213; 1.5 C path $3,557/$4,185/$16,552. 1.5 C limit 'infeasible' (would need emissions near zero in 5 years: 'a deep depression (output declining by around 75%)'). Carbon prices must rise to $115 (optimal), $63 (Paris) and $200 (2 C) by 2050. C/B optimal raises wealth ~$120T, 2 C ~$107T, Paris ~$85T versus current policy; runs 'assume complete efficiency and participation'.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"6","authors":"USAFacts (citing IRS Data Book)","year":"2025","title":"What does it cost the IRS to collect taxes?","venue":"USAFacts","type":"media","url":"https://usafacts.org/articles/what-does-it-cost-the-irs-to-collect-taxes/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"IRS cost of collecting $100: 36 cents in FY2024; recent peak 53 cents in FY2010. Used for the administration component (0.53% of revenue).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"6","authors":"Baird, S.; Friedman, J.; Schady, N.","year":"2011","title":"Aggregate Income Shocks and Infant Mortality in the Developing World","venue":"Review of Economics and Statistics 93(3):847-856 (near-final version: GWU IIEP WP 2010-7)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www2.gwu.edu/~iiep/assets/docs/papers/Baird_IIEPWP2010-7.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"1.7 million births in 59 developing countries: a one percent decrease in per capita GDP is associated with an increase in mortality of between 0.24 and 0.40 infants per 1,000 children born (abstract; Table 2).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"6","authors":"World Bank, World Development Indicators (via FRED)","year":"2025","title":"Crude birth rate and total population, low and middle income countries","venue":"FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (SPDYNCBRTINLMY; SPPOPTOTLLMY)","type":"government","url":"https://fred.stlouisfed.org/data/SPDYNCBRTINLMY","doi":"","reported_estimate":"2024: crude birth rate 17.84 per 1,000; population 6,722,971,301; so about 119.9 million births a year in low- and middle-income countries.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"6","authors":"Broughel, J.; Viscusi, W.K.","year":"2017","title":"Death by Regulation: How Regulations Can Increase Mortality Risk (research summary)","venue":"Mercatus Center at George Mason University","type":"working_paper","url":"https://mercatus.org/media/65351/download","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Regulations costing more than $99.3 million per life saved can be expected to increase mortality risk (range $75.4m-$123.2m): about one statistical death per $99.3m of cost imposed, through lower income and private health spending.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"6","authors":"Tol, R. S. J.","year":"2012","title":"An Updated Analysis of Carbon Dioxide Emission Abatement as a Response to Climate Change (Copenhagen Consensus 2012 challenge paper: Climate Change, Emissions Abatement)","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center, Copenhagen Consensus III","type":"think_tank","url":"https://copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/climateemissionsabatement.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Table 2 (p.8): scenario 3, carbon tax $250/tC in 2010 rising with the discount rate, CO2 425 ppm in 2100, NPV costs $47,600bn, benefit-cost ratio 0.02; $12/tC 0.26; $3/tC 1.02; $2/tC 1.51; $1.8/tC 1.56. Table 3 (p.9): corrected ratios for the $250/tC tax 0.01 (within-model uncertainty) to 0.12 (all corrections).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"6","authors":"Lomborg, B.","year":"2020","title":"False Alarm: How Climate Change Panic Costs Us Trillions, Hurts the Poor, and Fails to Fix the Planet","venue":"Basic Books","type":"book","url":"https://www.shortform.com/blog/benefits-of-a-carbon-tax/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Using DICE, an optimal global carbon tax costs ~$20T and cuts damages from ~$140T to ~$100T (net benefit ~$22T; implied BCR ~2); reduces 2100 warming from ~4.1 C to ~3.75 C (7.4 F to 6.75 F). URL is a secondary summary (Shortform).","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Scores the optimal tax (~$36-48/t in 2020-2030), far below $135; a milder policy."},{"policy_id":"6","authors":"Rennert, K.; Errickson, F.; Prest, B. C.; et al.","year":"2022","title":"Comprehensive evidence implies a higher social cost of CO2","venue":"Nature (published 1 Sept 2022)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-022-05224-9","doi":"10.1038/s41586-022-05224-9","reported_estimate":"Mean SCC $185/tCO2 (5-95%: $44-413) at 2% near-term discount rate, 3.6x the prior US value of $51 -- under this SCC a $135/t tax has BCR >1 (counter-evidence).","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Marginal-damage estimate at a 2% discount rate under which a $135 tax passes; the main mainstream counter-case, not a full-cost evaluation of a target-driven, non-rebated global tax."},{"policy_id":"6","authors":"Barrage, L.; Nordhaus, W.","year":"2024","title":"Policies, projections, and the social cost of carbon: Results from the DICE-2023 model","venue":"Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 121(13): e2312030121","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2312030121","doi":"10.1073/pnas.2312030121","reported_estimate":"A 2 C-limited path raises global wealth by ~$107T (present value) versus current policy; 'the 2 C target does pass the cost-benefit test in cases with sufficiently low discounting (2%) or the alternate damage function'.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Reports net wealth, not separate benefits and costs, so no ratio can be taken; assumes 'complete efficiency and participation' and a carbon price path ($200/t by 2050) that reaches $135 later than 2030; the same model finds the 1.5 C path, to which $135 in 2030 corresponds in IPCC SR1.5, infeasible."},{"policy_id":"7","authors":"Taylor, R.L.C.","year":"2019","title":"Bag leakage: The effect of disposable carryout bag regulations on unregulated bags","venue":"Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 93:254-271","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jeeman/v93y2019icp254-271.html","doi":"10.1016/j.jeem.2019.01.001","reported_estimate":"California bag bans eliminated ~40 million lb/yr of plastic carryout bags but increased trash-bag purchases by ~12 million lb (i.e., roughly 30% of the reduction offset by weight); 12-22% of carryout bags were previously reused as trash bags","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"7","authors":"Bisinella, V.; Albizzati, P.F.; Astrup, T.F.; Damgaard, A.","year":"2018","title":"Life Cycle Assessment of grocery carrier bags (Environmental Project No. 1985)","venue":"Danish Environmental Protection Agency","type":"government","url":"https://www2.mst.dk/udgiv/publications/2018/02/978-87-93614-73-4.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Conventional cotton bag must be reused ~7,100 times and organic cotton ~20,000 times to match an LDPE plastic bag across all 16 environmental indicators","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"7","authors":"Morris, J.; Seasholes, B.","year":"2014","title":"How Green Is that Grocery Bag Ban? An Assessment of the Environmental and Economic Effects of Grocery Bag Bans and Taxes (Policy Study 437)","venue":"Reason Foundation","type":"think_tank","url":"https://reason.org/wp-content/uploads/files/how_green_bag_ban.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Bans/taxes yield minimal environmental benefit, raise costs for consumers (esp. low-income) and impose significant enforcement costs; HDPE bags often environmentally preferable on lifecycle basis","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"7","authors":"OECD","year":"2022","title":"Global Plastics Outlook: Policy Scenarios to 2060","venue":"OECD Publishing, Paris","type":"intl_org","url":"https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/global-plastics-outlook_aa1edf33-en.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Global Ambition policy package lowers global GDP ~0.8% vs baseline in 2060 (Regional Action ~0.3%), costs higher in non-OECD countries","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"7","authors":"Environment and Climate Change Canada","year":"2022","title":"Single-use Plastics Prohibition Regulations (SOR/2022-138): Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement","venue":"Canada Gazette, Part II, Vol. 156, No. 13 (22 June 2022)","type":"government","url":"https://gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p2/2022/2022-06-22/html/sor-dors138-eng.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"10-year (2023-2032) PV costs C$1,990m vs PV monetised benefits C$616m (BCR ~0.31); annualised costs C$234m, of which government compliance and enforcement C$0.9m, business administration C$0.1m, manufacturers' forgone profit C$21m, waste management C$23m, remainder consumer substitution costs; 'around $5 per capita per year'; ~1.3 Mt plastic waste and ~22,000 t plastic pollution avoided.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"7","authors":"Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra)","year":"2020","title":"Impact Assessment on the proposal to ban the supply of plastic drinking straws to the end user in England (Final, RPC-4316(3)-DEFRA)","venue":"UK Impact Assessment 2020 No. 36 (legislation.gov.uk)","type":"government","url":"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukia/2020/36/pdfs/ukia_20200036_en.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"10-year PV costs £36.9-77.7m (best £54.0m) vs PV benefits £2.4-4.6m (best £3.5m); net present value best estimate -£50.5m (range -£75.3m to -£32.3m); extra CO2 from paper straws monetised as a cost; 60% of costs assumed passed to consumers.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"7","authors":"United Nations Environment Programme","year":"2025","title":"Talks on global plastic pollution treaty adjourn without consensus (press release, 15 August 2025)","venue":"UNEP press release","type":"intl_org","url":"https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/press-release/talks-global-plastic-pollution-treaty-adjourn-without-consensus","doi":"","reported_estimate":"INC-5.2 in Geneva (183 member states, 10 days) adjourned without agreeing treaty text; production limits among contested issues.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"7","authors":"Visual Capitalist (citing IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2023)","year":"2023","title":"Visualizing the $105 Trillion World Economy in One Chart","venue":"Visual Capitalist, summarising IMF WEO April 2023","type":"media","url":"https://www.visualcapitalist.com/visualizing-the-105-trillion-world-economy-in-one-chart/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"World GDP ~ $105 trillion in 2023.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"7","authors":"Meng, F.; Brandão, M.; Cullen, J.M.","year":"2024","title":"Replacing Plastics with Alternatives Is Worse for Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Most Cases","venue":"Environmental Science & Technology","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10867844/","doi":"10.1021/acs.est.3c05191","reported_estimate":"Life-cycle comparison of 16 applications covering ~90% of global plastic volume: 'in 15 of the 16 applications a plastic product incurs fewer GHG emissions than their alternatives. In these applications, plastic products release 10% to 90% fewer emissions across the product life cycle.' Plastics are responsible for ~4.5% of global GHG emissions.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"7","authors":"United Nations Environment Programme","year":"2024","title":"Emissions Gap Report 2024: No more hot air ... please! (as summarised by IISD SDG Knowledge Hub)","venue":"UNEP","type":"intl_org","url":"https://sdg.iisd.org/news/unprecedented-cuts-needed-to-keep-15oc-alive-emissions-gap-report-2024/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Global GHG emissions set a new record of 57.1 GtCO2e in 2023 (+1.3% on 2022).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"7","authors":"Nordhaus, W.D.","year":"2019","title":"Climate Change: The Ultimate Challenge for Economics (Nobel Prize Lecture)","venue":"American Economic Review 109(6):1991-2014","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/aer.109.6.1991","doi":"10.1257/aer.109.6.1991","reported_estimate":"DICE-2016R3 cost-benefit optimal SCC ~$36/tCO2 (2020). Used to value substitutes' extra emissions at the high end.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"7","authors":"Rennert, K.; Errickson, F.; Prest, B. C.; et al.","year":"2022","title":"Comprehensive evidence implies a higher social cost of CO2","venue":"Nature 610:687-692","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-022-05224-9","doi":"10.1038/s41586-022-05224-9","reported_estimate":"Mean SCC $185/tCO2 (5-95%: $44-413) at 2% near-term discount rate. Used in the low-end sensitivity.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"7","authors":"Waste & Recycling Magazine (event listing of UNEP INC-5.3)","year":"2026","title":"INC-5.3: The third part of the fifth session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee to develop an international legally binding instrument on plastic pollution","venue":"Waste & Recycling Magazine (Canada)","type":"media","url":"https://wasterecyclingmag.ca/?p=21143","doi":"","reported_estimate":"INC-5.3 held 7 February 2026 in Geneva as a one-day resumed session agreed by the Bureau on 30 October 2025 after the former Chair resigned; organisational only (election of officers and a new Chair), no substantive treaty negotiations.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"7","authors":"Environment Agency (Edwards, C.; Fry, J. M.)","year":"2011","title":"Life cycle assessment of supermarket carrier bags: a review of the bags available in 2006 (Report SC030148)","venue":"Environment Agency (England and Wales)","type":"government","url":"https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a7bff74ed915d01ba1ca7c7/scho0711buan-e-e.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Paper, LDPE, non-woven PP and cotton bags should be reused at least 3, 4, 11 and 131 times respectively to have lower global warming potential than conventional HDPE bags that are not reused (173 times for cotton if HDPE bags are reused as bin liners).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"7","authors":"Franklin Associates (for the American Chemistry Council)","year":"2018","title":"Life Cycle Impacts of Plastic Packaging Compared to Substitutes in the United States and Canada: Theoretical Substitution Analysis","venue":"Franklin Associates, a Division of ERG","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.symphonyenvironmental.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Franklin-LCA-Apr-2018.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Substitute packaging would weigh ~4.5 times as much as the plastic packaging it replaces (US); plastic packaging global warming potential is 26.2% of substitutes' (max-decomposition case); US GWP savings of plastic vs substitutes 39.5-67.1 million tCO2e/yr; total energy demand 52% of substitutes'.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"7","authors":"Trucost (for the American Chemistry Council), as reported by Recycling Today","year":"2016","title":"Plastics and Sustainability: A Valuation of Environmental Benefits, Costs, and Opportunities for Continuous Improvement","venue":"Recycling Today (news report of the Trucost study)","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.recyclingtoday.com/news/trucost-plastics-savings","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Environmental (natural-capital) cost of plastics in consumer goods and packaging $139bn/yr; replacing them with alternatives that perform the same function would raise environmental costs to $533bn/yr (Waste Advantage, 29 July 2016, confirms the figures are annual: https://wasteadvantagemag.com/study-finds-plastics-reduce-environmental-costs-by-nearly-4-times-compared-to-alternatives/).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"7","authors":"Plastics Industry Association","year":"2025","title":"2025 Size and Impact Report: U.S. Plastics Industry Remains Robust, Impactful, and Vital","venue":"Plastics Industry Association","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.plasticsindustry.org/?p=15530","doi":"","reported_estimate":"US plastics industry shipments $550.7bn in 2024 ($754.5bn including suppliers); 1,066,500 direct jobs (1.71 million including suppliers).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"7","authors":"IISD SDG Knowledge Hub (summarising OECD Global Plastics Outlook 2022)","year":"2022","title":"Global Outlook Details Scenarios to Decrease Plastic Pollution by 2060","venue":"SAICM Knowledge / IISD","type":"intl_org","url":"https://saicmknowledge.org/articles/global-outlook-details-scenarios-decrease-plastic-pollution-2060","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Regional Action scenario: global GDP 0.3% lower; Global Ambition: plastics tax of USD 750/t by 2030 and USD 1,500/t by 2060 plus a 33% higher packaging tax, global GDP 0.8% lower than baseline.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"7","authors":"United Nations","year":"2022","title":"Global Issues: Population","venue":"United Nations","type":"intl_org","url":"https://www.un.org/en/global-issues/population","doi":"","reported_estimate":"World population reached 8 billion on 15 November 2022 (used to scale Canada's per-capita cost).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"7","authors":"Lau, W.W.Y.; Shiran, Y.; Bailey, R.M.; et al.","year":"2020","title":"Evaluating scenarios toward zero plastic pollution","venue":"Science 369(6510):1455-1461","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.aba9475","doi":"10.1126/science.aba9475","reported_estimate":"System Change Scenario could cut ocean plastic flows >80% by 2040 with existing technology; companion Pew report claims ~$70bn savings to governments vs business-as-usual (contrasting positive estimate for a broad package, not a ban)","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Scores a broad reuse-, redesign- and recycling-led system-change package and finds net savings; not a ban on plastics, and does not net out substitutes' extra emissions."},{"policy_id":"7","authors":"UNEP","year":"2023","title":"Turning off the Tap: How the world can end plastic pollution and create a circular economy","venue":"United Nations Environment Programme","type":"intl_org","url":"https://www.unep.org/resources/turning-off-tap-end-plastic-pollution-create-circular-economy","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Circular shift saves ~$1.27T (costs and recycling revenues) plus ~$3.25T avoided externalities to 2040; investment $65bn/yr vs $113bn/yr under throwaway economy.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Scores a broad reuse-, redesign- and recycling-led system-change package and finds net savings; not a ban on plastics, and does not net out substitutes' extra emissions."},{"policy_id":"8","authors":"Holtz-Eakin, D.; et al.","year":"2019","title":"The Green New Deal: Scope, Scale, and Implications","venue":"American Action Forum research","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.americanactionforum.org/research/the-green-new-deal-scope-scale-and-implications/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"$51-93 trillion over 2020-2029 (clean grid $5.4T; high-speed rail $1.1-2.5T; job guarantee $6.8-44.6T; universal healthcare $36T; green housing $1.6-4.2T); up to ~$600k per household.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"8","authors":"Dayaratna, K.D.; Loris, N.","year":"2019","title":"Assessing the Costs and Benefits of the Green New Deal's Energy Policies (Backgrounder No. 3427)","venue":"Heritage Foundation Backgrounder","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.heritage.org/energy-economics/report/assessing-the-costs-and-benefits-the-green-new-deals-energy-policies","doi":"","reported_estimate":"GDP loss >$15T through 2040; peak 5.2m jobs lost; $165,000 per family of four; electricity costs +30%; eliminating all US CO2 averts <0.2 C and <2 cm sea-level rise by 2100; model reached only 58% CO2 cut by 2050.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"8","authors":"Turner, D.; Lassman, K.","year":"2019","title":"What the Green New Deal Could Cost a Typical Household","venue":"Competitive Enterprise Institute study (with Power the Future)","type":"think_tank","url":"https://cei.org/studies/what-the-green-new-deal-could-cost-a-typical-household/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Energy/transport/buildings provisions cost >$70,000 per household in year one in most studied states (>$100,000 in Alaska), ~$45,000/yr in years 2-5, >$37,000/yr thereafter. EV component: $39,500 EV at 90% financing = about $7,647 a year in loan payments for five years; grid costs drawn from AAF (Holtz-Eakin & Bosch $39,000/household), Wood Mackenzie ($4.7T incl. $700bn transmission) and Zycher (AEI).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"8","authors":"Tol, R.S.J.","year":"2023","title":"Costs and Benefits of the Paris Climate Targets","venue":"Climate Change Economics 14(4) (Special issue on reaching net zero by 2050)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S2010007823400031","doi":"10.1142/S2010007823400031","reported_estimate":"Costs 3.8-5.6% of GDP in 2100 (optimal implementation) vs benefits 2.8-3.2% of GDP; Paris targets fail the cost-benefit test unless risk aversion high and discount rate low (implied BCR ~0.5-0.85).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"8","authors":"NBC News (staff)","year":"2019","title":"Senate fails to advance Green New Deal as Democrats protest McConnell 'sham' vote","venue":"NBC News (26 March 2019)","type":"media","url":"https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/senate-fails-advance-green-new-deal-democrats-protest-mcconnell-sham-n987506","doi":"","reported_estimate":"GND resolution failed 0-57 on a procedural vote needing 60; 43 Democrats voted present.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"8","authors":"Chirakijja, J.; Jayachandran, S.; Ong, P.","year":"2024","title":"Inexpensive Heating Reduces Winter Mortality","venue":"The Economic Journal 134(657):402-417 (NBER WP 25681, 2019)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/25681.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Quasi-experimental (gas vs electric heating areas x price shocks): the 42% fall in natural-gas prices relative to electricity in 2005-2010 averted about 11,000 US winter deaths per year; elasticity of all-cause mortality with respect to heating price ~0.03 (0.057 for winter deaths from relevant causes). Authors: policymakers should consider these effects when evaluating policies that affect home energy costs.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"8","authors":"U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, ASPE","year":"2024","title":"Standard Values for Regulatory Analysis, 2024","venue":"HHS Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation","type":"government","url":"https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cd2a1348ea0777b1aa918089e4965b8c/standard-ria-values.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Value per statistical life for 2024: low $6.1m, central $13.1m, high $19.9m (2023 dollars).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"8","authors":"Nordhaus, W.D.","year":"2019","title":"Climate Change: The Ultimate Challenge for Economics (Nobel Prize Lecture)","venue":"American Economic Review 109(6):1991-2014","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/aer.109.6.1991","doi":"10.1257/aer.109.6.1991","reported_estimate":"DICE-2016R3 cost-benefit optimal SCC ~$36/tCO2 (2020). Used as low-end benefit per tonne.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"8","authors":"Works Progress Administration (Hopkins, H.L., Administrator)","year":"1938","title":"Report on Progress of the WPA Program, June 30, 1938","venue":"US Works Progress Administration (FRASER, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis archive)","type":"government","url":"https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/publications/wpa/wpaReports/1938_wpa_ReportProgressOfWPA.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"July 1937-June 1938: expenditures for administrative and general supervisory purposes were 4.3% of the total (general administrative 3.2%, general project supervision 1.1%); 25,531 administrative staff. Used as the administrative share of a federal job guarantee.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"8","authors":"Ballard, C. L.; Shoven, J. B.; Whalley, J.","year":"1985","title":"General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States","venue":"American Economic Review 75(1): 128-138","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v75y1985i1p128-38.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Marginal welfare loss from raising an additional dollar of revenue is 34-48 cents (working-paper abstract); average 13-22 cents. The 0.48 figure is used for the deadweight component of the cost total.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"8","authors":"Feldstein, M.","year":"1999","title":"Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax","venue":"Review of Economics and Statistics 81(4): 674-680","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w5055","doi":"10.1162/003465399558391","reported_estimate":"A proportional rise in all personal income tax rates involves a deadweight loss of nearly two dollars per incremental dollar of revenue. Used for the deadweight of financing at both ends of the range.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"8","authors":"U.S. Census Bureau","year":"2024","title":"Census Bureau Releases New Estimates on America's Families and Living Arrangements","venue":"US Census Bureau press release","type":"government","url":"https://census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2024/families-and-living-arrangements.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"38.5m one-person households were 29% of all US households in 2024, i.e. ~133m households (38.5/0.29). Used to scale CEI's per-household vehicle cost.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"8","authors":"World Bank, World Development Indicators","year":"2026","title":"GDP (current US$), NY.GDP.MKTP.CD, 2024","venue":"World Bank API","type":"government","url":"https://api.worldbank.org/v2/country/USA;CAN;EUU;GBR;NOR;CHE;ISL;AUS;NZL;WLD;LMY/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?date=2024&format=json","doi":"","reported_estimate":"2024 GDP, US$bn: US 29,298.0; EU-27 19,501.1; UK 3,695.5; Canada 2,270.1; Australia 1,757.0; Switzerland 969.9; Norway 500.9; New Zealand 261.5; Iceland 33.2; total 58,287.2 (1.99x US); world 111,669.4; low and middle income 39,490.9.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"8","authors":"Global Carbon Project (via Our World in Data)","year":"2025","title":"CO2 emissions dataset (fossil fuels and cement), 2024","venue":"Our World in Data","type":"intl_org","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/owid/co2-data/master/owid-co2-data.csv","doi":"","reported_estimate":"2024, Mt CO2: US 4,904.1; EU-27 2,426.2; Canada 533.3; Australia 386.7; UK 312.9; NZ 32.5; Switzerland 32.1; Norway 37.2; Iceland 3.8; total 8,668.8 (1.77x US); world 38,598.6.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"8","authors":"Parliamentary Budget Officer (Canada)","year":"2021","title":"Beyond Paris: Reducing Canada's GHG Emissions by 2030","venue":"Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer","type":"government","url":"https://www.pbo-dpb.ca/en/news-releases--communiques-de-presse/COM-2122-016--despite-additional-carbon-pricing-significant-emissions-reductio--malgre-la-tarification-accrue-du-carbone-le-canada-devra-reduire","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Additional carbon pricing lowers real GDP by 0.8% in 2030; with non-price measures at minimum cost, 2030 real GDP is reduced by a total of 1.4%.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"8","authors":"Kose, M.A.; Lakatos, C.; Ohnsorge, F.; Stocker, M.","year":"2017","title":"The Global Role of the U.S. Economy: Linkages, Policies and Spillovers","venue":"World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 7962","type":"working_paper","url":"http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/649771486479478785/pdf/WPS7962.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"A 1 percentage point increase in U.S. growth could lift growth in EMDEs by 0.6 percentage points after one year (section 4.1, Figure 8).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"8","authors":"Huidrom, R.; Kose, M.A.; Ohnsorge, F.","year":"2017","title":"How Important are Spillovers from Major Emerging Markets?","venue":"World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 8093","type":"working_paper","url":"https://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/786391496863791206/pdf/WPS8093.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"A 1 pp rise in EM7 growth raises other emerging and frontier market growth by 0.9 pp after three years; a G7 growth rise raises it by about 0.5 pp more (Figure 3), i.e. about 1.4 pp per 1 pp G7 shock.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"8","authors":"Baird, S.; Friedman, J.; Schady, N.","year":"2011","title":"Aggregate Income Shocks and Infant Mortality in the Developing World","venue":"Review of Economics and Statistics 93(3):847-856 (near-final version: GWU IIEP WP 2010-7)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www2.gwu.edu/~iiep/assets/docs/papers/Baird_IIEPWP2010-7.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"1.7 million births in 59 developing countries: a one percent decrease in per capita GDP is associated with an increase in mortality of between 0.24 and 0.40 infants per 1,000 children born (abstract; Table 2).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"8","authors":"World Bank, World Development Indicators (via FRED)","year":"2025","title":"Crude birth rate and total population, low and middle income countries","venue":"FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (SPDYNCBRTINLMY; SPPOPTOTLLMY)","type":"government","url":"https://fred.stlouisfed.org/data/SPDYNCBRTINLMY","doi":"","reported_estimate":"2024: crude birth rate 17.84 per 1,000; population 6,722,971,301; so about 119.9 million births a year in low- and middle-income countries.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"8","authors":"Broughel, J.; Viscusi, W.K.","year":"2017","title":"Death by Regulation: How Regulations Can Increase Mortality Risk (research summary)","venue":"Mercatus Center at George Mason University","type":"working_paper","url":"https://mercatus.org/media/65351/download","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Regulations costing more than $99.3 million per life saved can be expected to increase mortality risk (range $75.4m-$123.2m): about one statistical death per $99.3m of cost imposed, through lower income and private health spending.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"8","authors":"Jalan, J.; Ravallion, M.","year":"2003","title":"Estimating the Benefit Incidence of an Antipoverty Program by Propensity-Score Matching","venue":"Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 21(1):19-30","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/bes/jnlbes/v21y2003i1p19-30.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Argentina's Trabajar public-works programme: 'The average direct gain to the participant is found to be about half the gross wage.'","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"8","authors":"Babiker, M.H.","year":"2005","title":"Climate change policy, market structure, and carbon leakage","venue":"Journal of International Economics 65(2):421-445","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://cs3.mit.edu/publication/13737","doi":"10.1016/j.jinteco.2004.01.003","reported_estimate":"Leakage rates 'as high as 130%', meaning 'GHG control policies in the industrialized countries actually lead to higher global emissions'; IPCC AR4 WG3 11.7.2.1 reports his range as 25-130%.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"8","authors":"Böhringer, C.; Balistreri, E.J.; Rutherford, T.F. (via Harvard Belfer Center brief)","year":"2012","title":"The role of border carbon adjustment in unilateral climate policy: Overview of an Energy Modeling Forum study (EMF 29)","venue":"Energy Economics 34(S2):S97-S110","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/role-border-carbon-adjustment-unilateral-climate-policy-insights-model-comparison-study","doi":"","reported_estimate":"'Leakage rates in the BAU case are between 5% and 19%, with a mean value of 12%.'","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"8","authors":"Barrage, L.; Nordhaus, W.","year":"2024","title":"Policies, projections, and the social cost of carbon: Results from the DICE-2023 model","venue":"Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 121(13): e2312030121","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2312030121","doi":"10.1073/pnas.2312030121","reported_estimate":"'The SCC in the baseline run is $66/tCO2 for the 2020 period (in 2019 international $).'","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"8","authors":"Trabandt, M.; Uhlig, H.","year":"2012","title":"How Do Laffer Curves Differ Across Countries?","venue":"Federal Reserve Board IFDP 1048 (NBER WP 17862); in Alesina & Giavazzi (eds.), Fiscal Policy after the Financial Crisis, 2013","type":"working_paper","url":"https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2012/1048/ifdp1048.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Table 7 (2010 calibration): maximum additional tax revenue at the peak of the Laffer curve, as a share of baseline GDP: US 7.3% (labour taxes), 2.3% (capital), 7.4% (both); EU-14 3.0%, 0.9%, 3.1%.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"8","authors":"Hänsel, M.C.; Drupp, M.A.; Johansson, D.J.A.; Nesje, F.; Azar, C.; Freeman, M.C.; Groom, B.; Sterner, T.","year":"2020","title":"Climate economics support for the UN climate targets","venue":"Nature Climate Change 10:781-789","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.pik-potsdam.de/en/news/latest-news/an-economic-case-for-the-un-climate-targets-early-and-strong-climate-action-pays-off","doi":"10.1038/s41558-020-0833-x","reported_estimate":"Updated DICE (expert discounting, updated damages/carbon cycle) finds limiting warming below 2 C economically optimal, requiring CO2 prices >$100/t.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Models an efficient global carbon price under expert low discounting, not the GND's mandate-and-spending design; outside the range."},{"policy_id":"8","authors":"Galvani, A.P.; Parpia, A.S.; Foster, E.M.; Singer, B.H.; Fitzpatrick, M.C.","year":"2020","title":"Improving the prognosis of health care in the USA","venue":"The Lancet 395(10223):524-533","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(19)33019-3","doi":"10.1016/S0140-6736(19)33019-3","reported_estimate":"Single-payer universal care would cut national health spending 13%, >$450bn a year (2017 dollars), and save >68,000 lives and 1.73m life-years a year (abstract read via Europe PMC, PMID 32061298).","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Used only in the high end of the range: it is a modelling estimate that assumes large administrative and price savings, and AAF's $36T outlay estimate, used for costs, does not assume such net savings; the low end excludes it."},{"policy_id":"8","authors":"Rennert, K.; Errickson, F.; Prest, B. C.; et al.","year":"2022","title":"Comprehensive evidence implies a higher social cost of CO2","venue":"Nature 610:687-692","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-022-05224-9","doi":"10.1038/s41586-022-05224-9","reported_estimate":"Mean SCC $185/tCO2 (5-95%: $44-413) at 2% near-term discount rate.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Highest published social cost of carbon; the range uses DICE-2023 ($66/t) and Nordhaus ($36/t)."},{"policy_id":"9","authors":"C40 Cities; Arup; University of Leeds","year":"2019","title":"The Future of Urban Consumption in a 1.5°C World (Headline Report)","venue":"C40 Cities report (copy hosted by Arup)","type":"intl_org","url":"https://www.arup.com/globalassets/downloads/insights/arup-c40-the-future-of-urban-consumption-in-a-1-5c-world.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Ambitious 2030 targets: 0 kg meat and 0 kg dairy per person per year (current C40 averages 58 kg and 155 kg); 3 new clothing items per person per year (progressive: 8); 0 private vehicles (C40 average 240 per 1,000 people; progressive target 190); 1 short-haul (<1,500 km) return flight every 3 years per person (progressive: every 2 years), which cuts C40 residents' flight trips by about 28% against 2017. C40 consumption-based emissions 4.5 GtCO2e in 2017 (about 10% of global); 94 member cities, 523 million people in 2017. Ambitious interventions cut cumulative 2017-2050 emissions by about 32 GtCO2e (Fig. 15, by category: buildings 21->11.9, food 17.7->7.2, clothing 6.8->2.5, private transport 9.9->6.1, electronics 5->3.4, aviation 3.5->1.6). Flights 2% of C40 consumption emissions (aviation fuel combustion 66% of that, fuel extraction 18%). A 'conservative micro-rebound effect' offsets about one third of savings. Wider-benefit claims: 160,000-170,000 diet-related deaths avoided a year; residents 'save $93 billion' on clothing. States it 'does not advocate for the wholesale adoption of these more ambitious targets'. No cost or BCR estimate.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"9","authors":"C40 Cities","year":"2015","title":"Press release: Cities from India, Philippines and United Arab Emirates join C40's global network","venue":"C40 Cities press release (13 Aug 2015)","type":"intl_org","url":"https://www.c40.org/news/press-release-cities-from-india-philippines-and-united-arab-emirates-join-c40-s-global-network/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"C40 'represents 500+ million people and one quarter of the global economy'. Used to scale world figures to C40 cities: 25% x ~$105T world GDP = ~$26,250bn.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"9","authors":"Abbiasov, T.; Heine, C.; Sabouri, S.; Salazar-Miranda, A.; Santi, P.; Glaeser, E.; Ratti, C.","year":"2024","title":"The 15-minute city quantified using human mobility data","venue":"Nature Human Behaviour 8:445-455","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-023-01770-y","doi":"10.1038/s41562-023-01770-y","reported_estimate":"GPS data from 40m US devices: median resident makes only 14% of consumption trips locally; higher local usage correlates with higher experienced segregation for low-income residents.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"9","authors":"Lusk, J.L.; Norwood, F.B.","year":"2009","title":"Some Economic Benefits and Costs of Vegetarianism","venue":"Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 38(2):109-124","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/55529/files/lusk%20-%20current.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Demand-system estimate (Raper et al. 2002 parameters): a 1% cut in at-home meat requires compensation of ~$0.16 per household per week; eliminating at-home meat requires ~$200.48 per household per week (~$10,500/yr, 1993 $), ~$1.3T a year for US households (~$1.8T in 2006 $). Authors call the 100% figure an extrapolation 'far outside the range of data'; excludes dairy and meals away from home.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"9","authors":"U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis via Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED)","year":"2026","title":"Gross Domestic Product, annual (GDPA)","venue":"FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis","type":"government","url":"https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDPA","doi":"","reported_estimate":"US nominal GDP 2006 = $13,815.6bn. Used to express Lusk & Norwood's $1.8T (2006 $) as 13.0% of GDP.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"9","authors":"Visual Capitalist (citing IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2023)","year":"2023","title":"Visualizing the $105 Trillion World Economy in One Chart","venue":"Visual Capitalist, summarising IMF WEO April 2023","type":"media","url":"https://www.visualcapitalist.com/visualizing-the-105-trillion-world-economy-in-one-chart/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"World GDP ~ $105 trillion in 2023.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"9","authors":"FAO","year":"2023","title":"Trade of agricultural commodities 2005-2022 (FAOSTAT Analytical Brief 80)","venue":"FAOSTAT Analytical Brief 80","type":"intl_org","url":"https://www.fao.org/3/cc9206en/cc9206en.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"US food (excl. fish) exports $159.6bn = 10% of world total in 2022 (so world ~ $1,596bn); meat and meat preparations = 12% of food export value (~ $191bn).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"9","authors":"Moody, J.; Farr, E.; Papagelis, M.; Keith, D.R.","year":"2021","title":"The value of car ownership and use in the United States","venue":"Nature Sustainability 4(9):769-774","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/nat/natsus/v4y2021i9d10.1038_s41893-021-00731-5.html","doi":"10.1038/s41893-021-00731-5","reported_estimate":"Discrete-choice experiments in Chicago, Dallas, Seattle and Washington DC: respondents need on average ~$11,197 to give up access to their own vehicle for one year, at least as much as the ~$9,000 average total private cost of ownership; more than half the value is non-use (flexibility, status).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"9","authors":"Center for Automotive Research","year":"2015","title":"Contribution of the Automotive Industry to the Economies of All Fifty States and the United States","venue":"CAR report","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.cargroup.org/publication/contribution-of-the-automotive-industry-to-the-economies-of-all-fifty-state-and-the-united-states/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Auto industry historically 3-3.5% of US GDP; 1.7m direct employees; net employment impact of nearly 8 million jobs (~4.5% of US jobs); over $500bn a year in compensation.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"9","authors":"Parry, I.W.H.; Walls, M.; Harrington, W.","year":"2007","title":"Automobile Externalities and Policies","venue":"Journal of Economic Literature 45(2):373-399","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://media.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-06-26-REV.pdf","doi":"10.1257/jel.45.2.373","reported_estimate":"Table 2 central marginal external costs (2005 $): local pollution 2.0, congestion 5.0, accidents 3.0 cents/mile (mileage-related sum 10.0); greenhouse 0.3, oil dependency 0.6 cents/mile; assumes 21 mpg.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"9","authors":"US Department of Energy, Alternative Fuels Data Center (from FHWA Highway Statistics)","year":"2025","title":"Average Annual Vehicle Miles Traveled by Major Vehicle Category","venue":"AFDC data table 10309","type":"government","url":"https://afdc.energy.gov/data/10309","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Cars average 11,026 miles a year; light trucks/vans 11,360.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"9","authors":"US Environmental Protection Agency","year":"2024","title":"Greenhouse Gas Emissions from a Typical Passenger Vehicle","venue":"EPA Green Vehicle Guide","type":"government","url":"https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/greenhouse-gas-emissions-typical-passenger-vehicle","doi":"","reported_estimate":"A typical passenger vehicle emits about 4.6 tCO2 a year (22.2 mpg, ~11,500 miles); 8,887 g CO2 per gallon.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"9","authors":"Prud'homme, R.; Lee, C.-W.","year":"1999","title":"Size, Sprawl, Speed and the Efficiency of Cities","venue":"Urban Studies 36(11):1849-1858","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/urbstu/v36y1999i11p1849-1858.html","doi":"10.1080/0042098992638","reported_estimate":"City productivity rises with the effective size of the labour market (jobs reachable within a given travel time); a 10% rise in average commuting speed raises labour productivity by ~2.9% (as quoted in Strong Towns 2017 from a report citing the paper); a 10% rise in job-home distance cuts effective labour-market size ~11.5%. 23 French cities. Used for the slower-travel component.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"9","authors":"Wolff, H.","year":"2014","title":"Keep Your Clunker in the Suburb: Low-Emission Zones and Adoption of Green Vehicles","venue":"The Economic Journal 124(578):F481-F512","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/publication/keep-your-clunker-in-the-suburb-low-emission-zones-and-adoption-of-green-vehicles/","doi":"10.1111/ecoj.12091","reported_estimate":"German LEZs reduced PM10 and sped up green-vehicle adoption; back-of-envelope 'health benefits of roughly 2 billion dollars have come at a cost of 1 billion dollars' for upgrading the vehicle fleet (BCR ~2).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"9","authors":"Air Transport Action Group (ATAG)","year":"2024","title":"Facts & figures (Aviation: Benefits Beyond Borders 2024)","venue":"ATAG web page","type":"think_tank","url":"https://atag.org/facts-figures","doi":"","reported_estimate":"2023: direct aviation GDP ~$1.1 trillion (~1% of world GDP); total impact incl. indirect, induced and tourism $4.1 trillion (3.9% of world GDP); 86.5m jobs (11.6m direct); flights emitted 882 Mt CO2 in 2023; 4.4bn passengers.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"9","authors":"Lu, S. (reporting WTO World Trade Statistical Review 2023)","year":"2023","title":"WTO Reports World Textiles and Clothing Trade in 2022","venue":"FASH455 Global Apparel & Textile Trade and Sourcing (University of Delaware)","type":"media","url":"https://shenglufashion.com/2023/08/14/wto-reports-world-textiles-and-clothing-trade-in-2022/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"World clothing exports $576bn in 2022; textile exports $339bn; Bangladesh 7.9% of world clothing exports.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"9","authors":"Frankel, J. A.; Romer, D.","year":"1999","title":"Does Trade Cause Growth?","venue":"American Economic Review 89(3): 379-399","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.89.3.379","doi":"10.1257/aer.89.3.379","reported_estimate":"Geography-instrumented estimate: raising the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP by one percentage point raises income per person by between one-half and two percent (as summarised in Ossa, Univ. of Zurich lecture 'Gains from trade', 2025, https://econ.uzh.ch/dam/jcr:3e218cd0-ad31-4ecd-a862-bfff347fcae9/Topic%2003%20-%20Gains%20from%20trade%20neu.pdf).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"9","authors":"Feyrer, J.","year":"2019","title":"Trade and Income—Exploiting Time Series in Geography","venue":"American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 11(4):1-35","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aejapp/v11y2019i4p1-35.html","doi":"10.1257/app.20170616","reported_estimate":"Time-varying instrument from air-versus-sea distance (aircraft technology): 'Trade has a significant effect on income with an elasticity of roughly one-half'. Used as a cross-check on the trade-loss component.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"9","authors":"Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (as reported by The Register)","year":"2008","title":"UK gov torpedoes personal carbon credit plans (reporting Defra's pre-feasibility study of personal carbon trading)","venue":"The Register (11 May 2008)","type":"media","url":"https://www.theregister.com/offbeat/2008/05/11/ukgov-torpedoes-personal-carbon-credit-plans/1268998","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Defra: 'Initial set up costs would be between £700m and £2bn. Running costs would be between £1bn and £2bn a year' for a UK personal carbon allowance scheme.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"9","authors":"Management in Practice (reporting the Office for National Statistics)","year":"2009","title":"UK population hits record 61 million high","venue":"Management in Practice (28 Aug 2009)","type":"media","url":"https://managementinpractice.com/news/uk-population-hits-record-61-million-high/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"UK population 61.4 million (mid-2008 ONS estimate). Used to convert Defra's scheme cost to a per-person cost.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"9","authors":"Fowlie, M.; Greenstone, M.; Wolfram, C.","year":"2018","title":"Do Energy Efficiency Investments Deliver? Evidence from the Weatherization Assistance Program","venue":"Quarterly Journal of Economics 133(3):1597-1644","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://epic.uchicago.edu/research/do-energy-efficiency-investments-deliver-evidence-from-the-weatherization-assistance-program/","doi":"10.1093/qje/qjy005","reported_estimate":"Randomized-encouragement study of ~30,000 Michigan households: upfront costs (~$4,585 per complier household) are 'about twice the actual energy savings' (~$2,349 PV); model-projected savings more than three times actual; social rate of return about -7.8% a year over 16 years with CO2 at $38/t; net cost ~$201 per ton CO2 at 3% ($285 at 7%).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"9","authors":"European Commission (as summarised by the European Clean Hydrogen Observatory)","year":"2020","title":"A Renovation Wave for Europe (COM(2020) 662), policy summary","venue":"European Clean Hydrogen Observatory (EU) policy page","type":"government","url":"https://observatory.clean-hydrogen.europa.eu/eu-policy/renovation-wave-europe","doi":"","reported_estimate":"EUR 275bn of additional investment a year needed to reach 2030 targets; ~35 million building units renovated by 2030; renovation rate doubled from 1% to 2% a year. Against EU27 GDP of EUR 12,653bn (2020, Ricardo/EC 2021) this is 2.17% of GDP. Commission's own estimate of required spending; used as the compliance cost only, not for benefits.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"9","authors":"Nordhaus, W.D.","year":"2019","title":"Climate Change: The Ultimate Challenge for Economics (Nobel Prize Lecture)","venue":"American Economic Review 109(6):1991-2014","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/aer.109.6.1991","doi":"10.1257/aer.109.6.1991","reported_estimate":"DICE-2016R3 cost-benefit optimal SCC ~$36/tCO2 (2020). Used as low-end benefit per tonne.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"9","authors":"US Census Bureau (as reported by The Business Standard)","year":"2024","title":"World population to be 8.09 billion on 1 Jan 2025","venue":"The Business Standard (reporting US Census Bureau population clock release)","type":"media","url":"https://www.tbsnews.net/node/1030931","doi":"","reported_estimate":"World population ~8.09 billion on 1 January 2025. Used for C40's population share: 523m / 8.09bn = 6.5%.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"9","authors":"US Census Bureau (McKenzie, B.; Rapino, M.)","year":"2011","title":"Commuting in the United States: 2009 (American Community Survey Reports ACS-15)","venue":"US Census Bureau","type":"government","url":"https://libraryarchives.metro.net/DPGTL/harvested/2011-Commuting-in-the-united-states-2009.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Table 5, workers in metro areas: mean travel time to work 24.2 minutes driving alone, 47.8 minutes by public transportation.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"9","authors":"Prieto-Curiel, R.; Ospina, J.P.","year":"2024","title":"The ABC of mobility","venue":"Environment International","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.downtoearth.org.in/news/world/how-does-the-urban-world-commute-study-finds-over-half-prefer-cars-95138","doi":"","reported_estimate":"794 cities in 61 countries (~850m people): 51.4% of urban commutes are by car; 91.9% in the US and Canada; 18.8% in Eastern Asia.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"9","authors":"Baird, S.; Friedman, J.; Schady, N.","year":"2011","title":"Aggregate Income Shocks and Infant Mortality in the Developing World","venue":"Review of Economics and Statistics 93(3):847-856 (near-final version: GWU IIEP WP 2010-7)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www2.gwu.edu/~iiep/assets/docs/papers/Baird_IIEPWP2010-7.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"1.7 million births in 59 developing countries: a one percent decrease in per capita GDP is associated with an increase in mortality of between 0.24 and 0.40 infants per 1,000 children born (abstract; Table 2).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"9","authors":"World Bank, World Development Indicators (via FRED)","year":"2025","title":"Crude birth rate and total population, low and middle income countries","venue":"FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (SPDYNCBRTINLMY; SPPOPTOTLLMY)","type":"government","url":"https://fred.stlouisfed.org/data/SPDYNCBRTINLMY","doi":"","reported_estimate":"2024: crude birth rate 17.84 per 1,000; population 6,722,971,301; so about 119.9 million births a year in low- and middle-income countries.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"9","authors":"Broughel, J.; Viscusi, W.K.","year":"2017","title":"Death by Regulation: How Regulations Can Increase Mortality Risk (research summary)","venue":"Mercatus Center at George Mason University","type":"working_paper","url":"https://mercatus.org/media/65351/download","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Regulations costing more than $99.3 million per life saved can be expected to increase mortality risk (range $75.4m-$123.2m): about one statistical death per $99.3m of cost imposed, through lower income and private health spending.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"9","authors":"Galdon-Sanchez, J.E.; Gil, R.; Holub, F.; Uriz-Uharte, G.","year":"2023","title":"Social Benefits and Private Costs of Driving Restriction Policies: The Impact of Madrid Central on Congestion, Pollution, and Consumer Spending","venue":"Journal of the European Economic Association 21(3):1227-1267","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/jeurec/v21y2023i3p1227-1267..html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Pollution -19% and congestion -16%; consumers affected reduced brick-and-mortar spending in the regulated area by 21%, partly offset by online shopping.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"9","authors":"Christensen, P.; Francisco, P.; Myers, E.; Souza, M.","year":"2023","title":"Decomposing the Wedge between Projected and Realized Returns in Energy Efficiency Programs","venue":"Review of Economics and Statistics 105(4):798-817","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://e2e.uchicago.edu/pdf/workingpapers/WP046.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"9,800+ Illinois homes, 2009-2016: 'approximately 51% of projected savings are realized for the average home'; prior studies find 38% (Michigan WAP, Fowlie, Greenstone & Wolfram 2018), 58% (Wisconsin, Allcott & Greenstone 2017) and 73% (Massachusetts). Engineering-model bias explains up to 41% of the shortfall.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"9","authors":"Barrage, L.; Nordhaus, W.","year":"2024","title":"Policies, projections, and the social cost of carbon: Results from the DICE-2023 model","venue":"Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 121(13): e2312030121","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2312030121","doi":"10.1073/pnas.2312030121","reported_estimate":"'The SCC in the baseline run is $66/tCO2 for the 2020 period (in 2019 international $).'","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"9","authors":"Aldred, R. et al.","year":"2024","title":"Impacts of active travel interventions on travel behaviour and health: Results from a five-year longitudinal travel survey in Outer London","venue":"Journal of Transport & Health 35:101771","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214140524000173","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Mini-Holland active-travel/LTN schemes in Enfield, Kingston, Waltham Forest: BCR ~50:1 to 200:1 (health), ~GBP 4,800 health benefit per adult over 20 years (per press coverage of the paper) -- counter-evidence for the non-coercive component.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Voluntary low-traffic and active-travel schemes in Outer London (health BCR ~50-200): shows the non-coercive 15-minute-city planning component can pay, but it does not price car bans or consumption caps."},{"policy_id":"9","authors":"Coalition for Urban Transitions (Vivid Economics)","year":"2019","title":"Climate Emergency, Urban Opportunity","venue":"Coalition for Urban Transitions","type":"think_tank","url":"https://urbantransitions.global/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Climate-Emergency-Urban-Opportunity-report.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Urban low-carbon measures: US$1.83 trillion invested a year 2020-2050 (about 2% of 2018 world GDP), with annual savings of US$2.80 trillion in 2030 and US$6.98 trillion in 2050; NPV US$23.9 trillion at 3.5% (p. 68).","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Covers cities' sector (production-side) actions, which are scored under the Green New Deal entry rather than with the consumption caps. Its savings are engineering projections: measured programmes realise about 38-73% of projected energy savings, 51% on average in the largest study (Christensen et al. 2023; Fowlie, Greenstone & Wolfram 2018), and Allcott & Greenstone (2012) find profitable efficiency opportunities much smaller than engineering-accounting studies suggest. At 51% realisation the projected $2.80tn of 2030 savings become about $1.43tn, below the $1.83tn a year of investment, a net cost of about $0.4tn a year; at 38%, savings of $1.06tn leave a net cost of about $0.77tn. McKinsey (2022) puts total net-zero capital spending at $9.2tn a year, $3.5tn above today's, peaking at 8.8% of world GDP in 2030."},{"policy_id":"9","authors":"Rennert, K.; Errickson, F.; Prest, B. C.; et al.","year":"2022","title":"Comprehensive evidence implies a higher social cost of CO2","venue":"Nature 610:687-692","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-022-05224-9","doi":"10.1038/s41586-022-05224-9","reported_estimate":"Mean SCC $185/tCO2 (5-95%: $44-413) at 2% near-term discount rate.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Highest published social cost of carbon ($185/t); the range uses DICE-2023 ($66/t) as the upper carbon value."},{"policy_id":"10","authors":"Galiana, I.; Green, C.","year":"2012","title":"Technology-led Mitigation (Third Copenhagen Consensus: Climate Change Assessment Paper)","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center; final version in Lomborg (ed.), Global Problems, Smart Solutions: Costs and Benefits (Cambridge University Press, 2013)","type":"book","url":"https://copenhagenconsensus.com/publication/third-copenhagen-consensus-technology-led-mitigation-assessment-galiana-green","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Increased low-carbon energy R&D would yield benefits 'ranging from 3 to 11 times higher than cost, depending on rate of success and time horizon'.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"10","authors":"Lomborg, B.","year":"2009","title":"op-ed on the Copenhagen Consensus on Climate results (Forbes, 21 Sept 2009)","venue":"Forbes (author's archive PDF)","type":"media","url":"https://www.lomborg.com/sites/default/files/imported/bl_op-ed_2009_sept_21_forbes.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Reports Galiana & Green: about $100bn a year of non-carbon energy R&D would yield ~$11 of avoided climate damage per $1 (called conservative); reports Tol: carbon cuts to stay under 2 C avoid ~2 cents of damage per $1 spent; global carbon taxes judged 'very poor'.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"10","authors":"Rosegrant, M. W.; Wong, B.; Sulser, T. B.; Dubosse, N.; Lybbert, T. J.","year":"2023","title":"Benefit-Cost Analysis of Increased Funding for Agricultural Research and Development in the Global South","venue":"Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis 14(S1)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-benefit-cost-analysis/article/benefitcost-analysis-of-increased-funding-for-agricultural-research-and-development-in-the-global-south/5E4F7A33E8DBCD5326D3C164AB51F84C","doi":"10.1017/bca.2023.27","reported_estimate":"BCR 33; costs $61bn NPV ($5.2bn/yr); benefits $2.1 trillion; +10% ag output, -35% hunger, -16% food prices, +4% per capita income over 35 years.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"10","authors":"Alston, J. M.; Andersen, M. A.; James, J. S.; Pardey, P. G.","year":"2011","title":"The Economic Returns to U.S. Public Agricultural Research","venue":"American Journal of Agricultural Economics 93(5):1257-1277","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/ajagec/v93y2011i5p1257-1277.html","doi":"10.1093/ajae/aar044","reported_estimate":"Average own-state BCR 21:1, 32:1 including interstate spillovers; real IRR 9-10%.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"10","authors":"Glennerster, R.; Emerick, K.; Krahn, A.; et al.","year":"2024","title":"The Return to Investing in Climate-Resilient Crops","venue":"Market Shaping Accelerator, University of Chicago (draft report)","type":"working_paper","url":"https://marketshaping.uchicago.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/The-Return-to-Investing-in-Climate-Resilient-Crops.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Adoption-based advance market commitment (pull prize) for heat-resilient crops: BCR 7.5-22.6 (West African maize), 7.7-25.7 (East African sorghum) across the three adoption/technology scenarios, 24.3 for a $250m multi-target fund.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"10","authors":"Bickel, J. E.; Lane, L.","year":"2009","title":"An Analysis of Climate Engineering as a Response to Climate Change (Copenhagen Consensus on Climate: Climate Engineering Assessment)","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center (Fix the Climate)","type":"think_tank","url":"https://copenhagenconsensus.com/publication/fix-climate-climate-engineering-assessment-bickel-lane","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Stratospheric aerosol insertion: ~$230bn cost, benefits 'fifteen-times higher' per this summary page, but the paper's own ratio is 'on the order of 25 to 1' (as quoted by Pielke 2009); marine cloud whitening: ~$5.8bn cost, ~$20 trillion benefits, BCR ~3,448:1.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"10","authors":"Bickel, J. E.; Lane, L.","year":"2012","title":"Climate Engineering (Third Copenhagen Consensus: Climate Engineering Assessment)","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center (Copenhagen Consensus 2012)","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/publication/third-copenhagen-consensus-climate-engineering-assessment-bickel-lane","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Climate-engineering R&D program 'on the order of a billion dollars'; each $1 could create ~$1,000 of benefits.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"10","authors":"Kremer, M.; Levin, J.; Snyder, C. M.","year":"2020","title":"Advance Market Commitments: Insights from Theory and Experience","venue":"AEA Papers and Proceedings","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pandp.20201017","doi":"10.1257/pandp.20201017","reported_estimate":"$1.5bn pneumococcal AMC: ~150 million children immunized in 73 countries, ~700,000 lives saved, ~$83 per DALY averted; diffusion ~5 years faster than rotavirus vaccine without an AMC.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"10","authors":"Brunt, L.; Lerner, J.; Nicholas, T.","year":"2012","title":"Inducement Prizes and Innovation","venue":"Journal of Industrial Economics 60(4): 657-696","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jindec:v:60:y:2012:i:4:p:657-696","doi":"","reported_estimate":"RASE prizes 1839-1939: doubling a cash prize raised entries 6.4-14% and renewed (high-quality) patents 4-7%; each extra medal raised high-quality patents 20-44%.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"10","authors":"Williams, H.","year":"2012","title":"Innovation Inducement Prizes: Connecting Research to Policy","venue":"Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 31(3):752-776","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/85845","doi":"10.1002/pam.21638","reported_estimate":"Literature review prompted by the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010 (all federal agencies may offer prizes): success of prizes is hard to judge and 'careful empirical evaluations of innovation inducement prizes are needed'.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"10","authors":"Bays, J.; Goland, T.; Newsum, J.","year":"2009","title":"Using Prizes to Spur Innovation","venue":"McKinsey Quarterly (July 2009)","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/using-prizes-to-spur-innovation","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Ansari X Prize: $10M purse induced >$100M in team spending and >$1.5bn subsequent investment; large prizes tripled to $375M over a decade; only 23% of sponsors evaluate impact.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"10","authors":"McKinsey & Company","year":"2022","title":"McKinsey partners with Stripe, Alphabet, Shopify, and Meta on $925 million carbon removal commitment","venue":"McKinsey 'New at McKinsey' blog (13 April 2022)","type":"media","url":"https://www.mckinsey.com/about-us/new-at-mckinsey-blog/mckinsey-partners-with-stripe-alphabet-shopify-and-meta-on-$925-million-carbon-removal-commitment","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Frontier: a $925M, eight-year advance market commitment guaranteeing future demand for permanent carbon removal to expand supply.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"10","authors":"XPRIZE Foundation","year":"2025","title":"XPRIZE Makes History, Awards $100M Prize for Groundbreaking Carbon Removal Solutions","venue":"XPRIZE Foundation news release (April 2025)","type":"media","url":"https://www.xprize.org/news/xprize-makes-history-awards-100m-prize-for-groundbreaking-carbon-removal-solutions","doi":"","reported_estimate":"$100M XPRIZE Carbon Removal (Musk Foundation-funded) awarded in April 2025.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"10","authors":"Olson, S. (interview with Erika Wagner, X Prize Foundation)","year":"2011","title":"X-Prize director describes incentive prizes","venue":"NextBigFuture (June 2011)","type":"media","url":"https://www.nextbigfuture.com/2011/06/x-prize-director-describes-incentive.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"'The rough rule of thumb is that the operational costs are equal to the prize costs': a $10M prize implies ~$20M total spending (research, infrastructure, judges, staff, media).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"10","authors":"Goes, M.; Tuana, N.; Keller, K.","year":"2011","title":"The Economics (or Lack Thereof) of Aerosol Geoengineering","venue":"Climatic Change 109: 719-744","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-010-9961-z","doi":"10.1007/s10584-010-9961-z","reported_estimate":"Complete substitution of aerosol geoengineering for CO2 abatement fails a cost-benefit test over a wide range of scenarios, driven by termination risk and damages from geoengineering itself (as summarised in Bickel & Agrawal 2013).","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Peer-reviewed finding that substituting aerosol geoengineering for CO2 abatement fails a cost-benefit test in many scenarios; it concerns deployment, not research, and is answered by Bickel & Agrawal (2013). It is one reason the 1,000:1 research figure is treated as contested."},{"policy_id":"10","authors":"Bickel, J. E.; Agrawal, S.","year":"2013","title":"Reexamining the Economics of Aerosol Geoengineering","venue":"Climatic Change 119: 993-1006","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-012-0619-x","doi":"10.1007/s10584-012-0619-x","reported_estimate":"Reframing Goes et al.: geoengineering may pass a cost-benefit test over a wide range of the scenarios Goes et al. considered (abstract; no single BCR in abstract).","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Reply to Goes et al. finding that geoengineering may pass a cost-benefit test; it gives no research-specific ratio, so it is used only as context."},{"policy_id":"10","authors":"Pielke, R. A., Jr.","year":"2009","title":"A Perspective Paper on Climate Engineering (Copenhagen Consensus on Climate)","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center","type":"think_tank","url":"https://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/admin/publication_files/resource-2753-2009.28.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Reports Bickel & Lane's BCRs as ~25:1 (stratospheric aerosols) and ~5,000:1 (marine cloud whitening); criticises them as 'precision without accuracy', citing Goes et al.'s contrary result.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Critique of the Bickel & Lane ratios ('precision without accuracy'); used as context for the contested geoengineering figure, not as a separate estimate."},{"policy_id":"11","authors":"Diamond, R.; McQuade, T.; Qian, F.","year":"2019","title":"The Effects of Rent Control Expansion on Tenants, Landlords, and Inequality: Evidence from San Francisco","venue":"American Economic Review 109(9): 3365-3394","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20181289","doi":"10.1257/aer.20181289","reported_estimate":"Treated landlords cut rental supply 15%; tenant mobility down ~20%; NBER version: 5.1% citywide rent rise.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"11","authors":"Diamond, R.; McQuade, T.; Qian, F.","year":"2018","title":"The Effects of Rent Control Expansion on Tenants, Landlords, and Inequality: Evidence from San Francisco (NBER conference draft)","venue":"NBER conference paper f99478","type":"working_paper","url":"https://conference.nber.org/conf_papers/f99478/f99478.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Covered tenants gained $7.621bn cumulative 1995-2012 ($423m/yr; $3,100-5,900 per person per year), about one third of it landlord buyout transfers; citywide rent +7% and $5bn welfare loss to all renters, 'almost as large' as tenant gains.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"11","authors":"Ahern, K. R.; Giacoletti, M.","year":"2022","title":"Robbing Peter to Pay Paul? The Redistribution of Wealth Caused by Rent Control","venue":"NBER Working Paper 30083","type":"working_paper","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w30083","doi":"10.3386/w30083","reported_estimate":"St. Paul 2021 law cut property values 6-7% ($1.57bn); 67% direct capitalisation, 33% (at least $518m) deadweight externalities; higher-income tenants gained most, lower-income owners lost most.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"11","authors":"Autor, D. H.; Palmer, C. J.; Pathak, P. A.","year":"2014","title":"Housing Market Spillovers: Evidence from the End of Rent Control in Cambridge, Massachusetts","venue":"Journal of Political Economy 122(3): 661-717","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/675536","doi":"10.1086/675536","reported_estimate":"Decontrol in 1995 added about $1.8bn to Cambridge's housing stock 1994-2004, nearly a quarter of total residential price appreciation, mostly on never-controlled properties.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"11","authors":"Glaeser, E. L.; Luttmer, E. F. P.","year":"2003","title":"The Misallocation of Housing Under Rent Control","venue":"American Economic Review 93(4): 1027-1046","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v93y2003i4p1027-1046.html","doi":"10.1257/000282803769206188","reported_estimate":"An economically and statistically significant fraction of New York City apartments is misallocated across demographic groups under rent control; dollar figures are in the NBER working-paper version (w6220), listed separately.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"11","authors":"Kholodilin, K. A.","year":"2024","title":"Rent control effects through the lens of empirical research: An almost complete review of the literature","venue":"Journal of Housing Economics 63: 101983","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.diw.de/de/diw_01.c.893635.de/publikationen/externe_referierte_aufsaetze/2024_0000/rent_control_effects_through_the_lens_of_empirical_research__an_almost_complete_review_of_the_literature.html","doi":"10.1016/j.jhe.2024.101983","reported_estimate":"Rent controls are effective at slowing rent growth in controlled units but bring wide-ranging adverse effects for society as a whole.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"11","authors":"Clark Center Economic Experts Panel (US)","year":"2012","title":"Rent Control (Feb 7, 2012)","venue":"Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets, Chicago Booth","type":"think_tank","url":"https://kentclarkcenter.org/surveys/rent-control/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"0 strongly agree, 1 agree, 3 uncertain, 20 disagree, 13 strongly disagree (33/37 = 89% disagree) that rent limits improved affordable housing.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"11","authors":"Clark Center Economic Experts Panel (US)","year":"2024","title":"National Rent Caps (Jul 23, 2024)","venue":"Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets, Chicago Booth","type":"think_tank","url":"https://kentclarkcenter.org/surveys/national-rent-caps/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"A 5% cap on corporate landlords: 80.5% disagree it would make middle-income Americans substantially better off (2.4% agree); 68.3% agree it would substantially reduce apartments for rent (7.3% disagree). 41 responses.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"11","authors":"Elmendorf, C. S.; Nall, C.; Oklobdzija, S.","year":"2024","title":"What State Housing Policies Do Voters Want? Evidence from a Platform-Choice Experiment","venue":"Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy 5(1) (SSRN 4811534)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4811534","doi":"","reported_estimate":"National survey of ~5,000 urban and suburban voters: homeowners and renters alike support price controls; Cato (Bourne 2024) reports over 85% supported capping rents.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"11","authors":"City and County of San Francisco, Rent Arbitration Board","year":"2024","title":"Rent Arbitration Board FY 2024-25 and FY 2025-26 Budget Memo","venue":"City and County of San Francisco","type":"government","url":"https://www.sf.gov/sites/default/files/2024-02/Rent%20Arbitration%20Board%20FY24-26%20Budget%20Memo.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Proposed FY2024-25 budget $13,827,383 (FY2025-26 $14,386,934); 50 FTE; funded by the Rent Board fee (up to $64/unit proposed for FY2025-26); 219,125 dwelling units and 13,138 SRO guest units billed (projected FY2023-24).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"11","authors":"City of Berkeley Rent Stabilization Board","year":"2024","title":"FY 2024-2025 Budget, Staffing Model, and Expenditure Level (Item 7C, 20 June 2024)","venue":"City of Berkeley Rent Stabilization Board","type":"government","url":"https://rentboard.berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/documents/06-20-2024_RSB_ITEM%207C_ACTION_FY%202024-2025%20Budget%2C%20Staffing%20Model%2C%20and%20Exp.%20Level_FINAL_0.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"FY2024-25 expenditure budget $8,332,918; ~29-30 FTE; registration fee $344 per fully covered unit and $212 per partially covered unit; ~5,700 partially covered units; $6.88m fully-covered fee revenue implies ~20,000 fully covered units.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"11","authors":"New York State Homes and Community Renewal, Office of Rent Administration","year":"2025","title":"Office of Rent Administration 2025 Annual Report","venue":"NYS HCR","type":"government","url":"https://hcr.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2025/12/ora_2025-annual-report_final.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"ORA has 350 staff across six offices administering 1,064,049 registered rent-stabilized units (registration year 2025); no budget figure published.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"11","authors":"U.S. Census Bureau","year":"2026","title":"Quarterly Residential Vacancies and Homeownership, Second Quarter 2026 (press release)","venue":"U.S. Census Bureau, Housing Vacancy Survey","type":"government","url":"https://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/files/currenthvspress.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Estimated 46,827 thousand renter-occupied housing units in Q2 2026 (Table 3; MOE +/-335 thousand).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"11","authors":"Glaeser, E. L.; Luttmer, E. F. P.","year":"1997","title":"The Misallocation of Housing Under Rent Control (NBER Working Paper 6220)","venue":"NBER Working Paper 6220","type":"working_paper","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w6220","doi":"10.3386/w6220","reported_estimate":"Best estimate of the cost of New York rent control from misallocating rental apartments: $200 per apartment a year; lower bound from bedrooms and rent/own choice more than $40 per regulated or owned apartment; correcting for unobservables and other attributes gives $200-2,000 per apartment, $300m-$3bn a year for 1.5 million apartments (authors call the top 'perhaps unrealistic'). Data: 1993 NYC Housing and Vacancy Survey vs 1993 American Housing Survey.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"11","authors":"Turner, B.; Malpezzi, S.","year":"2003","title":"A Review of Empirical Evidence on the Costs and Benefits of Rent Control","venue":"Swedish Economic Policy Review 10: 11-56","type":"government","url":"https://government.se/contentassets/6e57e1d818bb4b289ac512bb7d307fa5/bengt-turner--stephen-malpezzi-a-review-of-empirical-evidence-on-the-costs-and-benefits-of-rent-control","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Table 1: Olsen (1972) NYC 1968 subsidy $406 a year, tenant benefit $213, transfer efficiency 0.52; Mildner (1987 data) landlord cost of subsidy $122/month for controlled units, -$14 for stabilized, efficiency 0.65; other studies 0.45-0.99. Early (2000): controls raise uncontrolled rents 12% and 'the average benefit to tenants in regulated units was negative'. Gyourko & Linneman (1990): Manhattan units under old controls had 'a 9 percent higher probability of being in unsound condition'. Glaeser & Luttmer: misallocation DWL 'from USD 200 to USD 2,000 per apartment per year'.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"11","authors":"Sims, D. P.","year":"2007","title":"Out of control: What can we learn from the end of Massachusetts rent control?","venue":"Journal of Urban Economics 61(1): 129-151","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/juecon/v61y2007i1p129-151.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"As summarised by the NMHC review (Sturtevant 2018): rent control had little effect on new construction but was associated with owners converting rental units to condominiums, keeping thousands of units off the Boston-area rental market; controlled buildings were of lower quality. No dollar estimate used here.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"11","authors":"Early, D. W.","year":"2000","title":"Rent Control, Rental Housing Supply, and the Distribution of Tenant Benefits","venue":"Journal of Urban Economics 48(2): 185-204","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/juecon/v48y2000i2p185-204.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"As reported by Turner & Malpezzi (2003): using 1996 NYC data, controls raised uncontrolled rents by 12% and the average benefit to tenants in regulated units was negative (abstract not available; figures read from the review).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"11","authors":"General Social Survey / ISSP Role of Government (SDA codebook)","year":"2024","title":"PRICECONGOVTS: government responsibility to keep prices under control","venue":"GSS cumulative codebook (UC Berkeley SDA)","type":"government","url":"https://sda.berkeley.edu/sdaweb/docs/gss24rel3/DOC/hcbk0223.htm","doi":"","reported_estimate":"32.1% definitely should, 41.8% probably should (73.9% total), pooled across years.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"11","authors":"Favilukis, J.; Mabille, P.; Van Nieuwerburgh, S.","year":"2023","title":"Affordable Housing and City Welfare","venue":"Review of Economic Studies 90(1): 293-330","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w25906","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdac024","reported_estimate":"Calibrated NYC model: affordability policies (including rent control) have substantial insurance value, and targeting the neediest can yield substantial net welfare gains despite supply and misallocation costs.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"A calibrated structural model of well-targeted affordability policy, not an estimate of actual rent caps; its gains depend on targeting that real rent-control programmes lack (see Ahern & Giacoletti on who benefits). Shown as the main counterpoint."},{"policy_id":"11","authors":"Diamond, R.; McQuade, T.; Qian, F.","year":"2018","title":"The Effects of Rent Control Expansion on Tenants, Landlords, and Inequality (NBER w24181 abstract)","venue":"NBER Working Paper 24181","type":"working_paper","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w24181","doi":"10.3386/w24181","reported_estimate":"Rent control offered large benefits to covered tenants; welfare losses could be mitigated if rent-increase insurance were provided as government social insurance rather than a landlord mandate.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Supports the tenant-insurance rationale, but the authors' remedy is a different, tax-funded policy; the gross tenant benefits it reports are already in the ratio's numerator."},{"policy_id":"12","authors":"Albrecht, B. C.; Tabarrok, A.; Whitmeyer, M.","year":"2026","title":"Chaos and Misallocation under Price Controls","venue":"arXiv 2602.12066 (working paper)","type":"working_paper","url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.12066","doi":"","reported_estimate":"1973-74 US gasoline controls: ceiling 20% below baseline, 9% shortfall; Harberger triangle ~2.0% of spending; misallocation 2.2-17.7% of spending (1.09-8.75x the triangle); cites Frech & Lee and Deacon & Sonstelie finding queuing costs could exceed the entire rent transfer.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"12","authors":"Frech, H. E. III; Lee, W. C.","year":"1987","title":"The Welfare Cost of Rationing-By-Queuing Across Markets: Theory and Estimates from the U.S. Gasoline Crises","venue":"Quarterly Journal of Economics 102(1): 97-108","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/qjecon/v102y1987i1p97-108..html","doi":"10.2307/1884682","reported_estimate":"Estimates the welfare cost of improper allocation across markets in the 1973-74 and 1979 gasoline crises (queuing costs could exceed the transfer, per Albrecht et al.).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"12","authors":"Davis, L. W.; Kilian, L.","year":"2011","title":"The Allocative Cost of Price Ceilings in the U.S. Residential Market for Natural Gas","venue":"Journal of Political Economy 119(2): 212-241","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w14030","doi":"10.3386/w14030","reported_estimate":"Allocative cost of natural-gas price ceilings averaged $4.6bn a year 1950-2000 (peak $6.4bn in 1980), roughly tripling earlier net welfare loss estimates; MacAvoy's DWL $10.5bn/yr 1968-77.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"12","authors":"Blinder, A. S.; Newton, W. J.","year":"1981","title":"The 1971-1974 Controls Program and the Price Level: An Econometric Post-Mortem","venue":"Journal of Monetary Economics 8(1): 1-23","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://nber.org/papers/w0279","doi":"10.3386/w0279","reported_estimate":"Nixon controls cut the non-food, non-energy price level 3-4% by Feb 1974, but catch-up after April 1974 left it only 0-2% below the no-controls path; decontrol explains most of 1974's double-digit core inflation.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"12","authors":"Cavallo, A.; Cavallo, E.; Rigobon, R.","year":"2014","title":"Prices and Supply Disruptions during Natural Disasters","venue":"Review of Income and Wealth 60: S449-S471","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w19474","doi":"10.3386/w19474","reported_estimate":"After the 2010 Chile and 2011 Japan earthquakes, goods available fell 32% and 17% while prices stayed stable for months (sellers fearing 'customer anger').","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"12","authors":"Clark Center Economic Experts Panel (US)","year":"2012","title":"Price Gouging (May 2, 2012)","venue":"Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets, Chicago Booth","type":"think_tank","url":"https://kentclarkcenter.org/surveys/price-gouging/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Connecticut SB 60 anti-gouging bill: 1 strongly agree, 2 agree, 6 uncertain, 15 disagree, 5 strongly disagree, 3 no opinion (20 of 29 taking a position = 69% against).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"12","authors":"Clark Center Economic Experts Panel (US)","year":"2024","title":"Election Economic Policy Ideas (Sept 10, 2024)","venue":"Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets, Chicago Booth","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.kentclarkcenter.org/surveys/election-economic-policy-ideas/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"As tallied by Cato (Bourne, Sept 13 2024): 88% agree widespread price controls create substantial distortions (99% confidence-weighted); 77% agree little evidence that price gouging causes high grocery prices, 0% disagree.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"12","authors":"Oil & Gas Journal (reporting CRA International study for ACCF)","year":"2007","title":"ACCF: Price-gouging legislation could be costly","venue":"Oil & Gas Journal","type":"media","url":"https://www.ogj.com/general-interest/article/17228006/accf-price-gouging-legislation-could-be-costly","doi":"","reported_estimate":"A federal price-gouging law in force after Katrina/Rita would have caused about $1.9bn of welfare losses (Sept-Oct 2005).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"12","authors":"Data for Progress","year":"2026","title":"Voters Support a Progressive Agenda Focused on Lowering Costs and Taking On Corporations","venue":"Data for Progress blog (1,085 likely voters, Apr 17-20, 2026)","type":"think_tank","url":"https://dataforprogress.org/blog/2026/4/29/voters-support-a-progressive-agenda-focused-on-lowering-costs-and-taking-on-corporations","doi":"","reported_estimate":"65% support cracking down on grocery store price gouging.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"12","authors":"General Social Survey / ISSP Role of Government (SDA codebook)","year":"2024","title":"PRICECONGOVTS: government responsibility to keep prices under control","venue":"GSS cumulative codebook (UC Berkeley SDA)","type":"government","url":"https://sda.berkeley.edu/sdaweb/docs/gss24rel3/DOC/hcbk0223.htm","doi":"","reported_estimate":"32.1% definitely should, 41.8% probably should (73.9% total), pooled across years.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"12","authors":"Bleiberg, R. M. (reporting J. T. Dunlop, Cost of Living Council)","year":"1974","title":"Farewell to Wage and Price Controls","venue":"Imprimis 3(7), Hillsdale College","type":"media","url":"https://imprimis.hillsdale.edu/farewell-to-wage-and-price-controls-july-1974/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Per Dunlop, the 'five freezes and phases, stretching over more than two and a half years, cost the taxpayer nearly $200 million and U.S. industry an estimated $721 million to $2 billion'; other sources put the cost to industry at about $2bn a year, or perhaps $5bn for the whole period.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"12","authors":"U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis via Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED)","year":"2026","title":"Gross Domestic Product, annual (GDPA)","venue":"FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis","type":"government","url":"https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDPA","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Nominal GDP: 1973 $1,425.4bn; 1974 $1,545.2bn; 2024 $29,381.0bn; 2025 $30,861.3bn.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"12","authors":"Deacon, R. T.; Sonstelie, J.","year":"1989","title":"The Welfare Costs of Rationing by Waiting","venue":"Economic Inquiry 27(2): 179-196","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/ecinqu/v27y1989i2p179-96.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Under gasoline price controls with rationing by waiting, the value of time in queues plus the waste from buying more per purchase may exceed the rent transferred from suppliers to consumers; 'Rent seeking exhausts an estimated 116 percent of the rent transferred.'","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"12","authors":"Tarr, D. G.","year":"1994","title":"The Welfare Costs of Price Controls for Cars and Color Televisions in Poland: Contrasting Estimates of Rent-Seeking from Recent Experience","venue":"World Bank Economic Review 8(3): 415-443","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/528531468776389780/pdf/The-welfare-costs-of-price-controls-for-cars-and-color-televisions-in-Poland-contrasting-estimates-of-rent-seeking-from-recent-experience.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Colour televisions with rent dissipation: welfare cost 0.46% of GDP, 112% of Polish producers' sales, about ten times the Harberger triangle (rent rectangle 116bn zlotys, triangle 14bn). Cars without dissipation: 0.29% of GDP, 36% of producers' sales.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"12","authors":"Higgs, R.","year":"2009","title":"The Two-Price System: U.S. Rationing During World War II","venue":"The Independent Institute (28 April 2009; also published in The Freeman)","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.independent.org/news/article.asp?id=2491","doi":"","reported_estimate":"The Office of Price Administration imposed 259,966 sanctions between 11 Feb 1941 and 31 May 1947; one in fifteen businesses was charged with illicit transactions and one in five warned; 2,000-5,000 investigators and 500-1,000 attorneys; substantial black-market shares in beef and gasoline (no percentage given).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"12","authors":"Aparicio, D.; Cavallo, A.","year":"2021","title":"Targeted Price Controls on Supermarket Products","venue":"Review of Economics and Statistics 103(1): 60-71","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w24275","doi":"10.1162/rest_a_00880","reported_estimate":"Argentina 2007-15: controlled goods stayed available (no evidence of shortages), but effects on aggregate inflation were temporary and firms introduced new, higher-priced varieties.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Shows narrow, negotiated supermarket controls need not cause shortages, which argues the low end overstates harm for mild controls; but it gives no welfare estimate and found only temporary price effects, so it cannot set either end of the ratio."},{"policy_id":"12","authors":"Henderson, D. R. (EconLib)","year":"","title":"EconLib post on price controls and the 1979 gasoline shortage (date not checked)","venue":"Econlib","type":"media","url":"https://www.econlib.org/?p=80768","doi":"","reported_estimate":"1979: average price ~80c, DOE market-clearing estimate $1.00, effective price including waiting time ~$1.20 per gallon.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Blog-level arithmetic; used only as a cross-check on the low end, not as its basis."},{"policy_id":"12","authors":"Rockoff, H.","year":"1984","title":"Drastic Measures: A History of Wage and Price Controls in the United States","venue":"Cambridge University Press","type":"book","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/b/cup/cbooks/9780521244961.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"History of US controls from colonial times to 1971-74, covering black markets and enforcement; argues controls can sometimes have a net positive effect, in particular that temporary controls may reduce the unemployment and lost output that usually accompany disinflation.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Argues temporary controls can lower the output cost of disinflation, which would raise the high end in that setting; it gives no welfare estimate per $1 transferred that could enter the ratio, and the policy here is not tied to a disinflation programme."},{"policy_id":"13","authors":"Clemens, M.A.","year":"2011","title":"Economics and Emigration: Trillion-Dollar Bills on the Sidewalk?","venue":"Journal of Economic Perspectives 25(3):83-106 (CGD Working Paper 264, Aug 2011)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/1425376_file_Clemens_Economics_and_Emigration_FINAL.pdf","doi":"10.1257/jep.25.3.83","reported_estimate":"Table 1 (efficiency gain from eliminating barriers, % of world GDP). Labour mobility, all barriers: Hamilton & Whalley (1984) 147.3; Moses & Letnes (2004) 96.5; Iregui (2005) 67; Klein & Ventura (2007) 122. Merchandise trade, all policy barriers: 0.3-4.1 (Hertel & Keeney 2006 0.3; Anderson & Martin 2005 0.7; Dessus et al. 1999 4.1, with trade-productivity effect). Capital flows 0.1-1.7. Table 2 (partial removal; emigration % of origin pop. -> gain % world GDP): Moses & Letnes 73.6->96.5, 29.3->54.8, 10.3->22.0; Iregui 53->67, 24->31; Klein & Ventura >99->122, 14.8->20, 7.3->10; Walmsley & Winters 0.8->0.6, 1.6->1.2; van der Mensbrugghe & Roland-Holst 0.8->0.9, 2.0->2.3. Text: full-removal gains 'often in the range of 50-150 percent of world GDP'. Tables at pp. 27-28 of the CGD WP version (identical text to JEP article).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"13","authors":"Borjas, G.J.","year":"2015","title":"Immigration and Globalization: A Review Essay","venue":"Journal of Economic Literature 53(4):961-974","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://gborjas.scholars.harvard.edu/resource/jel2015pdf","doi":"10.1257/jel.53.4.961","reported_estimate":"Premigration world GDP $70tn. Table 1 (costless open borders, elasticity -0.3): world GDP gain $9.4tn / $40.1tn / $62.4tn for North/South productivity ratio R = 2/4/6; at R=4, 2.6bn workers (5.6bn people) move, Northern wages -39.3%, Southern +143.0%, capitalists +$12.0tn. Table 2 (R=4), lambda = weight on Southern (origin) productivity carried to North, lambda 0/0.25/0.5/0.75/1.0: Panel A gross gain $40.1/24.2/8.8/-5.5/-17.5tn; Panel B net of migration costs (cost = 10x a Southern worker's initial salary, 5% discount) $28.1/12.9/-0.9/-12.4/-20.0tn.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"13","authors":"Docquier, F.; Machado, J.; Sekkat, K.","year":"2015","title":"Efficiency Gains from Liberalizing Labor Mobility","venue":"Scandinavian Journal of Economics 117(2):303-346 (ERF WP 745, 2013)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://publications.uni.lu/handle/10993/21544","doi":"10.1111/sjoe.12097","reported_estimate":"Calibrated GE model with empirically estimated migration and visa costs: about 400 million people want to migrate; liberalizing migration raises world GDP by 11.5-12.5% in the medium term; gains range from 7.0% (with schooling externalities, i.e. brain-drain effects) to 17.9% (with network effects). WP version: natives' income USA +0.3%, EU27 +2.1%, GCC -0.7%; sending-country natives +26% (SSA) to +79.3%.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"13","authors":"Kennan, J.","year":"2013","title":"Open Borders","venue":"Review of Economic Dynamics 16(2):L1-L13 (NBER WP 18307)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w18307","doi":"10.1016/j.red.2012.08.003","reported_estimate":"Net gain from open borders (static model with migration costs), averaged over all workers incl. non-migrants in less-developed countries: $11,046 per worker per year (PPP 2012$) vs average income $8,382 (+132%) for 40 countries; $10,369 vs $8,903 (+116%) for all non-frontier PWT countries (NBER WP pp. 15-16). Real-wage fall in rich countries small and disappears as capital adjusts.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"13","authors":"Clemens, M.A.; Montenegro, C.E.; Pritchett, L.","year":"2019","title":"The Place Premium: Bounding the Price Equivalent of Migration Barriers","venue":"Review of Economics and Statistics 101(2):201-213","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://repec.iza.org/dp9789.pdf","doi":"10.1162/rest_a_00776","reported_estimate":"Lower-bound US/home real-wage ratio for identical low-skill workers: Mexico 2.557, median country 3.95; lower-bound gain PPP$10,523 (Mexico) to 13,600 (median) per year. (Carried over from evidence/16.json.)","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"13","authors":"World Bank","year":"2025","title":"GDP (current US$) - World (NY.GDP.MKTP.CD)","venue":"World Development Indicators","type":"intl_org","url":"https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=1W","doi":"","reported_estimate":"World GDP 2025 (most recent value): $118,350,166.04 million.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"13","authors":"Docquier, F.; Rapoport, H.","year":"2012","title":"Globalization, Brain Drain, and Development","venue":"Journal of Economic Literature 50(3):681-730","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jel.50.3.681","doi":"10.1257/jel.50.3.681","reported_estimate":"Survey finding: high-skill emigration 'need not deplete a country's human capital stock' and 'can generate positive network externalities'. Effects on sending countries depend on context. Used to set the brain-drain term to zero for low-skill flows in the strict-border mirror-image score.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"13","authors":"World Bank / KNOMAD","year":"2024","title":"Remittances Slowed in 2023, Expected to Grow Faster in 2024 (Migration and Development Brief 40)","venue":"World Bank press release, 26 June 2024","type":"intl_org","url":"https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2024/06/26/remittances-slowed-in-2023-expected-to-grow-faster-in-2024","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Remittances to low- and middle-income countries reached $656bn in 2023, more than FDI and ODA. Mexico received $66.2bn (+7.8%). Treated as part of the migrant's earnings, not added separately.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"13","authors":"Congressional Budget Office","year":"2025","title":"An Update to the Demographic Outlook, 2025 to 2055","venue":"CBO report (September 2025)","type":"government","url":"https://www.cbo.gov/publication/61735","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Net immigration is 1.6m lower in 2025 and 0.96m lower in 2026 than in the January 2025 projection, mainly because of executive actions. The 2025 reconciliation act (P.L. 119-21) alone means 320,000 fewer people in the Social Security area population in 2035, from the removal of 290,000 immigrants. Used for the H.R. 1 enforcement cost in the strict-border mirror-image score: $170.7bn / 320,000 = $533,400 per person.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"13","authors":"American Immigration Council","year":"2024","title":"Mass Deportation: Devastating Costs to America, Its Budget and Economy","venue":"American Immigration Council report (1 Oct 2024)","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/report/mass-deportation/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"One-time removal of 13.3m people costs at least $315bn (arrests $89.3bn, detention $167.8bn, legal processing $34.1bn, removal $24.1bn). 1m deportations a year costs about $88bn/yr ($88,000 each, all-in), or $967.9bn over about a decade. GDP would fall 4.2-6.8%.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"13","authors":"Edelberg, W.; Veuger, S.; Watson, T.","year":"2026","title":"Macroeconomic Implications of Immigration Flows in 2025 and 2026: January 2026 Update","venue":"Brookings Institution / AEI","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.brookings.edu/articles/macroeconomic-implications-of-immigration-flows-in-2025-and-2026-january-2026-update","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Net migration -295,000 to -10,000 in 2025 and -925,000 to +185,000 in 2026. US GDP growth lower by 0.2-0.3 pp in 2025 and 0.1-0.3 pp in 2026. Consumer spending $40-60bn lower in 2025 and a further $10-40bn lower in 2026.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"13","authors":"di Giovanni, J.; Levchenko, A.A.; Ortega, F.","year":"2015","title":"A Global View of Cross-Border Migration","venue":"Journal of the European Economic Association 13(1):168-202 (NBER WP 20002)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://nber.org/papers/w20002","doi":"10.1111/jeea.12110","reported_estimate":"Quantitative multi-country model: in the long run natives in main receiving countries gain about 5-10% in welfare from observed migration (product variety); short-run average effect close to zero; remittance-receiving countries gain about 10%. Not added, to avoid double counting with Allen et al. Signals that the native-loss term is conservative.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"13","authors":"Allen, T.; Dobbin, C. de C.; Morten, M.","year":"2024","title":"Border Walls (NBER Working Paper 25267, Nov 2018, revised May 2024)","venue":"NBER Working Paper 25267","type":"working_paper","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w25267","doi":"10.3386/w25267","reported_estimate":"2006-10 wall (548 extra miles) cost $2.3bn plus $0.45bn maintenance 2007-15 (GAO lifetime maintenance about $1bn); reduced migration by about 311,000 (95% CI about 219,000-378,000); high-skill US workers lose $21/yr (0.04%), low-skill US workers gain $9/yr (0.02%).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"13","authors":"Clemens, M.A.; Lewis, E.G.; Postel, H.M.","year":"2018","title":"Immigration Restrictions as Active Labor Market Policy: Evidence from the Mexican Bracero Exclusion","venue":"American Economic Review 108(6):1468-1487","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/aer.20170765","doi":"10.1257/aer.20170765","reported_estimate":"Excluding almost 500,000 Mexican bracero farm workers in 1964 did not raise native farm wages; the authors cannot reject zero change in agricultural wages and employment, because farms adopted labour-saving technology and switched crops.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"13","authors":"East, C.N.; Luck, P.; Mansour, H.; Velasquez, A.","year":"2023","title":"The Labor Market Effects of Immigration Enforcement","venue":"Journal of Labor Economics (IZA DP 11486)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://docs.iza.org/dp11486.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Secure Communities lowered employment of low-skill noncitizens and of citizens in middle and high-skill occupations: about 178 fewer employed citizens per 100,000, about 1.5 citizen jobs lost per noncitizen job lost, and about 600,000 fewer employed male citizens nationally; small, imprecise positive effect on low-skill citizens.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"13","authors":"National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (Blau, F.D.; Mackie, C., eds.)","year":"2017","title":"The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration","venue":"National Academies Press","type":"government","url":"https://www.nationalacademies.org/news/new-report-assesses-the-economic-and-fiscal-consequences-of-immigration","doi":"10.17226/23550","reported_estimate":"Wage effects on natives very small over 10+ years; 75-year fiscal impact generally positive at federal level and negative at state/local level; first generation less fiscally favourable than natives, second generation the most favourable; results hinge on how public-goods costs are allocated.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"13","authors":"Nowrasteh, A.; Eckhardt, S.; Howard, M.","year":"2023","title":"The Fiscal Impact of Immigration in the United States","venue":"Cato Institute White Paper","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.cato.org/white-paper/fiscal-impact-immigration-united-states","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Replicates and updates the NAS model. High-school-dropout immigrant arriving at 25: NPV +$216,000 excluding descendants and +$57,000 including descendants (Cato model), against -$32,000 / -$177,000 for native-born dropouts. Used as the forgone fiscal contribution in the strict-border case least favourable to restriction.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"13","authors":"Congressional Research Service","year":"2025","title":"Comparing DHS Component Funding, FY2025: In Brief (R48115)","venue":"CRS Report R48115","type":"government","url":"https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/2025-05-12_R48115_646947568245eb6527f21cd4313b4ada79fdadb9.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Net discretionary: CBP $19.62bn (FY2024 enacted and FY2025 CR); ICE $9.56bn (FY2024) and $10.04bn (FY2025 CR). CBP total budget authority FY2024 $22.67bn.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"13","authors":"American Immigration Council","year":"2025","title":"What's in the Big Beautiful Bill? Immigration and Border Security Unpacked","venue":"American Immigration Council fact sheet","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/fact-sheet/big-beautiful-bill-immigration-border-security/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"H.R. 1 provides $170.7bn of extra immigration and border enforcement funding through 30 Sept 2029, including $46.6-51.6bn for the wall and CBP facilities, $45bn for ICE detention and $29.9bn for enforcement and removal. Lines: DOJ (immigration judges, prosecutions) $3.3bn; border processing $2.1bn (treated as admin); DHS reimbursement fund $10bn; states $13.5bn; DOD $1bn.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"13","authors":"O'Herron, M. (Brennan Center for Justice)","year":"2026","title":"ICE and Customs and Border Protection Budgets to Exceed $200 Billion","venue":"Brennan Center for Justice","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/ice-customs-and-border-protection-budgets-exceed-200-billion","doi":"","reported_estimate":"OBBBA gave DHS $170bn through Sept 2029; the 2026 Secure America Act added $70bn more; ICE and CBP had $118bn unspent as of April 2026.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"13","authors":"U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics","year":"2010","title":"Women in the Labor Force: A Databook, Table 8 (2009 annual averages, ages 25-64, by educational attainment)","venue":"BLS","type":"government","url":"https://www.bls.gov/cps/wlftable8-2010.htm","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Civilian labour force aged 25-64, 2009 (thousands): total 126,247; less than high school 11,401; high school no college 36,159; some college/associate 35,291; bachelor's or higher 43,397. Used to weight Allen et al.'s per-worker effects.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"13","authors":"Broughel, J.; Viscusi, W.K.","year":"2017","title":"Death by Regulation: How Regulations Can Increase Mortality Risk (research summary)","venue":"Mercatus Center at George Mason University","type":"working_paper","url":"https://mercatus.org/media/65351/download","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Regulations costing more than $99.3 million per life saved can be expected to increase mortality risk (range $75.4m-$123.2m): about one statistical death per $99.3m of cost imposed, through lower income and private health spending.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"13","authors":"U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, ASPE","year":"2024","title":"Standard Values for Regulatory Analysis, 2024","venue":"HHS Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation","type":"government","url":"https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cd2a1348ea0777b1aa918089e4965b8c/standard-ria-values.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Value per statistical life for 2024: central $13.1m (2023 dollars).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"13","authors":"Baird, S.; Friedman, J.; Schady, N.","year":"2011","title":"Aggregate Income Shocks and Infant Mortality in the Developing World","venue":"Review of Economics and Statistics 93(3):847-856 (near-final version: GWU IIEP WP 2010-7)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www2.gwu.edu/~iiep/assets/docs/papers/Baird_IIEPWP2010-7.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"1.7 million births in 59 developing countries: a one percent decrease in per capita GDP is associated with an increase in mortality of between 0.24 and 0.40 infants per 1,000 children born (abstract; Table 2).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"13","authors":"World Bank, World Development Indicators (via FRED)","year":"2025","title":"Crude birth rate and total population, low and middle income countries","venue":"FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (SPDYNCBRTINLMY; SPPOPTOTLLMY)","type":"government","url":"https://fred.stlouisfed.org/data/SPDYNCBRTINLMY","doi":"","reported_estimate":"2024: crude birth rate 17.84 per 1,000; population 6,722,971,301; so about 119.9 million births a year in low- and middle-income countries.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"13","authors":"Congressional Budget Office","year":"2024","title":"Effects of the Immigration Surge on the Federal Budget and the Economy","venue":"CBO report (23 July 2024)","type":"government","url":"https://www.cbo.gov/publication/60569","doi":"","reported_estimate":"An extra 8.7 million net immigrants over 2021-26 lowers federal deficits by $0.9T over 2024-34 (revenues +$1.2T, mandatory outlays +$0.3T; discretionary about +$0.2T not included) and raises nominal GDP by $8.9T. CBO expects state and local costs to exceed revenues but did not estimate them. Points the same way as the open-borders case: more immigration lowers federal deficits.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"13","authors":"Cooperative Election Study team","year":"2025","title":"Cooperative Election Study 2024 Common Content","venue":"Harvard Dataverse, doi:10.7910/DVN/X11EP6","type":"working_paper","url":"https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/X11EP6","doi":"10.7910/DVN/X11EP6","reported_estimate":"79% of respondents backed increasing border patrols (as used for the former strict-border-controls entry). Cited for the opposite side of public opinion in selected_by.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"13","authors":"Clemens, M.A.; Pritchett, L.","year":"2019","title":"The New Economic Case for Migration Restrictions: An Assessment","venue":"Journal of Development Economics 138:153-164 (IZA DP 9730, 2016)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://docs.iza.org/dp9730.pdf","doi":"10.1016/j.jdeveco.2018.12.003","reported_estimate":"Calibrated model of productivity transmission, assimilation and congestion: 'On current evidence about the magnitudes of these parameters, dynamically efficient policy would not imply open borders but would imply relaxations on current restrictions.' Evidence that migrants carry large fractions of origin productivity is described as unsupported.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"No dollar BCR. It cuts both ways: it rejects large productivity transmission (supports using Borjas lambda <= 0.25) but also finds full open borders is not the efficient policy, so it bounds the policy from above rather than setting a number."},{"policy_id":"13","authors":"Moses, J.W.; Letnes, B.","year":"2004","title":"The Economic Costs to International Labor Restrictions: Revisiting the Empirical Discussion","venue":"World Development 32(10):1609-1626","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/wdevel/v32y2004i10p1609-1626.html","doi":"10.1016/j.worlddev.2004.05.007","reported_estimate":"Full removal 96.5% of world GDP with equal inherent productivity, 9.6% when poor-country migrants are assumed 1/5 (and 1/3) as productive (Table 5, as cited by Clemens 2011); 10% removal of wage gap $774bn/yr (Table 9). WIDER DP 2003/41 version: complete removal up to ~$3.4tn/yr. Article full text not accessed (paywalled); figures verified only via Clemens (2011) and the WIDER discussion paper.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Its headline figures enter through Clemens (2011) Tables 1-2; the 9.6% low-productivity case is a further downside check, not used separately to avoid double counting."},{"policy_id":"13","authors":"Klein, P.; Ventura, G.","year":"2009","title":"Productivity Differences and the Dynamic Effects of Labor Movements","venue":"Journal of Monetary Economics 56(8):1059-1073","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/moneco/v56y2009i8p1059-1073.html","doi":"10.1016/j.jmoneco.2009.10.011","reported_estimate":"Abstract: removing barriers yields 'large' output and welfare gains, applied to EU enlargement and a hypothetical North American common labour market. The steady-state world figure (122% of world GDP full removal; 20% and 10% for partial) is from Klein & Ventura (2007, B.E. J. Macro 7(1), doi 10.2202/1935-1690.1370) as reported by Clemens (2011).","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Regional transition-path application; exact numbers not accessed. World-level estimate already enters via Clemens (2011)."},{"policy_id":"13","authors":"Hall, J.B.","year":"2016","title":"Every Immigrant Without High School Degree Will Cost Taxpayers $640,000","venue":"Heritage Foundation commentary","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.heritage.org/immigration/commentary/every-immigrant-without-high-school-degree-will-cost-taxpayers-640000","doi":"","reported_estimate":"From the NAS report: 75-year NPV net fiscal cost of a nonelderly adult immigrant without a high school diploma = $231,000 (current plus second generation); about $640,000 in undiscounted future outlays (author's own extrapolation). Used as the fiscal saving in the strict-border case most favourable to restriction.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Argues the other way: a fiscal cost per low-skill immigrant. Used only in the strict-border mirror-image score, where under global accounting it does not change the sign; the open-borders range counts real output and moving costs, not fiscal transfers."},{"policy_id":"13","authors":"Stanford News Service (on Allen, Dobbin & Morten 2018 version)","year":"2018","title":"Border wall came at high cost, low benefit to U.S. workers, Stanford study finds","venue":"Stanford News (15 Nov 2018)","type":"media","url":"https://news.stanford.edu/2018/11/15/border-wall-came-high-cost-low-benefit-u-s-workers/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"2018 version: wall cost $2.3bn (about $7 per US resident); cut Mexican-born workers by 0.6% (about 83,000); low-skill US workers +$0.36/yr, high-skill -$4.35/yr; a 25% cut in US-Mexico trade costs would cut migration more and benefit workers in both countries.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Superseded by the 2024 revision of the border-wall study (Allen, Dobbin & Morten 2024), which is the version used in the strict-border mirror-image score; same sign."},{"policy_id":"14","authors":"Congressional Budget Office","year":"2022","title":"Costs of Suspending Student Loan Payments and Canceling Debt","venue":"CBO letter, Sept 26, 2022","type":"government","url":"https://www.cbo.gov/publication/58494","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Cancellation of up to $10,000 ($20,000 for Pell recipients) costs about $400bn in present value; payment pause Sept-Dec 2022 $20bn.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"14","authors":"Smetters, K.; Chen, J.","year":"2022","title":"Biden's Student Loan Forgiveness: Budgetary Costs and Distributional Impact","venue":"Penn Wharton Budget Model brief (Aug 26, 2022; corrected Oct 4, 2022)","type":"think_tank","url":"https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/issues/2022/8/26/biden-student-loan-forgiveness","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Cancellation $469-519bn over FY2022-31; with forbearance and new IDR ~$605bn static, >$1T with higher IDR take-up; about two-thirds of forgiveness benefits to households earning <=$88k; top 5% ~0%.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"14","authors":"Catherine, S.; Yannelis, C.","year":"2023","title":"The Distributional Effects of Student Loan Forgiveness","venue":"Journal of Financial Economics 147(2): 297-316","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w28175","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2022.10.003","reported_estimate":"Full or partial forgiveness is regressive in present value: the top decile benefits as much as the bottom three deciles combined; enrolling eligible households in income-driven repayment is cheapest and most progressive.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"14","authors":"Ballard, C. L.; Shoven, J. B.; Whalley, J.","year":"1985","title":"General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States","venue":"American Economic Review 75(1): 128-138","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v75y1985i1p128-38.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Marginal excess burden centres around 33 cents per $1 of revenue, range 17-56 cents (per Fullerton & Henderson 1987, NBER w2353).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"14","authors":"Feldstein, M.","year":"1999","title":"Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax","venue":"Review of Economics and Statistics 81(4): 674-680","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w5055","doi":"10.1162/003465399558391","reported_estimate":"Deadweight loss of nearly $2 per extra $1 of revenue from a proportional rise in all personal income tax rates.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"14","authors":"Supreme Court of the United States","year":"2023","title":"Biden v. Nebraska, No. 22-506","venue":"U.S. Supreme Court opinion (June 30, 2023)","type":"government","url":"https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/22-506_nmip.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"6-3: the HEROES Act does not authorise the roughly $430bn mass cancellation plan.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"14","authors":"Catherine, S.; Perez Clanton, M.; Yannelis, C.","year":"2024","title":"The Distributional Effects of Student Loan Forgiveness: An Update on SAVE and the COVID-19 Moratorium","venue":"National Tax Journal 77(3): 655-680","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/731537","doi":"10.1086/731537","reported_estimate":"Income-driven repayment expansions are more progressive than universal forgiveness but may raise moral hazard at the school level.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"14","authors":"Cooperative Election Study team","year":"2025","title":"Cooperative Election Study 2024 Common Content","venue":"Harvard Dataverse, doi:10.7910/DVN/X11EP6","type":"working_paper","url":"https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/X11EP6","doi":"10.7910/DVN/X11EP6","reported_estimate":"Item CC24_323f 'Forgive up to $20,000 of student loan debt for each person': 55.1% support (weighted by commonweight, researcher-computed from the CES microdata; ~60,000 respondents).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"14","authors":"U.S. Department of Education","year":"2024","title":"Student Debt Relief for the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program ... (notice of proposed rulemaking, 89 FR 27564, 17 April 2024), Regulatory Impact Analysis","venue":"Federal Register","type":"government","url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-04-17/html/2024-07726.htm","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Net budget impacts of the waivers sum to ~$147bn (e.g., $62.1bn, $27.2bn, $17.1bn, $13.8bn, $11.0bn, $8.6bn, $7.6bn); one-time administrative expenses ~$13.0m for systems and contractors plus $18.0m for assigned-loan waivers; paperwork compliance for guaranty agencies and commercial FFEL holders $12.06m (annualized, 2%); one-time federal admin $3.4m annualized.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"14","authors":"Chen, J.; Smetters, K. (Penn Wharton Budget Model)","year":"2023","title":"Biden's New Income-Driven Repayment ('SAVE') Plan: Budgetary Cost Estimate Update","venue":"Penn Wharton Budget Model (17 July 2023)","type":"think_tank","url":"https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/p/2023-07-17-bidens-new-income-driven-repayment-save-plan/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"SAVE 10-year cost: $342bn with no behavioural change; $391bn with a conservative borrowing increase; $475bn medium; $559bn with maximum borrowing increase; 'future student borrowers have the incentive to increase their federal student loan borrowing'.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"14","authors":"NBC Boston / CNBC (reporting Sallie Mae, How America Pays for College 2024)","year":"2024","title":"Student loan forgiveness expectations may fuel more borrowing, expert says","venue":"NBC Boston (CNBC)","type":"media","url":"https://www.nbcboston.com/news/business/money-report/student-loan-forgiveness-expectations-may-fuel-more-borrowing-expert-says/3466182/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"49% of families borrowed for college in 2023-24 (41% the year before); 48% of student borrowers expect their debt to be forgiven; the article notes no causal link has been established.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"14","authors":"Lucca, D. O.; Nadauld, T.; Shen, K.","year":"2019","title":"Credit Supply and the Rise in College Tuition: Evidence from the Expansion in Federal Student Aid Programs","venue":"Review of Financial Studies 32(2): 423-466 (FRBNY Staff Report 733)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr733","doi":"10.1093/rfs/hhy069","reported_estimate":"About 60 cents of each $1 increase in subsidised loan maximums passes through to tuition; used to describe where induced borrowing goes, not added separately.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"14","authors":"Dinerstein, M.; Earnest, S.; Koustas, D. K.; Yannelis, C.","year":"2025","title":"Student Loan Forgiveness","venue":"NBER Working Paper 33462 (February 2025, revised August 2025)","type":"working_paper","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w33462","doi":"10.3386/w33462","reported_estimate":"Abstract: $132bn of federal student loans cancelled from March 2021; other debt rose 9 cents per $1 forgiven; earnings and employment fell; MPC 0.27, MPE -0.49. Table 9: MPT (labour-tax change) -0.117 per $1 of annuitized shock (full sample), -0.088 without expectations adjustment, -0.239 six months after; p.39: 'this forgiveness reduced earnings by around $1.4 billion per year'; marginal tax rate assumed 24%.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"14","authors":"Di Maggio, M.; Kalda, A.; Yao, V.","year":"2020","title":"Second Chance: Life without Student Debt","venue":"NBER Working Paper 25810 (rev. March 2020)","type":"working_paper","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w25810","doi":"10.3386/w25810","reported_estimate":"Borrowers whose private student loans were voided (chain-of-title failures) cut debt 11%, had 24% fewer delinquent accounts, moved and changed jobs more, and earned about $3,000 more over three years.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Positive behavioural effects of relief, but from defaulted private loans of a small group via a legal accident, not a broad federal programme; the implied extra tax revenue is small relative to the cost, so it is noted but not added to the ratio."},{"policy_id":"14","authors":"Dinerstein, M.; Yannelis, C.; Chen, C.-T.","year":"2024","title":"Debt Moratoria: Evidence from Student Loan Forbearance","venue":"American Economic Review: Insights 6(2): 196-213","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/aeri.20230032","doi":"10.1257/aeri.20230032","reported_estimate":"The 2020 payment pause led borrowers to take on more mortgage, auto and card debt rather than avoid delinquency, concentrated among non-delinquent borrowers.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Evidence on the payment pause, not cancellation; suggests relief went mostly to already-solvent borrowers but gives no welfare number."},{"policy_id":"15","authors":"Social Security and Medicare Boards of Trustees","year":"2026","title":"Status of the Social Security and Medicare Programs: A Summary of the 2026 Annual Reports","venue":"Social Security Administration, Office of the Chief Actuary","type":"government","url":"https://www.ssa.gov/oact/TRSUM/index.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"OASDI 75-yr actuarial deficit 4.42% of taxable payroll; HI 0.56%; OASI depletion Q4 2032, OASDI Q3 2034 (83% payable), HI Q2 2033 (89% payable); OASDI annual deficit 0.8% of GDP in 2026 rising to 2.4% by 2085; 2026 OASDI cost $1,697bn (5.3% of GDP); Medicare 4.1% of GDP in 2026.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"15","authors":"Congressional Budget Office","year":"2012","title":"Raising the Ages of Eligibility for Medicare and Social Security","venue":"CBO Issue Brief, Jan 10, 2012","type":"government","url":"https://www.cbo.gov/publication/42683","doi":"","reported_estimate":"FRA 67 to 70 cuts Social Security spending ~13%; Medicare age 65 to 67 cuts Medicare ~5%; raising the FRA to 70 or early age to 64 enlarges workforce and economy by slightly more than 1% in the long term.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"15","authors":"Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget","year":"2012","title":"Raising Eligibility Ages Is Good for the Budget...and the Economy","venue":"CRFB blog (Jan 11, 2012)","type":"think_tank","url":"https://crfb.org/blogs/raising-eligibility-ages-good-budgetand-economy","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Reporting CBO: all three age changes make GDP about 2% larger by 2035 and 3% by 2060; revenue gain roughly 0.5% of GDP in 2035 per CBO's rule of thumb.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"15","authors":"Mastrobuoni, G.","year":"2009","title":"Labor supply effects of the recent social security benefit cuts: Empirical estimates using cohort discontinuities","venue":"Journal of Public Economics 93(11-12): 1224-1233","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://repository.essex.ac.uk/7527/","doi":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.07.009","reported_estimate":"Mean retirement age of affected cohorts rose by about half as much as the 1983-law increase in the normal retirement age.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"15","authors":"Ballard, C. L.; Shoven, J. B.; Whalley, J.","year":"1985","title":"General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States","venue":"American Economic Review 75(1): 128-138","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v75y1985i1p128-38.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Marginal excess burden centres around 33 cents per $1 of revenue (range 17-56 cents), per Fullerton & Henderson 1987 (NBER w2353).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"15","authors":"Feldstein, M.","year":"1999","title":"Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax","venue":"Review of Economics and Statistics 81(4): 674-680","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w5055","doi":"10.1162/003465399558391","reported_estimate":"Nearly $2 of deadweight loss per extra $1 of revenue from a proportional rise in income tax rates.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"15","authors":"YouGov for Blueprint and The Liberal Patriot","year":"2024","title":"TLP / Blueprint poll: Biden and Trump economic proposals","venue":"Blueprint (4,038 voters, Mar 29-Apr 5, 2024)","type":"media","url":"https://blueprint2024.com/polling/tlp-biden-trump-economics/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"'Protect Medicare and Social Security from funding cuts or increases in the age of eligibility': net support +72.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"15","authors":"General Social Survey / ISSP Role of Government (SDA codebook)","year":"2024","title":"AIDOLDGOVTS: government responsibility to provide a decent standard of living for the old","venue":"GSS cumulative codebook (UC Berkeley SDA)","type":"government","url":"https://sda.berkeley.edu/sdaweb/docs/gss24rel3/DOC/hcbk0223.htm","doi":"","reported_estimate":"46.2% definitely should, 41.3% probably should (87.5% total), pooled across years.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"15","authors":"Social Security Administration, Office of the Chief Actuary","year":"2026","title":"Administrative Expenses as a Percentage of Total Cost (OASI, DI, OASDI)","venue":"SSA OACT","type":"government","url":"https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/STATS/admin.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"CY2025 administrative expenses: OASDI $6,952m, 0.4% of total cost (OASI 0.3%, $4,308m; DI 1.6%, $2,644m).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"15","authors":"Congressional Research Service","year":"2026","title":"Medicare's Financial Status (R43122, updated 27 July 2026)","venue":"CRS","type":"government","url":"https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/2026-07-27_R43122_8dd6f85a239b62fe1b5c4bc6beeabd061d455f39.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Table 1: HI administrative expenses $5.9bn in CY2025 against total HI expenditures of $444.2bn (about 1.3%, calculated from the table).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"15","authors":"Engelhardt, G. V.; Gruber, J.","year":"2006","title":"Social Security and the Evolution of Elderly Poverty","venue":"In Auerbach, Card & Quigley (eds), Public Policy and the Income Distribution, Russell Sage Foundation (NBER w10466)","type":"book","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w10466","doi":"10.3386/w10466","reported_estimate":"Elasticity of elderly poverty with respect to Social Security benefits is roughly unitary; cutting benefits would significantly raise elderly poverty.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Measures a real benefit (poverty reduction) that a distribution-weighted analysis would add; the dashboard values transfers at $1 per $1 without weights, so it informs who_benefits rather than the ratio."},{"policy_id":"16","authors":"Zucman, G.","year":"2024","title":"A blueprint for a coordinated minimum effective taxation standard for ultra-high-net-worth individuals","venue":"Report commissioned by the Brazilian G20 presidency, EU Tax Observatory (25 June 2024)","type":"working_paper","url":"https://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/report-g20.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"About 2,800 billionaires owned $14.2 trillion in 2024 (Forbes); their current individual tax is equivalent to 0.3% of wealth, so a perfectly enforced 2% minimum tax raises their payments by 1.7% of wealth. Revenue (Table 1, 2024): $242bn with perfect enforcement, $193bn if 20% is lost to avoidance and evasion ('$200-$250 billion per year ... from about 3,000 taxpayers'). Billionaires' pre-tax real return has averaged 7.5% a year; the tax would cut their net-of-tax return from 7.2% to 5.5%. The report states that the impact on global growth 'is unlikely to be large' but gives no quantified estimate.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"16","authors":"Feldstein, M.","year":"1999","title":"Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax","venue":"Review of Economics and Statistics 81(4): 674-680","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w5055","doi":"10.1162/003465399558391","reported_estimate":"'A marginal increase in tax revenue achieved by a proportional rise in all personal income tax rates involves a deadweight loss of nearly two dollars per incremental dollar of revenue.'","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"16","authors":"Ballard, C. L.; Shoven, J. B.; Whalley, J.","year":"1985","title":"General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States","venue":"American Economic Review 75(1): 128-138","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v75y1985i1p128-38.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"'The marginal welfare loss to consumers from raising an additional dollar of revenue is in the range of 34 cents to 48 cents.'","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"16","authors":"Huntley, J.; Ricco, J. (Penn Wharton Budget Model)","year":"2021","title":"Budgetary and Economic Effects of Senator Elizabeth Warren's Wealth Tax Legislation","venue":"Penn Wharton Budget Model brief (15 March 2021)","type":"think_tank","url":"https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/issues/2021/3/15/budgetary-effects-of-senator-warren-wealth-tax","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Ultra-Millionaire Tax Act of 2021 (2% on net worth above $50 million, 3% above $1 billion; $10bn a year of extra IRS funding, 70% for the wealth tax): conventional revenue including enforcement $2,390bn over 2022-2031; dynamic (with macroeconomic feedback) $2,025bn; dynamic revenue in 2031 $245bn. Revenue used for deficit reduction: GDP -0.6% in 2031 and -1.2% in 2050; capital stock -1.4% (2031) and -3.1% (2050); average hourly wage -0.7% and -1.2%. Semi-elasticity of taxable wealth -13.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"16","authors":"Ricco, J.; He, Z.; Huntley, J. (Penn Wharton Budget Model)","year":"2019","title":"Senator Elizabeth Warren's Wealth Tax: Projected Budgetary and Economic Effects","venue":"Penn Wharton Budget Model brief (12 December 2019)","type":"think_tank","url":"https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/issues/2019/12/12/senator-elizabeth-warrens-wealth-tax-projected-budgetary-and-economic-effects","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Campaign plan (2% above $50m, 6% above $1bn): revenue $2.7T conventional, $2.3T dynamic, $4.8T with no avoidance and $1.4T with 'extreme avoidance' (2021-2030). GDP in 2050 -0.9% if revenue reduces deficits; -1.1% to -2.1% if spent on public investment, depending on its productivity; wages -0.8% to -2.3%. Table A1: published semi-elasticities of taxable wealth range from -0.17 (Seim) to -40.5 (Brülhart et al.); weighted average -13.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"16","authors":"Advani, A.; Tarrant, H.","year":"2021","title":"Behavioural responses to a wealth tax","venue":"Fiscal Studies 42(3-4): 509-537","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/112695/1/1475_5890.12283.pdf","doi":"10.1111/1475-5890.12283","reported_estimate":"Estimates of the elasticity of taxable wealth 'vary by a factor of 800'. Reconciling the literature, 'a well-designed wealth tax would reduce the tax base by 7-17 per cent if levied at a tax rate of 1 per cent.'","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"16","authors":"Brülhart, M.; Gruber, J.; Krapf, M.; Schmidheiny, K.","year":"2022","title":"Behavioral Responses to Wealth Taxes: Evidence from Switzerland","venue":"American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 14(4): 111-150","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pol.20200258","doi":"10.1257/pol.20200258","reported_estimate":"A 1 percentage point drop in a canton's wealth tax rate raises reported taxable wealth by at least 43% after 6 years; 24% of the effect arises from taxpayer mobility and 21% from a concurrent rise in housing prices; savings responses explain at most a small fraction of the rest, suggesting sizable evasion where financial wealth is not third-party reported.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"16","authors":"Jakobsen, K.; Jakobsen, K.; Kleven, H.; Zucman, G.","year":"2020","title":"Wealth Taxation and Wealth Accumulation: Theory and Evidence from Denmark","venue":"Quarterly Journal of Economics 135(1): 329-388","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.econ.ku.dk/cebi/news/JJKZ_QJE_Aug2019.pdf","doi":"10.1093/qje/qjz032","reported_estimate":"Danish 1989 reform (marginal wealth tax cut from 2.2% to 1%): taxable wealth rose 19% after 8 years for the moderately wealthy and 31% for the very wealthy; simulated 30-year effects 30% and 65%. Long-run elasticity of taxable wealth with respect to the after-tax rate of return 0.77 (moderately wealthy) and 1.15 (very wealthy); estimates capture real and avoidance responses.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"16","authors":"Trabandt, M.; Uhlig, H.","year":"2011","title":"The Laffer curve revisited","venue":"Journal of Monetary Economics 58(4): 305-327 (NBER WP 15343)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w15343","doi":"10.1016/j.jmoneco.2011.07.003","reported_estimate":"Neoclassical growth model: in the steady state 51% of a capital tax cut is self-financing in the US model and 79% in the EU-14 (32% and 54% for labour taxes). The US can raise revenue by at most 6% by raising capital income taxes. 'A permanent surprise increase in capital taxes always raises tax revenues' once transition effects are counted.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"16","authors":"Advani, A.; Chamberlain, E.; Summers, A.","year":"2020","title":"A wealth tax for the UK: Wealth Tax Commission Final Report","venue":"Wealth Tax Commission (LSE International Inequalities Institute, CAGE Warwick, Economic and Social Research Council)","type":"working_paper","url":"https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/centres/cage/news/a-wealth-tax-for-the-uk.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Tables 5 and 6 (from Advani, Hughson and Tarrant 2020), one-off 5% tax: cost to government 0.4%-1.4% of revenue (1.4% at a GBP 10m threshold); Burgherr (2020) central estimate 1% at all thresholds; cost to taxpayers (valuation, filing, disputes) 0.05%-0.13% of taxable assets (0.06% at GBP 10m). Ireland's 1970s wealth tax had operating costs equal to one-quarter of revenue (Sandford and Morrissey 1985). PAYE costs 0.8% of revenue to administer, self-assessment income tax 2%.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"16","authors":"OECD","year":"2018","title":"The Role and Design of Net Wealth Taxes in the OECD","venue":"OECD Tax Policy Studies No. 26, OECD Publishing, Paris","type":"intl_org","url":"https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2018/04/the-role-and-design-of-net-wealth-taxes-in-the-oecd_g1g89919/9789264290303-en.pdf","doi":"10.1787/9789264290303-en","reported_estimate":"12 OECD countries had net wealth taxes in 1990, only 4 in 2017; repeals were justified by efficiency and administrative concerns, capital flight and high cost-yield ratios. Revenues in 2016 ranged from 0.2% of GDP (Spain) to 1.0% (Switzerland). No quantified administration cost is given.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"16","authors":"G20 Finance Ministers","year":"2024","title":"The Rio de Janeiro G20 Ministerial Declaration on International Tax Cooperation","venue":"G20 Brazil presidency, 26 July 2024 (text via 'The World and Japan' database)","type":"government","url":"https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/G20/20240726.D3E.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"'With full respect to tax sovereignty, we will seek to engage cooperatively to ensure that ultra-high-net-worth individuals are effectively taxed.' No binding commitment to a minimum tax.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"16","authors":"Ipsos for Earth4All and the Global Commons Alliance","year":"2024","title":"Tax the rich, say a majority of adults across 17 G20 countries surveyed","venue":"Earth4All news release, 24 June 2024","type":"media","url":"https://earth4all.life/news/tax-the-rich-say-g20-citizens/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"68% across 17 G20 countries back a wealth tax on wealthy people to fund major changes to the economy and lifestyles; 11% opposed. United States 67%, France 67%, Germany 68%; highest Indonesia 86%, lowest Saudi Arabia and Argentina 54%.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"16","authors":"Saez, E.; Zucman, G.","year":"2019","title":"Progressive Wealth Taxation","venue":"Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2019: 437-533","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Saez-Zuchman-final-draft.pdf","doi":"10.1353/eca.2019.0017","reported_estimate":"Revenue scoring assumes the wealthy hide 15% of wealth. Long-run elasticity of the billionaire tax base equals the average years fortunes have been taxed (eT = 15 for the Forbes 400); long-run revenue-maximising billionaire wealth tax around 6.25%. Bunching studies (Seim 2017) find a 1% wealth tax cuts reported wealth by only 0.2%; Colombia 2-3%.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"16","authors":"Scheuer, F.; Slemrod, J.","year":"2021","title":"Taxing Our Wealth","venue":"Journal of Economic Perspectives 35(1): 207-230","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.35.1.207","doi":"10.1257/jep.35.1.207","reported_estimate":"A dozen OECD countries levied wealth taxes in the recent past; only three retain them. Behavioural responses (saving, portfolio change, avoidance, evasion) are sometimes but not always substantial and depend on the breadth of the base and enforcement; US proposals differ from any previous wealth tax.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"16","authors":"Broughel, J.; Viscusi, W.K.","year":"2017","title":"Death by Regulation: How Regulations Can Increase Mortality Risk (research summary)","venue":"Mercatus Center at George Mason University","type":"working_paper","url":"https://mercatus.org/media/65351/download","doi":"","reported_estimate":"About one statistical death per $99.3m of cost imposed (range $75.4m-$123.2m), through lower income. Used by the dashboard's lost-income mortality step (not opened in this pass; same citation as the other entries).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"16","authors":"Londoño-Vélez, J.; Ávila-Mahecha, J.","year":"2024","title":"Behavioral Responses to Wealth Taxation: Evidence from Colombia","venue":"NBER Working Paper 32134","type":"working_paper","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w32134","doi":"10.3386/w32134","reported_estimate":"p.12: bunching elasticity of reported wealth with respect to the net-of-tax rate of 2 (s.e. 0.35) at the 2010 exemption notch; 3.125 with the pre-reform counterfactual, 4.0 by difference-in-differences (Table 2); p.1-2 and p.13: 'Colombia instantly loses up to 20% of the anticipated revenue increase due to taxpayers' immediate response'; responses driven by misreporting non-third-party-reported assets and hiding assets in tax havens.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"16","authors":"Guvenen, F.; Kambourov, G.; Kuruscu, B.; Ocampo, S.; Chen, D.","year":"2023","title":"Use It or Lose It: Efficiency and Redistributional Effects of Wealth Taxation","venue":"Quarterly Journal of Economics 138(2): 835-894 (Minneapolis Fed WP 764)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/working-papers/use-it-or-lose-it-efficiency-and-redistributional-effects-of-wealth-taxation","doi":"10.1093/qje/qjac047","reported_estimate":"With persistent heterogeneity in returns, replacing the capital income tax with a wealth tax in a revenue-neutral way shifts the burden to unproductive entrepreneurs, raises aggregate productivity and output and 'delivers a significantly higher average welfare'; the optimal wealth tax is positive.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Studies a revenue-neutral swap that replaces the capital income tax, not a new tax added on top of existing ones; under the minimum-tax design, billionaires' income taxes stay in place. It shows the low end could be too low if a wealth tax replaced capital income taxes."},{"policy_id":"16","authors":"Seim, D.","year":"2017","title":"Behavioral Responses to Wealth Taxes: Evidence from Sweden","venue":"American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 9(4): 395-421","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pol.20150290","doi":"10.1257/pol.20150290","reported_estimate":"Net-of-tax-rate elasticities of taxable wealth 0.09-0.27 (bunching); about a third due to underreporting; responses reflect evasion and avoidance rather than changes in saving.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Bunching estimates capture only responses near the exemption threshold and are argued to understate the full response (Saez and Zucman 2019; Advani and Tarrant 2021); the reconciled 7-17% range of Advani and Tarrant is used instead. It points to a higher ratio than the high end."},{"policy_id":"16","authors":"Li, H.; Smith, K. (Tax Foundation)","year":"2020","title":"Analysis of Sen. Warren and Sen. Sanders' Wealth Tax Plans","venue":"Tax Foundation Fiscal Report (28 January 2020)","type":"think_tank","url":"https://taxfoundation.org/research/all/federal/wealth-tax/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"After macroeconomic feedback, Warren's plan raises about $2.2T and Sanders' $2.6T over 2020-2029; long-run GDP -0.37% (Warren) and -0.43% (Sanders); US wealth permanently -7.19% and -10.21%, replaced by foreign inflows; uses the Warren campaign's -8 semi-elasticity.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Assumes an almost completely open economy in which foreign capital replaces lost US saving, so its GDP loss is smaller than Penn Wharton's; a coordinated global tax leaves no outside capital to fill the gap. Less aggressive than the cost used."},{"policy_id":"17","authors":"Congressional Budget Office","year":"2020","title":"How CBO Analyzes the Costs of Proposals for Single-Payer Health Care Systems That Are Based on Medicare's Fee-for-Service Program (Working Paper 2020-08)","venue":"CBO Working Paper 2020-08 (10 Dec 2020)","type":"government","url":"https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56811","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Across five illustrative single-payer options in 2030: national health expenditures change by -$0.7T to +$0.3T; federal subsidies rise by $1.5T to $3.0T; coverage nearly universal.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"17","authors":"Blahous, C.","year":"2018","title":"The Costs of a National Single-Payer Healthcare System","venue":"Mercatus Center Working Paper (30 July 2018)","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.mercatus.org/research/working-papers/costs-national-single-payer-healthcare-system","doi":"","reported_estimate":"M4A (S. 1804) adds about $32.6T in federal spending 2022-31 (10.7% of GDP in 2022, about 12.7% in 2031); assumes provider payments more than 40% below private rates; doubling all projected federal income-tax revenue would be insufficient.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"17","authors":"Blahous, C.","year":"2021","title":"Understanding CBO's Medicare for All Cost Estimates","venue":"Mercatus Center Policy Brief (12 April 2021)","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.mercatus.org/research/policy-briefs/understanding-cbos-medicare-all-cost-estimates","doi":"","reported_estimate":"CBO Option 5 (closest to current proposals) raises federal costs about $3.0T in 2030; Option 3 $1.77T, Option 4 $2.40T; 2030 NHE baseline $6.6T; demand rises about 11-12% under both CBO and Blahous.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"17","authors":"Blumberg, L.J.; Holahan, J.; Buettgens, M. et al. (Urban Institute, with Commonwealth Fund)","year":"2019","title":"Comparing Health Insurance Reform Options: From 'Building on the ACA' to Single Payer","venue":"Urban Institute / Commonwealth Fund (16 Oct 2019)","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.commonwealthfund.org/press-release/2019/new-analysis-projects-cost-coverage-impacts-single-payer-plan-and-other-health","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Enhanced single payer: covers everyone; national health spending +$720bn in 2020; federal spending +$2.8T in 2020, $34T over 10 years. Single-payer 'lite': national spending -$209.5bn (-6%), federal +$1.5T in 2020.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"17","authors":"Galvani, A.P.; Parpia, A.S.; Foster, E.M.; Singer, B.H.; Fitzpatrick, M.C.","year":"2020","title":"Improving the prognosis of health care in the USA","venue":"The Lancet 395(10223):524-533","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(19)33019-3","doi":"10.1016/S0140-6736(19)33019-3","reported_estimate":"Single payer (S. 1804) saves about 13% of national health expenditure, more than $450bn a year (2017 USD), and prevents more than 68,000 deaths and 1.73 million life-years lost a year.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"17","authors":"Miller, S.; Johnson, N.; Wherry, L.R.","year":"2021","title":"Medicaid and Mortality: New Evidence from Linked Survey and Administrative Data","venue":"Quarterly Journal of Economics 136(3):1783-1829","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w26081","doi":"10.1093/qje/qjab004","reported_estimate":"ACA Medicaid expansions cut annual mortality among affected near-elderly adults by 0.132 percentage points (9.4%); CBPP summary: at least 19,200 deaths averted among 55-64-year-olds in expansion states 2014-17.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"17","authors":"Ballard, C. L.; Shoven, J. B.; Whalley, J.","year":"1985","title":"General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States","venue":"American Economic Review 75(1): 128-138","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v75y1985i1p128-38.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Marginal welfare loss from raising an additional $1 of revenue is 34-48 cents; 34 cents used here.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"17","authors":"Institute for Clinical and Economic Review","year":"2023","title":"2023 Value Assessment Framework","venue":"ICER","type":"think_tank","url":"https://icer.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/ICER_2023_VAF_For-Publication_092523.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Health-benefit price benchmarks set at $100,000 and $150,000 per QALY or evLYG gained; used to value life-years.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"17","authors":"Council of Economic Advisers","year":"2018","title":"The Opportunity Costs of Socialism","venue":"Executive Office of the President","type":"government","url":"https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/The-Opportunity-Costs-of-Socialism.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"If 'Medicare for All' were financed through higher taxes, 'GDP would fall by 9 percent, or about $7,000 per person in 2022'; programme financed with about $2.4T in 2022; funding it from existing spending would require cutting more than half the federal budget.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"17","authors":"U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis via Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED)","year":"2026","title":"Gross Domestic Product, annual (GDPA)","venue":"FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis","type":"government","url":"https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDPA","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Nominal GDP 2025: $30,861.3bn.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"17","authors":"Moir, M.; Barua, B.","year":"2024","title":"The Private Cost of Public Queues for Medically Necessary Care, 2024","venue":"Fraser Institute (2 May 2024)","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/private-cost-of-public-queues-for-medically-necessary-care-2024","doi":"","reported_estimate":"1,209,194 Canadians waiting for treatment in 2023; lost time valued at almost C$3.5bn (about C$2,871 each) counting working hours only, or C$10.6bn (about C$8,730 each) counting all hours except eight hours of sleep a night.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"17","authors":"Moir, M.; Barua, B.","year":"2024","title":"Waiting Your Turn: Wait Times for Health Care in Canada, 2024 Report","venue":"Fraser Institute (12 Dec 2024)","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/waiting-your-turn-wait-times-for-health-care-in-canada-2024","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Median wait from GP referral to treatment 30.0 weeks in 2024 (27.7 in 2023; 9.3 in 1993, 222% longer now); about 1.5 million procedures awaited.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"17","authors":"Blahous, C.","year":"2019","title":"Testimony before the House Committee on Rules, Hearing on H.R. 1384, the Medicare for All Act of 2019 (30 April 2019)","venue":"U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Rules","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/109356/witnesses/HHRG-116-RU00-Wstate-BlahousC-20190430.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Added federal costs $32.6-38.8T over 2022-31; the $32.6T lower bound assumes savings 'without regard for any accompanying adverse effects this might have on health care access, timeliness or quality'; first-dollar coverage induces 11% additional demand for the privately insured and 16% for the uninsured; lowering provider payments to Medicare rates saves $5.307T; 'We do not know how providers would respond to payment reductions of this magnitude'.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"17","authors":"World Bank via Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED); U.S. Census Bureau via FRED; Board of Governors via FRED","year":"2026","title":"Population, Total for Canada (POPTOTCAA647NWDB); Population (POPTHM); Canada / U.S. Foreign Exchange Rate, annual (AEXCAUS)","venue":"FRED","type":"government","url":"https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/AEXCAUS","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Canada population 2023: 40,049,088; US population Aug 2026: 343,008 thousand; 2025 average exchange rate 1.3973 Canadian dollars per US dollar.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"17","authors":"Broughel, J.; Viscusi, W.K.","year":"2017","title":"Death by Regulation: How Regulations Can Increase Mortality Risk (research summary)","venue":"Mercatus Center at George Mason University","type":"working_paper","url":"https://mercatus.org/media/65351/download","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Regulations costing more than $99.3 million per life saved can be expected to increase mortality risk (range $75.4m-$123.2m): about one statistical death per $99.3m of cost imposed, through lower income and private health spending.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"17","authors":"Trabandt, M.; Uhlig, H.","year":"2012","title":"How Do Laffer Curves Differ Across Countries?","venue":"Federal Reserve Board IFDP 1048 (NBER WP 17862); in Alesina & Giavazzi (eds.), Fiscal Policy after the Financial Crisis, 2013","type":"working_paper","url":"https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2012/1048/ifdp1048.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Table 7 (2010 calibration): maximum additional tax revenue at the peak of the Laffer curve, as a share of baseline GDP: US 7.3% (labour taxes), 2.3% (capital), 7.4% (both); EU-14 3.0%, 0.9%, 3.1%.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"17","authors":"Feldstein, M.","year":"1999","title":"Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax","venue":"Review of Economics and Statistics 81(4): 674-680","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w5055","doi":"10.1162/003465399558391","reported_estimate":"'The relative deadweight loss caused by increasing existing tax rates is substantially greater and may exceed $2 per $1 of revenue.'","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"17","authors":"Browning, E.K.","year":"1987","title":"On the Marginal Welfare Cost of Taxation","venue":"American Economic Review 77(1):11-23","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v77y1987i1p11-23.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"'MWC can vary from under 10 percent to more than 300 percent of marginal tax revenue.'","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"17","authors":"Finkelstein, A.; Taubman, S.; Wright, B.; et al. (Oregon Health Study Group)","year":"2012","title":"The Oregon Health Insurance Experiment: Evidence from the First Year","venue":"Quarterly Journal of Economics 127(3):1057-1106 (NBER WP 17190)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w17190","doi":"10.3386/w17190","reported_estimate":"Lottery-based RCT: Medicaid raised insurance by about 25 pp, raised use of care, and cut out-of-pocket costs and medical debt; better self-reported health. Later follow-up (Baicker et al. 2013) found no significant change in measured physical-health markers over two years.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Randomized evidence on covering low-income adults, not a cost estimate for single payer. It suggests mortality gains as large as Galvani's are uncertain; used as context only."},{"policy_id":"18","authors":"Henderson, D.R.","year":"2019","title":"Universal Basic Income, In Perspective","venue":"Hoover Institution (Defining Ideas)","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.hoover.org/research/universal-basic-income-perspective","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Yang $1,000/month per adult ~ $2.544T/yr (56% increase in federal spending; ~74% tax increase); $10,000/yr variant adds ~$1.07T net; high implicit marginal tax rates for $15k-$55k earners.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"18","authors":"Hendren, N.; Sprung-Keyser, B.","year":"2020","title":"A Unified Welfare Analysis of Government Policies","venue":"Quarterly Journal of Economics 135(3):1209-1318","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://academic.oup.com/qje/article/135/3/1209/5781614","doi":"10.1093/qje/qjaa006","reported_estimate":"MVPFs for 133 US policies: Negative Income Tax experiment MVPF = -0.01 (partly due to reduced earnings of children in adulthood, per Price & Song 2018); tax credits and cash welfare to low-income households range from negative values to 1.20 (EITC 1.12-1.20); unemployment insurance 0.43-1.03; housing vouchers 0.65-0.91.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"18","authors":"Ortiz, I.; Behrendt, C.; Acuña-Ulate, A.; Nguyen, Q.A.","year":"2018","title":"Universal Basic Income proposals in light of ILO standards: Key issues and global costing (ESS Working Paper No. 62)","venue":"International Labour Office, Social Protection Department","type":"intl_org","url":"https://www.ilo.org/media/413276/download","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Global UBI at the national poverty line costs on average 39.4% of GDP (all persons at 100%) or 32.7% (children at 50%); low-income countries 62.3-79.1% of GDP; high-income countries 27.4-29.9%.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"18","authors":"Visual Capitalist (citing IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2023)","year":"2023","title":"Visualizing the $105 Trillion World Economy in One Chart","venue":"Visual Capitalist, summarising IMF WEO April 2023","type":"media","url":"https://www.visualcapitalist.com/visualizing-the-105-trillion-world-economy-in-one-chart/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"World GDP ~ $105 trillion in 2023 (IMF WEO April 2023 projection).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"18","authors":"Feldstein, M.","year":"1999","title":"Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax","venue":"Review of Economics and Statistics 81(4): 674-680","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w5055","doi":"10.1162/003465399558391","reported_estimate":"Deadweight loss could be as much as 30% of revenue; 'A marginal increase in tax revenue achieved by a proportional rise in all personal income tax rates involves a deadweight loss of nearly two dollars per incremental dollar of revenue.' Used as the high excess-burden case for financing a UBI.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"18","authors":"Ballard, C. L.; Shoven, J. B.; Whalley, J.","year":"1985","title":"General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States","venue":"American Economic Review 75(1): 128-138","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v75y1985i1p128-38.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"CGE model of the US tax system: 'The marginal welfare loss to consumers from raising an additional dollar of revenue is in the range of 34 cents to 48 cents' (working-paper abstract). Used as the low (mainstream) excess-burden case.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"18","authors":"Daruich, D.; Fernández, R.","year":"2020","title":"Universal Basic Income: A Dynamic Assessment (NBER WP 27351; published AER 114(1), 2024)","venue":"NBER Working Paper 27351","type":"working_paper","url":"https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w27351/revisions/w27351.rev0.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"GE-OLG model with human capital: a labour-tax-financed UBI ($5,500 per adult, 2000 dollars, in the WP version) raises the average labour tax from 22% to ~27.8%; steady-state GDP falls 12.9% (capital stock -20.2%); 'all future generations ... would be willing to sacrifice over 9% of consumption' to avoid it, though current adults gain 1.2%.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"18","authors":"Gilberstadt, H. (Pew Research Center)","year":"2020","title":"More Americans oppose than favor the government providing a universal basic income for all adult citizens","venue":"Pew Research Center Short Reads (19 Aug 2020)","type":"media","url":"https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/08/19/more-americans-oppose-than-favor-the-government-providing-a-universal-basic-income-for-all-adult-citizens/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Public support 45%: 45% favour vs 54% oppose a federal $1,000/month guaranteed income for all adult citizens (American Trends Panel, n=11,001, 27 Jul-2 Aug 2020); Democrats 66% favour, Republicans 78% oppose.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"18","authors":"Basic Income Earth Network (reporting Dalia Research)","year":"2017","title":"Survey of 11,000 Europeans finds 68% would vote for basic income","venue":"BIEN News (1 May 2017)","type":"media","url":"https://basicincome.org/news/2017/05/survey-of-11000-europeans-finds-68-would-vote-for-basic-income/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Public support 68%: 68% of 11,021 respondents aged 14-65 in all 28 EU states (March 2017) would vote for a basic income in a referendum, up from 64% in 2016; 24% against; MoE +/-1.1%.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"18","authors":"GiveDirectly","year":"2024","title":"Where your donations go","venue":"GiveDirectly","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.givedirectly.org/where-your-donations-go","doi":"","reported_estimate":"'In the last 3 years, 74% of dollars went to our large transfer programs, where ~80% was delivered as cash, with the rest covering the cost of getting it there'; Mozambique start-up ~60% efficiency, later USAID programmes ~75%.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"18","authors":"GiveWell","year":"2020","title":"GiveDirectly (November 2020 version)","venue":"GiveWell","type":"think_tank","url":"https://givewell.org/node/3473","doi":"","reported_estimate":"'The proportion of total expenses that GiveDirectly has delivered directly to recipients is approximately 83% overall.'","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"18","authors":"Caldes, N.; Coady, D.; Maluccio, J. A.","year":"2004","title":"The Cost of Poverty Alleviation Transfer Programs: A Comparative Analysis of Three Programs in Latin America (FCND Discussion Paper 174; published in World Development 34(5), 2006)","venue":"IFPRI FCND Discussion Paper / World Development","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/16007/files/dp04174b.pdf","doi":"10.1016/j.worlddev.2005.10.003","reported_estimate":"Steady-state cost-transfer ratios (non-transfer cost per unit transferred): PROGRESA 0.041, PRAF 0.068, RPS 0.212; programme-life averages including set-up: PROGRESA 0.106, PRAF 0.499, RPS 0.629.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"18","authors":"Vivalt, E.; Rhodes, E.; Bartik, A. W.; Broockman, D. E.; Miller, S.","year":"2024","title":"The Employment Effects of a Guaranteed Income: Experimental Evidence from Two U.S. States (NBER Working Paper 32719)","venue":"NBER Working Paper 32719","type":"working_paper","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w32719","doi":"10.3386/w32719","reported_estimate":"1,000 treated receive $1,000/month vs 2,000 controls at $50/month for three years: individual income excluding transfers -$1,900/yr (preferred); household income excluding transfers -$4,215/yr (raw survey) or -$3,228 (adjusted); 'For every dollar received, total household income excluding the transfers fell by about 28 cents, and total individual income fell by around 16 cents'; participation -4.2 points; partners reduce hours about as much as participants.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"18","authors":"Trabandt, M.; Uhlig, H.","year":"2012","title":"How Do Laffer Curves Differ Across Countries?","venue":"Federal Reserve Board IFDP 1048 (NBER WP 17862); in Alesina & Giavazzi (eds.), Fiscal Policy after the Financial Crisis, 2013","type":"working_paper","url":"https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2012/1048/ifdp1048.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Table 7 (2010 calibration): maximum additional tax revenue at the peak of the Laffer curve, as a share of baseline GDP: US 7.3% (labour taxes), 2.3% (capital), 7.4% (both); EU-14 3.0%, 0.9%, 3.1%.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"18","authors":"Browning, E.K.","year":"1987","title":"On the Marginal Welfare Cost of Taxation","venue":"American Economic Review 77(1):11-23","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v77y1987i1p11-23.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"'MWC can vary from under 10 percent to more than 300 percent of marginal tax revenue.'","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"18","authors":"Jones, D.; Marinescu, I.","year":"2022","title":"The Labor Market Impacts of Universal and Permanent Cash Transfers: Evidence from the Alaska Permanent Fund","venue":"American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 14(2): 315-340","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pol.20190299","doi":"10.1257/pol.20190299","reported_estimate":"Abstract (p.315): 'the dividend had no effect on employment and increased part-time work by 1.8 percentage points (17 percent)'; 'a universal and permanent cash transfer does not significantly decrease aggregate employment'; cites an income effect of about -0.1 from the NIT experiments and lottery studies.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"18","authors":"VATT Institute for Economic Research; Kela (Hamalainen, K. et al.)","year":"2020","title":"Results of the basic income experiment: small employment effects, better perceived economic security and mental wellbeing","venue":"VATT / Finnish Ministry of Social Affairs and Health press release on final evaluation","type":"government","url":"https://vatt.fi/en/-/results-of-the-basic-income-experiment-small-employment-effects-better-perceived-economic-security-and-mental-wellbeing","doi":"","reported_estimate":"2017-18 pilot (unemployed recipients): ~6 more days employed in Nov 2017-Oct 2018 vs controls (78 days avg); small employment effect; better self-reported wellbeing.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Two-year pilot for 2,000 unemployed people with no tax financing; says nothing about labour supply or tax costs of a universal program."},{"policy_id":"18","authors":"Egger, D.; Haushofer, J.; Miguel, E.; Niehaus, P.; Walker, M.W.","year":"2022","title":"General Equilibrium Effects of Cash Transfers: Experimental Evidence From Kenya","venue":"Econometrica 90(6)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.3982/ECTA17945","doi":"10.3982/ECTA17945","reported_estimate":"~$1,000 transfers to 10,500 households (15% of local GDP): local transfer multiplier ~2.4, minimal inflation, large spillovers to non-recipients -- counter-evidence for low-income settings.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Local spending multiplier of a one-off, donor-funded transfer in poor Kenyan villages; not a welfare BCR and not a permanent tax-financed universal payment."},{"policy_id":"18","authors":"Banerjee, A.; Faye, M.; Krueger, A.; Niehaus, P.; Suri, T.","year":"2023","title":"Universal Basic Income: Short-Term Results from a Long-Term Experiment in Kenya","venue":"Working paper (15 Sept 2023), NBER conference draft","type":"working_paper","url":"https://conference.nber.org/conf_papers/f192616.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"GiveDirectly UBI RCT in 295 villages (about 23,000 adults treated): $0.75/day per adult for 12 years (long-term arm), 2 years (short-term) or about $500 lump sum. After about 2 years: enterprises +14%, net enterprise revenues +52%; no fall in total household labour (shift from wage work to self-employment); consumption +5% (n.s.); depression down in all arms; lump sum had economic effects as large or larger. No formal cost-benefit analysis.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Donor-funded transfers into very poor Kenyan villages, with no tax financing and no excess burden. It shows that UBI-style payments do not cut work in that setting, but it is not a tax-financed global programme."},{"policy_id":"19","authors":"Muralidharan, K.; Niehaus, P.; Sukhtankar, S.","year":"2025","title":"Identity Verification Standards in Welfare Programs: Experimental Evidence from India","venue":"Review of Economics and Statistics 107(2): 372-392 (NBER Working Paper 26744, 2020)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w26744","doi":"10.1162/rest_a_01296","reported_estimate":"Randomized rollout of mandatory Aadhaar-based biometric authentication (ABBA) in Jharkhand's food-ration program: 'leakage increased insignificantly by Rs. 14 per ration card x month'; ABBA 'did not decrease (and if anything slightly increased) government spending'; 'overall transaction costs across the government, dealers, and beneficiaries increased by Rs. 13.6 per ration card per month ... a non-trivial 7.8% increase'; beneficiaries' own costs +Rs 7 (17% of control mean); unseeded households lost Rs 49/month (12.6%); nearly 300,000 people lost access to benefits. Biometric (Aadhaar) verification reforms in India's PDS reduced corruption but 1.5-2 million beneficiaries lost access at some point; adverse effects driven mainly by how the transition was managed.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"19","authors":"World Bank ID4D","year":"2019","title":"Identification for Development (ID4D) overview brochure","venue":"World Bank","type":"intl_org","url":"https://id4d.worldbank.org/sites/id4d.worldbank.org/files/2019-05/ID4D_Overview_Brochure_English_20190508.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"~40% of adults 15+ in surveyed low-income countries lack ID; 45% of poorest quintile vs 28% richest; 45% of women vs 30% of men; robust ID systems 'have the potential to produce substantial savings in the public sector' (no dollar figure)","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"19","authors":"Harper, J.","year":"2018","title":"The New National ID Systems (Policy Analysis No. 831)","venue":"Cato Institute","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/new-national-id-systems","doi":"","reported_estimate":"National ID infrastructure (REAL ID, E-Verify, facial recognition) enables government tracking; California REAL ID compliance >= $220m initial; Pennsylvania $27m year one then $17-20m/yr","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"19","authors":"Hancock, A.","year":"2024","title":"Digital ID Isn't for Everybody, and That's Okay","venue":"Electronic Frontier Foundation Deeplinks (25 Sept 2024)","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/09/digital-id-isnt-everybody-and-thats-okay","doi":"","reported_estimate":"","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"19","authors":"United Nations DESA","year":"2022","title":"World population to reach 8 billion on 15 November 2022","venue":"United Nations press release","type":"intl_org","url":"https://www.un.org/en/desa/world-population-reach-8-billion-15-november-2022","doi":"","reported_estimate":"World population reached 8 billion on 15 November 2022.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"19","authors":"Muralidharan, K.; Niehaus, P.; Sukhtankar, S.","year":"2016","title":"Building State Capacity: Evidence from Biometric Smartcards in India","venue":"American Economic Review 106(10):2895-2929","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v106y2016i10p2895-2929.html","doi":"10.1257/aer.20141346","reported_estimate":"RCT across 157 subdistricts (19m people): 'the investment was cost-effective, as time savings to NREGS beneficiaries alone were equal to the cost of the intervention'; NREGS beneficiary time savings $4.3m vs government cost of implementation and operation $4.1m; NREGS leakage reduction $32.8m a year (eight times cost); SSP leakage reduction $3.3m a year vs $2.3m cost.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"19","authors":"Office for Budget Responsibility (reported by The Register)","year":"2025","title":"UK digital ID plan gets a price tag at last - £1.8B","venue":"The Register (28 Nov 2025), reporting OBR Economic and Fiscal Outlook","type":"media","url":"https://www.theregister.com/2025/11/28/digital_id_cost/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"OBR provisional forecast: national digital ID costs £1.8bn over three years (£0.5bn resource, £1.3bn capital), about £0.6bn a year; no offsetting savings yet identified; target to issue IDs to all legal residents by Aug 2029.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"19","authors":"YouGov","year":"2025","title":"Do you support or oppose the proposal to introduce a digital ID card system in Britain?","venue":"YouGov daily results (26 Sept 2025)","type":"media","url":"https://yougov.com/en-gb/daily-results/20250926-aaac5-1","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Public support 42%: 14% strongly and 28% somewhat support; 15% somewhat and 30% strongly oppose (45% oppose); 14% don't know; n=4,920 GB adults.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"19","authors":"UKAuthority","year":"2026","title":"Government drops mandatory digital ID for right to work","venue":"UKAuthority (14 Jan 2026)","type":"media","url":"https://www.ukauthority.com/articles/government-drops-mandatory-digital-id-for-right-to-work","doi":"","reported_estimate":"UK government abandoned compulsory digital ID for right-to-work checks; refocus on voluntary use for public services; OBR cost up to £1.8bn over 3 years disputed by government.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"19","authors":"ITV News","year":"2026","title":"Burnham to scrap digital ID to focus on cost of living in 'reset of priorities'","venue":"ITV News (July 2026)","type":"media","url":"https://www.itv.com/news/2026-07-18/burnham-to-scrap-digital-id-to-focus-on-cost-of-living-in-reset-of-priorities","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Incoming PM Andy Burnham to scrap the UK all-adult digital ID programme; support had collapsed after the 2025 announcement and right-to-work use had already been made voluntary.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"19","authors":"World Bank (Koshy, T.; Jayaram, P.; Menon, R.; Jain, N.; Prajapat, U. [Ernst & Young]; Chandra, K.)","year":"2018","title":"Understanding Cost Drivers of Identification Systems","venue":"World Bank ID4D","type":"intl_org","url":"https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/702641544730830097/pdf/Understanding-Cost-Drivers-of-Identification-Systems.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Citing Gelb & Diofasi Metz (2018): building a foundational ID likely costs a low-income country ~0.6% of GDP; enrolment and credential issuance ~$4-11 per registrant; recurrent costs ~0.06-0.1% of GDP in a few countries; staff often >80% of annual costs; Aadhaar iris capture added ~Rs 4.40 ($0.06) per enrolment.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"19","authors":"Visual Capitalist (citing IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2023)","year":"2023","title":"Visualizing the $105 Trillion World Economy in One Chart","venue":"Visual Capitalist","type":"media","url":"https://www.visualcapitalist.com/visualizing-the-105-trillion-world-economy-in-one-chart/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"World GDP about $105 trillion in 2023 (IMF WEO April 2023).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"19","authors":"Unique Identification Authority of India (Ministry of Electronics & IT), Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 4373","year":"2017","title":"Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 4373, answered on 29 March 2017 (expenditure on UID scheme and Aadhaar generated)","venue":"Lok Sabha, Government of India","type":"government","url":"https://www.uidai.gov.in/images/loksabha/LS_USQ_4373_answered_on_29032017.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"'Total expenditure incurred under UID scheme since inception upto 28th February, 2017 is Rs. 8,537.92 Crores'; 'As on 15th March 2017, a total of 112.78 crore Aadhaar have been generated' (Rs 75.7 per Aadhaar, build and running costs together).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"19","authors":"Gelb, A.; Clark, J.","year":"2013","title":"Identification for Development: The Biometrics Revolution (Working Paper 315)","venue":"Center for Global Development Working Paper 315","type":"working_paper","url":"https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/1426862_file_Biometric_ID_for_Development.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"p.17: unit cost of national ID schemes in poor countries 'typically around US$5 per head'; fn 31: unit cost estimates for the UK's abortive ID card US$150-600 per head (BBC 2009).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"19","authors":"Gelb, A. (Center for Global Development)","year":"2016","title":"ID4Africa 2016 presentation: modelling the costs of an ID system; investment and steady-state costs; financing models (RENIEC, Peru)","venue":"ID4Africa 2016 Annual Meeting, Kigali","type":"think_tank","url":"https://id4africa.com/2016/presentations/2-4-1_Center_for_Global_Development_Alan_Gelb.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Enrolment $3-6 per person (Aadhaar low-cost $1.16); low-income model (40m people): investment $7 per person (0.5% of GDP), steady state $1.42 per person registered, $29m = 0.11% of GDP; 'Model 1. Covered by budget allocations - Most common model'; RENIEC (Peru) budget $130m, $4 per head, 0.065% of GDP, 15% from the state, 85% from charges to businesses and individuals.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"19","authors":"National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (Macro/Finance Group)","year":"2012","title":"A cost-benefit analysis of Aadhaar","venue":"NIPFP, New Delhi (9 November 2012)","type":"government","url":"https://macrofinance.nipfp.org.in/releases/uid_cba.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Table 1 (p.16, Rs crore, constant prices, 2010-11 to 2020-21): total cost 37,187 (270 rising to 4,835 a year); total benefit 109,806 (leakage reductions in PDS, MNREGS, fertiliser, LPG and other schemes, 7-12% leakage assumed); real IRR 52.85%. Benefit-cost ratio computed here: 2.95 undiscounted, 2.55 at 8%. Benefits are fiscal savings to government; gains to the wider economy set to zero.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"19","authors":"White, O.; Madgavkar, A.; Manyika, J.; Mahajan, D.; Bughin, J.; McCarthy, M.; Sperling, O.","year":"2019","title":"Digital identification: A key to inclusive growth","venue":"McKinsey Global Institute","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/tech-and-ai/our-insights/digital-identification-a-key-to-inclusive-growth","doi":"","reported_estimate":"'Good' digital ID (consent-based, privacy-protecting) could unlock value equal to 3-13% of GDP by 2030 (~6% emerging, ~3% mature economies); ~1bn people lack legal ID; risks include surveillance and exclusion (contrasting positive estimate)","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Consultancy projection of potential value from consent-based, privacy-protecting 'good' ID; not an evaluation of a mandate."},{"policy_id":"19","authors":"Government of India, Ministry of Finance (PIB), citing BlueKraft Digital Foundation","year":"2025","title":"India's DBT: Boosting Welfare Efficiency","venue":"Press Information Bureau (21 April 2025)","type":"government","url":"https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2123192&reg=48&lang=2","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Cumulative leakage savings of ~Rs 3.48 lakh crore (2009-2024) from Aadhaar-linked Direct Benefit Transfer; assessment is correlational, not causal (contrasting positive estimate)","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Government claim of cumulative leakage savings that is correlational, not causal, and largely counts transfers."},{"policy_id":"19","authors":"Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra)","year":"2008","title":"Synthesis report on the findings from Defra's pre-feasibility study into personal carbon trading","venue":"Defra (April 2008)","type":"government","url":"https://www.flemingpolicycentre.org.uk/Synthesis.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Additional annual benefit per participant £0-£6.90 (0-5% response) or £0-£13.80 (0-10%) vs additional cost £30.50-£73.63 (central £52.07); 'in the central case the costs are fifteen times the benefits... even in the most optimistic case... 4.5 times'; set-up £700m-£2bn, running £1-2bn/yr vs upstream trading £50-100m set-up, ~£50m/yr running.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Covers personal carbon-allowance tracking, a carbon-tracking use of an ID system that is not part of the new policy definition (a plain digital ID mandate). Kept as an alternative framing: Defra's own appraisal gives benefit/cost of 0.07 central and 0.22 at best for that use."},{"policy_id":"20","authors":"Congressional Budget Office","year":"2022","title":"Estimated Budgetary Effects of Public Law 117-169, to Provide for Reconciliation Pursuant to Title II of S. Con. Res. 14","venue":"CBO cost estimate (7 Sept 2022)","type":"government","url":"https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2022-09/PL117-169_9-7-22.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Sec. 11001 drug price negotiation: -$98.5bn deficit effect 2022-2031; Sec. 11004 implementation funding $3.0bn budget authority (2022), $2.845bn outlays 2022-31.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"20","authors":"Congressional Budget Office","year":"2023","title":"How CBO Estimated the Budgetary Impact of Key Prescription Drug Provisions in the 2022 Reconciliation Act","venue":"CBO report (Feb 2023)","type":"government","url":"https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2023-02/58850-IRA-Drug-Provs.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Negotiation reduces the deficit by $25bn in 2031 (Part D -$14bn, Part B -$9bn, other -$1bn); manufacturers will set higher launch prices; enrollees will use more drugs and fewer Part A/B services.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"20","authors":"Congressional Budget Office (Swagel, P.)","year":"2023","title":"Letter to Chairman Jodey Arrington and Rep. Michael Burgess on the effects of P.L. 117-169 on new drug development","venue":"CBO letter (21 Dec 2023)","type":"government","url":"https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2023-12/59792-Letter.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Over the next 30 years, 13 fewer new drugs (of about 1,300) will come to market because of the law, about 1%; global revenues from new drugs fall 1-3%.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"20","authors":"Dubois, P.; de Mouzon, O.; Scott Morton, F.; Seabright, P.","year":"2015","title":"Market Size and Pharmaceutical Innovation","venue":"RAND Journal of Economics 46(4):844-871","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.tse-fr.eu/articles/market-size-and-pharmaceutical-innovation","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12113","reported_estimate":"Elasticity of innovation with respect to expected market size = 0.23; about $2.5bn of additional revenue is needed to support one new chemical entity.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"20","authors":"Cogan, J.F.; Heil, D.; Mulligan, C.B.","year":"2025","title":"Medicare Drug Price Regulation: Small Savings, Large Innovation Losses","venue":"Hoover Institution (March 2025)","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.hoover.org/research/medicare-drug-price-regulation-small-savings-large-innovation-losses","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Fully phased-in IRA: Medicare spending -1.1% after manufacturers' price response (-2.3% before); brand revenue -$10.9bn/yr (with response) or -$24.1bn (without); annual social cost of lost innovation $196.3bn (Philipson method) or $4.5bn (Mulligan method) with response; Part D households save about $51-65/yr.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"20","authors":"Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services","year":"2025","title":"Agency Information Collection Activities: Drug Price Negotiation for Initial Price Applicability Year 2028 (CMS-10849; OMB 0938-1452)","venue":"Federal Register (public inspection 2025-20748)","type":"government","url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-20748.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Affected public: private sector; 405 respondents; total annual hours 47,620; no dollar cost stated.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"20","authors":"Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services","year":"2023","title":"Agency Information Collection Activities: Negotiation Data Elements and Drug Price Negotiation Process (CMS-10847)","venue":"Federal Register 88 FR (3 July 2023), doc. 2023-14176","type":"government","url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2023-07-03/pdf/2023-14176.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"CMS-10847: 3,300 respondents, 3,000 annual responses, 17,000 total annual hours (manufacturers and the public).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"20","authors":"Chandra, A.; Flack, E.; Obermeyer, Z.","year":"2024","title":"The Health Costs of Cost Sharing","venue":"Quarterly Journal of Economics 139(4):2037-2082 (NBER WP 28439)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w28439","doi":"10.1093/qje/qjae015","reported_estimate":"'Those facing smaller budgets consume fewer drugs and die more: 0.0164 percentage points per month (13.9%) for each $100 per month budget decrease (24.4%).' Cost-sharing makes patients miss opportunities to buy health at about $11,321 per life-year.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"20","authors":"Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services","year":"2024","title":"Negotiated prices for initial price applicability year 2026 (fact sheet and infographic)","venue":"CMS","type":"government","url":"https://www.cms.gov/files/document/infographic-negotiated-prices-maximum-fair-prices.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"'$1.5 Billion in estimated out-of-pocket savings in 2026 for people with Medicare prescription drug plans'; $6bn (22%) lower net spending had prices applied in 2023.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"20","authors":"Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services","year":"2025","title":"Negotiated prices for initial price applicability year 2027 (fact sheet)","venue":"CMS","type":"government","url":"https://www.cms.gov/files/document/fact-sheet-negotiated-prices-ipay-2027.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Net savings about $8.5bn (36%) including coverage-gap spending; enrollees 'would save ... an estimated $685 million in out-of-pocket costs'.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"20","authors":"Chicago Policy Review","year":"2024","title":"The Future of Medicare Drug Price Negotiation and Pharmaceutical Innovation","venue":"Chicago Policy Review (22 Jan 2024)","type":"media","url":"https://chicagopolicyreview.org/2024/01/22/the-future-of-medicare-drug-price-negotiation-and-pharmaceutical-innovation/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Contrasts CBO's about 13 fewer of 1,300 drugs over 30 years with Philipson's much larger industry-linked estimates (e.g., 79 fewer small-molecule drugs over 20 years, 116m life-years), noting the latter is partly PhRMA-funded.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Secondary summary; the underlying CBO and Philipson figures are cited directly."},{"policy_id":"20","authors":"Philipson, T.J.; Durie, T. (UChicago EC-CHC)","year":"2021","title":"Issue Brief: The Impact of HR 5376 on Biopharmaceutical Innovation and Patient Health","venue":"University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute / EC-CHC (30 Nov 2021)","type":"think_tank","url":"https://ecchc.economics.uchicago.edu/2021/11/30/issue-brief-the-impact-of-hr-5376-on-biopharmaceutical-innovation-and-patient-health","doi":"","reported_estimate":"H.R. 5376 drug-pricing provisions cut industry revenue 12.0% through 2039 and R&D about 18.5% ($663bn), giving 135 fewer new drugs and 331.5 million US life-years lost.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Lost-innovation estimate about ten times CBO's projection; the same Hoover paper's own (Mulligan) method is used for the low end."},{"policy_id":"21","authors":"Patenaude, B.; Sriudomporn, S.; Mak, J.","year":"2023","title":"Sustainable Development Goal Halftime Project: Benefit-Cost Analysis Using Methods from the Decade of Vaccine Economics Model","venue":"Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis 14(S1): 136-180","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/jbcoan/v14y2023is1p136-180_6.html","doi":"10.1017/bca.2023.11","reported_estimate":"80 LMICs, 9 vaccines, 2023-2030: total costs US$7,581,837,329; VSLY benefits US$762,172,371,554; BCR 100.53","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"21","authors":"Copenhagen Consensus Center","year":"2025","title":"Best Things First: The 12 most efficient solutions for the world's poorest (folded leaflet, web version)","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center","type":"think_tank","url":"https://copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/2025-10/BTF%20Folded%20Leaflet%20WEB.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Childhood immunization BCR 101; $1.7bn/yr (incl. $0.2bn parents' time); ~523,000 lives saved per year","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"21","authors":"Ozawa, S.; Clark, S.; Portnoy, A.; Grewal, S.; Brenzel, L.; Walker, D.G.","year":"2016","title":"Return On Investment From Childhood Immunization In Low- And Middle-Income Countries, 2011-20","venue":"Health Affairs 35(2): 199-207","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/10.1377/hlthaff.2015.1086","doi":"10.1377/hlthaff.2015.1086","reported_estimate":"Net return about 16 times cost (cost-of-illness; benefit-cost ratio about 17) and 44 times cost (full-income approach; ratio about 45), 94 LMICs, 10 vaccines","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"21","authors":"Sim, S.Y.; Watts, E.; Constenla, D.; Brenzel, L.; Patenaude, B.N.","year":"2020","title":"Return On Investment From Immunization Against 10 Pathogens In 94 Low- And Middle-Income Countries, 2011-30","venue":"Health Affairs 39(8): 1343-1353","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/10.1377/hlthaff.2020.00103","doi":"10.1377/hlthaff.2020.00103","reported_estimate":"ROI (cost of illness) 26.1 (2011-20) and 19.8 (2021-30); ROI (value of statistical life) 51.0 and 52.2","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"21","authors":"Copenhagen Consensus Center (Post-2015 Consensus expert panel)","year":"2015","title":"Post-2015 Consensus: smart development goals (presentation of benefit per dollar by target)","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center","type":"think_tank","url":"https://copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/post-2015_presentation_3.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Health: Expanded immunization $60 per $1 (panel figure)","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"21","authors":"Jamison, D.T.; Jha, P.; Laxminarayan, R.; Ord, T.","year":"2012","title":"Infectious Disease, Injury, and Reproductive Health (Copenhagen Consensus 2012 Challenge Paper)","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center; also in Lomborg (ed.), Global Problems, Smart Solutions (Cambridge University Press, 2013)","type":"think_tank","url":"https://copenhagenconsensus.com/publication/third-copenhagen-consensus-infectious-disease-assessment-jamison-jha-et-al","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Immunization expansion BCR 20","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"21","authors":"GiveWell","year":"2025","title":"Our Top Charities","venue":"GiveWell","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.givewell.org/charities/top-charities","doi":"","reported_estimate":"New Incentives (cash incentives for routine vaccination, Nigeria): about $146 to vaccinate an infant; about $4,500 per life saved (2022-24 grants)","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"21","authors":"WHO; UNICEF","year":"2025","title":"Global childhood vaccination holds steady, yet over 14 million infants remain unvaccinated (WUENIC 2024 estimates)","venue":"UNICEF/WHO press release","type":"intl_org","url":"https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/global-childhood-vaccination-holds-steady-yet-over-14-million-infants-remain","doi":"","reported_estimate":"2024: DTP3 85%, DTP1 89%, 14.3M zero-dose infants; MCV1 84%, MCV2 76%","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"21","authors":"Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance","year":"2024","title":"Gavi Alliance 2023 Annual Financial Report","venue":"Gavi (Geneva)","type":"intl_org","url":"https://www.gavi.org/sites/default/files/2024-06/Gavi-Alliance-2023-Annual-Financial-Report.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Gavi-Core 2023: direct country programme expenses US$2,025m; Secretariat programme implementation US$86m; partners' programme implementation US$209m; overhead (management, general and fundraising) US$65m. Overhead 2.73% and operating expenses 6.83% of total expenses (2022: 2.86% and 7.61%). Non-direct spending (86+209+65 = 360) is 17.8% of direct country programme expenses; Secretariat implementation plus overhead (151) is 7.5%.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"21","authors":"Ballard, C. L.; Shoven, J. B.; Whalley, J.","year":"1985","title":"General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States","venue":"American Economic Review 75(1): 128-138","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v75y1985i1p128-38.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Marginal excess burden centres around 33 cents per $1 of revenue, range 17-56 cents (per Fullerton & Henderson 1987, NBER w2353).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"21","authors":"Feldstein, M.","year":"1999","title":"Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax","venue":"Review of Economics and Statistics 81(4): 674-680","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w5055","doi":"10.1162/003465399558391","reported_estimate":"Deadweight loss of nearly $2 per extra $1 of revenue from a proportional rise in all personal income tax rates.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"21","authors":"Carrico, J.; La, E.M.; Talbird, S.E.; et al.","year":"2022","title":"Value of the Immunization Program for Children in the 2017 US Birth Cohort","venue":"Pediatrics 150(3): e2021056007","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://publications.aap.org/pediatrics/article/150/3/e2021056007/188497/Value-of-the-Immunization-Program-for-Children-in","doi":"10.1542/peds.2021-056007","reported_estimate":"US programme: cost $8.5bn; averted costs $63.6bn; BCR 7.5 societal, 2.8 payer","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Rich-country programme with low child mortality; this policy is an aid-funded LMIC scale-up, so it does not set the range. It confirms benefits exceed costs even in the US."},{"policy_id":"21","authors":"Zhou, F.; Jatlaoui, T.C.; Leidner, A.J.; et al.","year":"2024","title":"Health and Economic Benefits of Routine Childhood Immunizations in the Era of the Vaccines for Children Program - United States, 1994-2023","venue":"MMWR 73(31): 682-685","type":"government","url":"https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/73/wr/mm7331a2.htm","doi":"10.15585/mmwr.mm7331a2","reported_estimate":"BCR 3.3 (payer) and 10.9 (societal) for US cohorts 1994-2023","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"US setting, not the LMIC aid programme being ranked. The payer-only 3.3 also excludes non-medical benefits."},{"policy_id":"22","authors":"Copenhagen Consensus Center (Post-2015 Consensus expert panel)","year":"2015","title":"Post-2015 Consensus: smart development goals (presentation of benefit per dollar by target)","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center","type":"think_tank","url":"https://copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/post-2015_presentation_3.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Health: Aspirin heart attack therapy $63; High blood pressure medication $47; Stroke/heart attack pill $7 per $1 (panel figures)","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"22","authors":"Nugent, R.","year":"2015","title":"Post-2015 Consensus: Health Perspective - Non-Communicable Diseases","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center (Post-2015 Consensus perspective paper)","type":"think_tank","url":"https://copenhagenconsensus.com/publication/post-2015-consensus-health-perspective-non-communicable-diseases-nugent","doi":"","reported_estimate":"BCRs (3% discount; DALY $1,000 / $5,000): aspirin for AMI 31/153; hypertension management 7/34; secondary prevention of CVD 3/17; salt reduction 19/95; tobacco tax 10/52; package 9/44; ~$8.5bn/yr for five interventions","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"22","authors":"Watkins, D.; Ahmed, S.; Pickersgill, S.","year":"2023","title":"Best Investments in Chronic, Noncommunicable Disease Prevention and Control in Low- and Lower-Middle-Income Countries","venue":"Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis 14(S1): 255-271","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/jbcoan/v14y2023is1p255-271_10.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Aspirin for suspected heart attack is a 'best investment' (BCR > 15) in both LICs and LMCs; CVD primary prevention and chronic heart-failure treatment also > 15 in LMCs; best-investment package costs US$19bn 2023-2030 (~US$2.4bn/yr), averts 12m deaths, BCR 23; all 30 NCD interventions BCR 4.1; 8% discount","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"22","authors":"World Health Organization","year":"2018","title":"Saving lives, spending less: a strategic response to noncommunicable diseases (WHO/NMH/NVI/18.8)","venue":"WHO","type":"intl_org","url":"https://alertas.directoriolegislativo.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/WHO-NMH-NVI-18.8-eng.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Drug therapy for cardiovascular disease (manage CVD and diabetes): return US$3.29 per US$1 by 2030 in LLMICs (economic benefits only); full Best Buy package US$1.27 per person per year, at least US$7 per $1, 8.2M lives saved by 2030","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"22","authors":"Bertram, M.Y.; et al.","year":"2018","title":"Investing in non-communicable diseases: an estimation of the return on investment for prevention and treatment services","venue":"The Lancet 391(10134): 2071-2078","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(18)30665-2","doi":"10.1016/S0140-6736(18)30665-2","reported_estimate":"Peer-reviewed ROI methodology underlying WHO's 2018 Best Buy returns (cited in WHO 2018)","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"22","authors":"Nugent, R.; Brouwer, E.","year":"2015","title":"Economic Benefit-Cost Analysis of Select Secondary Prevention Interventions in LMIC","venue":"Global Heart 10(4): 319-321","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://rti.org/publication/economic-benefit-cost-analysis-select-secondary-prevention-interventions-lmic","doi":"10.1016/j.gheart.2015.09.002","reported_estimate":"Benefit-cost ratio of 7:1 for tobacco taxation (50% reduction in use) combined with 70% coverage of high-risk populations with a multidrug regimen","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"22","authors":"Moran, A.E.; Farrell, M.; Cazabon, D.; Garg, R.; et al.","year":"2022","title":"Building the health-economic case for scaling up the WHO-HEARTS hypertension control package in low- and middle-income countries","venue":"Revista Panamericana de Salud Publica 46: e140","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.rti.org/publication/building-health-economic-case-scaling-who-hearts-hypertension-control-package-low-and","doi":"10.26633/RPSP.2022.140","reported_estimate":"HEARTS package costs about US$18-44 per person treated per year; interventions are cost-saving or cost-effective","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"22","authors":"Yusuf, S.; Joseph, P.; Dans, A.; et al. (TIPS-3 Investigators)","year":"2021","title":"Polypill with or without Aspirin in Persons without Cardiovascular Disease","venue":"New England Journal of Medicine 384: 216-228","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMoa2028220","doi":"10.1056/NEJMoa2028220","reported_estimate":"Polypill + aspirin vs placebo HR 0.69 (95% CI 0.50-0.97); polypill alone HR 0.79 (0.63-1.00); 43% non-adherence by end (as reported by TCTMD)","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"22","authors":"Executive Boards of UNDP/UNFPA/UNOPS, UNICEF and UN-Women","year":"2018","title":"Joint comprehensive proposal on the cost-recovery policy (DP/FPA-ICEF-UNW/2018/1)","venue":"United Nations","type":"intl_org","url":"https://aa.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/board-documents/main-document/EN-Joint_report_on_cost_recovery.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Harmonized standard cost-recovery (indirect cost) rate of 8 per cent on other-resources (earmarked donor) contributions; 7 per cent for thematic contributions.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"22","authors":"World Health Organization; United Nations Development Programme","year":"2019","title":"Non-communicable disease prevention and control: a guidance note for investment cases (WHO/NMH/NMA/18.97)","venue":"WHO/UNDP (UN Interagency Task Force on NCDs)","type":"intl_org","url":"https://www.unnutrition.org/wp-content/uploads/NCD-investment-case-guidance-note-2019.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"In WHO NCD return-on-investment cases, clinical interventions are costed as drug/supply costs plus related health-system costs; policy interventions are costed as 'programme costs, defined as costs incurred at the administrative level outside the point of delivery' (OneHealth Tool / WHO NCD Costing Tool).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"22","authors":"Disease Control Priorities (Watkins, D.A.; et al.)","year":"2023","title":"CCC replication repository: new_inputs/PINandCosts0625.csv; '3. Cost calcs_bca.Rmd'; '4. BCR tables and figures.R'; Figures/clinical_full_2023_2030*.csv","venue":"GitHub (Disease-Control-Priorities/CCC)","type":"working_paper","url":"https://github.com/Disease-Control-Priorities/CCC","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Clinical unit costs carry a 'Cost adjustment' multiplier of 1.17 (community platform), 1.25658 (health centre) or 1.48824 (first-level hospital), i.e. a 17% above-facility markup plus ancillary costs; intersectoral policies carry 1.0. Policy unit costs per capita (2017 US$): tobacco tax 0.004, alcohol tax 0.004, salt policy 0.0351. PV 2023-30 at 8% (LIC+LMC): tobacco tax gross benefits $51.31bn, incremental cost $0.0453bn, forgone surplus $0.462bn; alcohol tax $2.935bn, $0.0286bn, $0.0264bn; salt $15.61bn, $0.414bn, $0.0156bn. Code sets forgone surplus = 0.9% (tobacco/alcohol) and 0.1% (salt) of gross benefits.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"22","authors":"Disease Control Priorities (Watkins, D.A.; Pickersgill, S.; et al.)","year":"2023","title":"CCC replication repository: output/cost_outputs.csv (deaths averted by intervention, year and income group, 2022-2030)","venue":"GitHub (Disease-Control-Priorities/ccc)","type":"working_paper","url":"https://github.com/Disease-Control-Priorities/ccc/blob/main/output/cost_outputs.csv","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Deaths averted (column Deaths.avert), LICs + LMCs, summed 2023-2030: tobacco excise tax 1,553,547; alcohol excise tax 72,253; CVD primary prevention (LMCs) 6,606,272; chronic heart-failure treatment (LMCs) 2,405,984; aspirin for suspected heart attack 23,591. In 2030 (full implementation): tobacco tax 425,916; alcohol tax 17,298. The best-investment interventions (14 in LMCs, 6 in LICs) sum to 12.1m deaths averted over 2023-2030, matching the 12 million in Watkins et al. (2023) Table 2.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"22","authors":"Ballard, C. L.; Shoven, J. B.; Whalley, J.","year":"1985","title":"General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States","venue":"American Economic Review 75(1): 128-138","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v75y1985i1p128-38.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Marginal excess burden centres around 33 cents per $1 of revenue, range 17-56 cents (per Fullerton & Henderson 1987, NBER w2353).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"22","authors":"Feldstein, M.","year":"1999","title":"Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax","venue":"Review of Economics and Statistics 81(4): 674-680","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w5055","doi":"10.1162/003465399558391","reported_estimate":"Deadweight loss of nearly $2 per extra $1 of revenue from a proportional rise in all personal income tax rates.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"22","authors":"Nugent, R.","year":"2015","title":"Post-2015 Consensus: Health Perspective - Non-Communicable Diseases","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center (Post-2015 Consensus perspective paper)","type":"think_tank","url":"https://copenhagenconsensus.com/publication/post-2015-consensus-health-perspective-non-communicable-diseases-nugent","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Aspirin for AMI BCR 153 at $5,000 per DALY","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Uses a $5,000 DALY value and 3% discount, well above the CCC 2023 values (US$995-4,440 per DALY, 8% discount), so it is not used as the high end; the panel's 63 is used instead."},{"policy_id":"23","authors":"Shretta, R.; Anye, R.N.","year":"2023","title":"An Investment Case for the Scale-up and Use of Insecticide-Treated Nets Halfway into the SDG Targets","venue":"Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis 14(S1): 16-54","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-benefit-cost-analysis/article/an-investment-case-for-the-scaleup-and-use-of-insecticidetreated-nets-halfway-into-the-sdg-targets/6D7B343AD211E9DC2684689965F6868A","doi":"","reported_estimate":"10-pp LLIN scale-up, 29 African countries: cost $5.7bn PV 2023-2030 (8%); 1,337,069 deaths averted; benefits $275.4bn; BCR 48","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"23","authors":"Copenhagen Consensus Center","year":"2025","title":"Best Things First: The 12 most efficient solutions for the world's poorest (folded leaflet, web version)","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center","type":"think_tank","url":"https://copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/2025-10/BTF%20Folded%20Leaflet%20WEB.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Malaria BCR 48; $1.1bn/yr; ~167,000 lives saved/yr; $10bn/yr from avoided sick days and healthcare costs","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"23","authors":"Copenhagen Consensus Center (Post-2015 Consensus expert panel)","year":"2015","title":"Post-2015 Consensus: smart development goals (presentation of benefit per dollar by target)","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center","type":"think_tank","url":"https://copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/post-2015_presentation_3.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Health: Halve malaria infections $36 per $1 (panel figure)","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"23","authors":"Jamison, D.T.; Jha, P.; Laxminarayan, R.; Ord, T.","year":"2012","title":"Infectious Disease, Injury, and Reproductive Health (Copenhagen Consensus 2012 Challenge Paper)","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center; also in Lomborg (ed.), Global Problems, Smart Solutions (CUP 2013)","type":"think_tank","url":"https://copenhagenconsensus.com/publication/third-copenhagen-consensus-infectious-disease-assessment-jamison-jha-et-al","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Malaria ACT subsidy: $300M/yr, ~300,000 child deaths averted, BCR 35","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"23","authors":"Hallett, T.B.; Menzies, N.A.; Resch, S.; Pretorius, C.; Stover, J.; Su, J.S.; Winskill, P.; et al.","year":"2025","title":"The case for optimal investment in combating HIV, tuberculosis, and malaria: a global modelling study","venue":"The Lancet 406(10500): 261-270","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/cid/publications/case-optimal-investment-combating-hiv-tuberculosis-and-malaria-global","doi":"10.1016/S0140-6736(25)00831-1","reported_estimate":"2027-29 need $140.6bn; 23M lives saved, 400M cases/infections averted; up to $19 intrinsic health value or $3.50 direct economic benefit per $1","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"23","authors":"GiveWell","year":"2025","title":"Our Top Charities","venue":"GiveWell","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.givewell.org/charities/top-charities","doi":"","reported_estimate":"SMC (Malaria Consortium): ~$7 per child protected, ~$4,000 per life saved; ITNs (AMF): ~$6 per net, ~$5,500 per life saved (2022-24 grants)","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"23","authors":"ACCESS-SMC Partnership","year":"2020","title":"Effectiveness of seasonal malaria chemoprevention at scale in west and central Africa: an observational study","venue":"The Lancet 396(10265): 1829-1840","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)32227-3","doi":"10.1016/S0140-6736(20)32227-3","reported_estimate":"Protective effectiveness 88.2% (95% CI 78.7-93.4) within 28 days of SMC; 3.65M (2015) and 7.55M (2016) children treated in 7 countries; ~US$3.63 per child (as summarised by 2 Minute Medicine)","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"23","authors":"World Health Organization","year":"2025","title":"World Malaria Report 2025: partner briefing","venue":"WHO Global Malaria Programme","type":"intl_org","url":"https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/malaria/world-malaria-reports/world-malaria-report-2025-partner-briefing-eng.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"2024 funding US$3.9bn vs 2025 GTS target US$9.3bn (shortfall ~US$5.4bn, 42% attained); SMC 54M children per cycle in 2024 (up from 170,000 in 2012); 14M deaths averted 2000-2024","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"23","authors":"Sarma, N.; Patouillard, E.; Cibulskis, R.E.; Arcand, J.-L.","year":"2019","title":"The Economic Burden of Malaria: Revisiting the Evidence","venue":"American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene 101(6): 1405-1415","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.ajtmh.org/view/journals/tpmd/101/6/article-p1405.xml","doi":"10.4269/ajtmh.19-0386","reported_estimate":"10% fall in malaria incidence -> +0.27% GDP per capita level; larger gains in poorer, high-burden countries","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"23","authors":"Bhatt, S.; Weiss, D.J.; Cameron, E.; et al.","year":"2015","title":"The effect of malaria control on Plasmodium falciparum in Africa between 2000 and 2015","venue":"Nature 526: 207-211","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nature.com/articles/nature15535","doi":"10.1038/nature15535","reported_estimate":"Interventions averted ~663M clinical cases 2000-2015; ITNs contributed 68%","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"23","authors":"The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria","year":"2025","title":"Annual Financial Report 2024","venue":"The Global Fund (Geneva)","type":"intl_org","url":"https://archive.theglobalfund.org/media/sqilcy4b/archive_2024-annual-financial_report_en.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Operating expenses US$410m (2024), US$400m (2023), US$374m (2022) against grant expenditure of US$6,155m, US$4,460m and US$4,576m; 'Operating costs, at spot rate, as a percentage of total expenditure decreased to 6% in 2024 (2023: 8%)'. Opex as a share of grant expenditure: 6.7% (2024), 9.0% (2023), 7.8% (2022-24).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"23","authors":"Ballard, C. L.; Shoven, J. B.; Whalley, J.","year":"1985","title":"General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States","venue":"American Economic Review 75(1): 128-138","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v75y1985i1p128-38.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Marginal excess burden centres around 33 cents per $1 of revenue, range 17-56 cents (per Fullerton & Henderson 1987, NBER w2353).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"23","authors":"Feldstein, M.","year":"1999","title":"Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax","venue":"Review of Economics and Statistics 81(4): 674-680","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w5055","doi":"10.1162/003465399558391","reported_estimate":"Deadweight loss of nearly $2 per extra $1 of revenue from a proportional rise in all personal income tax rates.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"23","authors":"Hallett, T.B.; Menzies, N.A.; Resch, S.; Pretorius, C.; Stover, J.; Su, J.S.; Winskill, P.; et al.","year":"2025","title":"The case for optimal investment in combating HIV, tuberculosis, and malaria: a global modelling study","venue":"The Lancet 406(10500): 261-270","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/cid/publications/case-optimal-investment-combating-hiv-tuberculosis-and-malaria-global","doi":"10.1016/S0140-6736(25)00831-1","reported_estimate":"Up to $3.50 of direct economic benefit per $1","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Counts only direct economic benefits (output and health-system savings), not the value of lives saved, so it is not comparable with the value-of-life BCRs used across the dashboard's health block. It does show the return stays above 1 even on that narrow basis."},{"policy_id":"23","authors":"World Health Organization","year":"2025","title":"World Malaria Report 2025: partner briefing","venue":"WHO Global Malaria Programme","type":"intl_org","url":"https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/malaria/world-malaria-reports/world-malaria-report-2025-partner-briefing-eng.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Cases rose to 282M and deaths to 610,000 in 2024; antimalarial drug resistance named a key threat","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Rising drug and insecticide resistance could lower future effectiveness below the trial-based assumptions in the BCRs. It is not quantified as a BCR, so it is noted as a risk rather than used to set the range."},{"policy_id":"24","authors":"Larsen, B.; Hoddinott, J.; Razvi, S.","year":"2023","title":"Investing in Nutrition: A Global Best Investment Case","venue":"Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis 14(S1): 235-254","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-benefit-cost-analysis/article/investing-in-nutrition-a-global-best-investment-case/0C420F828BB9160A78E440004AFDA4A9","doi":"10.1017/bca.2023.22","reported_estimate":"BCRs (8% discount): MMN replacing IFA for pregnant women 37.5 (~65 with no delivery cost); MMN+calcium 18.6-23.9; CFP top 40% 15.9; SQ-LNS bottom 60% 13.7. Costs: MMN ~$84M/yr; calcium ~$216M/yr; SQ-LNS ~$3.2bn/yr","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"24","authors":"Copenhagen Consensus Center","year":"2025","title":"Best Things First: The 12 most efficient solutions for the world's poorest (folded leaflet, web version)","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center","type":"think_tank","url":"https://copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/2025-10/BTF%20Folded%20Leaflet%20WEB.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Nutrition (better feeding for young children; multiple micronutrients and calcium for pregnant women): BCR 18; $1.4bn/yr incl. $0.2bn time cost; ~18,000 lives saved; $19bn lifetime income gain","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"24","authors":"Horton, S.; Ross, J.","year":"2003","title":"The Economics of Iron Deficiency","venue":"Food Policy 28: 51-75 (corrigendum 2007)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://doi.org/10.1016/S0306-9192(02)00070-2","doi":"10.1016/S0306-9192(02)00070-2","reported_estimate":"Iron fortification: median BCR 6:1 across 10 countries (physical productivity only), 36:1 including discounted future cognitive benefits","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"24","authors":"Horton, S.; Alderman, H.; Rivera, J.A.","year":"2008","title":"Copenhagen Consensus 2008 Best Practice Paper: Micronutrient Fortification (Iron and Salt Iodization)","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center","type":"think_tank","url":"https://copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/bpp_fortification.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Iron fortification BCR 8 (3%) / 7 (6%), $0.12 per person per year; salt iodization 30 (3%) / 12 (6%), $0.05 per person per year","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"24","authors":"Copenhagen Consensus Center","year":"","title":"Micronutrient Fortification and Biofortification Challenge (Guide to Giving)","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center","type":"think_tank","url":"https://copenhagenconsensus.com/guide-giving/micronutrient-fortification-and-biofortification-challenge","doi":"","reported_estimate":"South Asia & SSA: salt iodization (80% coverage) $19M/yr cost vs $570M/yr benefits; iron flour fortification (50% coverage) $167M/yr vs $1,336M/yr; biofortification benefits 20-200x costs","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"24","authors":"Imdad, A.; Mayo-Wilson, E.; Haykal, M.R.; Regan, A.; Sidhu, J.; Smith, A.; Bhutta, Z.A.","year":"2022","title":"Vitamin A supplementation for preventing morbidity and mortality in children from six months to five years of age","venue":"Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews 2022, Issue 3, CD008524","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.cochrane.org/CD008524/vitamin-a-supplements-children-aged-6-months-5-years","doi":"10.1002/14651858.CD008524.pub4","reported_estimate":"All-cause mortality RR 0.88 (95% CI 0.83-0.93), 19 trials, 1,202,382 children, high-certainty; diarrhoea mortality RR 0.88; 47 trials in total","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"24","authors":"GiveWell","year":"2025","title":"Our Top Charities","venue":"GiveWell","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.givewell.org/charities/top-charities","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Vitamin A supplementation (Helen Keller Intl): ~$2 per child per year; ~$3,500 per life saved (2022-24 grants)","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"24","authors":"Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (citing Garrett, G. et al. 2019, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation)","year":"2019","title":"Food fortification brief","venue":"GAIN","type":"intl_org","url":"https://www.gainhealth.org/sites/default/files/publications/final_food-fortification-brief.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Fortification returns $27 per $1 overall; iodine in salt 28:1; iron in flour 8:1; folic acid in flour 46:1","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"24","authors":"Executive Boards of UNDP/UNFPA/UNOPS, UNICEF and UN-Women","year":"2018","title":"Joint comprehensive proposal on the cost-recovery policy (DP/FPA-ICEF-UNW/2018/1)","venue":"United Nations","type":"intl_org","url":"https://aa.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/board-documents/main-document/EN-Joint_report_on_cost_recovery.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Harmonized standard cost-recovery (indirect cost) rate of 8 per cent on other-resources (earmarked donor) contributions; 7 per cent for thematic contributions.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"24","authors":"Ballard, C. L.; Shoven, J. B.; Whalley, J.","year":"1985","title":"General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States","venue":"American Economic Review 75(1): 128-138","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v75y1985i1p128-38.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Marginal excess burden centres around 33 cents per $1 of revenue, range 17-56 cents (per Fullerton & Henderson 1987, NBER w2353).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"24","authors":"Feldstein, M.","year":"1999","title":"Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax","venue":"Review of Economics and Statistics 81(4): 674-680","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w5055","doi":"10.1162/003465399558391","reported_estimate":"Deadweight loss of nearly $2 per extra $1 of revenue from a proportional rise in all personal income tax rates.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"24","authors":"Awasthi, S.; Peto, R.; et al. (DEVTA team)","year":"2013","title":"Vitamin A supplementation every 6 months with retinol in 1 million pre-school children in north India: DEVTA, a cluster-randomised trial","venue":"The Lancet 381(9876): 1469-1477","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://files.givewell.org/files/DWDA%202009/Interventions/Vitamin%20A/Awasthi_etal_2013a_VitaminASupplementation.pdf","doi":"10.1016/S0140-6736(12)62125-4","reported_estimate":"Mortality ratio 0.96 (95% CI 0.89-1.03), p=0.22: no statistically significant reduction in child mortality","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"The largest single trial found a small, non-significant effect, which suggests vitamin A's benefit may now be smaller where deficiency and child mortality have fallen. It is already pooled in the Cochrane meta-analysis (RR 0.88), so it lowers confidence (grade A, not A+) rather than setting the range."},{"policy_id":"24","authors":"Copenhagen Consensus Center (Post-2015 Consensus expert panel)","year":"2015","title":"Post-2015 Consensus: smart development goals (presentation of benefit per dollar by target)","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center","type":"think_tank","url":"https://copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/post-2015_presentation_3.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Food Security and Nutrition: Reduce child malnutrition $45 per $1 (panel figure)","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Covers a broader stunting-reduction package (feeding, deworming, etc.), not micronutrients alone, so it is not used for this narrower policy."},{"policy_id":"25","authors":"Watkins, D.; Ahmed, S.; Pickersgill, S.","year":"2023","title":"Best Investments in Chronic, Noncommunicable Disease Prevention and Control in Low- and Lower-Middle-Income Countries","venue":"Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis 14(S1): 255-271","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/jbcoan/v14y2023is1p255-271_10.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Tobacco excise taxes BCR 100 (LMCs); alcohol excise taxes BCR 53 (LICs); without forgone consumer surplus (offset 0.9) tobacco tax BCR 620 (LICs) and 1,300 (LMCs); India: benefits US$35bn, cost US$5.7m/yr, +US$50bn/yr revenue by 2030, 910,000 lives saved, BCR >= 97; revenue treated as a transfer","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"25","authors":"World Health Organization","year":"2018","title":"Saving lives, spending less: a strategic response to noncommunicable diseases (WHO/NMH/NVI/18.8)","venue":"WHO","type":"intl_org","url":"https://alertas.directoriolegislativo.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/WHO-NMH-NVI-18.8-eng.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Return per US$1 (LLMICs, by 2030): reduce tobacco use US$7.43; reduce harmful alcohol use US$9.13; whole Best Buy package >= US$7; raising cigarette excise would add US$141bn revenue","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"25","authors":"Bertram, M.Y.; et al.","year":"2018","title":"Investing in non-communicable diseases: an estimation of the return on investment for prevention and treatment services","venue":"The Lancet 391(10134): 2071-2078","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(18)30665-2","doi":"10.1016/S0140-6736(18)30665-2","reported_estimate":"Peer-reviewed ROI method underlying WHO's tobacco and alcohol Best Buy returns","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"25","authors":"Jha, P.; Peto, R.","year":"2014","title":"Global Effects of Smoking, of Quitting, and of Taxing Tobacco","venue":"New England Journal of Medicine 370: 60-68","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.dcp-3.org/sites/default/files/resources/NEJM%20Tobacco%20Tax.pdf","doi":"10.1056/NEJMra1308383","reported_estimate":"Price elasticity ~-0.4; doubling real price cuts consumption ~1/3 and raises revenue; tripling specific excise in LMICs roughly doubles retail price; doubling prices worldwide adds ~$100bn/yr revenue; 1/3 cut in prevalence avoids ~200M deaths this century","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"25","authors":"Global Tobacco Economics Consortium (Jha, P.; Mishra, S.; Ulep, V.; Marquez, P.; Fuchs, A.; Jamison, D.T.; et al.)","year":"2018","title":"The health, poverty, and financial consequences of a cigarette price increase among 500 million male smokers in 13 middle income countries: compartmental model study","venue":"BMJ 361: k1162","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://experts.umn.edu/en/publications/the-health-poverty-and-financial-consequences-of-a-cigarette-pric/","doi":"10.1136/bmj.k1162","reported_estimate":"50% price rise: ~450M life-years gained; poorest 20% gain 6.7x more life-years than richest 20%; 8.8M men avoid extreme poverty; poorest pay ~10% of $122bn extra tax","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"25","authors":"Chisholm, D.; Moro, D.; Bertram, M.; Pretorius, C.; Gmel, G.; et al.","year":"2018","title":"Are the 'Best Buys' for Alcohol Control Still Valid? An Update on the Comparative Cost-Effectiveness of Alcohol Control Strategies at the Global Level","venue":"Journal of Studies on Alcohol and Drugs 79(4): 514-522","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.drugsandalcohol.ie/29545/","doi":"10.15288/jsad.2018.79.514","reported_estimate":"Alcohol excise tax increases: cost below I$0.10 per capita; under I$100 per healthy life year gained in all settings","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"25","authors":"Wagenaar, A.C.; Salois, M.J.; Komro, K.A.","year":"2009","title":"Effects of beverage alcohol price and tax levels on drinking: a meta-analysis of 1003 estimates from 112 studies","venue":"Addiction 104(2): 179-190","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://centaur.reading.ac.uk/17960/1/MS-08-0405_Alcohol_price_meta-analysis_REVISED_9-23-08.pdf","doi":"10.1111/j.1360-0443.2008.02438.x","reported_estimate":"Mean price/tax elasticities: beer -0.46, wine -0.69, spirits -0.80, total alcohol -0.51; heavy drinking -0.28","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"25","authors":"Copenhagen Consensus Center (Post-2015 Consensus expert panel)","year":"2015","title":"Post-2015 Consensus: smart development goals (presentation of benefit per dollar by target)","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center","type":"think_tank","url":"https://copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/post-2015_presentation_3.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Health: Increase tobacco prices 125% $22 per $1 (panel figure)","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"25","authors":"Disease Control Priorities (Watkins, D.A.; et al.)","year":"2023","title":"CCC replication repository: new_inputs/PINandCosts0625.csv; '3. Cost calcs_bca.Rmd'; '4. BCR tables and figures.R'; Figures/clinical_full_2023_2030*.csv","venue":"GitHub (Disease-Control-Priorities/CCC)","type":"working_paper","url":"https://github.com/Disease-Control-Priorities/CCC","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Clinical unit costs carry a 'Cost adjustment' multiplier of 1.17 (community platform), 1.25658 (health centre) or 1.48824 (first-level hospital), i.e. a 17% above-facility markup plus ancillary costs; intersectoral policies carry 1.0. Policy unit costs per capita (2017 US$): tobacco tax 0.004, alcohol tax 0.004, salt policy 0.0351. PV 2023-30 at 8% (LIC+LMC): tobacco tax gross benefits $51.31bn, incremental cost $0.0453bn, forgone surplus $0.462bn; alcohol tax $2.935bn, $0.0286bn, $0.0264bn; salt $15.61bn, $0.414bn, $0.0156bn. Code sets forgone surplus = 0.9% (tobacco/alcohol) and 0.1% (salt) of gross benefits.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"25","authors":"World Health Organization","year":"2021","title":"WHO technical manual on tobacco tax policy and administration","venue":"WHO (Geneva)","type":"intl_org","url":"https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240019188","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Cost-of-collection ratio (recurrent tax-administration budget per 100 units collected, 2015, IMF survey): low-income 1.3, lower-middle-income 1.6, upper-middle 0.9, high-income 0.9. California tax stamps: US$0.42 per 1,000 (traditional), US$4.77 (first high-tech), US$8.20 (encrypted).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"25","authors":"World Bank Group","year":"2019","title":"Confronting Illicit Tobacco Trade: A Global Review of Country Experiences","venue":"World Bank (WBG Global Tobacco Control Program)","type":"intl_org","url":"https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/677451548260528135/pdf/133959-REPL-PUBLIC-6-2-2019-19-59-24-WBGTobaccoIllicitTradeFINALvweb.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Global tobacco tax revenue loss from illicit trade US$40-50bn a year, about 600bn sticks or 10% of global consumption; tax increases do not necessarily lead to substantial illicit trade. UK: illicit-strategy enforcement staff spending by HMRC and the Border Agency about GBP90m a year (plus GBP209m start-up investment in 2000); 1999 illicit loss GBP2.5bn = 25% of tobacco revenue (implies ~GBP10bn revenue). Georgia: secure tax-stamp system cost EUR5 per 1,000 stamps, borne by industry from 2018. Australia: A$7.7m enforcement funding attached to 2016/17 excise increases.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"25","authors":"World Health Organization; United Nations Development Programme","year":"2019","title":"Non-communicable disease prevention and control: a guidance note for investment cases (WHO/NMH/NMA/18.97)","venue":"WHO/UNDP (UN Interagency Task Force on NCDs)","type":"intl_org","url":"https://www.unnutrition.org/wp-content/uploads/NCD-investment-case-guidance-note-2019.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"In WHO NCD return-on-investment cases, clinical interventions are costed as drug/supply costs plus related health-system costs; policy interventions are costed as 'programme costs, defined as costs incurred at the administrative level outside the point of delivery' (OneHealth Tool / WHO NCD Costing Tool).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"25","authors":"Disease Control Priorities (Watkins, D.A.; Pickersgill, S.; et al.)","year":"2023","title":"CCC replication repository: output/cost_outputs.csv (deaths averted by intervention, year and income group, 2022-2030)","venue":"GitHub (Disease-Control-Priorities/ccc)","type":"working_paper","url":"https://github.com/Disease-Control-Priorities/ccc/blob/main/output/cost_outputs.csv","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Deaths averted (column Deaths.avert), LICs + LMCs, summed 2023-2030: tobacco excise tax 1,553,547; alcohol excise tax 72,253; CVD primary prevention (LMCs) 6,606,272; chronic heart-failure treatment (LMCs) 2,405,984; aspirin for suspected heart attack 23,591. In 2030 (full implementation): tobacco tax 425,916; alcohol tax 17,298. The best-investment interventions (14 in LMCs, 6 in LICs) sum to 12.1m deaths averted over 2023-2030, matching the 12 million in Watkins et al. (2023) Table 2.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"25","authors":"Watkins, D.; Ahmed, S.; Pickersgill, S.","year":"2023","title":"Best Investments in Chronic, Noncommunicable Disease Prevention and Control in Low- and Lower-Middle-Income Countries","venue":"Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis 14(S1): 255-271","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/jbcoan/v14y2023is1p255-271_10.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Tobacco tax BCR 620 (LICs) to 1,300 (LMCs) with no forgone consumer surplus","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Assumes smokers lose no welfare from smoking less. Watkins et al. keep a forgone-consumer-surplus charge in their headline figure, and this analysis follows them to stay conservative, so 1,300 is not used as the high end."},{"policy_id":"25","authors":"Remler, D.K.","year":"2004","title":"Poor Smokers, Poor Quitters, and Cigarette Tax Regressivity","venue":"American Journal of Public Health 94(2): 225-229","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/aph/ajpbhl/2004942225-229_5.html","doi":"10.2105/AJPH.94.2.225","reported_estimate":"Whether cigarette taxes are regressive depends on the burden measure; under every measure they heavily burden poor smokers who do not quit","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Does not dispute the BCR. It qualifies the distributional finding: net health and financial gains are pro-poor (GTEC 2018), but poor continuing smokers bear a real burden. Recorded here so the 'pro-poor' label is not overstated."},{"policy_id":"26","authors":"Copenhagen Consensus Center (Hall, A.; Horton, S.)","year":"2008","title":"Deworming: best practice paper (Copenhagen Consensus guide to giving)","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center","type":"think_tank","url":"https://copenhagenconsensus.com/guide-giving/deworming","doi":"","reported_estimate":"'each dollar spent results in about $6 of benefits' for preschool children; 'up to 60 times' the costs in high-infection areas.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"26","authors":"Ahuja, A.; Baird, S.; Hicks, J.H.; Kremer, M.; Miguel, E.","year":"2017","title":"Economics of Mass Deworming Programs (DCP3 Vol. 8, Ch. 29)","venue":"Disease Control Priorities, 3rd ed.","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.dcp-3.org/sites/default/files/chapters/DCP3%20CAHD_Ch%2029.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Long-run benefits 'more than 100 times the cost'; annualised internal rate of return 32-51%; under $0.3bn a year to treat most of 870 million at-risk children (pp. 417-419).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"26","authors":"Hamory, J.; Miguel, E.; Walker, M.; Kremer, M.; Baird, S.","year":"2021","title":"Twenty-year economic impacts of deworming","venue":"PNAS 118(14):e2023185118","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://haushofer.ne.su.se/ec2303/Lecture%206%20-%20Health/Hamory_Miguel_Walker_Kremer_Baird_PNAS_2021.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"'annualized social internal rate of return is 37%'; social NPV US$ PPP 230.71 (earnings) to 467.90 (consumption) at a 10% discount rate.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"26","authors":"Baird, S.; Hicks, J.H.; Kremer, M.; Miguel, E.","year":"2016","title":"Worms at Work: Long-run Impacts of a Child Health Investment","venue":"Quarterly Journal of Economics 131(4):1637-1680","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://nber.org/papers/w21428","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Ten-year follow-up of the Kenyan Primary School Deworming Project: higher earnings, hours and meals for treated children as adults (basis of DCP3 return figures).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"26","authors":"World Health Organization","year":"2023","title":"Soil-transmitted helminth infections (fact sheet)","venue":"WHO","type":"intl_org","url":"https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/soil-transmitted-helminth-infections","doi":"","reported_estimate":"WHO recommends periodic preventive chemotherapy (deworming) for children in endemic areas.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"26","authors":"Ballard, C. L.; Shoven, J. B.; Whalley, J.","year":"1985","title":"General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States","venue":"American Economic Review 75(1): 128-138","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v75y1985i1p128-38.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Marginal excess burden centres around 33 cents per $1 of revenue, range 17-56 cents (per Fullerton & Henderson 1987, NBER w2353).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"26","authors":"Feldstein, M.","year":"1999","title":"Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax","venue":"Review of Economics and Statistics 81(4): 674-680","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w5055","doi":"10.1162/003465399558391","reported_estimate":"Deadweight loss of nearly $2 per extra $1 of revenue from a proportional rise in all personal income tax rates.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"26","authors":"Taylor-Robinson, D.C.; Maayan, N.; Soares-Weiser, K.; Donegan, S.; Garner, P.","year":"2015","title":"Deworming drugs for soil-transmitted intestinal worms in children: effects on nutritional indicators, haemoglobin, and school performance","venue":"Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://doi.org/10.1002/14651858.CD000371.pub6","doi":"10.1002/14651858.CD000371.pub6","reported_estimate":"Mass treatment shows little or no effect on many nutrition, haemoglobin and school outcomes. Death between ages 1 and 6: 27 vs 25 per 1,000, RR 0.95, 1,005,135 participants (3 trials), low-quality evidence: 'May be little or no effect on death'.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Covers short-run outcomes; the range uses long-run trial and Copenhagen estimates. Used for lives_saved_direct (no deaths averted counted)."},{"policy_id":"27","authors":"Kohler, H.-P.; Behrman, J. R.","year":"2015","title":"Post-2015 Consensus: Population and Demography Assessment","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/post-2015-consensus/populationanddemography","doi":"","reported_estimate":"'Achieve universal access to sexual and reproductive health (SRH) services by 2030, and eliminate unmet need for modern contraception by 2040 which will return $120 for every dollar spent.'","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"27","authors":"Lomborg, B.","year":"2019","title":"Why Family Planning Is a Smart Investment","venue":"Jordan Times (syndicated op-ed)","type":"media","url":"https://www.jordantimes.com/opinion/bj%C3%B8rn-lomborg/why-family-planning-smart-investment","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Kohler & Behrman: ~$3.6bn/yr to serve 214 million women; 640,000 fewer newborn deaths, 150,000 fewer maternal deaths a year; $40 per $1 on health alone; demographic dividend $288bn/yr; $120 per $1 in total. Donor FP funding ~$1.27bn in 2017.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"27","authors":"Madise, N.; Nandi, A.; Wong, B.; Razvi, S.","year":"2023","title":"Achieving Maternal and Neonatal Mortality Development Goals Effectively: A Cost-Benefit Analysis","venue":"Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis 14(S1): 206-234","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://doi.org/10.1017/bca.2023.24","doi":"10.1017/bca.2023.24","reported_estimate":"Figure 3 (55 LICs/LMICs, 8% discount): BEmONC+FP 87; BEmONC alone 83; CEmONC 65; entire continuum of care 36; family planning alone 22; antenatal 7; periconceptual 6. Headline package: +$3.2bn/yr, $278bn/yr benefits plus $25bn/yr demographic dividend; 1.20m newborn and 161,000 maternal deaths averted per year at full scale. Family planning in Table 2: 68.6m extra women covered at unit costs $2.89 drugs + $2.14 staff + $0.65 hospital + $0.75 supervision.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"27","authors":"Amporfu, E.; Arthur, E.; Novignon, J.; Wong, B.","year":"2020","title":"Costs and Benefits of Family Planning in Ghana (Ghana Priorities)","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center / National Development Planning Commission, Ghana","type":"think_tank","url":"https://copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/gp_a4_family_planning_final.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"8% discount: +10 pp contraceptive prevalence, married women BCR 33.6; unmarried women 29.3; compulsory comprehensive adolescent SRH education 2.3.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"27","authors":"Joshi, S.; Schultz, T. P.","year":"2013","title":"Family Planning and Women's and Children's Health: Long-Term Consequences of an Outreach Program in Matlab, Bangladesh","venue":"Demography 50: 149-180","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13524-012-0172-2","doi":"10.1007/s13524-012-0172-2","reported_estimate":"Quasi-experimental comparison of Matlab programme vs comparison villages: ~17% lower fertility sustained about two decades, with better women's health and child outcomes.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"27","authors":"Miller, G.","year":"2010","title":"Contraception as Development? New Evidence from Family Planning in Colombia","venue":"The Economic Journal 120(545): 709-736","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02306.x","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02306.x","reported_estimate":"","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"27","authors":"Duflo, E.; Dupas, P.; Kremer, M.","year":"2021","title":"The Impact of Free Secondary Education: Experimental Evidence from Ghana","venue":"NBER Working Paper 28937","type":"working_paper","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w28937","doi":"10.3386/w28937","reported_estimate":"Randomized secondary-school scholarships for 2,064 youths, 12 years of data: higher attainment, knowledge, skills and preventive health behaviour; reduced female fertility; earnings gains for women. (Sub-policy evidence.)","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"27","authors":"Duflo, E.; Dupas, P.; Spelke, E.; Walsh, M.","year":"2026","title":"Intergenerational Impacts of Secondary Education: Experimental Evidence from Ghana","venue":"American Economic Review 116(9): 3586-3621","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257%2Faer.20241001","doi":"10.1257/aer.20241001","reported_estimate":"RCT with 15-year follow-up: scholarships delay fertility, reduce unwanted pregnancies; 'Under-one mortality is reduced by half'; children's test scores +0.24 SD by age five; 'a conservatively estimated US$4.1 in benefits for each US$1 the policy would cost the government in the long run'. (Sub-policy BCR.)","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"27","authors":"Duflo, E.; Dupas, P.; Spelke, E.; Walsh, M. (VoxDev column)","year":"2024","title":"Subsidising secondary education has huge benefits for this generation and the next","venue":"VoxDev","type":"media","url":"https://voxdev.org/topic/education/subsidising-secondary-education-has-huge-benefits-generation-and-next","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Four years of senior high school cost ~$505 per woman including forgone wages; benefits 6-56x cost overall and 10-110x when targeted at girls; children of female recipients have 45% lower under-3 mortality. (Sub-policy.)","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"27","authors":"J-PAL","year":"2024","title":"Multigenerational Benefits to Secondary Schooling in Ghana (evaluation summary)","venue":"J-PAL evaluation summary","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.povertyactionlab.org/evaluation/returns-secondary-schooling-ghana","doi":"","reported_estimate":"SHS enrolment 75% (scholarship) vs 19%; graduation 73% vs 45%; +1.26 years of secondary education; female recipients' earnings 20-30% higher from 2020-2023. (Sub-policy.)","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"27","authors":"Copenhagen Consensus Center","year":"2015","title":"Post-2015 Consensus: Gender Equality (targets summary)","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center","type":"think_tank","url":"https://copenhagenconsensus.com/post-2015-consensus/gender-equality","doi":"","reported_estimate":"'Programs increasing the number of years of education and increasing the age at marriage can return $5 for every dollar spent'; SRH access returns $120 (Kohler & Behrman). (Sub-policy.)","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"27","authors":"Psacharopoulos, G.","year":"2015","title":"Post-2015 Consensus: Education (targets summary)","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center","type":"think_tank","url":"https://copenhagenconsensus.com/post-2015-consensus/education","doi":"","reported_estimate":"'Ensure secondary school completion has a benefit of $4 for every dollar spent.' (Sub-policy.)","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"27","authors":"UNESCO","year":"2024","title":"Progress on girls' access to education: What the new UNESCO data reveals","venue":"UNESCO web article","type":"intl_org","url":"https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/progress-girls-access-education-what-new-unesco-data-reveals","doi":"","reported_estimate":"122 million girls out of school worldwide.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"27","authors":"Executive Boards of UNDP/UNFPA/UNOPS, UNICEF and UN-Women","year":"2018","title":"Joint comprehensive proposal on the cost-recovery policy (DP/FPA-ICEF-UNW/2018/1)","venue":"United Nations","type":"intl_org","url":"https://aa.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/board-documents/main-document/EN-Joint_report_on_cost_recovery.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Harmonized standard cost-recovery (indirect cost) rate of 8 per cent on other-resources (earmarked donor) contributions; 7 per cent for thematic contributions.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"27","authors":"Sully, E.A.; Biddlecom, A.; Darroch, J.E.; et al.","year":"2020","title":"Adding It Up: Investing in Sexual and Reproductive Health 2019 - Methodology Report","venue":"Guttmacher Institute","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/adding-it-up-investing-in-sexual-reproductive-health-2019-methodology.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Total cost = direct costs + 'programs and systems costs' (indirect markups) covering program management, staff supervision, monitoring and evaluation, human resources development, transport, health education and outreach, infrastructure, commodity supply systems and health information systems.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"27","authors":"Ballard, C. L.; Shoven, J. B.; Whalley, J.","year":"1985","title":"General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States","venue":"American Economic Review 75(1): 128-138","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v75y1985i1p128-38.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Marginal excess burden centres around 33 cents per $1 of revenue, range 17-56 cents (per Fullerton & Henderson 1987, NBER w2353).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"27","authors":"Feldstein, M.","year":"1999","title":"Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax","venue":"Review of Economics and Statistics 81(4): 674-680","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w5055","doi":"10.1162/003465399558391","reported_estimate":"Deadweight loss of nearly $2 per extra $1 of revenue from a proportional rise in all personal income tax rates.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"27","authors":"Pritchett, L. H.","year":"1994","title":"Desired Fertility and the Impact of Population Policies","venue":"Population and Development Review 20(1): 1-55","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://doi.org/10.2307/2137629","doi":"10.2307/2137629","reported_estimate":"Argues that women's desired fertility, not contraceptive access, explains most cross-country differences in fertility, implying a smaller fertility (and demographic-dividend) effect of supply-side family planning.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"No BCR. Its argument bears mainly on the demographic-dividend part of the 120 figure, which is why the low end rests on Madise et al.'s 22, well below it."},{"policy_id":"27","authors":"Amporfu, E.; Arthur, E.; Novignon, J.; Wong, B.","year":"2020","title":"Costs and Benefits of Family Planning in Ghana (Ghana Priorities)","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center / National Development Planning Commission, Ghana","type":"think_tank","url":"https://copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/gp_a4_family_planning_final.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Compulsory comprehensive adolescent sexual and reproductive health education: BCR 2.3.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Different intervention (school curriculum, not contraceptive supply); not part of this policy."},{"policy_id":"28","authors":"Madise, N.; Nandi, A.; Wong, B.; Razvi, S.","year":"2023","title":"Achieving Maternal and Neonatal Mortality Development Goals Effectively: A Cost-Benefit Analysis","venue":"Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis 14(S1): 206-234","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://doi.org/10.1017/bca.2023.24","doi":"10.1017/bca.2023.24","reported_estimate":"Figure 3 (55 LICs/LMICs, 8% discount): BEmONC+FP 87; BEmONC alone 83; CEmONC 65; entire continuum of care 36; family planning alone 22; antenatal 7; periconceptual 6. Headline package: +$3.2bn/yr, $278bn/yr benefits plus $25bn/yr demographic dividend; 1.20m newborn and 161,000 maternal deaths averted per year at full scale. Family planning in Table 2: 68.6m extra women covered at unit costs $2.89 drugs + $2.14 staff + $0.65 hospital + $0.75 supervision.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"28","authors":"Lomborg, B.","year":"2023","title":"Best Things First, ch. 3: Do the Smartest Solutions First (manuscript, Table 3.1)","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center (book manuscript chapter)","type":"book","url":"https://copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/2023-05/Ch%203%20Do%20the%20Smartest%20Solutions%20First.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Table 3.1, annual averages 2023-30: Tuberculosis total cost $6.2bn 'whereof non-financial cost' $1.0bn enabler cost, 0.6m lives/yr, BCR 46; Maternal & newborn health total cost $4.9bn whereof $2.1bn time cost, 1.4m lives/yr, BCR 87; Chronic diseases $4.4bn whereof $0.2bn consumer loss, BCR 23. Non-financial costs 'do not need to be financed by higher taxes'.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"28","authors":"Copenhagen Consensus Center","year":"2025","title":"Best Things First: The 12 most efficient solutions for the world's poorest (folded leaflet, web version)","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center","type":"think_tank","url":"https://copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/2025-10/BTF%20Folded%20Leaflet%20WEB.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Tuberculosis BCR 46: 'costing $6.2Bn annually, saves 554,000 lives per year'. Maternal and newborn health BCR 87: institutional births with basic emergency obstetric care cost '$4.9Bn annually (including $2.1Bn' mothers' time), saving 1.2 million newborns a year. Chronic disease BCR 23 (alcohol, tobacco, salt, trans-fat regulation plus clinical care).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"28","authors":"Lomborg, B.","year":"2023","title":"Save 4.2 Million Lives and Generate $1.1 Trillion in Economic Benefits for Only $41 Billion: Introduction to the Special Issue on the Most Efficient Policies for the Sustainable Development Goals","venue":"Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis 14(S1): 1-15","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://doi.org/10.1017/bca.2023.32","doi":"10.1017/bca.2023.32","reported_estimate":"Halftime project uses an 8% discount rate and VSL = 54 x GNI per capita; summary table of the 12 best investments (TB $6.2bn/yr BCR 46; maternal & newborn $4.9bn/yr BCR 87; chronic disease BCR 23).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"28","authors":"Bhutta, Z. A.; Das, J. K.; Bahl, R.; Lawn, J. E.; Salam, R. A.; Paul, V. K.; Sankar, M. J.; Blencowe, H.; et al.","year":"2014","title":"Can Available Interventions End Preventable Deaths in Mothers, Newborn Babies, and Stillbirths, and at What Cost?","venue":"The Lancet 384(9940): 347-370 (Every Newborn series)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(14)60792-3","doi":"10.1016/S0140-6736(14)60792-3","reported_estimate":"Universal coverage of existing interventions would avert 71% of neonatal deaths, 33% of stillbirths and 54% of maternal deaths by 2025 at $5.65bn/yr incremental running cost; 82% of the effect and $3.66bn of the cost is facility-based care.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"28","authors":"Executive Boards of UNDP/UNFPA/UNOPS, UNICEF and UN-Women","year":"2018","title":"Joint comprehensive proposal on the cost-recovery policy (DP/FPA-ICEF-UNW/2018/1)","venue":"United Nations","type":"intl_org","url":"https://aa.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/board-documents/main-document/EN-Joint_report_on_cost_recovery.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Harmonized standard cost-recovery (indirect cost) rate of 8 per cent on other-resources (earmarked donor) contributions; 7 per cent for thematic contributions.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"28","authors":"Ballard, C. L.; Shoven, J. B.; Whalley, J.","year":"1985","title":"General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States","venue":"American Economic Review 75(1): 128-138","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v75y1985i1p128-38.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Marginal excess burden centres around 33 cents per $1 of revenue, range 17-56 cents (per Fullerton & Henderson 1987, NBER w2353).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"28","authors":"Feldstein, M.","year":"1999","title":"Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax","venue":"Review of Economics and Statistics 81(4): 674-680","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w5055","doi":"10.1162/003465399558391","reported_estimate":"Deadweight loss of nearly $2 per extra $1 of revenue from a proportional rise in all personal income tax rates.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"28","authors":"National Planning Commission (Malawi); Larsen, B.; Razvi, S.; Madise, N.; Mapila, S.; Wong, B.","year":"2021","title":"Cost benefit analysis of improving neonatal and maternal health outcomes in Malawi - Technical Report (Malawi Priorities)","venue":"National Planning Commission (Malawi), Copenhagen Consensus Center and African Institute for Development Policy","type":"government","url":"https://afidep.org/publication/cost-benefit-analysis-of-improving-neonatal-and-maternal-health-outcomes-in-malawi-technical-report/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Table 14 (p.20, 8% discount, MWK million PV 2021-35): full BEmONC package cost 28,644, benefit 442,456, BCR 15; targeted package 11,812 / 370,905, BCR 31; KMC 45; assisted vaginal delivery 19; clean birth practices 13. Full package reduces neonatal mortality 15%, maternal 19%, stillbirths 13%. Table 15: BCRs stay above 9 under 30% lower benefits.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"28","authors":"Madise, N.; Nandi, A.; Wong, B.; Razvi, S.","year":"2023","title":"Achieving Maternal and Neonatal Mortality Development Goals Effectively: A Cost-Benefit Analysis","venue":"Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis 14(S1): 206-234","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://doi.org/10.1017/bca.2023.24","doi":"10.1017/bca.2023.24","reported_estimate":"Entire continuum of care BCR 36; antenatal package 7; periconceptual 6; BEmONC+FP 87.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Different scope: 36/7/6 are broader or non-facility packages; 87 includes family planning (policy 27) and its demographic dividend, so using it would double count."},{"policy_id":"28","authors":"Stenberg, K.; Axelson, H.; Sheehan, P.; Anderson, I.; Gulmezoglu, A. M.; Temmerman, M.; et al.","year":"2014","title":"Advancing Social and Economic Development by Investing in Women's and Children's Health: A New Global Investment Framework","venue":"The Lancet 383(9925): 1333-1354","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(13)62231-X","doi":"10.1016/S0140-6736(13)62231-X","reported_estimate":"An extra $5 per person per year (~$30bn/yr) across 74 high-burden countries yields up to nine times its value in economic and social benefits.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Far broader package (all women's and children's health, ~$30bn/yr) than facility obstetric/newborn upgrades; lower average return expected for a broader package."},{"policy_id":"29","authors":"Pretorius, C.; Arinaminpathy, N.; Mandal, S.; Sahu, S.; Pai, M.; Mathiasson, R.; Wong, B.","year":"2023","title":"One Million Lives Saved Per Year: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Global Plan to End Tuberculosis, 2023-2030 and Beyond","venue":"Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis 14(S1): 337-354","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://doi.org/10.1017/bca.2023.13","doi":"10.1017/bca.2023.13","reported_estimate":"Main spec BCR 46.0 (costs $56,391m, benefits $2,595,230m PV at 8%); 27.3m deaths averted 2023-2050; $2,063 per death averted; incremental cost $4.4bn (2023), peak $7.1bn (2027), $5.2bn (2030); sensitivity range 28-84 (5%: 55.4; 12%: 36.6; incl. R&D: 34.0; disruption baseline 71.0, at 5% 83.9; with vaccines + R&D 27.7). Source: CCC manuscript, https://copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/2023-03/Tuberculosis_Best_Investment_Manuscript_230211.pdf","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"29","authors":"Lomborg, B.","year":"2023","title":"Best Things First, ch. 3: Do the Smartest Solutions First (manuscript, Table 3.1)","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center (book manuscript chapter)","type":"book","url":"https://copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/2023-05/Ch%203%20Do%20the%20Smartest%20Solutions%20First.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Table 3.1, annual averages 2023-30: Tuberculosis total cost $6.2bn 'whereof non-financial cost' $1.0bn enabler cost, 0.6m lives/yr, BCR 46; Maternal & newborn health total cost $4.9bn whereof $2.1bn time cost, 1.4m lives/yr, BCR 87; Chronic diseases $4.4bn whereof $0.2bn consumer loss, BCR 23. Non-financial costs 'do not need to be financed by higher taxes'.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"29","authors":"Lomborg, B.","year":"2023","title":"Save 4.2 Million Lives and Generate $1.1 Trillion in Economic Benefits for Only $41 Billion: Introduction to the Special Issue on the Most Efficient Policies for the Sustainable Development Goals","venue":"Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis 14(S1): 1-15","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://doi.org/10.1017/bca.2023.32","doi":"10.1017/bca.2023.32","reported_estimate":"Halftime project uses an 8% discount rate and VSL = 54 x GNI per capita; summary table of the 12 best investments (TB $6.2bn/yr BCR 46; maternal & newborn $4.9bn/yr BCR 87; chronic disease BCR 23).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"29","authors":"Copenhagen Consensus Center","year":"2015","title":"Post-2015 Consensus: Health - Infectious Diseases (targets summary)","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center","type":"think_tank","url":"https://copenhagenconsensus.com/post-2015-consensus/health-infectious-diseases","doi":"","reported_estimate":"'Reduce TB deaths by 95% and TB incidence by 90%': annual benefits $344,647m, annual costs $8,092m, $43 per $1; ~1.3m fewer deaths a year.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"29","authors":"World Health Organization","year":"2025","title":"Global gains in tuberculosis response endangered by funding challenges (Global TB Report 2025 release)","venue":"WHO news release, 12 Nov 2025","type":"intl_org","url":"https://www.who.int/news/item/12-11-2025-global-gains-in-tuberculosis-response-endangered-by-funding-challenges","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Over 1.2m TB deaths and 10.7m cases in 2024; 8.3m newly diagnosed and treated (~78%); US$5.9bn available in 2024 vs US$22bn annual target for 2027; treatment success 88% (drug-susceptible), 71% (drug-resistant).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"29","authors":"The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria","year":"2025","title":"Annual Financial Report 2024","venue":"The Global Fund (Geneva)","type":"intl_org","url":"https://archive.theglobalfund.org/media/sqilcy4b/archive_2024-annual-financial_report_en.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Operating expenses US$410m (2024), US$400m (2023), US$374m (2022) against grant expenditure of US$6,155m, US$4,460m and US$4,576m; 'Operating costs, at spot rate, as a percentage of total expenditure decreased to 6% in 2024 (2023: 8%)'. Opex as a share of grant expenditure: 6.7% (2024), 9.0% (2023), 7.8% (2022-24).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"29","authors":"Ballard, C. L.; Shoven, J. B.; Whalley, J.","year":"1985","title":"General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States","venue":"American Economic Review 75(1): 128-138","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v75y1985i1p128-38.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Marginal excess burden centres around 33 cents per $1 of revenue, range 17-56 cents (per Fullerton & Henderson 1987, NBER w2353).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"29","authors":"Feldstein, M.","year":"1999","title":"Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax","venue":"Review of Economics and Statistics 81(4): 674-680","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w5055","doi":"10.1162/003465399558391","reported_estimate":"Deadweight loss of nearly $2 per extra $1 of revenue from a proportional rise in all personal income tax rates.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"29","authors":"Vassall, A.","year":"2016","title":"Benefits and Costs of Controlling the Spread of Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis in Bangladesh (Bangladesh Priorities)","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center and BRAC Research and Evaluation Division, Bangladesh Priorities","type":"think_tank","url":"https://copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/documents/vassall_tb.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Results table (p.10): Intervention 1 (expand detection, diagnosis and treatment to 90% of TB cases, incl. standard MDR-TB treatment), benefit $2,211m / cost $107.3m = 20.60 at 3%; $1,916m / $107.3m = 17.86 at 5%; $1,386m / $107.3m = 12.91 at 10%. Drug-susceptible TB only 15.30-24.40; MDR-TB only 1.81-5.34.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"29","authors":"Laxminarayan, R.; Klein, E.; Dye, C.; Floyd, K.; Darley, S.; Adeyi, O.","year":"2007","title":"Economic Benefit of Tuberculosis Control","venue":"World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4295","type":"intl_org","url":"https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-4295","doi":"10.1596/1813-9450-4295","reported_estimate":"Global Plan to Stop TB vs no-DOTS: benefits exceed costs by a factor of 15 in 22 high-burden countries and 9 (95% CI 8-9) in the Africa region (abstract via IDEAS: https://ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/wbrwps/4295.html).","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Older (2006-2015 plan, DOTS-era costs) and uses a different benefit valuation than the 2023 Halftime standard; it confirms TB control pays off but is not comparable with the 8%-discount CCC series used across this block."},{"policy_id":"30","authors":"Geldsetzer, P.; Bloom, D. E.; Humair, S.; Bärnighausen, T.","year":"2015","title":"Benefits and Costs of the HIV/AIDS Targets for the Post-2015 Development Agenda (Post-2015 Consensus Health Perspective)","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center working paper","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/health_perspective_-_geldsetzer_-_hiv.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"90% MMC coverage in hyperendemic countries: B:C 11.3 (3%) and 7.4 (5%) at $1,000/life-year; 56.4 (3%) and 37.0 (5%) at $5,000/life-year; additional cost $451.9m-$524.7m (2015-2030) vs $16.5-19.3bn for ART scale-up; ART B:C 3.0-16.6.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"30","authors":"Copenhagen Consensus Center","year":"2015","title":"Post-2015 Consensus: Health - Infectious Diseases (targets summary)","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center","type":"think_tank","url":"https://copenhagenconsensus.com/post-2015-consensus/health-infectious-diseases","doi":"","reported_estimate":"'attain circumcision coverage of at least 90% amongst HIV-negative adult men': annual benefits $818m, annual costs $30m, $28 per $1; ART for CD4<350: $10 per $1.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"30","authors":"Auvert, B.; Taljaard, D.; Lagarde, E.; Sobngwi-Tambekou, J.; Sitta, R.; Puren, A.","year":"2005","title":"Randomized, Controlled Intervention Trial of Male Circumcision for Reduction of HIV Infection Risk: The ANRS 1265 Trial","venue":"PLoS Medicine 2(11): e298","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.0020298","doi":"10.1371/journal.pmed.0020298","reported_estimate":"3,274 men aged 18-24, Orange Farm, South Africa: HIV incidence 0.85 vs 2.1 per 100 person-years; RR 0.40 (95% CI 0.24-0.68), i.e. 60% protection (61% adjusted).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"30","authors":"Njeuhmeli, E.; Forsythe, S.; Reed, J.; Opuni, M.; Bollinger, L.; Heard, N.; et al.","year":"2011","title":"Voluntary Medical Male Circumcision: Modeling the Impact and Cost of Expanding Male Circumcision for HIV Prevention in Eastern and Southern Africa","venue":"PLoS Medicine 8(11): e1001132","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1001132","doi":"10.1371/journal.pmed.1001132","reported_estimate":"80% coverage in 13 settings by 2015: 20.34m circumcisions 2011-2015 plus 8.42m to 2025; 3.36m HIV infections averted through 2025; total cost $2bn; net savings from averted treatment $16.51bn; $65.85-$95.15 per VMMC.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"30","authors":"Haacker, M.; Fraser-Hurt, N.; Gorgens, M.","year":"2016","title":"Effectiveness of and Financial Returns to Voluntary Medical Male Circumcision for HIV Prevention in South Africa: An Incremental Cost-Effectiveness Analysis","venue":"PLOS Medicine 13(5): e1002012","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002012","doi":"10.1371/journal.pmed.1002012","reported_estimate":"One VMMC at age 20 prevents >0.2 HIV infections (0.08 at age 30); net financial savings $617 per VMMC at 5% discount; financial rate of return up to 14.5%; cost recouped after 13 years.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"30","authors":"UNAIDS","year":"2025","title":"AIDS, Crisis and the Power to Transform: UNAIDS Global AIDS Update 2025","venue":"UNAIDS","type":"intl_org","url":"https://www.unaids.org/en/UNAIDS-global-AIDS-update-2025","doi":"","reported_estimate":"1.3m new infections in 2024; international assistance funds 80% of prevention programmes in LMICs; funding cuts could cause millions of extra infections by 2029.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"30","authors":"The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria","year":"2025","title":"Annual Financial Report 2024","venue":"The Global Fund (Geneva)","type":"intl_org","url":"https://archive.theglobalfund.org/media/sqilcy4b/archive_2024-annual-financial_report_en.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Operating expenses US$410m (2024), US$400m (2023), US$374m (2022) against grant expenditure of US$6,155m, US$4,460m and US$4,576m; 'Operating costs, at spot rate, as a percentage of total expenditure decreased to 6% in 2024 (2023: 8%)'. Opex as a share of grant expenditure: 6.7% (2024), 9.0% (2023), 7.8% (2022-24).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"30","authors":"Ballard, C. L.; Shoven, J. B.; Whalley, J.","year":"1985","title":"General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States","venue":"American Economic Review 75(1): 128-138","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v75y1985i1p128-38.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Marginal excess burden centres around 33 cents per $1 of revenue, range 17-56 cents (per Fullerton & Henderson 1987, NBER w2353).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"30","authors":"Feldstein, M.","year":"1999","title":"Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax","venue":"Review of Economics and Statistics 81(4): 674-680","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w5055","doi":"10.1162/003465399558391","reported_estimate":"Deadweight loss of nearly $2 per extra $1 of revenue from a proportional rise in all personal income tax rates.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"30","authors":"Bansi-Matharu, L.; Mudimu, E.; Martin-Hughes, R.; et al.","year":"2023","title":"Cost-effectiveness of voluntary medical male circumcision for HIV prevention across sub-Saharan Africa: results from five independent models","venue":"The Lancet Global Health 11(2): e244-e255","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://doi.org/10.1016/S2214-109X(22)00515-0","doi":"10.1016/S2214-109X(22)00515-0","reported_estimate":"Continuing VMMC cost-effective (threshold $500/DALY, $90 per procedure) in 68% of setting scenarios; 62% where incidence <0.1 per 100 person-years, 95% where >1.0; 'remains a cost-effective, often cost-saving' intervention for the next five years.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Cost-effectiveness study (no BCR). It does not overturn the range but shows returns fall with incidence, so the high end, based on 2015 estimates (56 before overhead), is optimistic for today's lower-incidence settings."},{"policy_id":"30","authors":"Geldsetzer, P.; Bloom, D. E.; Humair, S.; Bärnighausen, T.","year":"2015","title":"Benefits and Costs of the HIV/AIDS Targets for the Post-2015 Development Agenda (Post-2015 Consensus Health Perspective)","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center working paper","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/health_perspective_-_geldsetzer_-_hiv.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"ART to 90% of adults with CD4<350: BCR 3.0-16.6; additional cost $16.5-19.3bn.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Different intervention (treatment, not circumcision); this policy is defined as VMMC only."},{"policy_id":"31","authors":"Feldstein, M.","year":"1996","title":"The Missing Piece in Policy Analysis: Social Security Reform (Richard T. Ely Lecture)","venue":"American Economic Review 86(2): 1-14 (NBER WP 5413)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w5413","doi":"10.3386/w5413","reported_estimate":"Deadweight loss of the unfunded system about 1% of GDP a year; shifting to a funded system has a net present-value gain of more than $15 trillion, about 3% of future GDP each year.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"31","authors":"Feldstein, M.; Samwick, A.","year":"1998","title":"The Transition Path in Privatizing Social Security","venue":"In M. Feldstein (ed.), Privatizing Social Security, University of Chicago Press/NBER (NBER WP 5761)","type":"book","url":"https://www.nber.org/system/files/chapters/c6251/c6251.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"About 2.04-2.1% of payroll in accounts replaces the 12.4% payroll tax long-run; transition burden +0.82% of payroll in year 1, +1.58% by year 15 (1-3% range); deadweight loss falls by 1.57% of payroll; family example: parents lose $11,680, children gain >$23,000 (3% discount); aggregate PV for those aged 20-65 negative; at 5.4% return, long-run contribution 3.31%.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"31","authors":"Kotlikoff, L. J.","year":"1998","title":"Simulating the Privatization of Social Security in General Equilibrium","venue":"In M. Feldstein (ed.), Privatizing Social Security, University of Chicago Press/NBER, ch. 7","type":"book","url":"https://www.nber.org/system/files/chapters/c6252/c6252.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Efficiency gain to future generations with transition generations compensated (LSRA): 7.23% of lifetime income (cold-turkey), 4.33% (consumption-tax financing), 1.65% (income tax), 1.08% (payroll tax); -1.22% with income-tax financing and 30% benefit-tax linkage. Uncompensated long run: capital +57%, output +17%, wages +10%; oldest generation loses ~26%.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"31","authors":"Kotlikoff, L. J.; Smetters, K.; Walliser, J.","year":"1999","title":"Privatizing Social Security in the United States: Comparing the Options","venue":"Review of Economic Dynamics 2(3): 532-574","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/red/issued/v2y1999i3p532-574.html","doi":"10.1006/redy.1999.0068","reported_estimate":"Privatization 'can substantially raise long-run living standards' but imposes welfare losses on transition generations and takes a long time to pay off.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"31","authors":"Geanakoplos, J.; Mitchell, O. S.; Zeldes, S. P.","year":"1998","title":"Would a Privatized Social Security System Really Pay a Higher Rate of Return?","venue":"In Arnold, Graetz & Munnell (eds.), Framing the Social Security Debate, Brookings Institution Press, 137-156 (NBER WP 6713)","type":"book","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w6713","doi":"10.3386/w6713","reported_estimate":"Paying accrued benefits requires a permanent new tax of about 3% of payroll, which erases the rate-of-return advantage of individual accounts; gains from privatization and diversification are much smaller than claimed (basis of the low end, BCR about 1).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"31","authors":"Cooley, T. F.; Soares, J.","year":"1999","title":"Privatizing Social Security","venue":"Review of Economic Dynamics 2: 731-755","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/tcooley/papers/pri_soc_sec.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Privatizing is long-run welfare-improving, but every feasible transition uses debt that shifts cost to unborn generations; a majority never supports transition in the first two periods.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"31","authors":"Schmidt-Hebbel, K.","year":"1998","title":"Does Pension Reform Really Spur Productivity, Saving, and Growth?","venue":"Central Bank of Chile Working Paper No. 33","type":"working_paper","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/p/chb/bcchwp/33.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Chile's 1981 funded-account reform improved labour markets and raised saving, investment and productivity; it accounts for about a quarter of Chile's growth increase.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"31","authors":"Board of Trustees, Federal OASDI Trust Funds","year":"2026","title":"2026 OASDI Trustees Report, Section VI.F (Infinite-horizon and closed-group obligations)","venue":"Social Security Administration","type":"government","url":"https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/2026/VI_F_infinite.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Open-group unfunded obligation $29.3T through 2100 and $71.9T over the infinite horizon; closed-group (past and current participants) unfunded obligation $55.6T (present values, 1 Jan 2026).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"31","authors":"Board of Trustees, Federal OASDI Trust Funds","year":"2026","title":"2026 OASDI Trustees Report, Section II.B (Trust fund operations in 2025)","venue":"Social Security Administration","type":"government","url":"https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/2026/II_B_cyoper.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"2025: net payroll tax contributions $1,322.6bn; total income $1,449.3bn; total cost $1,609.5bn; benefit payments $1,596.5bn.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"31","authors":"Diamond, P. A.","year":"1999","title":"Administrative Costs and Equilibrium Charges with Individual Accounts","venue":"NBER Working Paper 7050","type":"working_paper","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w7050","doi":"10.3386/w7050","reported_estimate":"A government-organised individual-account system might cost $40-50 per worker per year; privately organised accounts would cost considerably more.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"31","authors":"Board of Trustees, Federal OASDI Trust Funds","year":"2026","title":"2026 OASDI Trustees Report, Section II.A (Highlights)","venue":"Social Security Administration","type":"government","url":"https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/2026/II_A_highlights.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"About 185 million people paid payroll taxes on covered earnings in 2025; 70 million beneficiaries in December 2025.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"31","authors":"U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics via Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED)","year":"2026","title":"Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items (CPIAUCSL), annual average","venue":"FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis","type":"government","url":"https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL","doi":"","reported_estimate":"CPI-U annual average 166.583 (1999), 229.586 (2012), 321.962 (2025).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"31","authors":"Diamond, P. A.; Orszag, P. R.","year":"2005","title":"Saving Social Security","venue":"Journal of Economic Perspectives 19(2): 11-32 (authors per the Brookings book; the JEP page loaded did not list them) (see also the book Saving Social Security: A Balanced Approach, Brookings 2004/2005)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://plosjournal.deepdyve.com/lp/american-economic-association/saving-social-security-SM6A6unK2v","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Costs are projected to rise by about 2.5% of GDP over 75 years; solvency can be restored with modest benefit cuts and revenue increases, and 'major surgery is neither warranted nor desirable'.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Argues for a progressive pay-as-you-go fix instead of accounts and gives no BCR for privatization. Its main point, that account returns are offset by legacy debt, is already carried into the low end through Geanakoplos, Mitchell & Zeldes."},{"policy_id":"31","authors":"Orszag, P. R.; Stiglitz, J. E.","year":"2001","title":"Rethinking Pension Reform: Ten Myths About Social Security Systems","venue":"In Holzmann & Stiglitz (eds.), New Ideas About Old Age Security, World Bank","type":"intl_org","url":"https://business.columbia.edu/faculty/research/rethinking-pension-reform-ten-myths-about-social-security-systems","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Challenges the claims that individual accounts raise saving, returns and labour-market efficiency; argues pension design must fit country circumstances.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"A qualitative critique with no quantified welfare estimate to put in the range."},{"policy_id":"31","authors":"Gill, I. S.; Packard, T.; Yermo, J.","year":"2005","title":"Keeping the Promise of Social Security in Latin America","venue":"World Bank and Stanford University Press","type":"intl_org","url":"https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/91607899-d1ca-5f42-8bb9-65693ea3ad96/full","doi":"10.1596/0-8213-5817-0","reported_estimate":"Reviews more than a decade of Latin American pension privatizations (two decades for Chile): reforms 'undoubtedly a major step forward' but 'still works in progress'; the full report documents coverage and fee problems.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Evaluates implementation in developing countries with weaker capital markets; gives no BCR comparable with the US models."},{"policy_id":"32","authors":"Feldstein, M.","year":"1999","title":"Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax","venue":"Review of Economics and Statistics 81(4): 674-680","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w5055","doi":"10.1162/003465399558391","reported_estimate":"Deadweight loss >12x Harberger's classic estimate; raising revenue via proportional rate increases costs ~$2 of deadweight loss per $1 of extra revenue","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"32","authors":"Ballard, C. L.; Shoven, J. B.; Whalley, J.","year":"1982","title":"The Welfare Cost of Distortions in the United States Tax System: A General Equilibrium Approach","venue":"NBER Working Paper 1043 (published as 'General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States', American Economic Review 75(1): 128-138, 1985)","type":"working_paper","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/1043.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Marginal welfare loss from raising an additional dollar of revenue 34-48 cents; replacing the existing tax system with lump-sum taxes gains $1.8-3.1 trillion, 13-22 cents per dollar of revenue; a consumption-type VAT yields larger efficiency gains than a proportional income tax.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"32","authors":"Hendren, N.; Sprung-Keyser, B.","year":"2020","title":"A Unified Welfare Analysis of Government Policies","venue":"Quarterly Journal of Economics 135(3): 1209-1318","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://academic.oup.com/qje/article/135/3/1209/5781614","doi":"10.1093/qje/qjaa006","reported_estimate":"MVPFs of top-income-tax-rate changes: 1981 cut infinite (95% CI 0.94-inf; conventional BCR 1.67), 1986 44.27 (CI 2.37-inf), 1993 increase 1.85 (CI 1.19-4.07), 2013 increase 1.16","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"32","authors":"Saez, E.; Slemrod, J.B.; Giertz, S.H.","year":"2012","title":"The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review","venue":"Journal of Economic Literature 50(1): 3-50","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257%2Fjel.50.1.3","doi":"10.1257/jel.50.1.3","reported_estimate":"Elasticity estimates vary considerably by method and period; frames deadweight-loss calculations (counterweight to high-elasticity estimates)","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"32","authors":"Chodorow-Reich, G.; Zidar, O.; Zwick, E.","year":"2024","title":"Lessons from the Biggest Business Tax Cut in US History","venue":"Journal of Economic Perspectives 38(3): 61-88 (NBER WP 32672)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/jep.38.3.61","doi":"10.1257/jep.38.3.61","reported_estimate":"TCJA corporate provisions: corporate revenue fell ~40% (0.63% of GDP/yr over first decade); corporate investment +8-14%; long-run domestic corporate capital +7%; long-run GDP +0.9% (first-decade average +0.44%); labour income up < $1,000 per worker vs CEA's $4,000-9,000; individual-tax offsets only 1.5-6.3% of the revenue loss.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"32","authors":"Congressional Budget Office","year":"2025","title":"Monthly Budget Review: Summary for Fiscal Year 2025","venue":"CBO","type":"government","url":"https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2025-11/61307-MBR-FY25-final.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"FY2025: individual income taxes $2,656bn; corporate income taxes $452bn; payroll taxes $1,748bn; total receipts $5,235bn; outlays $7,010bn; deficit $1,775bn.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"32","authors":"Hodge, S.A.; Rock, C.","year":"2024","title":"Tax Complexity Now Costs the U.S. Economy Over $546 Billion Annually","venue":"Tax Foundation (6 Aug 2024; updated 27 Aug 2025)","type":"think_tank","url":"https://taxfoundation.org/data/all/federal/irs-tax-compliance-costs/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Total federal tax compliance cost $546.1bn in 2024 (7.92bn hours; $412.8bn time + $133.3bn out-of-pocket), from OIRA/IRS paperwork-burden estimates. Individual income tax returns $145.4bn; business income-tax returns $118.9bn; employer quarterly return $44.8bn; depreciation $25.4bn; estates and trusts $20.2bn; QBI deduction $19.0bn.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"32","authors":"Bergh, A.; Henrekson, M.","year":"2011","title":"Government Size and Growth: A Survey and Interpretation of the Evidence","venue":"Journal of Economic Surveys 25(5): 872-897","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://portal.research.lu.se/en/publications/government-size-and-growth-a-survey-and-interpretation-of-the-evi/","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-6419.2011.00697.x","reported_estimate":"In rich countries, a 10-percentage-point increase in government size is associated with 0.5-1% lower annual growth; authors warn of pitfalls in a causal reading.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"32","authors":"Altig, D.; Auerbach, A.J.; Kotlikoff, L.J.; Smetters, K.A.; Walliser, J.","year":"2001","title":"Simulating Fundamental Tax Reform in the United States","venue":"American Economic Review 91(3): 574-595","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.91.3.574","doi":"10.1257/aer.91.3.574","reported_estimate":"Significant long-run output increases for some reforms replacing the income tax (e.g., consumption taxes); smaller gains for reforms protecting low-income and older generations","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"32","authors":"York, E.; Watson, G.","year":"2023","title":"Fair Tax Plan: National Sales Tax (FairTax Act analysis)","venue":"Tax Foundation blog (updated Dec 2023)","type":"think_tank","url":"https://taxfoundation.org/blog/fair-tax-national-sales-tax/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Proposed 23% inclusive (29.8% exclusive) rate falls short of revenue neutrality; Gale estimates at least 44% needed; less progressive than current system","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"32","authors":"Gray, G.; Holtz-Eakin, D.","year":"2023","title":"Evaluation and Macroeconomic Impact of the FairTax","venue":"American Action Forum research","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.americanactionforum.org/research/evaluation-and-macroeconomic-impact-of-the-fairtax/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"GDP +3.1% on average over first 5 years (investment +18.3%, consumption -3.0%); revenue-maintaining tax-inclusive rate 27.8%-68.8%","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"32","authors":"US Constitution (National Archives transcript)","year":"1787","title":"The Constitution of the United States: A Transcription, Article V","venue":"National Archives","type":"government","url":"https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Amendments require two-thirds of both Houses (or a convention) and ratification by three-fourths of the states","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"32","authors":"Internal Revenue Service","year":"2026","title":"IRS Budget and Workforce (IRS Data Book, FY2025, Table 6)","venue":"IRS Statistics of Income","type":"government","url":"https://www.irs.gov/statistics/irs-budget-and-workforce","doi":"","reported_estimate":"IRS actual expenditures were $19.0 billion for overall operations in FY2025; 95,226 FTE.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"32","authors":"Coffey, B.; McLaughlin, P. A.; Peretto, P. F.","year":"2020","title":"The cumulative cost of regulations","venue":"Review of Economic Dynamics 38: 1-21","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2020.03.004","doi":"10.1016/j.red.2020.03.004","reported_estimate":"Federal regulation added since 1980 cut growth ~0.8 pp/yr; 2012 GDP ~$4T lower.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Measures regulation, not taxes or spending, so it does not price this policy's sub-policies."},{"policy_id":"32","authors":"Hendren, N.; Sprung-Keyser, B.","year":"2020","title":"A Unified Welfare Analysis of Government Policies","venue":"Quarterly Journal of Economics 135(3): 1209-1318","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://academic.oup.com/qje/article/135/3/1209/5781614","doi":"10.1093/qje/qjaa006","reported_estimate":"Comparative welfare analysis of 133 US policy changes; direct investments in children's health and education often have very high MVPFs.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Not a separate estimate. It shows that if the 'shrink government' cuts fall on high-MVPF programmes, the ratio could fall below 1; the range assumes cut spending is worth $1 per $1."},{"policy_id":"32","authors":"Jorgenson, D. W.","year":"2012","title":"Comprehensive Tax Reform and U.S. Energy Policy (testimony to the Senate Finance Committee, June 12, 2012)","venue":"U.S. Senate Committee on Finance","type":"government","url":"https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Jorgenson%20Testimony.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Jorgenson-Yun 'Efficient Taxation of Income' would generate growth equivalent to a $7 trillion increase in national wealth (then ~$60 trillion).","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Senate testimony, not a study of income-tax repeal; Jorgenson-Yun's reform keeps an income tax. Cross-check only."},{"policy_id":"33","authors":"Fretwell, H.; Regan, S.","year":"2015","title":"Divided Lands: State vs. Federal Management in the West","venue":"PERC Public Lands Report","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.perc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/150303_PERC_DividedLands.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"States earn $14.51 per $1 spent managing trust lands vs $0.73 for USFS/BLM; timber $2.51 vs $0.32-0.38; grazing $4.89 vs $0.10-0.14; minerals $138.08 vs $19.76; recreation $6.86 vs $0.20-0.28.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"33","authors":"Jakus, P. M.; Stambro, J. E.; Hogue, M.; Downen, J.; Pace, L.; Grijalva, T. C.","year":"2017","title":"Western Public Lands and the Fiscal Implications of a Transfer to States","venue":"Land Economics 93(3):371-389","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/uwp/landec/v93y2017i3p371-389.html","doi":"10.3368/le.93.3.371","reported_estimate":"States can cover management costs with land-based revenues if they have access to fossil fuel and timber resources at favorable prices; federal lands generate less economic value than private lands.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"33","authors":"Stambro, J. E. (with Jakus, P. M. et al.)","year":"2014","title":"An Analysis of a Transfer of Federal Lands to the State of Utah","venue":"Utah Economic and Business Review 74(3), Bureau of Economic and Business Research, University of Utah","type":"working_paper","url":"https://d36oiwf74r1rap.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/uebr2014no3.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Managing 31.2m acres would cost ~$248m/yr by 2017 (~$280m with PILT); 2017 revenues $202.7-377.6m (low prices) to $235.1-422.0m (high prices); profitable only if oil/gas prices stay high and Utah gets 100% of royalties.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"33","authors":"Edwards, C.; O'Toole, R.","year":"2012","title":"Reforming Federal Land Management","venue":"Cato Institute, DownsizingGovernment.org essay","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.cato.org/downsizing-government-essay/reforming-federal-land-management","doi":"","reported_estimate":"BLM/NPS/FWS spent $7.8bn vs $5.2bn revenues (2010); Interior deferred maintenance $13.5-19.9bn; BLM revenue almost all from <1 million of 256 million acres.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"33","authors":"Anderson, T. L.; Smith, V. L.; Simmons, E.","year":"1999","title":"How and Why to Privatize Federal Lands","venue":"Cato Policy Analysis No. 363","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa363.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Proposes auctioning federal lands (one-third of US land area) over 20-40 years using equal per-citizen 'public land share certificates'.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"33","authors":"Anderson, T. L.; Leal, D. R.","year":"2015","title":"Free Market Environmentalism for the Next Generation","venue":"Palgrave Macmillan","type":"book","url":"https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/9781137443397","doi":"10.1057/9781137443397","reported_estimate":"","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"33","authors":"Hazlett, T. W.; Munoz, R. E.","year":"2009","title":"A Welfare Analysis of Spectrum Allocation Policies","venue":"RAND Journal of Economics 40(3): 424-454","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://techliberation.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Hazlett.Munoz.RandJournalofEconomics.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"US: +60 MHz cuts prices ~8% and raises consumer surplus ~$8.8bn/yr vs ~$3.0bn tax-efficiency value of licence sales; UK 140 MHz: ~$39bn consumer gains; Belgium/Greece: consumer losses from withheld spectrum 15-20x the social value of revenue; US consumer surplus at least $150bn/yr vs $53bn total licence revenue; estimates are lower bounds.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"33","authors":"Hazlett, T. W.","year":"2008","title":"Optimal Abolition of FCC Spectrum Allocation","venue":"Journal of Economic Perspectives 22(1): 103-128","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/jecper/v22y2008i1p103-128.html","doi":"10.1257/jep.22.1.103","reported_estimate":"Evidence from cellular liberalization shows large efficiency gains from the price system; proposes exclusive frequency rights and abolishing FCC central allocation (no single BCR).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"33","authors":"Kahn, C.; Hanson, S.; Giles, S.; Freeberg, C.; Ribeiro, L.","year":"2021","title":"The C-Band Spectrum Auction: Retrospective and Prospective Observations","venue":"MITRE","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.mitre.org/news-insights/publication/c-band-spectrum-auction-retrospective-and-prospective-observations","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Auction 107: 280 MHz (3.7-3.98 GHz); $80.9bn clock-phase proceeds plus $9.7bn accelerated clearing payments, $3.3bn relocation costs, $0.3bn assignment premiums.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"33","authors":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","year":"2008","title":"Federal Land Management: Federal Land Transaction Facilitation Act Restrictions and Management Weaknesses Limit Future Sales and Acquisitions (GAO-08-196)","venue":"GAO report","type":"government","url":"https://gao.gov/assets/a271917.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"BLM raised $95.7m mostly by selling 16,659 acres (265 sales, July 2000-May 2007) and spent $3.2m ($3,171,956) on FLTFA administrative expenses to conduct land sales; no more than 20% of proceeds may be used for administration. Derived: 3.3% of proceeds, about $190 per acre.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"33","authors":"Larson, W.","year":"2015","title":"New Estimates of Value of Land of the United States (BEA Working Paper WP2015-3)","venue":"Bureau of Economic Analysis Working Paper","type":"government","url":"https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/papers/WP2015-3.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Land in the lower 48 states and DC worth about $23 trillion in 2009; the federal government holds about $1.8 trillion (about 8%).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"33","authors":"O'Laughlin, J.","year":"2014","title":"Would a transfer of federal lands to the State of Idaho make or lose money? (Issue Brief No. 16)","venue":"University of Idaho, College of Natural Resources, Policy Analysis Group","type":"think_tank","url":"https://objects.lib.uidaho.edu/ir/ir0077.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Executive summary and Table 7 (p.15): net cash flow to Idaho -$111m/yr (low: 500 mmbf at $150/mbf), -$60m (medium), +$24m (high: 1 bn bf at $250/mbf); Table 6 (p.14): gross timber revenue $75m / $160m / $250m with management costs at 40% of revenue; wildfire $40m, recreation $7m, highways $12m, SRS payments $31.2m, PILT $1.0-1.9m, BLM lands net cost $53m a year.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"33","authors":"Haefele, M.; Loomis, J.; Bilmes, L.","year":"2016","title":"Total Economic Value of US National Park Service Estimated to be $92 Billion: Implications for Policy","venue":"George Wright Forum 33(3): 335-345","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/total-economic-value-us-national-park-service-estimated-be-92-billion-implications","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Survey-based total economic value of NPS lands and programmes about $92bn a year (use plus non-use).","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Values parks under current management; it does not estimate how much value would be lost under private or trust ownership, so it cannot enter the ratio. It shows the non-market stakes are large."},{"policy_id":"33","authors":"U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis","year":"2024","title":"Outdoor Recreation Satellite Account, U.S. and States, 2023","venue":"BEA News Release","type":"government","url":"https://bea.gov/news/2024/outdoor-recreation-satellite-account-us-and-states-2023","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Outdoor recreation value added $639.5bn, 2.3% of US GDP in 2023 (non-market value at stake in public-land policy).","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Measures the size of outdoor recreation (value added), not the change from privatization."},{"policy_id":"33","authors":"Stambro, J. E. (with Jakus, P. M. et al.)","year":"2014","title":"An Analysis of a Transfer of Federal Lands to the State of Utah","venue":"Utah Economic and Business Review 74(3), Bureau of Economic and Business Research, University of Utah","type":"working_paper","url":"https://d36oiwf74r1rap.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/uebr2014no3.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Low-energy-price scenario: ~$202.7m revenue vs ~$280m cost incl. PILT replacement, ratio 0.72.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"A state takeover that keeps federal-style obligations (PILT) under low commodity prices; it is not a sale to private owners, so it is shown as the downside case rather than the low end."},{"policy_id":"34","authors":"World Bank","year":"2017","title":"The Sunken Billions Revisited: Progress and Challenges in Global Marine Fisheries","venue":"World Bank, Environment and Sustainable Development series","type":"intl_org","url":"https://imcsnet.org/sites/default/files/media_files/The-Sunken-Billion-Revisited-Progress-and-Challenges-in-Global-Marine-Fisheries.pdf","doi":"10.1596/978-1-4648-0919-4","reported_estimate":"Foregone net benefits $83.3bn in 2012 (95% CI $49.7-104.9bn); net benefits $3.0bn now vs $86.3bn optimal; effort must fall ~44%; PV (5%, 20 yr) $514bn current path, $1,196bn moderate path, $1,465bn rapid path; rapid path loses ~$44bn over 4 years, moderate path $0.3bn in year 1; governance costs 1-14% of landings value; optimal revenue $140.6bn.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"34","authors":"World Bank","year":"2017","title":"Giving Oceans a Break Could Generate $83 Billion in Additional Benefits for Fisheries (press release, 14 Feb 2017)","venue":"World Bank","type":"intl_org","url":"https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2017/02/14/giving-oceans-a-break-could-generate-83-billion-in-additional-benefits-for-fisheries","doi":"","reported_estimate":"~$83bn foregone benefits in 2012; reform could raise sector profits from ~$3bn to ~$86bn a year; report 'does not prescribe a particular reform path'.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"34","authors":"Costello, C.; Gaines, S. D.; Lynham, J.","year":"2008","title":"Can Catch Shares Prevent Fisheries Collapse?","venue":"Science 321(5896): 1678-1681","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://msi.ucsb.edu/news/new-study-ucsb-hawaii-scientists-offers-solution-global-fisheries-collapse","doi":"10.1126/science.1159910","reported_estimate":"Data on 11,000+ fisheries: nearly a third of open-access fisheries have collapsed, about half that rate under catch shares.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"34","authors":"Costello, C.; Ovando, D.; Clavelle, T.; et al.","year":"2016","title":"Global fishery prospects under contrasting management regimes","venue":"Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113(18): 5125-5129","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.escholarship.org/content/qt0cq3n2c6/qt0cq3n2c6.pdf","doi":"10.1073/pnas.1520420113","reported_estimate":"Rights-based fishery management vs business-as-usual by 2050: +16 MMT catch, +$53bn annual profit, +619 MMT biomass; median fishery reaches recovery targets in under 10 years; 98% of stocks could be healthy by mid-century.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"34","authors":"Grafton, R. Q.; Squires, D.; Fox, K. J.","year":"2000","title":"Private Property and Economic Efficiency: A Study of a Common-Pool Resource","venue":"Journal of Law and Economics 43(2): 679-713","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jlawec/v43y2000i2p679-713.html","doi":"10.1086/467469","reported_estimate":"BC halibut ITQ natural experiment: efficiency gains in cost, revenue and product form after private harvesting rights, though they take years to appear and are limited by restrictions on transferability and duration.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"34","authors":"Mangin, T.; Costello, C.; Anderson, J.; Arnason, R.; Elliott, M.; Gaines, S. D.; Hilborn, R.; Peterson, E.; Sumaila, R.","year":"2018","title":"Are fishery management upgrades worth the cost?","venue":"PLOS ONE 13(9): e0204258","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0204258","doi":"10.1371/journal.pone.0204258","reported_estimate":"p.14: catch-share reform in the top 25 fishing nations, BCRs 1.7-268 (median ~14); global BCR 9.3 (catch shares) and 9.4 (catch controls); 7.0 and 10.1 when costs scale with revenue. p.15: extreme-cost case ($489/t) global BCR 2.8 for catch shares. Table 2 (p.16): global management cost (72.4% of catch) $7.6bn (2012), $8.0bn (2050 BAU), $15.0bn (2050 catch shares), $30.91bn (extreme). p.3: literature costs 3-28% of landings (Iceland, Newfoundland, Norway), OECD average 6% (0-70%), Australia/UK/US 7-30%, Thailand 0.7-1.64%, Namibia 3.7-5.9%. p.16: 'in most countries, taxpayers end up paying'.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"34","authors":"Arnason, R.; Hannesson, R.; Schrank, W. E.","year":"2000","title":"Costs of fisheries management: the cases of Iceland, Norway and Newfoundland","venue":"Marine Policy 24(3): 233-243","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/marpol/v24y2000i3p233-243.html","doi":"10.1016/S0308-597X(99)00029-9","reported_estimate":"Abstract: management costs as a percent of the gross value of landings are 'by far highest in Newfoundland (15-25%), lowest in Iceland (about 3%), with Norway in the middle (about 10%)'.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"34","authors":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","year":"2005","title":"Individual Fishing Quotas: Management Costs Varied and Were Not Recovered as Required (GAO-05-241)","venue":"GAO report to Congress, 11 March 2005","type":"government","url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-GAO-05-241/html/GAOREPORTS-GAO-05-241.htm","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Results in Brief: FY2003 management costs of the Alaskan halibut and sablefish IFQ program at least $3.2m, 1.4% of ex-vessel value; surfclam/ocean quahog IFQ at least $274,000, under 0.5%; cost-recovery fee capped at 3% of ex-vessel value; NMFS recovered about $3.2m of halibut/sablefish incremental costs and nothing for the other two programs.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"34","authors":"Metzner, R. (comp.); Harte, M. (New Zealand chapter)","year":"2008","title":"Report of the Expert Consultation on Low-cost Fisheries Management Strategies and Cost Recovery, Georgetown, Guyana, 4-7 September 2007 (FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Report No. 853)","venue":"FAO, Rome (ISBN 978-92-5-106092-6)","type":"intl_org","url":"https://www.fao.org/docrep/pdf/011/i0405e/i0405e02.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"p.134: Nicaragua government fisheries management spending 0.66% of the value of landings (2002-04 average, Table 10); Arnason et al. Iceland 3%, Norway 8%, Newfoundland 20%; Cox (2002) Australian Commonwealth fisheries 7.2%. Harte (pp.147-205), p.155: New Zealand management cost 4% of landed value 'compared to an OECD average of 17 percent'; p.179-180: industry cost-recovery levies predicted to fall to 38% of Ministry of Fisheries expenditure in 2005/06.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"34","authors":"Wyatt, N. (Ministry of Fisheries, New Zealand)","year":"2000","title":"Why recover costs? Cost recovery and property rights in New Zealand","venue":"In Shotton, R. (ed.), Use of Property Rights in Fisheries Management, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 404/1","type":"intl_org","url":"https://www.fao.org/4/x8985e/x8985e0e.htm","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Current costs of fisheries services borne by the Crown and by industry are 'close to $NZ23 million and $NZ39 million respectively', i.e. industry pays about 63%.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"34","authors":"Essington, T. E.","year":"2010","title":"Ecological indicators display reduced variation in North American catch share fisheries","venue":"Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107(2): 754-759","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://agris.fao.org/search/en/records/65df84004c5aef494fe32200","doi":"10.1073/pnas.0907252107","reported_estimate":"Catch shares markedly reduced year-to-year variability in exploitation, landings and discards, but average levels of most indicators (except discards) were unchanged.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Suggests the ecological gain is mainly stability rather than better averages, which cautions against the high end. It gives no economic value to put in the ratio."},{"policy_id":"34","authors":"Pinkerton, E.; Edwards, D. N.","year":"2009","title":"The elephant in the room: The hidden costs of leasing individual transferable fishing quotas","venue":"Marine Policy 33(4): 707-713","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/marpol/v33y2009i4p707-713.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"In the BC halibut ITQ fishery, quota leasing reduces economic benefits to active fishermen and society; challenges theoretical claims for ITQ benefits.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Concerns the distribution of rents (owners vs active fishers) more than total net benefit; used for who_benefits, not the ratio."},{"policy_id":"35","authors":"Selgin, G.; Lastrapes, W. D.; White, L. H.","year":"2012","title":"Has the Fed been a failure?","venue":"Journal of Macroeconomics 34(3)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0164070412000304","doi":"10.1016/j.jmacro.2012.02.003","reported_estimate":"Price level: $100 basket in 1790 cost $108 in 1913 but $2,422 in 2008; pre-Fed contractions not more severe than post-WWII and recoveries shorter (7.7 vs 10.6 months); 75-90% of Great Moderation attributed to good luck rather than policy (per Cato summary).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"35","authors":"Lucas, R. E., Jr.","year":"2000","title":"Inflation and Welfare","venue":"Econometrica 68(2):247-274","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0262.00109","doi":"10.1111/1468-0262.00109","reported_estimate":"Welfare gain of reducing inflation from 10% to zero is slightly under 1% of real income.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"35","authors":"Lagos, R.; Wright, R.","year":"2005","title":"A Unified Framework for Monetary Theory and Policy Analysis","venue":"Journal of Political Economy 113(3): 463-484","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/429804","doi":"10.1086/429804","reported_estimate":"Going from 10% to 0% inflation can be worth between 3% and 5% of consumption (search-theoretic model), several times Lucas-style estimates.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"35","authors":"Basel Committee on Banking Supervision","year":"2010","title":"An assessment of the long-term economic impact of stronger capital and liquidity requirements (LEI report)","venue":"Bank for International Settlements (also FSB)","type":"intl_org","url":"https://www.fsb.org/uploads/r_100818a.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Banking crises occur about once every 20-25 years (average annual probability ~4.5%); median cumulative discounted output loss per crisis 19% of pre-crisis GDP (no permanent effect), 63% (all studies), 158% (large permanent effects); each 1-point cut in annual crisis probability is worth ~0.2% (temporary) to ~0.6% (permanent) of output a year.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"35","authors":"Bordo, M.; Eichengreen, B.; Klingebiel, D.; Martinez-Peria, M. S.","year":"2001","title":"Is the crisis problem growing more severe?","venue":"Economic Policy 16(32): 52-82","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://academic.oup.com/economicpolicy/article-abstract/16/32/52/2366404","doi":"","reported_estimate":"120 years of data: crisis frequency since 1973 has been double that of the Bretton Woods and classical gold standard periods, matched only by the interwar years; output losses per crisis not larger.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"35","authors":"Watts, T.; Snyder, L.","year":"2015","title":"Current Evidence on the Resource Costs of Irredeemable Paper Money","venue":"Cato Journal 35(2)","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/2015/5/cj-v35n2-15.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Gold-standard resource cost Friedman (1960) ~2.5% of national product; Meltzer ~0.5% of GDP; White (1999) ~0.05% with ~2% reserves; measured classical gold standard 1879-1913 0.249% of GDP; Friedman-Meltzer costs $35.4-177bn/yr (2012$).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"35","authors":"Bordo, M. D.; Redish, A.; Rockoff, H.","year":"2015","title":"Why didn't Canada have a banking crisis in 2008 (or in 1930, or 1907, or ...)?","venue":"Economic History Review (NBER WP 17312, 2011)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w17312","doi":"10.1111/1468-0289.665","reported_estimate":"Canada's concentrated, branch-banking system avoided crises in 1907, 1930s and 2008 largely without (pre-1935) a central bank; stability attributed to banking structure.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"35","authors":"Lopez-Cordova, J.E.; Meissner, C.M.","year":"2003","title":"Exchange-Rate Regimes and International Trade: Evidence from the Classical Gold Standard Era","venue":"American Economic Review 93(1):344-353","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v93y2003i1p344-353.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"'two countries on gold would trade 60 percent more with each other'; a monetary union 'would more than double bilateral trade flows'.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"35","authors":"Estevadeordal, A.; Frantz, B.; Taylor, A.M.","year":"2003","title":"The Rise and Fall of World Trade, 1870-1939","venue":"Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(2):359-407 (NBER WP 9318)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w9318","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Going on gold raised trade by about 42%; 'Had the 1913 gold standard been applied in 1870, trade volumes would have been about 30 percent higher'; gold explains about 35% of the 1870-1913 rise in trade/GDP.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"35","authors":"Frankel, J. A.; Romer, D.","year":"1999","title":"Does Trade Cause Growth?","venue":"American Economic Review 89(3): 379-399","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.89.3.379","doi":"10.1257/aer.89.3.379","reported_estimate":"Raising the trade/GDP ratio by one percentage point 'raises income per person by between one-half and two percent'.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"35","authors":"World Bank, World Development Indicators","year":"2025","title":"Trade (% of GDP), NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS","venue":"World Bank","type":"intl_org","url":"https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS","doi":"","reported_estimate":"2024: United States 25.0%; world 56.7%.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"35","authors":"Bordo, M.D.; Rockoff, H.","year":"1996","title":"The Gold Standard as a \"Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval\"","venue":"Journal of Economic History 56(2):389-428","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/jechis/v56y1996i02p389-428_01.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"'the rate on a gold bond would be 40 basis points lower if the country were on the gold standard' (p. 413).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"35","authors":"Feldstein, M.","year":"1999","title":"The Costs and Benefits of Price Stability (introduction); Capital Income Taxes and the Benefit of Price Stability (NBER WP 6200)","venue":"University of Chicago Press / NBER","type":"working_paper","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w6200","doi":"10.3386/w6200","reported_estimate":"Net benefit of going from 2% inflation to price stability about 1% of GDP a year (US); Germany 1.4%, Spain 1.7%, UK 0.2%.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"35","authors":"Feldstein, M.","year":"1997","title":"The Costs and Benefits of Going from Low Inflation to Price Stability","venue":"NBER WP 5469; in Romer & Romer (eds.), Reducing Inflation","type":"working_paper","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w5469","doi":"10.3386/w5469","reported_estimate":"'annual deadweight loss of a two percent inflation rate is a surprisingly large one percent of GDP'.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"35","authors":"Dotsey, M.; Ireland, P.","year":"1996","title":"The Welfare Cost of Inflation in General Equilibrium","venue":"Journal of Monetary Economics 37(1):29-47","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/working_papers/1994/wp_94-4","doi":"","reported_estimate":"A sustained 4% inflation costs 0.41% of output a year (currency) and over 1% (M1).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"35","authors":"Friedman, M.","year":"1986","title":"The Resource Cost of Irredeemable Paper Money","venue":"Journal of Political Economy 94(3):642-647","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jpolec/v94y1986i3p642-47.html","doi":"10.1086/261393","reported_estimate":"The resource cost of gold and silver in private hoards under fiat 'may have been as great as or greater than it would have been under an effective gold standard' (p. 644).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"35","authors":"Mitchener, K.J.; Weidenmier, M.","year":"2008","title":"Trade and Empire","venue":"Economic Journal 118(533):1805-1834 (NBER WP 13765)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w13765","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Both countries on gold raised bilateral trade by between 18 and 57 percent (Table 2).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"35","authors":"Friedman, M.","year":"1960","title":"A Program for Monetary Stability","venue":"Fordham University Press (book)","type":"book","url":"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Program_for_Monetary_Stability","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Resource cost of a full commodity standard 'about 2.5 per cent of its national product' (as quoted in Watts & Snyder 2015).","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"1960 theoretical estimate for a full 100% commodity standard (2.5% of GDP); later measurement of the actual US classical gold standard found 0.249% (Watts & Snyder 2015), and fiat-era gold hoarding itself costs 0.014-0.022%."},{"policy_id":"35","authors":"Clark, P.; Tamirisa, N.; Wei, S.-J.","year":"2004","title":"Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade Flows - Some New Evidence","venue":"International Monetary Fund","type":"intl_org","url":"https://www.imf.org/external/np/res/exrate/2004/eng/051904.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"A negative effect of exchange-rate volatility on trade 'would appear to be fairly small and is by no means a robust, universal finding'.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Used for the low end (no trade gain)."},{"policy_id":"35","authors":"Bernanke, B.S.","year":"1995","title":"The Macroeconomics of the Great Depression: A Comparative Approach","venue":"Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 27(1):1-28 (NBER WP 4814)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w4814","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Over 1932-35 'the cumulative difference in log output levels was .310 ... in favor of countries not on gold'.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Depression-era episode; no published estimate of how often such episodes recur under a modern commodity standard."},{"policy_id":"36","authors":"Demirgüç-Kunt, A.; Detragiache, E.","year":"2002","title":"Does deposit insurance increase banking system stability? An empirical investigation","venue":"Journal of Monetary Economics 49(7): 1373-1406","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/moneco/v49y2002i7p1373-1406.html","doi":"10.1016/S0304-3932(02)00171-X","reported_estimate":"61 countries 1980-97, 40 systemic crises (4.4% of observations): explicit deposit insurance raises crisis probability, more so with wide coverage, government-run funded schemes, deregulated rates and weak institutions. The effect becomes insignificant at high institutional quality. Cutting US coverage to Swiss levels would have lowered the predicted probability of the 1980 US crisis from 4.3% to 2.5% (IMF WP 00/3 version, p.15).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"36","authors":"Laeven, L.; Valencia, F.","year":"2018","title":"Systemic Banking Crises Revisited (IMF Working Paper 18/206)","venue":"International Monetary Fund","type":"intl_org","url":"https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2018/09/14/Systemic-Banking-Crises-Revisited-46232","doi":"","reported_estimate":"151 systemic banking crises 1970-2017. US 2007 crisis: output loss 30.0% of trend GDP (cumulative over T to T+3), fiscal cost 4.5% of GDP gross (0.6% net), public debt +21.9% of GDP. Median fiscal cost 6.7% of GDP in high-income countries (3.3% net).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"36","authors":"Calomiris, C. W.; Jaremski, M.","year":"2019","title":"Stealing Deposits: Deposit Insurance, Risk-Taking, and the Removal of Market Discipline in Early 20th-Century Banks","venue":"Journal of Finance 74(2): 711-754","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jfinan/v74y2019i2p711-754.html","doi":"10.1111/jofi.12753","reported_estimate":"Early-1900s state deposit-insurance laws removed the market discipline that had constrained uninsured banks. Insured banks took more insolvency risk during the WWI farm boom, and the insurance systems collapsed with high losses when prices fell.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"36","authors":"Calomiris, C. W.","year":"1990","title":"Is Deposit Insurance Necessary? A Historical Perspective","venue":"Journal of Economic History 50(2): 283-295","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/jechis/v50y1990i02p283-295_03.html","doi":"10.1017/S0022050700036433","reported_estimate":"Antebellum and 1920s US experience: self-regulating mutual-liability schemes succeeded and compulsory state insurance systems failed. Branch banking improved stability.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"36","authors":"Anginer, D.; Demirgüç-Kunt, A.; Zhu, M.","year":"2014","title":"How does deposit insurance affect bank risk? Evidence from the recent crisis","venue":"Journal of Banking & Finance 48: 312-321","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/ypfs-documents/13908/","doi":"10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.09.013","reported_estimate":"Generous deposit insurance raised bank risk and systemic fragility in 2004-06 (log z-score coefficient -0.472) and lowered it during 2007-09 (+0.221). 'The overall effect of deposit insurance over the full sample remains negative' (WB PRWP 6289 version).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"36","authors":"Curry, T.; Shibut, L.","year":"2000","title":"The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and Consequences","venue":"FDIC Banking Review 13(2)","type":"government","url":"https://corpora.tika.apache.org/base/docs/govdocs1/436/436487.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Total S&L crisis loss ~$153bn, of which taxpayers ~$124bn (81%) and the industry ~$29bn (19%).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"36","authors":"Lucas, D.","year":"2019","title":"Measuring the Cost of Bailouts","venue":"Annual Review of Financial Economics 11: 85-108","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/135978","doi":"10.1146/annurev-financial-110217-022532","reported_estimate":"Total direct cost of 2008 crisis-related US bailouts 'on the order of $500 billion, or 3.5% of GDP in 2009'.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"36","authors":"Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (via Davis Polk client update)","year":"2023","title":"FDIC finalizes $16.3 billion special assessment to recover loss from SVB and Signature Bank failures","venue":"Davis Polk & Wardwell client update summarising FDIC final rule of 16 Nov 2023","type":"government","url":"https://www.davispolk.com/insights/client-update/fdic-finalizes-163-billion-special-assessment-recover-loss-svb-and-signature","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Estimated Deposit Insurance Fund loss from protecting uninsured depositors of SVB and Signature under the systemic-risk exception: ~$16.3bn, recovered at 13.4 bp a year on uninsured deposits over 8 quarters.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"36","authors":"International Monetary Fund","year":"2014","title":"Big Banks Benefit From Government Subsidies (IMF Survey, on GFSR April 2014 ch. 3)","venue":"IMF Survey","type":"intl_org","url":"https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/sopol033114a","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Implicit too-big-to-fail funding subsidy to global systemically important banks in 2012: up to $70bn in the US and up to $300bn in the euro area.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"36","authors":"Correia, S.; Luck, S.; Verner, E.","year":"2024","title":"Why Do Banks Fail? Bank Runs Versus Solvency (summary of 'Failing Banks', NBER WP 32907)","venue":"Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Liberty Street Economics","type":"working_paper","url":"https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2024/11/why-do-banks-fail-bank-runs-versus-solvency/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"5,000+ US bank failures 1865-2023. Insolvency is almost always the root cause, and runs can be ruled out as a plausible cause in >80% of pre-FDIC failures. Depositors lost ~30% in a typical pre-FDIC failure.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"36","authors":"Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation","year":"2025","title":"2024 Annual Report, Section II: Financial Highlights","venue":"FDIC Annual Report","type":"government","url":"https://fdic.gov/financial-reports/2024-annual-report-section2-financial-highlights","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Assessment revenue $11.6bn in 2024; DIF operating expenses $2,433m; DIF balance $137.1bn at 31 Dec 2024; reserve ratio 1.25% (30 Sep 2024).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"36","authors":"National Association of Insurance Commissioners","year":"2024","title":"U.S. Property & Casualty and Title Insurance Industries: 2024 Mid-Year Results","venue":"NAIC Financial Regulatory Services industry report","type":"government","url":"https://content.naic.org/sites/default/files/pc-and-title-2024mid-year-industry-report.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"P&C industry underwriting expense ratio 24.8% in the first half of 2024 (25.2% in H1 2023).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"36","authors":"Diamond, D. W.; Dybvig, P. H.","year":"1983","title":"Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity","venue":"Journal of Political Economy 91(3): 401-419","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://minneapolisfed.org/research/quarterly-review/bank-runs-deposit-insurance-and-liquidity","doi":"10.1086/261155","reported_estimate":"Theory: demand-deposit banks have a run equilibrium. 'there are circumstances when government provision of deposit insurance can produce superior contracts'.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Pure theory with no quantity. Its rationale enters the ratio through the Dávila & Goldstein cost estimate, which is calibrated on this class of model."},{"policy_id":"36","authors":"Dávila, E.; Goldstein, I.","year":"2023","title":"Optimal Deposit Insurance","venue":"Journal of Political Economy 131(7): 1676ff. (NBER WP 28676)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/2023-07/p1839.pdf","doi":"10.1086/723633","reported_estimate":"Optimal US coverage in 2008 ~ $381,000. Raising coverage from $100,000 to $200,000 is worth ~$13.2bn a year (9.46 bp of $14tn bank assets). 'the welfare gains from having a deposit insurance system at all are very large.'","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Used as the cost input (denominator) of both ends, not excluded. It is listed here because it is the strongest evidence that abolition lowers welfare, and on its own it implies a ratio below 1 for full abolition."},{"policy_id":"36","authors":"Egan, M.; Hortaçsu, A.; Matvos, G.","year":"2017","title":"Deposit Competition and Financial Fragility: Evidence from the US Banking Sector","venue":"American Economic Review 107(1): 169-216","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20150342","doi":"10.1257/aer.20150342","reported_estimate":"Structural model: uninsured deposits flee distressed banks and insured deposits do not. The calibrated model has multiple run equilibria, so banks can be very fragile.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Shows that uninsured funding is run-prone but gives no welfare figure for abolishing insurance, so it cannot be converted into a ratio."},{"policy_id":"37","authors":"Anderson, K.","year":"2012","title":"Trade Barriers (Copenhagen Consensus 2012 Challenge Paper)","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/publication/trade-barriers","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Doha Development Agenda: PV benefits $12-64 trillion vs costs <$400bn PV; BCR 90-180 globally, 140-250 for developing countries.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"37","authors":"Anderson, K.","year":"2015","title":"Post-2015 Consensus: Trade Assessment","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center (Post-2015 Consensus)","type":"think_tank","url":"https://copenhagenconsensus.com/post-2015-consensus/trade","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Doha completion: ~$2,000 world benefit per $1 (~$3,400 for developing countries); APEC FTA ~$1,700; TPP ~$1,200; ASEAN+3 ~$1,900; 160 million fewer in extreme poverty by 2030.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"37","authors":"Frankel, J. A.; Romer, D.","year":"1999","title":"Does Trade Cause Growth?","venue":"American Economic Review 89(3): 379-399","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.89.3.379","doi":"10.1257/aer.89.3.379","reported_estimate":"A 1-percentage-point increase in the trade share raises income per person by roughly 0.5-2%.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"37","authors":"Fajgelbaum, P. D.; Goldberg, P. K.; Kennedy, P. J.; Khandelwal, A. K.","year":"2020","title":"The Return to Protectionism","venue":"Quarterly Journal of Economics 135(1): 1-55","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w25638","doi":"","reported_estimate":"2018 US tariffs: $51bn (0.27% of GDP) loss to US buyers of imports; net aggregate real-income loss ~$7.2bn (0.04% of GDP) after tariff revenue and producer gains; full pass-through to domestic prices.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"37","authors":"Hong Kong Trade and Industry Department","year":"","title":"Hong Kong's Trade Policy","venue":"Government of the Hong Kong SAR","type":"government","url":"https://www.tid.gov.hk/en/our_work/hk_participation_in_ito/hk_trade_policy.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"'Hong Kong is a free port.' 'No tariff is charged on import or export of goods.'","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"37","authors":"Anderson, K.","year":"2015","title":"Benefits and Costs of the Trade Targets for the Post-2015 Development Agenda","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center, Post-2015 Consensus Assessment Paper (2015); republished as Chapter 9 in B. Lomborg (ed.), Prioritizing Development: A Cost Benefit Analysis of the UN's SDGs, Cambridge University Press, 2018 (https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/prioritizing-development/benefits-and-costs-of-the-trade-targets-for-the-post2015-development-agenda/6C7F2BE259D803132AA9E70957AAEC06)","type":"think_tank","url":"https://copenhagenconsensus.com/publication/post-2015-consensus-trade-assessment-anderson","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Doha completion with growth effects (one-fifth growth boost 2010-15, tapering to comparative-static by 2050): global BCR 1,300-2,800, developing countries 2,100-4,700 (3% and 5% discount rates); FTAAP 800-2,600 global.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"37","authors":"Wacziarg, R.; Welch, K. H.","year":"2008","title":"Trade Liberalization and Growth: New Evidence","venue":"World Bank Economic Review 22(2): 187-231","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://academic.oup.com/wber/article-abstract/22/2/187/1736899","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Countries that liberalized grew ~1.5 percentage points a year faster than before; investment rates rose 1.5-2.0 points; trade/GDP rose ~5 points.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"37","authors":"Anderson, K.; Winters, L. A.","year":"2008","title":"The Challenge of Reducing International Trade and Migration Barriers (Copenhagen Consensus 2008 Challenge Paper: Subsidies and Trade Barriers)","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center (also in Lomborg ed., Global Crises, Global Solutions, 2nd ed., Cambridge UP 2009)","type":"think_tank","url":"https://copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/imported/cp_subsidiesandtradebarrierscc08vol2.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Table 11: Doha liberalisation of subsidies and trade barriers, benefits to 2100 incl. dynamic gains: global BCR 932-1,121 at 3% and 269-363 at 6%; without dynamic gains 17-80; developing countries 692-3,147. Dynamic gains 'many times greater' than comparative-static gains.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"37","authors":"The Budget Lab at Yale","year":"2026","title":"The State of U.S. Tariffs: August 24, 2026","venue":"The Budget Lab at Yale","type":"think_tank","url":"https://budgetlab.yale.edu/research/state-us-tariffs","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Update of 24 Aug 2026: average statutory tariff rate 11.0% (11.8% by end-2026 under current law); consumer price impact ~0.7%; household costs ~$1,100 a year; revenue ~$1.9tn over ten years (somewhat lower after GDP effects).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"37","authors":"York, E.; Durante, A.","year":"2026","title":"Trump Tariffs: Tracking the Economic Impact of the Trump Trade War (updated 10 Sept 2026)","venue":"Tax Foundation","type":"think_tank","url":"https://taxfoundation.org/research/federal-tax/trump-tariffs-trade-war/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Tariffs raised taxes ~$1,000 per household in 2025 and $820 in 2026; $1.4tn revenue 2026-35 conventional (~$1tn dynamic); long-run GDP -0.4%; applied tariff rate 11.8% (1.5% in 2022); -338,000 FTE jobs; retaliation a further -0.1% GDP. The Supreme Court struck down the IEEPA tariffs on 20 Feb 2026 (Learning Resources v. Trump).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"37","authors":"U.S. International Trade Commission","year":"1995","title":"The Economic Effects of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders and Suspension Agreements (Inv. 332-344, Pub. 2900)","venue":"USITC Publication 2900","type":"government","url":"https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub2900.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Removing the 1991 AD/CVD orders gives a net US welfare gain of $1.59bn (0.03% of GDP); losses to petitioning and upstream industries of $320m-$1.09bn vs gains to the rest of the economy of $2.17-2.94bn.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"37","authors":"Gallaway, M. P.; Blonigen, B. A.; Flynn, J. E.","year":"1999","title":"Welfare costs of the U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty laws","venue":"Journal of International Economics 49(2): 211-244","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0022199698000634","doi":"10.1016/S0022-1996(98)00063-4","reported_estimate":"Collective net economic welfare cost of US AD/CVD orders ~$4bn in 1993, among the most costly US import restraint programs.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"37","authors":"World Trade Organization","year":"2015","title":"World Trade Report 2015: Speeding up trade: benefits and challenges of implementing the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement","venue":"WTO (report; press release PRESS/755, 26 Oct 2015)","type":"intl_org","url":"https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres15_e/pr755_e.htm","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Full TFA implementation cuts members' trade costs by 14.5% on average; global merchandise exports +$750bn-1T/yr (CGE); +0.5% GDP growth per annum; gravity model: +$1.8-3.6T exports, LDC exports +13-36%","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"37","authors":"Moïsé, E.","year":"2013","title":"The Costs and Challenges of Implementing Trade Facilitation Measures","venue":"OECD Trade Policy Papers (14 May 2013)","type":"intl_org","url":"https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/the-costs-and-challenges-of-implementing-trade-facilitation-measures_5k46hzqxt8jh-en.html","doi":"10.1787/5k46hzqxt8jh-en","reported_estimate":"Capital expenditure EUR 3.5-19M per country; annual operating costs no more than EUR 2.5M; costs 'not particularly large and far smaller than the benefits'","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"37","authors":"Feyrer, J.; Tyazhelnikov, V.; Aleman-Castilla, B.; Wong, B.","year":"2023","title":"Benefit-Cost Analysis of Increased Trade: An Order-of-Magnitude Estimate of the Benefit-Cost Ratio","venue":"Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis 14(S1)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://doi.org/10.1017/bca.2023.12","doi":"10.1017/bca.2023.12","reported_estimate":"~5% rise in global trade (10% tariff cut, 10% lower effective distance, deeper FTAs): benefits $700bn (0.83% of world GDP) vs costs $100bn (0.12%) in year one; BCR ~100 for low/lower-middle income, ~50 upper-middle, ~5 high-income; overall 11 (per Lomborg 2023 intro). Authors say the BCRs are at the low end of the plausible range.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Measures a partial 5% rise in world trade, static and year-one only; authors call their BCRs the low end of the plausible range. Not full free trade."},{"policy_id":"37","authors":"Lomborg, B.","year":"2023","title":"Save 4.2 Million Lives and Generate $1.1 Trillion in Economic Benefits for Only $41 Billion: Introduction to the Special Issue on the Most Efficient Policies for the Sustainable Development Goals","venue":"Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis 14(S1): 1-15","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://doi.org/10.1017/bca.2023.32","doi":"10.1017/bca.2023.32","reported_estimate":"Halftime 'best buy' list: trade BCR 95 for the poorer half of the world, 11 globally, 7 for high-income; $1.7bn annual cost.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Reports the same partial, static Halftime trade intervention (global 11, high-income 7, poorer half 95); narrower than full liberalisation."},{"policy_id":"37","authors":"Egger, P.; Nelson, D.","year":"2011","title":"How Bad Is Antidumping? Evidence from Panel Data","venue":"Review of Economics and Statistics 93(4): 1374-1390","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://direct.mit.edu/rest/article/93/4/1374/57911/How-Bad-Is-Antidumping-Evidence-from-Panel-Data","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Volume and welfare effects of antidumping 1948-2001 are 'negative but quite modest'.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Supports the sign but says the anti-dumping sub-policy's gains are modest. That is consistent with treating it as a small add-on to the free-trade core rather than a driver of the range."},{"policy_id":"38","authors":"Davis, L. W.","year":"2014","title":"The Economic Cost of Global Fuel Subsidies","venue":"American Economic Review 104(5): 581-585 (NBER WP 19736)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/19736","doi":"10.1257/aer.104.5.581","reported_estimate":"'road-sector subsidies for gasoline and diesel totaled $110 billion in 2012'; 'the total annual deadweight loss worldwide is $44 billion'; 'Incorporating external costs increases the economic costs substantially.' Deadweight loss per $1 of subsidy: 44/110 = 0.40.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"38","authors":"Black, S.; Liu, A. A.; Parry, I. W. H.","year":"2023","title":"IMF Fossil Fuel Subsidies Data: 2023 Update (IMF Working Paper 23/169)","venue":"International Monetary Fund","type":"intl_org","url":"https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2023/08/22/IMF-Fossil-Fuel-Subsidies-Data-2023-Update-537281","doi":"10.5089/9798400249006.001","reported_estimate":"'Global fossil fuel subsidies in 2022: $7 trillion'; 'Explicit subsidies (undercharging for supply costs) share of total subsidy: 18 percent' (0.18 x 7,000 = $1,260bn). Full price reform (including corrective taxes): CO2 '43 percent below baseline levels' by 2030 and '1.6 million local air pollution deaths per year' prevented.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"38","authors":"Jewell, J.; McCollum, D.; Emmerling, J.; Bertram, C.; Gernaat, D. E. H. J.; Krey, V.; Paroussos, L.; Berger, L.; Fragkiadakis, K.; Keppo, I.; Saadi, N.; Tavoni, M.; van Vuuren, D.; Vinichenko, V.; Riahi, K.","year":"2018","title":"Limited emission reductions from fuel subsidy removal except in energy-exporting regions","venue":"Nature 554(7691): 229-233","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nature.com/articles/nature25467","doi":"10.1038/nature25467","reported_estimate":"Removing fossil fuel subsidies 'would have an unexpectedly small impact on global energy demand and carbon dioxide emissions'; reduces global CO2 'by only a few per cent by 2030' (editorial summary); 0.5-2.2 GtCO2 a year by 2030, a 1-5% reduction (as reported by Carbon Brief, https://www.carbonbrief.org/?p=28593).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"38","authors":"Copenhagen Consensus Center","year":"2015","title":"Energy: Post-2015 Consensus","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center","type":"think_tank","url":"https://copenhagenconsensus.com/post-2015-consensus/energy","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Phase out fossil fuel energy subsidies: benefits 15 times cost; phase out implicit fossil fuel subsidies through energy taxes: 8 (Morris); universal electrification access: $5 per $1; double the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix: under $1 per $1.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"38","authors":"International Renewable Energy Agency (Taylor, M.)","year":"2020","title":"Energy Subsidies: Evolution in the Global Energy Transformation to 2050","venue":"IRENA, Abu Dhabi","type":"intl_org","url":"https://www.irena.org/publications/2020/Apr/Energy-Subsidies-2020","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Direct energy-sector subsidies in 2017 of US$634bn: fossil fuels US$447bn, renewable power US$128bn, biofuels US$38bn, nuclear US$21bn (figures as summarised by Enerdata; the report landing page gives no figures).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"38","authors":"Abrell, J.; Kosch, M.; Rausch, S.","year":"2019","title":"Carbon abatement with renewables: Evaluating wind and solar subsidies in Germany and Spain","venue":"Journal of Public Economics 169: 172-202","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/pubeco/v169y2019icp172-202.html","doi":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.11.007","reported_estimate":"Short-run abatement cost of solar subsidies EUR 411-1,944/tCO2; wind EUR 82-276/tCO2 (EUR 1,944 x ~1.1 $/EUR = $2,138/t, the upper per-tonne cost).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"38","authors":"Bistline, J.; Mehrotra, N.; Wolfram, C.","year":"2023","title":"Economic Implications of the Climate Provisions of the Inflation Reduction Act","venue":"Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2023 (NBER WP 31267)","type":"working_paper","url":"https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w31267/w31267.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Power-sector average abatement cost of IRA tax credits $36-87/tCO2 with discounted costs and undiscounted emissions, $88-94 if both are discounted; costs 'would be higher if distortions associated with financing the incentives were included'.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"38","authors":"Prest, B. C.","year":"2022","title":"Supply-Side Reforms to Oil and Gas Production on Federal Lands: Modeling the Implications for CO2 Emissions, Federal Revenues, and Leakage","venue":"Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists 9(4): 681-720","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/718963","doi":"10.1086/718963","reported_estimate":"A federal leasing ban 'reduces royalty revenues by $5 billion annually' and, after leakage, cuts emissions by about one-quarter of the amount projected for the Clean Power Plan; RFF summary (https://resources.org/common-resources/economic-and-emissions-consequences-supply-side-reforms-oil-and-gas-production-federal-lands): 'more than 300 million tons of CO2-equivalent' a year on federal lands, 'around 100 million tons in global emissions reductions annually' (2020-2050 averages).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"38","authors":"Hausman, C.; Kellogg, R.","year":"2015","title":"Welfare and Distributional Implications of Shale Gas","venue":"Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2015 (NBER WP 21115)","type":"working_paper","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/21115","doi":"10.3386/w21115","reported_estimate":"Between 2007 and 2013 the shale gas revolution increased welfare for natural gas consumers and producers by $48 billion per year; NBER Digest: consumer benefits of $74 billion in 2013.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"38","authors":"U.S. Department of Energy","year":"2024","title":"2024 LNG Export Study: Energy, Economic, and Environmental Assessment of U.S. LNG Exports","venue":"U.S. Department of Energy (summaries by Vinson & Elkins, Akin Gump and RFF)","type":"government","url":"https://www.rff.org/publications/issue-briefs/unpacking-the-department-of-energys-report-on-us-liquefied-natural-gas-exports/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Model Resolved (unconstrained) vs Existing/FID exports: '$80 billion increase in GDP in 2050' and '$410 billion cumulative increase in U.S. GDP from 2020-2050' (Vinson & Elkins summary); domestic customers pay four percent more in 2050; 'a cumulative increase of about 710 MMT of CO2-equivalent (CO2e) emissions between 2020 and 2050', 'only about 0.05 percent of predicted cumulative global CO2e emissions' (RFF); 0.56% upstream and midstream methane leak rate assumed.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"38","authors":"NERA Economic Consulting (for U.S. Department of Energy)","year":"2018","title":"Macroeconomic Outcomes of Market Determined Levels of U.S. LNG Exports","venue":"U.S. Department of Energy","type":"government","url":"https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2018/06/f52/Macroeconomic%20LNG%20Export%20Study%202018.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"GDP 'exceeds GDP with the lowest level of LNG exports by $13 to $72 billion in 2040'; 'overall U.S. economic output is higher whenever global markets call for higher levels of LNG exports'.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"38","authors":"Moss, T.; Leo, B.","year":"2014","title":"Maximizing Access to Energy: Estimates of Access and Generation for the Overseas Private Investment Corporation's Portfolio","venue":"Center for Global Development Working Paper","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/maximizing-access-energy-opic_1.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"For a $10 billion portfolio, 'A natural gas-only portfolio could provide electricity access to 90 million people' versus 20-27 million under a renewables-only mix; gas investment could reach roughly 60 million more people.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"38","authors":"U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission","year":"2024","title":"Congressional Budget Justification: Fiscal Year 2025 (NUREG-1100, Volume 40)","venue":"U.S. NRC","type":"government","url":"https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1100/v40/index.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"'The NRC's FY 2025 budget request, including the Office of the Inspector General, is $994,946K'; 2,897.9 FTE; $823,946K recovered from fees; net budget authority $151,000K.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"38","authors":"Energy Innovation Policy & Technology","year":"2025","title":"National IRA Rollback Update (March 2025)","venue":"Energy Innovation Policy & Technology LLC","type":"think_tank","url":"https://dev-ei.thisisvisceral.com/wp-content/uploads/National-IRA-Rollback-Update-March-2025_FINAL.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Repeal scenario vs current policies: 'GDP drops by more than $160 billion' in 2030, nearly $190bn in 2035; nearly 790,000 fewer jobs in 2030; emissions up nearly 260 million metric tons CO2e in 2030 and more than 530 million in 2035; household energy bills up more than $6bn in 2030. The scenario also rescinds other federal programme funding.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"38","authors":"Davis, S. J.; von Wachter, T.","year":"2011","title":"Recessions and the Costs of Job Loss","venue":"Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2011 (NBER WP 17638)","type":"working_paper","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w17638","doi":"10.3386/w17638","reported_estimate":"Men displaced in mass layoffs lose 1.4 years of pre-displacement earnings when unemployment is below 6% and 2.8 years when it exceeds 8% (present value, 5% discount rate, 20 years).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"38","authors":"U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics","year":"2025","title":"Occupational Employment and Wages - May 2024 (news release, 2 April 2025)","venue":"U.S. Department of Labor","type":"government","url":"https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/ocwage_04022025.htm","doi":"","reported_estimate":"All occupations: median hourly wage $23.80; mean annual wage $67,920 (median annual = 23.80 x 2,080 = $49,504).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"38","authors":"Parry, I. W. H.; Veung, C.; Heine, D.","year":"2014","title":"How Much Carbon Pricing is in Countries' Own Interests? The Critical Role of Co-Benefits (IMF Working Paper 14/174; published in Climate Change Economics 2015)","venue":"International Monetary Fund","type":"intl_org","url":"https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=41924.0","doi":"","reported_estimate":"'On average, nationally efficient prices are substantial, $57.5 per ton of CO2 (for year 2010)' for the top 20 emitters, driven mainly by reduced local air pollution from coal plants; used as the per-tonne value of local co-damages.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"38","authors":"Barrage, L.; Nordhaus, W.","year":"2024","title":"Policies, projections, and the social cost of carbon: Results from the DICE-2023 model","venue":"Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 121(13): e2312030121","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2312030121","doi":"10.1073/pnas.2312030121","reported_estimate":"'The SCC in the baseline run is $66/tCO2 for the 2020 period (in 2019 international $)'; upper carbon value.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"38","authors":"Ballard, C. L.; Shoven, J. B.; Whalley, J.","year":"1985","title":"General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States","venue":"American Economic Review 75(1): 128-138","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v75y1985i1p128-38.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Marginal excess burden centres around 33 cents per $1 of revenue, ranging 17-56 cents (as summarised by Fullerton & Henderson 1987, NBER w2353).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"38","authors":"Borenstein, S.; Davis, L. W.","year":"2016","title":"The Distributional Effects of US Clean Energy Tax Credits","venue":"Tax Policy and the Economy 30: 191-234","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w21437","doi":"10.1086/685597","reported_estimate":"Top income quintile received ~60% of clean-energy tax credits, bottom three quintiles ~10%; ~90% of EV credits went to the top quintile.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"38","authors":"Rennert, K.; Errickson, F.; Prest, B. C.; et al.","year":"2022","title":"Comprehensive evidence implies a higher social cost of CO2","venue":"Nature 610: 687-692","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-022-05224-9","doi":"10.1038/s41586-022-05224-9","reported_estimate":"SCC $185/tCO2 (5-95%: $44-413) at a 2% discount rate.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"The dashboard values CO2 at $36-66/t (DICE-2016R3 to DICE-2023). At $185/t the LOW-end net emission increase would cost far more and the HIGH-end net reduction would be worth more, widening the range in both directions."},{"policy_id":"38","authors":"Lee, K.; Miguel, E.; Wolfram, C.","year":"2020","title":"Experimental Evidence on the Economics of Rural Electrification","venue":"Journal of Political Economy 128(4): 1523-1565","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jpolec/doi10.1086-705417.html","doi":"10.1086/705417","reported_estimate":"Randomised grid expansion in rural Kenya: demand for connections 'falls sharply with price'; consumption 'is very low, implying low consumer surplus'; no meaningful medium-run economic or non-economic impacts.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Indicates that grid connections in poor rural areas can return less than their cost, which weighs against assuming large gains from fossil-fuel generation finance; not converted into a figure because the development-bank component is left unpriced."},{"policy_id":"38","authors":"Lang, P. A.","year":"2017","title":"Nuclear Power Learning and Deployment Rates; Disruption and Global Benefits Forgone","venue":"Energies 10(12): 2169","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/gam/jeners/v10y2017i12p2169-d123388.html","doi":"10.3390/en10122169","reported_estimate":"'Had the early rates continued, nuclear power could now be around 10% of its current cost'; additional nuclear 'could have substituted for 69,000-186,000 TWh of coal and gas generation', 'avoiding up to 9.5 million deaths and 174 Gt CO2 emissions'; in 2015 alone up to 540,000 deaths and 11 Gt CO2.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"A historical counterfactual of continued learning rates, not an estimate of the gain from licensing reform today; it does not attribute the cost escalation to regulation, so it is not used in the range."},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Kleiner, M. M.; Soltas, E. J.","year":"2023","title":"A Welfare Analysis of Occupational Licensing in U.S. States","venue":"Review of Economic Studies 90(5):2481-2516","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://academic.oup.com/restud/article-abstract/90/5/2481/7049987","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad015","reported_estimate":"Welfare loss 12% of occupational surplus; consumers' WTP offsets 80% of price rise; wages compensate 60% of training cost (item BCR 1.25-1.67)","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Kleiner, M. M.","year":"2015","title":"Reforming Occupational Licensing Policies","venue":"Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2015-01","type":"government","url":"https://www.hamiltonproject.org/publication/policy-proposal/reforming-occupational-licensing-policies/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Up to 2.85m fewer jobs and $203bn/yr cost to consumers","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Kleiner, M. M.; Vorotnikov, E.","year":"2018","title":"At What Cost? State and National Estimates of the Economic Costs of Occupational Licensing","venue":"Institute for Justice report","type":"government","url":"https://ij.org/report/at-what-cost/","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Nearly 2m jobs; misallocation ~$6bn conservative, broader measure 'may reach $184 billion or more'","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Congressional Budget Office","year":"2019","title":"The Effects on Employment and Family Income of Increasing the Federal Minimum Wage","venue":"CBO report, July 2019","type":"government","url":"https://www.cbo.gov/publication/55410","doi":"","reported_estimate":"$15 option: real family income in 2025 +$8bn for families below the poverty threshold, about -$16bn for families above it, -$9bn (0.1%) overall (report reposted 7 Nov 2019 with revised income values); median -1.3m jobs","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Cengiz, D.; Dube, A.; Lindner, A.; Zipperer, B.","year":"2019","title":"The Effect of Minimum Wages on Low-Wage Jobs","venue":"Quarterly Journal of Economics 134(3):1405-1454","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w25434","doi":"10.1093/qje/qjz014","reported_estimate":"Affected workers' wage +6.8%, affected employment +2.8% (n.s.); used for item low BCR 0.69","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Hsieh, C.-T.; Moretti, E.","year":"2019","title":"Housing Constraints and Spatial Misallocation","venue":"American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 11(2):1-39","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mac.20170388","doi":"10.1257/mac.20170388","reported_estimate":"Constraints lowered US growth 36% 1964-2009; NY/SJ/SF at median regulation: US GDP 2009 +3.7% (imperfect mobility, Table 5, pp.2, 27) or +8.9% (perfect mobility, Table 4, p.26; $1.95tn on 2009 GDP of $14.5tn, fn.28). HIGH uses 8.9%.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Greaney, B.","year":"2026","title":"Housing Constraints and Spatial Misallocation: Comment","venue":"American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 18(2):409-28","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mac.20230141","doi":"10.1257/mac.20230141","reported_estimate":"Cannot replicate HM 3.7%; documents code errors; corrected model gain 'two orders of magnitude smaller' (~0.04% of GDP, author's arithmetic)","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis via Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED)","year":"2026","title":"Gross Domestic Product, annual (GDPA)","venue":"FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis","type":"government","url":"https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDPA","doi":"","reported_estimate":"2025 GDP $30,861.3bn; 2012 GDP $16,254.0bn","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Philipson, T.; Berndt, E. R.; Gottschalk, A. H. B.; Sun, E.","year":"2008","title":"Cost-benefit analysis of the FDA: The case of the prescription drug user fee acts","venue":"Journal of Public Economics 92(5-6):1306-1325 (NBER WP 11724)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/pubeco/v92y2008i5-6p1306-1325.html","doi":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.09.010","reported_estimate":"Faster review under PDUFA I-II: social surplus +$14-31bn (PV, 1992$); 140,000-310,000 life-years gained; extreme upper bound on safety harm ~56,000 life-years (WP: ~$4.4bn PV at $100k/LY)","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Peltzman, S.","year":"1973","title":"An Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation: The 1962 Drug Amendments","venue":"Journal of Political Economy 81(5):1049-1091","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/260107","doi":"10.1086/260107","reported_estimate":"Net impact of 1962 efficacy rules 'equivalent to a 5-10 percent tax on drug purchases'","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services","year":"2025","title":"National Health Expenditure Fact Sheet","venue":"CMS","type":"government","url":"https://www.cms.gov/data-research/statistics-trends-and-reports/national-health-expenditure-data/nhe-fact-sheet","doi":"","reported_estimate":"2024 prescription drug spending $467.0bn","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics via Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED)","year":"2026","title":"Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items (CPIAUCSL), annual average","venue":"FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis","type":"government","url":"https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL","doi":"","reported_estimate":"1992 = 140.308; 2025 = 321.962 (factor 2.295)","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","year":"2023","title":"Sugar Program: Alternative Methods for Implementing Import Restrictions Could Increase Effectiveness (GAO-24-106144)","venue":"GAO report, Oct 31 2023","type":"government","url":"https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-24-106144","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Program costs consumers $2.5-3.5bn/yr; net cost to economy ~$1bn/yr (citing studies)","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Dahl, D. (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis)","year":"2015","title":"Compliance Costs Community Banks $4.5 Billion Annually, Survey Shows","venue":"On the Economy blog, Dec 2015","type":"government","url":"https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2015/december/compliance-costs-community-banks-billions","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Community-bank compliance cost $4.5bn in 2014 (CSBS survey of 974 banks); 22% of net income","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Congressional Budget Office","year":"2018","title":"Cost estimate: S. 2155, Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act","venue":"CBO cost estimate, March 2018","type":"government","url":"https://www.cbo.gov/publication/53632","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Deficits +$671m over 2018-2027; probability of SIFI failure/crisis 'small under current law and would be slightly greater'","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Coffey, B.; McLaughlin, P. A.; Peretto, P. F.","year":"2020","title":"The cumulative cost of regulations","venue":"Review of Economic Dynamics 38:1-21","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2020.03.004","doi":"10.1016/j.red.2020.03.004","reported_estimate":"Federal regulatory growth since 1980 slowed growth ~0.8 points a year; economy 'nearly 25 percent larger' and GDP ~$4tn higher in 2012 had regulation been held at 1980 levels (abstract p.1; pp.14, 16). Authors: 'this study is not a weighing of the costs and benefits of regulation' (p.2). HIGH: 4,000/16,254 = 24.61% of 2025 GDP.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Grabow, C.; Manak, I.; Ikenson, D. J.","year":"2018","title":"The Jones Act: A Burden America Can No Longer Bear","venue":"Cato Policy Analysis No. 845","type":"think_tank","url":"https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/jones-act-burden-america-can-no-longer-bear","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Cites USITC economy-wide cost estimates of $656 million to $9.8 billion per year; US-flag operating costs $20,053/day vs $7,454/day foreign-flag (2.7x); US coastal ships $190-250m vs ~$30m foreign-built.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"U.S. International Trade Commission","year":"2002","title":"The Economic Effects of Significant U.S. Import Restraints: Third Update 2002","venue":"USITC Publication 3519","type":"government","url":"https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub3519.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Economy-wide welfare gain from Jones Act removal ~$656 million per year (the low end of the USITC range cited by Cato).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Office of Management and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs","year":"2017","title":"2017 Draft Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulations and Agency Compliance with the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act","venue":"OMB, Dec 2017 (Table 1-1, PDF p.13; Table A-2, PDF pp.82-90)","type":"government","url":"https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/draft_2017_cost_benefit_report.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Table 1-1: 39 EPA major rules FY2007-2016, benefits $195.8-705.7bn, costs $54.1-64.8bn a year (2015$). Table A-2 ($m 2001): Florida numeric nutrient WQS benefits 23, costs 111-169 (p.88); Coal Combustion Residuals 182-226 vs 399-576 (p.88); Cooling Water Intake 24-27 vs 223-241 (p.90). Table 1-1 (2015$, low): USDA 0.6, DOE 20.3, HHS 5.9, DHS 0.5, DOJ 1.9, DOL 9.8, DOT 22.3, joint DOT-EPA 44.6. p.12-13: EPA rules over 80% of monetized benefits; air rules over 95% of EPA benefits, 'mostly attributable to the reduction in public exposure to fine particulate matter'; PM co-benefits the majority of MATS benefits","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Greenstone, M.; List, J. A.; Syverson, C.","year":"2012","title":"The Effects of Environmental Regulation on the Competitiveness of U.S. Manufacturing","venue":"NBER Working Paper 18392 (pp.21, 34)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w18392","doi":"10.3386/w18392","reported_estimate":"Air-quality nonattainment lowers TFP of polluting plants 2.6% (4.8% corrected); annual cost $11.0bn to $20.8bn (2010$), about 8.8% of manufacturing profits, 1972-1993. Used only in the full-repeal EPA variant.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Walker, W. R.","year":"2013","title":"The Transitional Costs of Sectoral Reallocation: Evidence from the Clean Air Act and the Workforce","venue":"Quarterly Journal of Economics 128(4):1787-1835","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/qjecon/v128y2013i4p1787-1835.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Workers in plants newly regulated by the 1990 CAAA lost more than $5.4bn of earnings in aggregate (one-time); small relative to the CAAA's benefits. Cross-check only.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Shapiro, J. S.; Walker, R.","year":"2018","title":"Why Is Pollution from US Manufacturing Declining? The Roles of Environmental Regulation, Productivity, and Trade","venue":"American Economic Review 108(12):3814-54","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v108y2018i12p3814-54.html","doi":"10.1257/aer.20151272","reported_estimate":"Manufacturing emissions fell 60% 1990-2008 despite output growth; the implicit pollution tax doubled; regulation explains most of the decline. Mechanism.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Dechezleprêtre, A.; Sato, M.","year":"2017","title":"The Impacts of Environmental Regulations on Competitiveness","venue":"Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 11(2):183-206","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/renvpo/v11y2017i2p183-206..html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Adverse effects on trade, employment, location and productivity are statistically significant in pollution- and energy-intensive sectors but small relative to general trends. Mechanism.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Eren, O.; Ozbeklik, S.","year":"2016","title":"What Do Right-to-Work Laws Do? Evidence from a Synthetic Control Method Analysis","venue":"Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 35(1):173-194","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/jpamgt/v35y2016i1p173-194.html","doi":"10.1002/pam.21861","reported_estimate":"Oklahoma's RTW law lowered private-sector unionization; total employment rate and private-sector average wages were not affected (union item LOW = 0)","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Vedder, R.; Gallaway, L.","year":"2002","title":"The Economic Effects of Labor Unions Revisited","venue":"Journal of Labor Research 23(1):105-130 (Table 1 as reprinted in Gallaway & Robe 2014, CEI, p.12)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/tra/jlabre/v23y2002i1p105-130.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Rees-method deadweight loss of unions 0.11% of wages in 2000 (0.08% factor-adjusted); 'could easily double' with a labour-supply response. Table values read from the CEI reprint; the journal article itself was not opened.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Gallaway, L.; Robe, J.","year":"2014","title":"The Unintended Consequences of Collective Bargaining","venue":"Competitive Enterprise Institute","type":"think_tank","url":"https://cei.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Lowell-Gallaway-and-Jonathan-Robe-Unintended-Consequences-of-Collective-Bargaining.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Reprints Vedder & Gallaway (2002) Table 1: deadweight loss 0.34% (1967) to 0.11% (2000) of wages; labour-supply response could double it (p.12-13)","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics","year":"2026","title":"Union Members - 2025 (USDL release, Feb 18 2026); Union Members in 2000 (Jan 18 2001)","venue":"BLS news releases","type":"government","url":"https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/union2_02182026.htm","doi":"","reported_estimate":"2025: membership rate 10.0%, private sector 5.9%, 14.7m members (about 7.4m private), 146.661m employed wage and salary workers. 2000: 13.5% (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/History/union2_01182001.txt)","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis via FRED","year":"2026","title":"Wages and salaries (A576RC1); GDP implicit price deflator (A191RD3A086NBEA)","venue":"FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis","type":"government","url":"https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/A576RC1","doi":"","reported_estimate":"2025 wages and salaries $12,976bn (mean of monthly SAAR); GDP deflator 2001 74.360, 2006 84.071, 2010 89.632, 2012 93.185, 2015 97.316, 2018 102.291, 2019 103.979, 2020 105.377, 2025 128.893","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Hirsch, B. T.","year":"2004","title":"What Do Unions Do for Economic Performance?","venue":"Journal of Labor Research 25(3):415-456","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/tra/jlabre/v25y2004i3p415-456.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Average union productivity effect near zero; unions lower profitability and tax returns on capital, reducing investment and subsequent employment and productivity growth. Mechanism.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Bradley, D.; Kim, I.; Tian, X.","year":"2017","title":"Do Unions Affect Innovation?","venue":"Management Science 63(7):2251-2271","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/inm/ormnsc/v63y2017i7p2251-2271.html","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2015.2414","reported_estimate":"Passing a union election lowers patent quantity 8.7% and quality 12.5% three years later (RD design). Mechanism.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Fallick, B. C.; Hassett, K. A.","year":"1999","title":"Investment and Union Certification","venue":"Journal of Labor Economics 17(3):570-582","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jlabec/v17y1999i3p570-82.html","doi":"10.1086/209931","reported_estimate":"A winning certification election cuts next-year investment as much as a 33-point rise in the corporate tax rate. Mechanism.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Holmes, T. J.","year":"1998","title":"The Effect of State Policies on the Location of Manufacturing: Evidence from State Borders","venue":"Journal of Political Economy 106(4):667-705 (Minneapolis Fed Staff Report 205)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/p/fip/fedmsr/205.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Large abrupt increase in manufacturing activity crossing from a non-RTW to an RTW state (staff-report abstract; the 'one-third' magnitude was not read in the source). Mechanism.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Crandall, R. W.; Winston, C.","year":"2003","title":"Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer Welfare? Assessing the Evidence","venue":"Journal of Economic Perspectives 17(4):3-26","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/jecper/v17y2003i4p3-26.html","doi":"10.1257/089533003772034871","reported_estimate":"No evidence that monopolization, collusion or merger policy has provided much benefit to consumers, nor evidence of deterrence (antitrust item low cost = 0)","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Federal Trade Commission","year":"2019","title":"FY2018 and FY2019 One-Page Performance Snapshots","venue":"FTC","type":"government","url":"https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/2019-one-page-ftc-performance-snapshot/2019_performance_snapshot.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Merger and nonmerger actions saved consumers over $3.8bn (FY2018) and over $4.8bn (FY2019); about $66 per $1 of merger-program resources (FY2019). FY2018: https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/2018-one-page-ftc-performance-snapshot/2018_performance_snapshot.pdf","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division","year":"2024","title":"FY 2025 Performance Budget, Congressional Justification","venue":"DOJ, March 2024 (pp.4, 23-24, 31-32)","type":"government","url":"https://www.justice.gov/d9/2024-03/atr_fy_2025_presidents_budget_narrative_03.11.24.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"FY2025 request $288.0m; HSR fees $341.9m offset; consumer savings, civil (merger and non-merger) FY16-23: 2.271, 1.408, 0.928, 3.939, 0.712, 1.567, 0.529, 1.822 $bn; criminal 62, 132, 58, 12, 114, 2,185, 1, 165 $m","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Federal Trade Commission","year":"2022","title":"FY 2023 Congressional Budget Justification","venue":"FTC (Budget Request Summary, p.8)","type":"government","url":"https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/P859900FY23CBJ.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Program level $490m; Promoting Competition mission $239.6m, 680 FTE","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"U.S. Environmental Protection Agency","year":"2011","title":"The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act from 1990 to 2020: Summary Report","venue":"EPA Office of Air and Radiation, March 2011 (pp.22-23, 28)","type":"government","url":"https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2015-07/documents/summaryreport.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"2020: direct benefits $1,951bn, costs $65bn (2006$) (pp.22-23); 'Even if one were to adopt the extreme assumption that fine particle and ozone pollution have no effect on premature mortality risk ... the benefits of reduced non-fatal health effects and improved visibility alone add up to $137 billion for the year 2020' (p.28). HIGH-end lost-benefit floor 137 x 1.533 = $210.0bn.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Gieringer, D. H.","year":"1985","title":"The Safety and Efficacy of New Drug Approval","venue":"Cato Journal 5(1):177-201","type":"think_tank","url":"https://cato.org/cato-journal/spring/summer-1985/safety-efficacy-new-drug-approval","doi":"","reported_estimate":"'the cost of FDA delay can be estimated at anywhere from 21,000 to 120,000 lives per decade'; FDA safety benefits 'some 5,000 casualties per decade, or 10,000 per decade for worst-case scenarios'. HIGH: (120,000-5,000)/10 x $13.1m = $150.65bn a year. Read from the article text on cato.org; the authors call the figures rough.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Beghin, J. C.","year":"2022","title":"Recapping the Effects of the U.S. Sugar Program","venue":"American Enterprise Institute report (excerpt, Yeutter Institute, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Feb 1 2022)","type":"think_tank","url":"https://yeutter-institute.unl.edu/research/faculty-research/recapping-effects-us-sugar-program","doi":"","reported_estimate":"The program 'has been shown to cost consumers $2.4-$4 billion a year' and 17,000-20,000 food-processing jobs; domestic prices about 100% above world prices. Read in the author's excerpt; the full AEI report was not opened.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Council of Economic Advisers","year":"2019","title":"The Economic Effects of Federal Deregulation since January 2017: An Interim Report","venue":"Executive Office of the President, June 2019 (pp.1, 14-15)","type":"government","url":"https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/The-Economic-Effects-of-Federal-Deregulation-Interim-Report.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"20 deregulatory actions save about $220bn a year and raise real incomes about 1.3% ($3,100 per household after 5-10 years, p.1); the 2018 relief act for small banks has 'annual net benefits of almost $5 billion' (p.14). Used for the bank item's high end only; the other actions are outside this package.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Cox, L. A.","year":"2012","title":"Reassessing the Human Health Benefits from Cleaner Air","venue":"Risk Analysis 32(5):816-829","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/riskan/v32y2012i5p816-829.html","doi":"10.1111/j.1539-6924.2011.01698.x","reported_estimate":"EPA's ~$2tn 2020 benefit estimate for the 1990 CAAA rests on assumptions including a 100% probability of a causal, linear, no-threshold PM2.5-mortality relation; with discrete uncertainty about these assumptions, 'probability >90% under plausible alternative assumptions' that CAAA costs exceed benefits (abstract). Supports using EPA's no-mortality case as the lowest credible lost benefit.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Gayer, T.; Viscusi, W. K.","year":"2013","title":"Overriding Consumer Preferences with Energy Regulations","venue":"Journal of Regulatory Economics 43(3):248-264 (Mercatus WP 12-21, July 2012, pp.21, 29, 31)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.ourenergypolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Energy_regulations_GayerViscusi_WP1221_1.pdf","doi":"10.1007/s11149-013-9210-2","reported_estimate":"CAFE 2017-25: $440bn (85%) of NHTSA's benefits and 87% of EPA's are private savings to consumers; heavy-duty trucks 86%; 'approximately 85 percent of the rule's estimated benefits' (WP pp.21, 29, 31). Read in the working-paper version.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Baker, J. B.","year":"2003","title":"The Case for Antitrust Enforcement","venue":"Journal of Economic Perspectives 17(4):27-50","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/jecper/v17y2003i4p27-50.html","doi":"10.1257/089533003772034880","reported_estimate":"Benefits of antitrust, especially deterrence, appear far larger than enforcement and compliance spending","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"No aggregate dollar figure; deterrence benefits noted as unpriced costs of the antitrust item."},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Kwoka, J.","year":"2015","title":"Mergers, Merger Control, and Remedies: A Retrospective Analysis of U.S. Policy","venue":"MIT Press","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.porchlightbooks.com/products/mergers-merger-control-and-remedies-john-kwoka-9780262536776","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Most studied mergers led to higher prices; remedies, especially conduct remedies, generally did not restrain them (publisher description; about three-quarters of mergers raised prices per Northeastern University summary)","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Implies current enforcement is too lax, so repeal would cost more; no annual national dollar figure. The book itself was not opened."},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Fortin, N. M.; Lemieux, T.; Lloyd, N.","year":"2021","title":"Labor Market Institutions and the Distribution of Wages: The Role of Spillover Effects","venue":"Journal of Labor Economics 39(S2):S369-S412","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jlabec/doi10.1086-712923.html","doi":"10.1086/712923","reported_estimate":"Union threat effects double the contribution of deunionization to the rise in male wage inequality 1979-2017","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Distributional (transfer) effect, not a net efficiency cost; no dollar figure."},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Austin, B.; Lilley, M. (summarised by Lilley, Manhattan Institute issue brief)","year":"2023","title":"Workers, Wages, and Economic Mobility: The Long-Run Effects of Right-to-Work Laws","venue":"Manhattan Institute Issue Brief, Sep 28 2023","type":"think_tank","url":"https://manhattan.institute/article/long-run-effects-of-right-to-work-laws","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Border counties: RTW raises manufacturing share by 3.23 points (28%), employment-to-population 1.58 points (residence) to 3.51 points (workplace), weekly wages $27.97 higher; poverty 1.41 points lower","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Border-pair estimates of a working paper not yet peer reviewed; gross earnings of added jobs are not a welfare gain without the value of time forgone. Would raise the union item if priced."},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Goldschlag, N.; Tabarrok, A.","year":"2018","title":"Is Regulation to Blame for the Decline in American Entrepreneurship?","venue":"Economic Policy 33(93):5-44","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/ecpoli/v33y2018i93p5-44..html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Using RegData, rising federal regulation cannot explain secular trends in economic dynamism","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Counter-evidence to aggregate RegData-based growth estimates (Coffey et al. 2020); no dollar figure."},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Dawson, J. W.; Seater, J. J.","year":"2013","title":"Federal Regulation and Aggregate Economic Growth","venue":"Journal of Economic Growth 18(2):137-177","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.appstate.edu/~perritj/Dawson.pdf","doi":"10.1007/s10887-013-9088-y","reported_estimate":"Published abstract: regulation substantially reduced growth of output and TFP. Working-paper versions opened: Dec 2008 draft, output in 2005 'about 56 percent of what it would have been had regulation remained at its 1949 level', about 1 point a year lower growth (pp.2, 22); 2005 draft (Appalachian State WP 05-02), output about 90% of the counterfactual. The published figures ('2 points a year', '28 percent') were not read in the published paper.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Counterfactual of 1949 regulation levels covers pre-1980 statutes outside the package; the published figures could not be opened and the drafts differ widely; Coffey et al. (2020) describe their own estimate as less than half of it."},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Chambers, D.; McLaughlin, P. A.; Richards, T.","year":"2022","title":"Regulation, Entrepreneurship, and Firm Size","venue":"Journal of Regulatory Economics 61(2):108-134","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/regeco/v61y2022i2d10.1007_s11149-022-09446-7.html","doi":"10.1007/s11149-022-09446-7","reported_estimate":"10% more industry regulatory restrictions: 0.5% fewer firms, 0.6% lower small-firm employment","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Mechanism; not convertible to a national dollar gain without the aggregate model."},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Bailey, J. B.; Thomas, D. W.","year":"2017","title":"Regulating Away Competition: The Effect of Regulation on Entrepreneurship and Employment","venue":"Journal of Regulatory Economics 52(3):237-254","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/regeco/v52y2017i3d10.1007_s11149-017-9343-9.html","doi":"10.1007/s11149-017-9343-9","reported_estimate":"More-regulated industries had fewer firm births and slower employment growth, 1998-2011","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Mechanism; not priced."},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Glaeser, E.; Gyourko, J.","year":"2018","title":"The Economic Implications of Housing Supply","venue":"Journal of Economic Perspectives 32(1):3-30 (NBER WP 23833)","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w23833","doi":"10.1257/jep.32.1.3","reported_estimate":"Misallocation cost of land-use rules 0.7% of GDP (city-level labour elasticity) to about 2% (city-industry); 'such calculations suggest that 2 percent of GDP may be an upper bound on the gains' (WP section on labour misallocation)","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Bounds the zoning gain well below Hsieh & Moretti's 3.7% and 8.9%; the low end already uses the smaller Greaney (2026) figure."},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Crain, W. M.; Crain, N. V.","year":"2023","title":"The Cost of Federal Regulation to the U.S. Economy, Manufacturing and Small Business","venue":"National Association of Manufacturers (pp.4, 32)","type":"think_tank","url":"https://nam.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/NAM-3731-Crains-Study-R3-V2-FIN.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Federal regulations cost $3.079tn in 2022 (2023 dollars): economic $2.067tn, environmental $588bn, tax compliance $300bn, occupational safety and homeland security $124bn","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Cost-only estimate that includes tax compliance; at $3,241bn in 2025 dollars it is below Coffey et al.'s $7,595bn, which is used for the high end."},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Crews, C. W.","year":"2025","title":"Ten Thousand Commandments 2025: An Annual Snapshot of the Federal Regulatory State","venue":"Competitive Enterprise Institute","type":"think_tank","url":"https://cei.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/10K_2025_v5.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Federal regulatory compliance and economic costs at least $2.155tn a year","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Cost-only and below Coffey et al.; not used."},{"policy_id":"39","authors":"Philipson, T. J.; Sun, E.","year":"2007","title":"Is the Food and Drug Administration Safe and Effective?","venue":"NBER Working Paper 13561","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w13561","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Product-liability exemption for FDA-regulated activities could raise consumer welfare by $47.8-754.7bn a year (4-66% of sales); PDUFA faster reviews raised social surplus $18-31bn","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"The large figures price tort-liability reform, not FDA deregulation; not part of this package."},{"policy_id":"40","authors":"Frank F.K. Byamugisha; Nancy Dubosse","year":"2023","title":"The Investment Case for Land Tenure Security in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Cost-Benefit Analysis","venue":"Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis 14(S1):272-300 (Copenhagen Consensus 'Halftime for the SDGs' / Best Things First)","type":"","url":"https://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/2023-04/Land%20Tenure%20Security%20Best%20Investment%20Manuscript%20230211.pdf","doi":"10.1017/bca.2023.14","reported_estimate":"8% discount rate, 30-yr horizon, Sub-Saharan Africa only. Table 7: Rural benefits PV $395.71bn / costs $21.72bn, BCR 18; Urban (avg house price) $236.93bn / $5.29bn, BCR 45; Urban (pop-weighted) $159.89bn, BCR 30. Cover page: 'Excellent Benefit Cost Ratio: 21'. Table 4 undiscounted 30-yr costs: rural 68.6, urban 13.8 ($bn; table header mislabeled 'US$ Millions'). Table 2: $10/parcel for 164.6m low-value rural parcels, $20/parcel for 18.3m high-value, $25/parcel urban. Admin running cost $7.50/parcel/yr midpoint (Burns et al. 2006), inflated to $10.16 (2020).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"40","authors":"National Planning Commission (Malawi); Saleema Razvi; Brad Wong; et al.","year":"2021","title":"A Cost-Benefit Note: Implementing the National Land Policy in Malawi - Technical Report (Malawi Priorities)","venue":"NPC Malawi / Copenhagen Consensus Center / AFIDEP","type":"","url":"https://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/mp_land_tilting_report.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Central BCR 73, range 18-138; total costs MWK 88,352m at 8% discount rate; titling cost ~$10-15 per parcel (~$20-30/ha); Tanzania mobile approach $20.57 -> $7.85 per parcel vs ~$40 traditional.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"40","authors":"Erica Field","year":"2007","title":"Entitled to Work: Urban Property Rights and Labor Supply in Peru","venue":"Quarterly Journal of Economics 122(4):1561-1602","type":"","url":"https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2007.122.4.1561","doi":"10.1162/qjec.2007.122.4.1561","reported_estimate":"Titles to >1.2m urban households (COFOPRI). Title associated with +17% total household work hours, -47% probability of working inside the home, -28% probability of child labor (abstract).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"40","authors":"Sebastian Galiani; Ernesto Schargrodsky","year":"2010","title":"Property rights for the poor: Effects of land titling","venue":"Journal of Public Economics 94(9-10):700-729","type":"","url":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.06.002","doi":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.06.002","reported_estimate":"Natural experiment, Buenos Aires. Constructed surface +12%; housing quality index +37%; household size 5.11 vs 6.06; +0.69 years schooling; secondary completion 53% vs 26%; only modest credit effects (figures from CEDLAS WP No.103, Aug 2010, p.3: https://www.econ.umd.edu/sites/www.econ.umd.edu/files/pubs/Documento_completo_1.pdf).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"40","authors":"Daniel Ayalew Ali; Klaus Deininger; Markus Goldstein","year":"2014","title":"Environmental and gender impacts of land tenure regularization in Africa: Pilot evidence from Rwanda","venue":"Journal of Development Economics 110:262-275","type":"","url":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.12.009","doi":"10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.12.009","reported_estimate":"Geographic discontinuity design. ~10 pp more likely to make/maintain soil conservation investments (about double control-group change); ~19 pp for female-headed households. Cost ~US$9-11 per parcel in pilot, since reduced to ~US$5; fee RWF 1000 (US$1.84) per parcel. (Figures from WPS5765, 2011, pp.10-13: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/d63797f6-e70f-54b9-8dd8-6ab36c658793/content)","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"40","authors":"Daniel Higgins; Tim Balint; Harold Liversage; Paul Winters","year":"2018","title":"Investigating the impacts of increased rural land tenure security: A systematic review of the evidence","venue":"Journal of Rural Studies 61:34-62 (NOT J. Dev. Effectiveness as in brief)","type":"","url":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2018.05.001","doi":"10.1016/j.jrurstud.2018.05.001","reported_estimate":"59 robust studies: strong evidence of positive effects on productive and environmentally beneficial investment and female empowerment, 'but a lack of support for links with productivity, access to credit, and income' (abstract).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"40","authors":"Lawry, S.; Samii, C.; Hall, R.; Leopold, A.; Hornby, D.; Mtero, F.","year":"2017","title":"The impact of land property rights interventions on investment and agricultural productivity in developing countries: a systematic review","venue":"Journal of Development Effectiveness 9(1): 61-81","type":"","url":"https://doi.org/10.1080/19439342.2016.1160947","doi":"10.1080/19439342.2016.1160947","reported_estimate":"20 quantitative + 9 qualitative studies; 'substantial productivity and income gains... although gains differ markedly by region'; no evidence for credit mechanism. Mean effects as tabulated by Byamugisha & Dubosse Table 5: productivity 0.42 (0.23-0.61), farm investment 0.05 (0.01-0.09), household income 0.15 (0.06-0.24); SSA moderator for productivity -0.42 (p=0.01).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"40","authors":"Prindex (as reported by Rural 21)","year":"2024","title":"Alarming trends in global tenure insecurity (Prindex Global Tenure Security Report 2024)","venue":"Rural 21 news","type":"","url":"https://www.rural21.com/english/news/detail/article/alarming-trends-in-global-tenure-insecurity.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"23% of adults worldwide, i.e. 1.1 billion people, feel insecure about land/property rights (up from 19% in 2020); 108 countries.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"40","authors":"Ballard, C. L.; Shoven, J. B.; Whalley, J.","year":"1985","title":"General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States","venue":"American Economic Review 75(1): 128-138","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v75y1985i1p128-38.html","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Marginal excess burden centres around 33 cents per $1 of revenue, range 17-56 cents (per Fullerton & Henderson 1987, NBER w2353).","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"40","authors":"Feldstein, M.","year":"1999","title":"Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax","venue":"Review of Economics and Statistics 81(4): 674-680","type":"peer_reviewed","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w5055","doi":"10.1162/003465399558391","reported_estimate":"Deadweight loss of nearly $2 per extra $1 of revenue from a proportional rise in all personal income tax rates.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"40","authors":"Adjasi, C.; Adiaba, S.","year":"2020","title":"Cost-Benefit Analysis of Land Title Reforms in Ghana: An Order of Magnitude Estimate (Ghana Priorities)","venue":"Copenhagen Consensus Center and National Development Planning Commission (Ghana)","type":"government","url":"https://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/gp_a4_land.pdf","doi":"","reported_estimate":"Table 1 (p.11): full-implementation cost GHS 1,658m (survey 1,061m). Table 2: benefits GHS 344,492m from a 25% rise in rural land value. Table 3 (p.12): BCR 182 / 146 / 91 / 43 / 5 at 75% / 50% / 25% / 10% / 1% probability of success; central estimate ~100 (91 at 25%). Tables 4-6: sensitivities 4-219.","role":"evidence","why_excluded":""},{"policy_id":"40","authors":"Hanan G. Jacoby; Bart Minten","year":"2007","title":"Is Land Titling in Sub-Saharan Africa Cost-Effective? Evidence from Madagascar","venue":"World Bank Economic Review 21(3):461-485","type":"","url":"https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/lhm011","doi":"10.1093/wber/lhm011","reported_estimate":"Title has no significant effect on plot-specific investment, little effect on productivity and land values; CBA says current formal titling should not be extended in rural Madagascar; new registration would have to be quite inexpensive.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Not excluded from range: used to justify LOW case (zero rural benefit). Excluded from central estimate because it evaluates expensive conventional titling (~$500/title per Byamugisha) rather than low-cost systematic registration."},{"policy_id":"40","authors":"Klaus Deininger; Gershon Feder","year":"2009","title":"Land Registration, Governance, and Development: Evidence and Implications for Policy","venue":"World Bank Research Observer 24(2):233-266","type":"","url":"https://doi.org/10.1093/wbro/lkp007","doi":"10.1093/wbro/lkp007","reported_estimate":"Evidence (not uniform) of tenure security, investment and productivity gains and more rental activity; credit evidence scant; 'little rigorous analysis of cost-effectiveness and long-term sustainability'; not a panacea; depends on governance.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Review, no BCR; informs difficulty rating and LOW case."},{"policy_id":"40","authors":"Lawry, S.; Samii, C.; Hall, R.; Leopold, A.; Hornby, D.; Mtero, F.","year":"2017","title":"The impact of land property rights interventions on investment and agricultural productivity in developing countries: a systematic review","venue":"Journal of Development Effectiveness 9(1): 61-81","type":"","url":"https://doi.org/10.1080/19439342.2016.1160947","doi":"10.1080/19439342.2016.1160947","reported_estimate":"Effects markedly lower in Sub-Saharan Africa; productivity moderator -0.42 (p=0.01); qualitative synthesis highlights potential adverse effects.","role":"counterpoint","why_excluded":"Not excluded; drives LOW case because the CCC rural benefit rests on a 15% income effect drawn from non-African 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pay landowners, communities or forest countries to keep tropical forest standing instead of clearing it. The payments are results-based: money flows when deforestation falls. The scale evaluated here is a cut of half in global deforestation, funded as public spending with monitoring and administration included.","why_on_list":"It came first of 18 options in the Peoples' Climate Vote 2021, chosen by 54% of respondents. It also features in the 2025 international survey of climate-policy attitudes by Dechezleprêtre and co-authors.","evidence":"Paying people to keep forests standing is often presented as one of the cheapest ways to cut carbon dioxide (CO2). The best evidence is a randomized trial in Uganda. Forest owners in 60 of 121 villages were paid not to clear their land for two years. Jayachandran et al. (2017) report that \"tree cover declined by 4.2% during the study period in treatment villages, compared to 9.1% in control villages.\" They found no sign that enrolled owners moved their clearing to nearby land. Valued at the social cost of carbon, the delayed emissions were worth 2.4 times the programme cost.\n\nThat result holds while the payments last. If owners catch up on the clearing as soon as payments stop, the ratio falls to 0.7. If the delay is permanent, it rises to 12.3, a case the authors call a very tentative extrapolation. The harder problem is delivery at scale. Where money buys carbon credits, West et al. (2023) find only about 6.1% of credits from voluntary REDD+ projects (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation) reflect additional reductions. Protection in one country can also push clearing elsewhere. A study summarised by Hu et al. (2024) puts that displacement at 42% to 95% of conservation effort. Combined, these bring the return down to about 9 cents per $1. Halving deforestation would cost about $33 billion a year, including monitoring and administration. Once the cost of raising the taxes that fund it is counted, the range is $0.03 to $1.79 per $1.","ratio":"**High end: 2.4.** This is the Uganda trial's published central ratio (Jayachandran et al. 2017). The working paper puts total programme cost at scale, payments plus administration, at about $0.57 per tonne of CO2 delayed (Jayachandran et al. 2016). The delayed emissions are valued at a $39 social cost of carbon. The trial's cost already includes monitoring and administration of the programme. Carbon-market certification costs do not apply to a government payments programme. The authors' own sensitivity range runs from 0.7 (immediate catch-up after payments stop) to 12.3 (permanent delay).\n\n**Low end: 0.09.** This is the full-cost case for delivery through credits, with leakage. Payments are counted as programme cost, as Jayachandran et al. do.\n\n1. Cost per credited tonne. Kindermann et al. (2008) give an upper average cost of $18.7 per tonne (28.0 ÷ 1.5). Monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) and certification add $1.46 per tonne (Merger et al. 2012). Total: $20.2 per tonne.\n2. Cost per real tonne. Only about 6.1% of credits reflect additional reductions (West et al. 2023). 20.2 ÷ 0.061 = $331 per real tonne.\n3. Value per dollar. At the $51 interim social cost of carbon used by the US Interagency Working Group (IWG) (Resources for the Future 2023): 51 ÷ 331 = 0.15.\n4. Leakage. Payments flow to countries one at a time, so displacement across borders applies. At the lowest figure of 42%: 0.15 × (1 − 0.42) = 0.09.\n\n**Range: 0.09 to 2.4. Full cost: $32.7 billion a year.**\n\nCross-checks. If every paid tonne were real, Kindermann's cost range of $6.4 to $18.7 per tonne gives ratios of 2.7 to 8.0 at a $51 social cost of carbon, and 9.9 to 29 at $185 (Rennert et al. 2022). Brazil's satellite-based enforcement system, DETER, breaks even at a carbon price of $0.76 per tonne (Assunção, Gandour and Rocha 2023). The Copenhagen Consensus Post-2015 assessment rated halving forest loss at about 10, while McVittie's re-estimate in the same assessment gave $2 to $3 per $1 (Markandya 2015).\n\n**After the cost of raising taxes.** Each $1 of public spending costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven and Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999). The low end uses the higher burden and the high end the lower one. The whole cost behind the ratio is public spending. Low end: 0.09 ÷ 3.00 = 0.03. High end: 2.4 ÷ 1.34 = 1.79. **Range after tax finance: 0.03 to 1.79.**","cost":"The full cost is $32.7 billion a year. It has three parts.\n\n- **Payments: $28.0 billion a year.** This is the high end of Kindermann et al. (2008), whose range for a 50% cut in deforestation is $17.2 to $28.0 billion a year. The payments equal landholders' opportunity costs: the farm and timber income they give up.\n- **Administration: about $4.7 billion a year.** Merger et al. (2012) find MRV and carbon-market compliance costs of up to $1.46 per tonne in Tanzanian REDD+ pilots. At Kindermann's upper volume of 2.7 billion tonnes a year: 2.7 × 1.46 = $3.9 billion. The Eliasch Review put capacity building at up to $4 billion over five years for 40 forest nations, or $0.8 billion a year (International Forest Industries 2008).\n- **Private compliance: zero.** The farmers' forgone income is the cost the payments compensate. Counting it again would double count it. Where enforcement replaces payment, as in Brazil, the same cost falls on landholders instead of the budget.\n\nNo separate estimate of lost national output was found. Lost farm output in forest countries is the same opportunity cost already counted. The risk of paying for credits that buy little is handled in the low-end ratio, not in the cost.","strength":"Grade: A. A randomized controlled trial published in *Science* reports a benefit-cost ratio of 2.4, with a range of 0.7 to 12.3. A peer-reviewed study of Brazil's enforcement system and a peer-reviewed global cost curve back it up. The low end rests on a peer-reviewed evaluation of REDD+ credits, also in *Science*. It falls short of the top grade for two reasons. Only one trial computes a ratio, and the evidence on offsets is negative.","difficulty":"Rating: moderate. The policy needs a sustained increase in funding, but working precedents exist. Norway makes results-based payments. The Amazon Fund is running. Brazil's DETER enforcement system cut deforestation sharply after 2004 to 2008 (Assunção, Gandour and Rocha 2023). No new treaty is needed. Delivery depends on enforcement capacity in tropical-forest countries. Take-up is another limit: in the Uganda trial only 32% of eligible owners enrolled, and 80% of those complied (Jayachandran et al. 2016).","who_benefits":"The policy is pro-poor. Payments flow to rural forest-owning households in low-income tropical countries. The climate benefits are global. Taxpayers in funding countries pay.\n\nThere is a caveat at village level. In the Uganda trial, forest owners gave neighbours less access to gather firewood. Jayachandran et al. (2016) note that \"most of those affected in this manner are the poorest, landless individuals in the community, and the program could have made them worse off.\" The programme also likely widened inequality within villages, because eligible owners were relatively wealthy to begin with.","counter":"The strongest case for the policy is that the high end understates it. The Copenhagen Consensus Post-2015 assessment rated halving forest loss at about 10, and Markandya's own assessment ran from $30 to more than $100 per $1 (Markandya 2015). Even McVittie's more cautious re-estimate of $2 to $3 per $1 sits close to the trial's 2.4. At the $185 social cost of carbon of Rennert et al. (2022), Kindermann's cost range gives 9.9 to 29. These figures are set aside because McVittie falls inside the adopted range and $185 is the highest published social cost of carbon. All of them also assume that every paid tonne is real, which West et al. (2023) find true of only about 6.1% of credits.\n\nThe verdict turns on permanence and credit quality. If the delay in clearing proved permanent, the trial's ratio would rise from 2.4 to 12.3; if owners catch up as soon as payments stop, it falls to 0.7. If government payments bought real tonnes at Kindermann's costs, the ratio would be 2.7 to 8.0 at a $51 social cost of carbon, instead of 0.09 for credit-based delivery with leakage. Either change would keep the ratio above 1 after the cost of raising the taxes that fund it, at $1.34 per public $1, and lift the policy out of the Bad tier.","references":["Assunção, J., C. Gandour, and R. Rocha. 2023. \"DETER-ing Deforestation in the Amazon: Environmental Monitoring and Law Enforcement.\" *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20200196.","Hu, J., E. O. Jåstad, T. F. Bolkesjø, and P. K. Rørstad. 2024. \"The Quantification and Tracing of Leakage in the Forest Sector in Nordic Countries.\" *Forests* 15 (2): 254. https://doi.org/10.3390/f15020254.","International Forest Industries. 2008. \"Eliasch Review on International Deforestation Published.\" *International Forest Industries*, October 14, 2008. https://internationalforestindustries.com/2008/10/14/eliasch-review-on-international-deforestation-published/.","Jayachandran, S., J. de Laat, E. F. Lambin, and C. Y. Stanton. 2016. *Cash for Carbon: A Randomized Controlled Trial of Payments for Ecosystem Services to Reduce Deforestation.* IPR Working Paper WP-16-25. Institute for Policy Research, Northwestern University. https://www.ipr.northwestern.edu/documents/working-papers/2016/WP-16-25.pdf.","Jayachandran, S., J. de Laat, E. F. Lambin, C. Y. Stanton, R. Audy, and N. E. Thomas. 2017. \"Cash for Carbon: A Randomized Trial of Payments for Ecosystem Services to Reduce Deforestation.\" *Science* 357 (6348): 267–273. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aan0568.","Kindermann, G., M. Obersteiner, B. Sohngen, J. Sathaye, K. Andrasko, E. Rametsteiner, B. Schlamadinger, S. Wunder, and R. Beach. 2008. \"Global Cost Estimates of Reducing Carbon Emissions through Avoided Deforestation.\" *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 105 (30): 10302–10307. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0710616105.","Markandya, A. 2015. *Biodiversity: Post-2015 Consensus.* Copenhagen Consensus Center. https://copenhagenconsensus.com/post-2015-consensus/biodiversity.","Merger, E., C. Held, T. Tennigkeit, and T. Blomley. 2012. \"A Bottom-Up Approach to Estimating Cost Elements of REDD+ Pilot Projects in Tanzania.\" *Carbon Balance and Management* 7: 9. https://doi.org/10.1186/1750-0680-7-9.","Rennert, K., F. Errickson, B. C. Prest, et al. 2022. \"Comprehensive Evidence Implies a Higher Social Cost of CO2.\" *Nature* 610: 687–692. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-022-05224-9.","Resources for the Future. 2023. *Social Cost of Carbon 101.* Resources for the Future. https://www.rff.org/publications/explainers/social-cost-carbon-101/.","West, T. A. P., S. Wunder, E. O. Sills, J. Börner, S. W. Rifai, A. N. Neidermeier, G. P. Frey, and A. Kontoleon. 2023. \"Action Needed to Make Carbon Offsets from Forest Conservation Work for Climate Change Mitigation.\" *Science* 381 (6660): 873–877. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.ade3535."]},"2":{"policy":"Governments pay for wind and solar power through subsidies and tax credits, or require it through mandates such as renewable portfolio standards (RPS), which oblige utilities to buy a set share of renewable power. The policy is evaluated as the subsidy or mandate itself. The question is what each dollar of support buys in avoided carbon dioxide (CO2), compared with what that CO2 is worth.","why_on_list":"It is one of the most popular climate policies in public surveys. It drew 53% support in the Peoples' Climate Vote and 69.5% in the international survey by Dechezleprêtre and co-authors.","evidence":"Subsidies and mandates for wind and solar do cut emissions. The question is the cost per tonne, and that varies widely. The most expensive case is solar subsidies in Germany and Spain. Abrell, Kosch and Rausch (2019) use weather-driven variation as a natural experiment and find short-run costs of up to €1,944 per tonne of CO2, or about $2,100. At the former US government carbon value, that returns about 2 cents per $1. Wind did much better, at €82 to €276 per tonne. In the United States, state renewable mandates raised retail electricity prices by 11% seven years after passage and cost $86 to $211 per tonne abated (Greenstone and Nath 2019). Model estimates of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) power-sector credits come to about $88 per tonne when costs and emissions are both discounted (Bistline, Mehrotra and Wolfram 2023). Those authors note the cost would be higher if the distortions from financing the credits were counted. The overall range is about 2 to 75 cents per $1. Counting full costs, the federal credits and the higher bills from state mandates cost about $238 billion a year. Once the cost of raising the taxes that fund it is counted, the range is $0.009 to $0.58 per $1.","ratio":"The ratio is the social value of a tonne of CO2 avoided, divided by the social resource cost of abating it. The abatement costs used are resource costs: generation, backup, transmission and fuel, or observed changes in retail prices. They already contain the costs borne by firms and ratepayers. Tax credits are transfers, so they are not added again.\n\n**Low end: 0.024.** This uses the highest published cost measured after the fact.\n\n1. Cost. Solar subsidies in Germany and Spain cost €411 to €1,944 per tonne in the short run (Abrell, Kosch and Rausch 2019). Upper end: 1,944 × about 1.1 dollars per euro = $2,138 per tonne.\n2. Value. The US Interagency Working Group (IWG) interim social cost of carbon is $51 per tonne (Resources for the Future 2023).\n3. Ratio: 51 ÷ 2,138 = 0.024.\n\n**High end: 0.75.** This uses the IRA power-sector estimate on a consistent basis.\n\n1. Cost. Bistline, Mehrotra and Wolfram (2023) put the abatement cost at $88 to $94 per tonne when both costs and emissions are discounted. That is the right comparison with a per-tonne social cost of carbon. Their headline $36 to $87 discounts the costs but not the tonnes.\n2. Value. The DICE-2023 model gives a social cost of carbon of $66 per tonne (Barrage and Nordhaus 2024).\n3. Ratio: 66 ÷ 88 = 0.75.\n\n**Range: 0.024 to 0.75. Full cost: $237.7 billion a year.**\n\nIntermediate results sit inside the range. State mandates at $86 to $211 per tonne give 0.24 to 0.59 at $51. Wind subsidies at €82 to €276, or $90 to $304, per tonne give 0.17 to 0.57 at $51. The Copenhagen Consensus Center (2015) rates doubling the renewable share of global energy below 1.\n\nCross-checks. At the $185 social cost of carbon of Rennert et al. (2022), the low end would be 0.087 and the high end 185 ÷ 88 = 2.10; state mandates would give 0.88 to 2.15. Intermittency matters too. In southeastern Arizona, Gowrisankaran, Reynolds and Samano (2016) find \"social costs of $138.4/MWh for 20% solar generation, of which unforecastable intermittency accounts for $6.1 and intermittency overall for $46.\" Idel (2022) finds that the full-system costs of wind and solar serving a whole market are far above the usual levelized cost of electricity (LCOE). These costs are inside the estimates based on observed prices, but can be understated in models that use LCOE.\n\n**After the cost of raising taxes.** Each $1 of public spending costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted, an extra $0.34 to $2.00 (Ballard, Shoven and Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999). The low end uses the higher burden and the high end the lower one. The credits are paid from taxes, but the mandates are paid by electricity customers. Only the tax-financed share of the cost carries the extra burden: (197 + 1.0) ÷ 237.7 = 0.833. Low end: 0.024 ÷ (1 + 2.0 × 0.833) = 0.009. High end: 0.75 ÷ (1 + 0.34 × 0.833) = 0.58. **Range after tax finance: 0.009 to 0.58.**","cost":"The full cost is $237.7 billion a year.\n\n- **Public outlay: $197 billion a year.** This is the high end of published estimates of the IRA energy subsidies: $1.97 trillion over 2025 to 2034 (Fisher and Loucks 2025). The Congressional Budget Office and the Joint Committee on Taxation put it at about $786 billion over 2024 to 2033. The July 2025 One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA) ends most wind, solar and electric-vehicle credits, so outlays under current law are lower. The figure is for the policy in full form.\n- **Administration: about $1.0 billion a year.** No administration cost specific to the energy credits was found. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) cost of collection at its recent peak, 53 cents per $100, is applied to $197 billion (USAFacts 2025).\n- **Private compliance: about $39.7 billion a year.** Ratepayers bear the cost of state mandates. Mandates raised retail prices 11% (Greenstone and Nath 2019). US retail electricity sales in 2024 were 3,975 terawatt-hours at 12.94 cents per kilowatt-hour, or $514 billion (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2025). States with mandates held 70.1% of retail revenue. 0.11 × 514 × 0.701 = $39.7 billion.\n- **Lost output: no estimate.** No published economy-wide estimate of output lost to US renewable subsidies and mandates was found.\n\nOne friction is not added. Wind developers valued $1 of nonrefundable tax credit at $0.85 of a grant (Johnston 2019). That is a split of the same outlay between developers and investors, not an extra resource cost.","strength":"Grade: B+. The low end comes from a peer-reviewed natural experiment based on weather variation. The high end comes from a model-based estimate published in *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*. A quasi-experimental working paper sits in between. All are converted to ratios with published social costs of carbon. Results differ in sign by technology and by carbon value, so the grade stays out of the A range.","difficulty":"Rating: moderate. The policy needs ordinary budget or tax legislation, or state RPS statutes. Precedent is abundant: the IRA of 2022, feed-in laws in the European Union and Germany, and 29 US state RPS laws. Durability is the weak point. The OBBBA cut back most federal wind, solar and electric-vehicle credits within three years of enactment. Wind and solar credits now end unless construction begins by July 4, 2026, or the facility is in service by December 31, 2027 (Kirkland & Ellis LLP 2025).","who_benefits":"The policy is regressive. Borenstein and Davis (2016) find the top fifth of US households by income received about 60% of clean-energy tax credits. The bottom three fifths received about 10%. About 90% of electric-vehicle credits went to the top fifth. Mandates raise retail electricity prices by 11% to 17% (Greenstone and Nath 2019), a cost that weighs more on low-income households. Tax credits also favour incumbents, which are more likely to owe taxes than new entrants (Johnston 2019). Health benefits from cleaner air are broad.","counter":"The strongest case for renewable subsidies comes from Wiser et al. (2017) at two Department of Energy (DOE) national laboratories. They find existing state mandates cost up to $31 billion over 2015 to 2050, against $97 billion in health benefits and $161 billion in climate benefits under central assumptions. That implies a ratio of 8.3, or 2.7 with lower-bound benefits. For an expanded mandate they count $558 billion in health and $599 billion in climate benefits, against costs of $23 to $194 billion. The study is set aside because it projects costs from the laboratories' own model, and studies of the same mandates after the fact find higher costs per tonne (Greenstone and Nath 2019).\n\nTwo findings would move the verdict. The first is a higher value of carbon. At the $185 social cost of carbon of Rennert et al. (2022), and before the cost of raising taxes, the source ratio at the high end rises from 0.75 to 2.10, and mandates reach 0.88 to 2.15. The second is a lower cost per tonne. If observed costs matched Wiser's projections, with health gains counted, the ratio would sit at 2.7 to 8.3 rather than below 1, enough to leave the Worst tier even after the cost of raising taxes.","references":["Abrell, J., M. Kosch, and S. Rausch. 2019. \"Carbon Abatement with Renewables: Evaluating Wind and Solar Subsidies in Germany and Spain.\" *Journal of Public Economics* 169: 172–202. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.11.007.","Barbose, G., et al. 2025. *State Electricity Resource Standards: 2025 Data Update.* LBNL Electricity Markets & Policy. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. https://emp.lbl.gov/sites/default/files/2025-08/State%20Electricity%20Resource%20Standards-2025%20Data%20Update.pdf.","Barrage, L., and W. Nordhaus. 2024. \"Policies, Projections, and the Social Cost of Carbon: Results from the DICE-2023 Model.\" *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 121 (13): e2312030121. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2312030121.","Bistline, J., N. Mehrotra, and C. Wolfram. 2023. \"Economic Implications of the Climate Provisions of the Inflation Reduction Act.\" *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, Spring 2023. NBER Working Paper 31267. https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w31267/w31267.pdf.","Borenstein, S., and L. W. Davis. 2016. \"The Distributional Effects of US Clean Energy Tax Credits.\" *Tax Policy and the Economy* 30. https://doi.org/10.1086/685597.","Copenhagen Consensus Center. 2015. *Energy: Post-2015 Consensus.* Copenhagen Consensus Center. https://copenhagenconsensus.com/post-2015-consensus/energy.","Fisher, T., and J. L. Loucks. 2025. *The Budgetary Cost of the Inflation Reduction Act's Energy Subsidies.* Policy Analysis No. 992. Cato Institute. https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/budgetary-cost-inflation-reduction-acts-energy-subsidies.","Gowrisankaran, G., S. S. Reynolds, and M. Samano. 2016. \"Intermittency and the Value of Renewable Energy.\" *Journal of Political Economy* 124 (4): 1187–1234. https://doi.org/10.1086/686733.","Greenstone, M., and I. Nath. 2019. \"Do Renewable Portfolio Standards Deliver Cost-Effective Carbon Abatement?\" BFI Working Paper 2019-62, revised June 24, 2026. Becker Friedman Institute and Energy Policy Institute, University of Chicago. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3374942.","Idel, R. 2022. \"Levelized Full System Costs of Electricity.\" *Energy* 259: 124905. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2022.124905.","Johnston, S. 2019. \"Nonrefundable Tax Credits versus Grants: The Impact of Subsidy Form on the Effectiveness of Subsidies for Renewable Energy.\" *Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists* 6 (3): 433–460. https://doi.org/10.1086/702736.","Kirkland & Ellis LLP. 2025. \"'One Big Beautiful Bill Act' Brings Big Changes to Green Energy Tax Credits.\" Kirkland & Ellis. https://www.kirkland.com/publications/kirkland-alert/2025/08/one-big-beautiful-bill-act-brings-big-changes-to-green-energy-tax-credits.","Rennert, K., F. Errickson, B. C. Prest, et al. 2022. \"Comprehensive Evidence Implies a Higher Social Cost of CO2.\" *Nature* 610: 687–692. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-022-05224-9.","Resources for the Future. 2023. *Social Cost of Carbon 101.* Resources for the Future. https://www.rff.org/publications/explainers/social-cost-carbon-101/.","U.S. Energy Information Administration. 2025. *United States Electricity Profile 2024; Revenue from Sales to Ultimate Customers by State.* EIA. https://www.eia.gov/electricity/state/unitedstates/.","USAFacts. 2025. \"What Does It Cost the IRS to Collect Taxes?\" USAFacts. https://usafacts.org/articles/what-does-it-cost-the-irs-to-collect-taxes/.","Wiser, R., T. Mai, D. Millstein, G. Barbose, L. Bird, J. Heeter, D. Keyser, V. Krishnan, and J. Macknick. 2017. \"Assessing the Costs and Benefits of US Renewable Portfolio Standards.\" *Environmental Research Letters* 12 (9): 094023. https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aa87bd."]},"3":{"policy":"Governments fund two kinds of protection against storms and floods. The first is early-warning systems: weather forecasting, alerts and evacuation. The second is flood defences, both built ones such as dikes and natural ones such as mangroves, marshes and reefs. The package is evaluated as public spending, with programme management included.","why_on_list":"It comes from the Peoples' Climate Vote, where two options in the \"Protecting People\" group each drew 45% support.","evidence":"Early warnings and flood defences protect people and property, and the evidence that they pay is consistent. The Global Commission on Adaptation (2019) finds benefits of $2 to $10 per $1 across its five priority adaptation investments. It estimates $1.8 trillion invested over 2020 to 2030 would yield $7.1 trillion in net benefits. A peer-reviewed review of disaster-risk studies by Mechler (2016) finds benefits average about four times costs. Early warnings alone score higher because they are cheap. Bringing weather services and warnings in all developing countries up to developed-country standard would cost about $1 billion a year and return $4 billion to $36 billion a year (Hallegatte 2012). Natural defences are also good value: salt marshes and mangroves are 2 to 5 times cheaper than submerged breakwaters for small waves (Narayan et al. 2016). The uncertainty lies in individual projects. Some dikes do not pay, and many published studies skip sensitivity tests. The case is strongest where exposure is high and protection is weak. Once the cost of raising the taxes that fund it is counted, the range is $0.58 to $7.46 per $1.","ratio":"The package combines early warnings and flood defences. Both sit inside the range found by the Global Commission on Adaptation (2019): $2 to $10 per $1 across its five priority investments, with an average of almost 4. The Commission finds early warnings save lives and assets worth at least ten times their cost, and mangrove benefits run up to 10 times costs.\n\n**Low end: 1.7.** The published ratios are computed on project costs. Programme management adds cost. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) caps it at 15% of grant awards (Federal Emergency Management Agency 2019). Adding that lowers a ratio by 1 ÷ 1.15. It is applied at the low end, where the highest cost estimate belongs: 2 ÷ 1.15 = 1.74, rounded to 1.7.\n\n**High end: 10.** This is the Commission's top ratio, already stated on total investment.\n\n**Central value: about 4.** Mechler (2016) finds benefits of disaster-risk management average about four times costs.\n\n**Range: 1.7 to 10. Full cost: $46 billion a year.**\n\nCross-checks by component:\n\n- **Early warnings.** Hallegatte (2012) estimates about $1 billion a year buys $4 billion to $36 billion a year in benefits. These include $0.3 billion to $2 billion in avoided asset losses, about 23,000 lives a year valued at $0.7 billion to $3.5 billion, and $3 billion to $30 billion in wider economic benefits. Ratio: 4 to 36. The Commission finds $800 million on early warnings avoids $3 billion to $16 billion a year in losses, a ratio of 3.75 to 20.\n- **US flood mitigation.** The National Institute of Building Sciences (NIBS) finds federal riverine-flood mitigation grants return about 7 to 1, and all federal mitigation grants 6 to 1 (Multihazard Mitigation Council 2019).\n- **Coastal defences.** Without adaptation, Hinkel et al. (2014) project that \"0.2–4.6% of global population is expected to be flooded annually in 2100 under 25–123 cm of global mean sea-level rise, with expected annual losses of 0.3–9.3% of global gross domestic product.\" Dikes would cost $12 billion to $71 billion a year by 2100, far less than the damage avoided.\n\nThe higher early-warning figures, up to 36, do not set the high end. Early warnings make up only about 1% to 3% of the package cost, so the blended ratio is dominated by the defences, at 2 to 10.\n\n**After the cost of raising taxes.** Each $1 of public spending costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven and Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999). The low end uses the higher burden and the high end the lower one. The whole cost behind the ratio is public spending. Low end: 1.74 ÷ 3.00 = 0.58. High end: 10 ÷ 1.34 = 7.46. **Range after tax finance: 0.58 to 7.46.**","cost":"The full cost is $46 billion a year.\n\n- **Public outlay: about $40 billion a year.** Early warnings cost about $1 billion a year for all developing countries (Hallegatte 2012). The UN's Early Warnings for All plan budgets $3.1 billion over 2023 to 2027, or about $0.6 billion a year (United Nations 2022). Coastal dikes cost $12 billion to $71 billion a year including maintenance, with a midpoint of about $40 billion (Hinkel et al. 2014). River and nature-based defences partly overlap with these.\n- **Administration: about $6.0 billion a year.** FEMA's hazard mitigation programme allows management costs of up to 15% of the grant: up to 10% for the recipient and 5% for the subrecipient. 0.15 × 40 = $6.0 billion, used as the upper bound.\n- **Private compliance: zero.** The package is public works and warning services, not a building code or land-use rule.\n- **Lost output: no estimate.** None is published, and tax financing is treated the same way as for the other public-spending policies.\n\nTwo bounds put the figure in context. The full five-area programme of the Global Commission on Adaptation is about $180 billion a year. The United Nations Environment Programme (2023) puts all adaptation needs of developing countries at $215 billion to $387 billion a year. This package is a subset of both.","strength":"Grade: A-. The central value comes from a peer-reviewed review of risk-based benefit-cost studies (Mechler 2016). It agrees with peer-reviewed studies of coastal defences (Hinkel et al. 2014) and nature-based defences (Narayan et al. 2016). The end points come from official estimates by the Global Commission on Adaptation, the World Bank and NIBS. No randomized or quasi-experimental ratio exists for the package, which keeps it below the top grade.","difficulty":"Rating: moderate. The policy is a sustained funding increase with clear precedents: Bangladesh's cyclone warning and shelter programme, FEMA mitigation grants, and the UN Early Warnings for All initiative, endorsed by 50 countries. No treaty or constitutional change is needed. Large defences do need capital budgets that run for years, and steady maintenance.","who_benefits":"The policy is pro-poor. Disaster deaths fall hardest on low-income countries. Countries with limited early-warning coverage have disaster mortality eight times higher than those with high coverage (United Nations 2022). Hallegatte's estimate targets developing countries. Mangrove protection also supports coastal fishing livelihoods (Global Commission on Adaptation 2019). Taxpayers fund the package.","counter":"The case against rests on how the published ratios are made. Kelman and Shreve (2014) find that many studies of disaster risk reduction lack sensitivity analysis, ignore climate change and its downsides, and give results that depend heavily on context. Mechler (2016) finds benefits average about four times costs, but calls the evidence base limited. Ward et al. (2017) find that \"investments in dykes may be economically attractive for reducing risk in large parts of the world, but not everywhere.\" Read together, these suggest the published 2:1 to 10:1 may be optimistic, and that some projects fall below 1. Neither caution gives a pooled ratio, so neither sets an end point.\n\nThe verdict would fall a tier if projects built at scale returned the bottom of the published range rather than Mechler's average. At 2:1, programme management at the 15% cap of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the cost of raising taxes take the low end to 0.58. The verdict would rise toward Excellent only if early warning carried more weight. Early-warning systems return 4 to 36 times their cost (Hallegatte 2012), but they are only about 1% to 3% of package cost, so the flood defences, at 2 to 10, set the result.","references":["Federal Emergency Management Agency. 2019. *Section 1215 | Management Costs (Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018).* FEMA Policy Guidance Fact Sheet. U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency. https://fema.gov/assistance/public/policy-guidance-fact-sheets/section-1215-management-costs.","Global Commission on Adaptation. 2019. *Adapt Now: A Global Call for Leadership on Climate Resilience.* Global Center on Adaptation and World Resources Institute. https://gca.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/GlobalCommission_Report_FINAL.pdf.","Hallegatte, S. 2012. *A Cost Effective Solution to Reduce Disaster Losses in Developing Countries: Hydro-Meteorological Services, Early Warning, and Evacuation.* Policy Research Working Paper 6058. World Bank. https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2051341.","Hinkel, J., D. Lincke, A. T. Vafeidis, M. Perrette, R. J. Nicholls, R. S. J. Tol, B. Marzeion, X. Fettweis, C. Ionescu, and A. Levermann. 2014. \"Coastal Flood Damage and Adaptation Costs under 21st Century Sea-Level Rise.\" *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 111 (9): 3292–3297. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1222469111.","Kelman, I., and C. M. Shreve. 2014. \"Does Mitigation Save? Reviewing Cost-Benefit Analyses of Disaster Risk Reduction.\" *International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction* 10 (A): 213–235. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2014.08.004.","Mechler, R. 2016. \"Reviewing Estimates of the Economic Efficiency of Disaster Risk Management: Opportunities and Limitations of Using Risk-Based Cost-Benefit Analysis.\" *Natural Hazards* 81 (3): 2121–2147. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-016-2170-y.","Multihazard Mitigation Council. 2019. *Natural Hazard Mitigation Saves: 2019 Report.* National Institute of Building Sciences. https://www.nibs.org/files/pdfs/ms_v3_grants_flood.pdf.","Narayan, S., M. W. Beck, B. G. Reguero, I. J. Losada, B. van Wesenbeeck, N. Pontee, J. N. Sanchirico, J. C. Ingram, G.-M. Lange, and K. A. Burks-Copes. 2016. \"The Effectiveness, Costs and Coastal Protection Benefits of Natural and Nature-Based Defences.\" *PLoS ONE* 11 (5): e0154735. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0154735.","United Nations. 2022. \"COP27: $3.1 Billion Plan to Achieve Early Warning Systems for All by 2027.\" *UN News*. https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/11/1130277.","United Nations Environment Programme. 2023. *Adaptation Gap Report 2023: Underfinanced. Underprepared.* UNEP. https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/43866/AGR23_KMEN.pdf?sequence=8.","Ward, P. J., B. Jongman, J. C. J. H. Aerts, P. D. Bates, W. J. W. Botzen, A. Diaz Loaiza, S. Hallegatte, J. M. Kind, J. Kwadijk, P. Scussolini, and H. C. Winsemius. 2017. \"A Global Framework for Future Costs and Benefits of River-Flood Protection in Urban Areas.\" *Nature Climate Change* 7: 642–646. https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate3350."]},"4":{"policy":"Governments set aside marine protected areas (MPAs): parts of the ocean closed to fishing and other uses to protect reefs, mangroves, coastal wetlands and fish stocks. The policy includes \"blue carbon\", the carbon stored by these coastal ecosystems. Fisheries management outside protected areas is a separate matter and is excluded.","why_on_list":"It drew 45% support in the Peoples' Climate Vote.","evidence":"Protecting parts of the ocean can pay through fish spilling over into open waters, tourism, coastal protection, biodiversity and stored carbon. The most complete global cost-benefit model finds benefits exceed costs by a factor of 1.4 to 2.7 (Brander et al. 2020). That model assumes protected areas work as designed. Field evidence says most do not. A study of 87 MPAs in 40 countries found only 9 had four or five of the features that make protection effective; most of the rest were ecologically no different from unprotected waters (Edgar et al. 2014). Staff and budget matter most: Gill et al. (2017) find that \"MPAs with adequate staff capacity had ecological effects 2.9 times greater than MPAs with inadequate capacity.\" Counting benefits only where protection works gives about 12 cents per $1. The modelled benefits are also contested. A more realistic model cuts the food benefits of priority areas by 62% (Ovando et al. 2023). Lost fishing access makes up about 90% of the cost, and fishers bear most of it. Once the cost of raising the taxes that fund it is counted, the range is $0.10 to $2.61 per $1.","ratio":"Benefits counted are fish spill-over, tourism and recreation, coastal protection, biodiversity and carbon storage in reefs, mangroves and coastal wetlands. Costs are setting up and managing the areas, plus the fishing income given up, which is about 90% of the total.\n\n**High end: 2.7.** Brander et al. (2020) build a peer-reviewed global bio-economic model. Across six expansion scenarios, benefits exceed costs by a factor of 1.4 to 2.7. Those ratios already include set-up, management and lost fishing.\n\n**Low end: 0.12.**\n\n1. Starting point. Brander's assessment for the Copenhagen Consensus Center covers the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of Africa's 38 coastal countries. The ratio is 9.2 for protecting 10% of each zone and 1.16 for 30% (Brander 2019). The ratio falls as protection spreads into lower-value areas where lost fishing costs more.\n2. Effectiveness. The 1.16 assumes every protected area works. Only 9 of 87 MPAs had the features that make them effective (Edgar et al. 2014). 9 ÷ 87 = 10%.\n3. Ratio: 1.16 × 0.10 = 0.12.\n\n**Range: 0.12 to 2.7. Full cost: $28.4 billion a year.**\n\nCross-checks. An earlier version of the global model, not peer-reviewed, reported 3.2 to 19.8 (Brander et al. 2015). It is superseded by the 2020 paper. Replacing its management cost with the high-end running cost from Balmford et al. (2004), $19 billion a year or $414.8 billion in present value (19 × 21.83), gives lower ratios for 30% coverage:\n\n- Scenario E2E30: 719.2 ÷ (227.0 − 23.8 + 414.8) = 1.16.\n- Scenario P2P30: 1,145.2 ÷ (228.0 − 24.4 + 414.8) = 1.85.\n\nBalmford's cost covers 20% to 30% of all seas, more than 30% of national zones, so this overstates cost. For blue carbon, the Global Commission on Adaptation (2019) finds mangrove preservation and restoration benefits up to 10 times costs.\n\n**After the cost of raising taxes.** Each $1 of public spending costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted, an extra $0.34 to $2.00 (Ballard, Shoven and Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999). The low end uses the higher burden and the high end the lower one. About 90% of the cost in Brander's ratios is fishers' lost access, a private cost. Only the remaining 10%, for setting up and managing the areas, is paid from taxes. Low end: 0.12 ÷ (1 + 2.0 × 0.10) = 0.1. High end: 2.7 ÷ (1 + 0.34 × 0.10) = 2.61. **Range after tax finance: 0.10 to 2.61.**","cost":"The full cost is about $28.4 billion a year. Costs are annualised at a 3% discount rate over 2015 to 2050, matching the source: an annuity factor of 21.83.\n\n- **Establishment: $0.36 billion a year.** In the global 30% scenario of Brander et al. (2015), set-up costs are $7.854 billion in present value. 7.854 ÷ 21.83 = $0.36 billion.\n- **Management and enforcement: $19 billion a year.** Balmford et al. (2004) estimate a global network covering 20% to 30% of the seas \"might cost between $5 billion and $19 billion annually to run.\" The high end is used. Brander's own management cost is lower, about $1.1 billion a year.\n- **Lost fishing income: $9.0 billion a year.** In the same scenario, the fisheries opportunity cost is $195.8 billion in present value. 195.8 ÷ 21.83 = $9.0 billion.\n- **Lost output: no estimate.** None is published. Other uses given up, such as shipping, minerals, offshore wind and subsistence fishing, are not valued in the sources.\n\nFor scale, Waldron et al. (2020) put protection of 30% of all land and ocean at about $140 billion a year by 2030.","strength":"Grade: B. The range rests on one peer-reviewed global bio-economic model (Brander et al. 2020). Its benefit inputs are disputed in *Nature* (Ovando et al. 2023; Hilborn and Kaiser 2022; Hiddink et al. 2023). Field evidence shows most protected areas fall short (Edgar et al. 2014; Gill et al. 2017). No randomized study or global cost-benefit analysis measured after the fact exists.","difficulty":"Rating: moderate. Each country can designate and enforce protected areas in its own waters under ordinary law. Many have, including the US Papahānaumokuākea monument. The global target of protecting 30% by 2030 is agreed under the 2022 Kunming-Montreal framework. Protecting the high seas needs the multilateral treaty on Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ). Enforcement against fishing is costly.","who_benefits":"Benefits are broad but costs are concentrated. Coastal protection, tourism, fish spill-over, biodiversity and carbon storage are widely shared. Balmford et al. (2004) estimate a global network would create around one million jobs. The main cost, lost fishing access, falls on fishing communities, some of them poor. After the Papahānaumokuākea expansion, Hawaii longline vessels that fished heavily in the area saw catch per unit of effort fall 7%, and revenue per trip fell 9%, or $3.5 million, in the first 16 months (Chan 2020).","counter":"The strongest case for ocean protection is that well-chosen areas pay many times over. Brander's Copenhagen Consensus assessment for Africa gives 9.2 for protecting 10% of coastal waters, and an earlier global model found 3.2 to 19.8 (Brander et al. 2015). Sala et al. (2021) find well-placed protection could raise catches by more than 8 million tonnes, and Waldron et al. (2020) find benefits at least 5 to 1 for protecting 30% of land and sea. These are set aside. The 2015 model was not peer-reviewed and is superseded. Sala et al. give no ratio, and their trawling-carbon estimate may be 100 to 1,000 times too high (Hiddink et al. 2023). Waldron's figure is not specific to the ocean. The Copenhagen Consensus itself rated combined land and sea protection at 0.85.\n\nThe verdict turns on enforcement and coverage. The low end assumes benefits only from the 9 of 87 protected areas that had the features that make them work (Edgar et al. 2014). If every area were run that well, the source ratio at the low end would rise from 0.12 to 1.16, close to the 1.4 to 2.7 of Brander et al. (2020), and the policy would move from the Bad toward the Mid tier. Fishing that moves rather than stops pushes the other way (Hilborn and Kaiser 2022).","references":["Balmford, A., P. Gravestock, N. Hockley, C. J. McClean, and C. M. Roberts. 2004. \"The Worldwide Costs of Marine Protected Areas.\" *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 101 (26): 9694–9697. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0403239101.","Brander, L. 2019. *Expansion of Marine Protected Areas.* Identifying Best Buys for Africa. Copenhagen Consensus Center. https://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/expansion_of_marine_protected_areas.pdf.","Brander, L., C. Baulcomb, J. A. C. van der Lelij, F. Eppink, A. McVittie, L. Nijsten, and P. van Beukering. 2015. *The Benefits to People of Expanding Marine Protected Areas.* IVM, VU Amsterdam, and WWF. https://files.worldwildlife.org/wwfcmsprod/files/Publication/file/8u8uxvczvw_Smart_Investments_in_Ocean_Health.pdf.","Brander, L. M., P. van Beukering, L. Nijsten, A. McVittie, C. Baulcomb, F. V. Eppink, and J. A. Cado van der Lelij. 2020. \"The Global Costs and Benefits of Expanding Marine Protected Areas.\" *Marine Policy* 116: 103953. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2020.103953.","Chan, H. L. 2020. \"Economic Impacts of Papahānaumokuākea Marine National Monument Expansion on the Hawaii Longline Fishery.\" *Marine Policy* 115: 103869. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2020.103869.","Copenhagen Consensus Center. 2015. *Biodiversity: Post-2015 Consensus.* Copenhagen Consensus Center. https://copenhagenconsensus.com/post-2015-consensus/biodiversity.","Edgar, G. J., et al. 2014. \"Global Conservation Outcomes Depend on Marine Protected Areas with Five Key Features.\" *Nature* 506: 216–220. https://doi.org/10.1038/nature13022.","Gill, D. A., et al. 2017. \"Capacity Shortfalls Hinder the Performance of Marine Protected Areas Globally.\" *Nature* 543: 665–669. https://doi.org/10.1038/nature21708.","Global Commission on Adaptation. 2019. *Adapt Now: A Global Call for Leadership on Climate Resilience.* Global Center on Adaptation and World Resources Institute. https://gca.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/GlobalCommission_Report_FINAL.pdf.","Hiddink, J. G., S. J. van de Velde, R. A. McConnaughey, et al. 2023. \"Quantifying the Carbon Benefits of Ending Bottom Trawling.\" *Nature* 617: E1–E2. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-023-06014-7.","Hilborn, R. 2016. \"Policy: Marine Biodiversity Needs More than Protection.\" *Nature* 535: 224–226. https://doi.org/10.1038/535224a.","Hilborn, R., and M. J. Kaiser. 2022. \"A Path Forward for Analysing the Impacts of Marine Protected Areas.\" *Nature* 607: E1–E2. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-022-04775-1.","Ovando, D., O. Liu, R. Molina, A. Parma, and C. Szuwalski. 2023. \"Global Effects of Marine Protected Areas on Food Security Are Unknown.\" *Nature* 621: E34–E36. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-023-06493-8.","Sala, E., J. Mayorga, D. Bradley, et al. 2021. \"Protecting the Global Ocean for Biodiversity, Food and Climate.\" *Nature* 592: 397–402. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-021-03371-z.","Waldron, A., et al. 2020. *Protecting 30% of the Planet for Nature: Costs, Benefits and Economic Implications.* Campaign for Nature and Cambridge Conservation Initiative. https://www.cambridgeconservation.org/news/economic-benefits-of-protecting-30-of-planets-land-ocean-outweigh-the-costs-at-least-5-to-1/.","Williamson, P., and J.-P. Gattuso. 2022. \"Carbon Removal Using Coastal Blue Carbon Ecosystems Is Uncertain and Unreliable, with Questionable Climatic Cost-Effectiveness.\" *Frontiers in Climate* 4: 853666. https://doi.org/10.3389/fclim.2022.853666."]},"5":{"policy":"Governments require every new car and truck sold to be zero-emission. Cars are covered worldwide from 2030. Trucks follow the schedules of California's Advanced Clean Fleets and Advanced Clean Trucks rules, which require 100% zero-emission truck sales, and the European Union's 90% cut in heavy-duty carbon dioxide (CO2) for 2040. It is a rule, not a spending programme.","why_on_list":"It is the only policy asked about in all three climate surveys used for the list: the Peoples' Climate Vote, the international survey by Dechezleprêtre and co-authors, and the European Investment Bank (EIB) climate survey.","evidence":"A ban would cut oil use, but what it does for the climate and for health depends on the power grid. On the 2010 to 2012 US grid, Holland et al. (2016) find that the average electric car did $1,095 more environmental damage over its life than the gasoline car it replaced. The US grid has since become cleaner, and by 2017 electric cars were cleaner than gasoline cars on average (Holland et al. 2020). A global ban in 2030 would put most new electric cars on grids like China's, 58% coal, and India's, 75% coal (Ember 2025). In Chinese cities, electric cars cause 3.6 times the fine-particle health damage of gasoline cars (Ji et al. 2012). An analysis of the UK's 2030 car ban puts costs at five times benefits. Trucks are harder still: electrifying US trucking needs nearly $1 trillion of chargers and grid before counting the vehicles. The result is a range from about minus 7 cents to 19 cents per $1. Full cost once the ban binds is about $1 trillion a year.","ratio":"No study evaluates this ban directly, so the ends come from the closest priced analyses. No published ratio covers trucks on the pessimistic side, so the range is anchored on the evidence for cars.\n\n**Low end: −0.07.**\n\n1. Benefit. Holland et al. (2016) value the full environmental benefit of an electric car over a gasoline car, counting CO2 and local pollution from power plants and tailpipes. They find the benefit \"ranges from $2,785 in California to −$4,964 in North Dakota, with a mean of −$1,095.\" That is on the 2010 to 2012 US grid. Coal-heavy grids in China and India make this the relevant case for a global ban.\n2. Cost per forced electric car. Battery premium: $10,000 (Mills 2023). Grid and charging: $6,250, from $75 billion to $125 billion of US power-sector investment for 20 million electric cars, or $3,750 to $6,250 per car (Hagerty, Sergici and Lam 2020). Total: $16,250.\n3. Ratio: −1,095 ÷ 16,250 = −0.07. With the battery premium alone it would be −0.11. A larger cost moves a negative ratio toward zero.\n\n**High end: 0.19.** The Centre for Economics and Business Research (Cebr), for the All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) for Fair Fuel, valued the UK's 2030 car ban. Benefits: £76 billion. Costs: £400 billion. Ratio: 76 ÷ 400 = 0.19 (Centre for Economics and Business Research 2023). Used cars lower this further. When new-car rules raise used-car values, old cars are scrapped later, and 13% to 16% of expected fuel savings leak away (Jacobsen and van Benthem 2015).\n\n**Range: −0.07 to 0.19. Full cost: $1,043.2 billion a year.**\n\nCross-checks. McKitrick (2023) models Canada's mandate across the whole economy. Costs run to over $2,700 per tonne of CO2. At the $185 social cost of carbon of Rennert et al. (2022), 185 ÷ 2,700 = 0.07. At the $51 US interim value (Resources for the Future 2023), 51 ÷ 2,700 = 0.02. McKitrick finds that \"while the mandate is binding, the costs per tonne of emissions abated are at least 10 times the Canadian carbon tax rates.\" The same model puts real output several percent below baseline by 2035 when cost parity arrives only in 2050.\n\nTrucks. A battery-electric heavy truck costs more than twice as much as a diesel one. Electrifying the US commercial fleet needs nearly $1 trillion for infrastructure alone: about $620 billion for charging and $370 billion for grid upgrades, or about $145,000 of charging per heavy-duty vehicle (Roland Berger 2024). The American Transportation Research Institute (ATRI) puts the payload loss at about 13,800 pounds per truck. It finds an all-electric US fleet would need more than 40% of current US electricity generation, plus 6.3 to 34.9 years of current world output of key battery minerals (American Transportation Research Institute 2022). The International Energy Agency (IEA) finds announced projects meet only 70% of copper needs and 50% of lithium needs in 2035 under national climate pledges (International Energy Agency 2024).","cost":"The full cost is $1,043.2 billion a year once the ban binds, at the high end. It is the private compliance cost of cars and trucks. Administration adds about $0.3 billion more, a rounding error at this scale.\n\n- **Public outlay: zero.** A ban is a rule. Public chargers are counted under compliance.\n- **Administration: about $0.3 billion a year, on top.** The UK Department for Transport (2023) puts administration at less than £35 million against £127.3 billion of total costs, or 0.0275%. Applied to the car costs: 0.000275 × 985 = $0.3 billion.\n- **Battery premium for cars: $560 billion a year.** Over 17 million electric cars sold in 2024 were just over 20% of sales, so about 85 million cars a year (International Energy Agency 2025). China is excluded, because two-thirds of electric cars there already cost less than gasoline equivalents. Outside China, 56 million buyers would switch. 56 million × $10,000 (Mills 2023) = $560 billion. The low case of $5,000 gives $280 billion.\n- **Grid and charging for cars: $425 billion a year.** Extra electric cars beyond 2024 levels: 85 − 17 = 68 million. 68 million × $6,250 = $425 billion. The low case of $3,750 gives $255 billion.\n- **Truck charging and grid, US only: $58.2 billion a year.** $990 billion (Roland Berger 2024) spread over the 17 years to 2040. Vehicle premiums are excluded.\n- **Lost output: no global estimate.** Published losses are national. McKitrick (2023) finds Canada's auto sector loses up to just over C$1.2 trillion over 2025 to 2050. PwC Strategy& for the European Association of Automotive Suppliers (CLEPA) finds a net loss of 275,000 EU supplier jobs by 2040 (PwC Strategy& 2021). Under a global ban, much of this output shifts between countries, so the national figures cannot be added up.\n\nCar costs come to $985 billion a year at the high end and about $535 billion at the low end. Fuel and maintenance savings are counted inside the ratio, not netted here.","strength":"Grade: B. The low end rests on peer-reviewed models of environmental damage (Holland et al. 2016, updated in 2020; Ji et al. 2012). The main cross-check is a peer-reviewed economy-wide model of an actual mandate (McKitrick 2023). The high end is a commissioned analysis of a single country. The cost inputs come from industry and think-tank figures. No study measures the ratio of a combustion-engine ban after the fact.","difficulty":"Rating: moderate. Each market can ban sales of new combustion-engine vehicles through ordinary law or regulation. No treaty is needed, and the EU has adopted a 2035 rule. But meeting a 2030 date across major markets needs zero-emission sales to rise from about 20% in 2024 to 100% within about five years. Precedents have slipped. The UK moved its 2030 ban to 2035 in 2023. The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) moved in 2026 to rescind its 2024 vehicle standards.","who_benefits":"The policy is regressive. Up-front premiums fall on car buyers. Lower-income and rural households face the largest burden relative to income and the least access to home charging. Borenstein and Davis (2016) find about 90% of US electric-vehicle tax credits went to the top fifth of households by income. Lower running costs and cleaner city air on low-carbon grids are broadly shared. On coal-heavy grids, local pollution shifts toward communities near power plants. Holland et al. (2016) find that \"91 percent of local pollution damages from driving an electric vehicle are exported to states other than the state in which the vehicle is driven.\"","counter":"Regulators' own appraisals make the strongest case for a ban. The UK Department for Transport (2023) rates its mandate of 80% zero-emission cars and 70% vans by 2030 at 1.31. The California Air Resources Board (2022) rates its truck rule at 1.5: costs of $84.6 billion against savings of $97.0 billion and health benefits of $61.7 billion. The European Commission (2023) finds first users of heavy trucks save €29,100 to €47,000. These appraisals are left out because each regulator appraises its own rule, and they assume electric vehicles become cheaper than conventional ones and grids become nearly coal-free. The US Environmental Protection Agency (2026) finds that the sign of its own estimate depends on fuel prices and on how much buyers value fuel savings.\n\nThe verdict depends on the grid the new cars plug into and on what they cost. On the 2010 to 2012 US grid an electric car did $1,095 more environmental harm than a gasoline car; in California it did $2,785 less (Holland et al. 2016). If a ban put new cars on grids as clean as California's, the low end would turn positive. The ratio would reach the Mid tier only if the regulators' assumptions of cheaper cars and clean grids held, giving 1.31 to 1.5.","references":["American Transportation Research Institute. 2022. \"Charging Infrastructure Challenges for the U.S. Electric Vehicle Fleet.\" Reported by *FleetOwner*. https://www.fleetowner.com/emissions-efficiency/article/21255957/.","Borenstein, S., and L. W. Davis. 2016. \"The Distributional Effects of US Clean Energy Tax Credits.\" *Tax Policy and the Economy* 30. https://doi.org/10.1086/685597.","California Air Resources Board. 2022. *Advanced Clean Fleets Standardized Regulatory Impact Assessment (Appendix C).* CARB. https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/barcu/regact/2022/acf22/appc.pdf.","Centre for Economics and Business Research. 2023. \"Banning Sales of New ICE Cars from 2030 Will Cost Five Times as Much as the Benefits, Says Report.\" Prepared for the All-Party Parliamentary Group for Fair Fuel for UK Motorists and Hauliers. Reported by *Forecourt Trader*. https://forecourttrader.co.uk/latest-news/banning-sales-of-new-ice-cars-from-2030-will-cost-five-times-as-much-as-the-benefits-says-report/672411.article.","Ember. 2025. *Global Electricity Review 2025: Major Countries and Regions.* Ember. https://ember-energy.org/latest-insights/global-electricity-review-2025/major-countries-and-regions/.","European Commission. 2023. *Impact Assessment: CO2 Emission Standards for Heavy-Duty Vehicles.* SWD(2023) 88. European Commission. https://cdn.qualenergia.it/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/policy_transport_hdv_20230214_impact_assessment_en_0.pdf.","Gillingham, K., and J. H. Stock. 2018. \"The Cost of Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions.\" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 32 (4): 53–72. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.32.4.53.","Hagerty, J. M., S. Sergici, and L. Lam. 2020. \"Electric Power Sector Investments of $75–125 Billion Needed to Support Projected 20 Million EVs by 2030, According to Brattle Economists.\" The Brattle Group. https://www.brattle.com/insights-events/publications/electric-power-sector-investments-of-75-125-billion-needed-to-support-projected-20-million-evs-by-2030-according-to-brattle-economists/.","Holland, S. P., E. T. Mansur, N. Z. Muller, and A. J. Yates. 2016. \"Are There Environmental Benefits from Driving Electric Vehicles? The Importance of Local Factors.\" *American Economic Review* 106 (12): 3700–3729. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20150897.","Holland, S. P., E. T. Mansur, N. Z. Muller, and A. J. Yates. 2020. \"Decompositions and Policy Consequences of an Extraordinary Decline in Air Pollution from Electricity Generation.\" *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* 12 (4): 244–274. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20190390.","International Energy Agency. 2024. \"Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2024.\" Press release. IEA. https://www.iea.org/news/sharp-declines-in-critical-mineral-prices-mask-risks-of-future-supply-strains-as-energy-transitions-advance.","International Energy Agency. 2025. \"Global EV Outlook 2025: More than 1 in 4 Cars Sold Worldwide This Year Is Set to Be Electric.\" Press release. IEA. https://www.iea.org/news/more-than-one-in-four-cars-sold-worldwide-this-year-is-set-to-be-electric-as-ev-sales-continue-to-grow.","Jacobsen, M. R., and A. A. van Benthem. 2015. \"Vehicle Scrappage and Gasoline Policy.\" *American Economic Review* 105 (3): 1312–1338. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20130935.","Ji, S., C. R. Cherry, M. J. Bechle, Y. Wu, and J. D. Marshall. 2012. \"Electric Vehicles in China: Emissions and Health Impacts.\" *Environmental Science & Technology* 46 (4): 2018–2024. https://doi.org/10.1021/es202347q.","McKitrick, R. 2023. \"Economic Implications of a Phased-in EV Mandate in Canada.\" Working Paper 2023-01, University of Guelph Department of Economics; published in *Canadian Journal of Economics*, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1111/caje.12745.","Mills, M. P. 2023. *Electric Vehicles for Everyone? The Impossible Dream.* Manhattan Institute. https://manhattan.institute/article/electric-vehicles-for-everyone-the-impossible-dream.","PwC Strategy&. 2021. \"An Electric Vehicle-Only Approach Would Lead to the Loss of Half a Million Jobs in the EU, Study Finds.\" CLEPA press release, December 6, 2021. https://clepa.eu/mediaroom/an-electric-vehicle-only-approach-would-lead-to-the-loss-of-half-a-million-jobs-in-the-eu-study-finds/.","Rennert, K., F. Errickson, B. C. Prest, et al. 2022. \"Comprehensive Evidence Implies a Higher Social Cost of CO2.\" *Nature* 610: 687–692. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-022-05224-9.","Resources for the Future. 2023. *Social Cost of Carbon 101.* Resources for the Future. https://www.rff.org/publications/explainers/social-cost-carbon-101/.","Roland Berger. 2024. \"Electrifying Trucking Would Cost Nearly $1 Trillion, Study Finds.\" Prepared for the Clean Freight Coalition. Reported by *Trucking Dive*. https://www.truckingdive.com/news/electrifying-trucking-costs-clean-freight-coalition-american-trucking-associations-roland-berger/710731/.","UK Department for Transport. 2023. *Zero Emission Vehicle Mandate and CO2 Regulations: Joint Government Response Cost Benefit Analysis.* UK Government. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6554be55544aea000dfb2d59/zev-mandate-consultation-final-cost-benefit-analysis.pdf.","US Environmental Protection Agency. 2026. *Regulatory Impact Analysis for Rescinding the GHG Endangerment Finding and Light-, Medium- and Heavy-Duty Vehicle GHG Standards.* EPA-420-R-26-002. US EPA. https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2026-02/420r26002.pdf."]},"6":{"policy":"A single worldwide tax on carbon dioxide emissions that reaches $135 per tonne by 2030. That price is the bottom of the range the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) gives for pathways that hold warming to 1.5°C: $135 to $5,500 per tonne in 2030 (Sobhani 2019). Every country would levy it. The policy does not say what happens to the revenue.","why_on_list":"It is an official proposal. A Paris-aligned carbon price is the centrepiece of the climate targets, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has put forward an international carbon price floor among large emitters (Parry, Black and Roaf 2021).","evidence":"The most direct test is Tol (2023), which sets the full cost of the Paris targets against their climate benefits. The 1.5°C target costs just above 5.5% of world output. Its benefits are about 3.1% of output against a high-emissions baseline and 2.2% against a middle one. Tol's verdict is blunt: \"The Paris targets do not pass the cost-benefit test unless risk aversion is high and discount rate low.\" He adds that even simple imperfections, such as unequal carbon prices between countries, \"would readily double the costs of climate policy.\" A price set and enforced country by country is exactly that case. The latest version of the Nordhaus climate-economy model, DICE-2023, puts the social cost of carbon on its best path at $59 per tonne in 2025 and $125 in 2050. Its optimal carbon price reaches $115 by 2050 (Barrage and Nordhaus 2024). That social cost implies about $69 in 2030. So $135 is roughly twice the model's social cost for that year, and above the optimal price it reaches only by 2050. The same model finds the 1.5°C limit infeasible. Higher energy prices also cost lives. Cheaper heating cut United States winter deaths by about 11,000 a year (Chirakijja, Jayachandran and Ong 2024), so dearer heating raises them. A smaller world economy also means more infant deaths in poor countries: about 152,000 to 505,000 a year (Baird, Friedman and Schady 2011). Put together, each dollar of cost returns between 16 and 55 cents of benefit.","ratio":"World output is taken as about $105 trillion (Visual Capitalist 2023). Figures are dollars a year.\n\n**High end: $0.55 per $1.** Tol's central 1.5°C comparison against the high-emissions baseline (SSP5-8.5).\n- Benefits: 3.1% of output = $3,255 billion.\n- Less infant deaths in poor countries: $30.0 billion.\n- Costs: 5.6% of output plus administration = $5,902 billion.\n- Ratio: (3,255 − 30.0) ÷ 5,902 = 0.55.\n\n**Low end: $0.16 per $1.** Benefits against the middle baseline (SSP3-7.0, 3.9°C by 2100), with costs doubled for unequal national prices.\n- Benefits: 2.2% of output = $2,310 billion.\n- Less winter deaths from dearer energy: $278 billion. A $75 tax raises electricity prices about 45% (IMF 2019); at $135 that scales to about 81%. A 42% heating-price change shifts about 11,000 United States winter deaths. 11,000 × 81 ÷ 42 = about 21,200 deaths. At the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) value of a statistical life, $13.1 million, that is about $278 billion, for the United States alone (HHS 2024).\n- Less infant deaths: world output falls 10.5%. Each 1% fall in income per person adds 0.40 infant deaths per 1,000 births, on about 119.9 million births a year in low- and middle-income countries (World Bank 2025). That is 505,498 deaths at $198,000 each = $100.1 billion.\n- Costs: 11.2% of output = $11,760 billion, plus administration = $11,782 billion.\n- Ratio: (2,310 − 278 − 100.1) ÷ 11,782 = 0.16.\n\nCross-checks. Tol's least-cost costs of 5.6% against the middle baseline give (2,310 − 278 − 50.0) ÷ 5,902 = 0.34. The most favourable pairing of Tol's reported ranges, benefits of 3.2% against costs of 3.8%, gives (3,360 − 21.7) ÷ 4,012 = 0.83. Tol's 2°C target gives 2.8 ÷ 3.8 = 0.74. None reaches 1. Spending the revenue rather than using it to cut other taxes raises costs further (Parry, Williams and Goulder 1999), which points toward the low end.\n\nRange used: $0.16 to $0.55 per $1, on a full cost of $5,902 billion a year.","cost":"The full cost is $5,902 billion a year.\n- **Public outlay: $0.** Tax revenue is a transfer, not a resource cost.\n- **Administration: about $22 billion.** The 1.5°C pathways have 31 GtCO2e of emissions in 2030 (IPCC 2022). At $135 a tonne that is $4,185 billion of revenue. At the Internal Revenue Service's highest recent cost of collection, 53 cents per $100 (USAFacts 2025): 4,185 × 0.0053 = about $22 billion.\n- **Private compliance: not added.** Firms' spending to cut emissions is already inside the output loss.\n- **Output loss: $5,880 billion.** Tol's 5.6% of output × $105 trillion. This is the highest published central estimate.\n\nLower estimates exist. The IPCC puts the loss at 2.6% to 4.2% of 2050 output for 1.5°C pathways, $2.7 to $4.4 trillion at today's output (IPCC 2022). Nordhaus (2019) finds about 1% of output for a 50% cut, about $1.05 trillion. Excess winter deaths are counted in the ratio, not in the cost.","strength":"Grade A-. The ratio rests on peer-reviewed cost-benefit work on Paris-strength carbon pricing (Tol 2023; Nordhaus 2019; Barrage and Nordhaus 2024). The cost side takes the high end of peer-reviewed and IPCC-assessed output losses. The mortality term uses a peer-reviewed quasi-experimental study (Chirakijja, Jayachandran and Ong 2024). It is not an A. No controlled study of a global tax at this level exists, none scores $135 exactly, and DICE-2023 finds that a 2°C path passes a cost-benefit test.","difficulty":"Hard. It needs a binding agreement among many countries. Carbon pricing covers only about 24% of global emissions, and prices still fall short of Paris levels (World Bank 2024). The IMF put the global average price at $2 a tonne in 2019 (IMF 2019). Even the IMF's own proposal is a floor among a small number of large emitters, not a single world price (Parry, Black and Roaf 2021).","who_benefits":"The tax is regressive. A $75 tax alone raises electricity prices about 45% and petrol about 15% over a decade, and the burden is larger for lower-income households in some countries, including China and the United States (IMF 2019). Fossil-dependent developing countries are hit hardest. Higher heating costs raise winter deaths among the poor and elderly (Chirakijja, Jayachandran and Ong 2024). Only lump-sum rebates reverse this: one United States study finds they raise bottom-fifth after-tax income by 6.8% (Pomerleau and Asen 2019). The policy as defined does not require them.","counter":"The strongest counter-case is a higher value of carbon. Rennert et al. (2022) put the social cost of carbon at $185 a tonne (5–95% range: $44 to $413) at a 2% discount rate, and on that number a $135 tax passes. DICE-2023 finds a 2°C-limited path raises global wealth by about $107 trillion against current policy (Barrage and Nordhaus 2024). The IPCC (2022) states: \"The global economic benefit of limiting warming to 2°C is reported to exceed the cost of mitigation in most of the assessed literature (medium confidence).\" These are kept out of the range. Rennert et al. give the damage from one more tonne, not a full-cost evaluation of a global tax. DICE-2023 reports net wealth only and assumes complete efficiency and participation. Lomborg (2020), who finds a net gain of about $22 trillion, scores an optimal tax of about $36 to $48 a tonne, far below $135.\n\nTwo assumptions move the verdict. If every country set the same price and cut emissions at least cost, the low end would rise from 0.16 to 0.34, and Tol's most favourable pairing gives 0.83 (Tol 2023). Both stay below 1. The tax would pass only at a lower price. On the optimal path in DICE-2023 the social cost of carbon is $59 a tonne in 2025, less than half of $135.","references":["Baird, S., J. Friedman, and N. Schady. 2011. \"Aggregate Income Shocks and Infant Mortality in the Developing World.\" *Review of Economics and Statistics* 93 (3): 847–856. https://www2.gwu.edu/~iiep/assets/docs/papers/Baird_IIEPWP2010-7.pdf.","Barrage, L., and W. Nordhaus. 2024. \"Policies, Projections, and the Social Cost of Carbon: Results from the DICE-2023 Model.\" *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 121 (13): e2312030121. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2312030121.","Broughel, J., and W. K. Viscusi. 2017. *Death by Regulation: How Regulations Can Increase Mortality Risk.* Research summary. Mercatus Center at George Mason University. https://mercatus.org/media/65351/download.","Chirakijja, J., S. Jayachandran, and P. Ong. 2024. \"Inexpensive Heating Reduces Winter Mortality.\" *The Economic Journal* 134 (657): 402–417. https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/25681.html.","Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Working Group III. 2022. *Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. Summary for Policymakers.* IPCC Sixth Assessment Report. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009157926.001.","International Monetary Fund. 2019. *Fiscal Monitor: How to Mitigate Climate Change, Executive Summary.* October 2019. IMF. https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/fiscal-monitor/2019/october/english/execsum.pdf.","Lomborg, B. 2020. *False Alarm: How Climate Change Panic Costs Us Trillions, Hurts the Poor, and Fails to Fix the Planet.* New York: Basic Books. https://www.shortform.com/blog/benefits-of-a-carbon-tax/.","Nordhaus, W. D. 2019. \"Climate Change: The Ultimate Challenge for Economics.\" *American Economic Review* 109 (6): 1991–2014. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.109.6.1991.","Parry, I. W. H., S. Black, and J. Roaf. 2021. *Proposal for an International Carbon Price Floor Among Large Emitters.* IMF Staff Climate Note 2021/001. International Monetary Fund. https://doi.org/10.5089/9781513583204.066.","Parry, I. W. H., R. C. Williams, and L. H. Goulder. 1999. \"When Can Carbon Abatement Policies Increase Welfare? The Fundamental Role of Distorted Factor Markets.\" *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.* NBER Working Paper 5967. https://www.nber.org/papers/w5967.","Pomerleau, K., and E. Asen. 2019. *Carbon Tax and Revenue Recycling: Revenue, Economic, and Distributional Implications.* Fiscal Fact. Tax Foundation. https://taxfoundation.org/research/all/federal/carbon-tax/.","Rennert, K., F. Errickson, et al. 2022. \"Comprehensive Evidence Implies a Higher Social Cost of CO2.\" *Nature.* https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-022-05224-9.","Sobhani, N. 2019. \"Unpacking the IPCC's Estimated Carbon Prices.\" Niskanen Center. https://www.niskanencenter.org/unpacking-the-ipccs-estimated-carbon-prices/.","Tol, R. S. J. 2023. \"Costs and Benefits of the Paris Climate Targets.\" *Climate Change Economics* 14 (4). https://doi.org/10.1142/S2010007823400031.","U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation. 2024. *Standard Values for Regulatory Analysis, 2024.* HHS. https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cd2a1348ea0777b1aa918089e4965b8c/standard-ria-values.pdf.","USAFacts. 2025. \"What Does It Cost the IRS to Collect Taxes?\" USAFacts. https://usafacts.org/articles/what-does-it-cost-the-irs-to-collect-taxes/.","Visual Capitalist. 2023. \"Visualizing the $105 Trillion World Economy in One Chart.\" Visual Capitalist, summarising IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2023. https://www.visualcapitalist.com/visualizing-the-105-trillion-world-economy-in-one-chart/.","World Bank. 2024. *State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2024.* Washington, DC: World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/d14ff4b1-823f-4d70-927c-456449772089/content.","World Bank. 2025. \"Crude Birth Rate and Total Population, Low and Middle Income Countries.\" World Development Indicators, via FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. https://fred.stlouisfed.org/data/SPDYNCBRTINLMY."]},"7":{"policy":"A worldwide ban on plastics, with binding rules against single-use plastic items such as bags, straws and cutlery. It would be agreed by treaty and enforced by every signatory. The substitutes are paper, glass, metal, cotton and other materials.","why_on_list":"It is an official proposal. The United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA) launched negotiations on a legally binding plastics treaty in resolution 5/14, and bans and single-use mandates are among the measures on the table.","evidence":"Governments that have banned single-use plastics have measured the result, and the numbers are poor. Canada's ban returns about 31 cents of monetised benefit per dollar of cost (Environment and Climate Change Canada 2022). England's straw ban returns as little as 3 cents (Defra 2020). The deeper problem is the substitutes. Meng, Brandão and Cullen (2024) compare 16 uses of plastic and find that in 15 of them plastic emits 10% to 90% less greenhouse gas over its life than the alternatives. Bans also leak. In California, Taylor (2019) finds \"the elimination of 40 million pounds of plastic carryout bags is offset by a 12 million pound increase in trash bag purchases.\" A cotton bag must be reused 131 times to match a conventional plastic bag that is not reused, on global-warming potential (Environment Agency 2011). One valuation puts the environmental cost of plastics in consumer goods and packaging at $139 billion a year, and of the alternatives at $533 billion (Trucost 2016). The uncertainty is large, and it runs mostly one way: the more of the substitutes' damage is counted, the worse the ban looks. Each dollar of cost returns between minus 42 cents and plus 30 cents.","ratio":"The cost base is $869 billion a year (see Full cost). The ratio is the regulator's own benefit per dollar of cost, less the extra environmental damage from heavier substitutes per dollar of cost.\n\n**High end: $0.30 per $1.**\n- Canada's impact statement: benefits C$616 million against costs C$1,990 million = 0.31. Its costs already include administration, enforcement, substitution and manufacturers' costs.\n- It does not price the substitutes' emissions, so the smallest published penalty is subtracted. Plastic emits at most 90% of the alternative's emissions, so alternatives emit at least 1 ÷ 0.9 = 1.11 times as much.\n- Plastics are about 4.5% of 57.1 GtCO2e of global emissions (UNEP 2024) = 2.57 Gt. 11% of that = 0.28 Gt.\n- At $36 a tonne (Nordhaus 2019): $10 billion. 10 ÷ 869 = 0.012.\n- Ratio: 0.31 − 0.012 = 0.30.\n\n**Low end: −$0.42 per $1.**\n- England's straw-ban lowest case: 2.4 ÷ 77.7 = 0.03. This already counts the extra carbon from paper straws.\n- Extra environmental cost of replacing plastics: $533 billion − $139 billion = $394 billion (Trucost 2016). 394 ÷ 869 = 0.45.\n- Ratio: 0.03 − 0.45 = −0.42.\n\nCross-checks. Valuing only the peer-reviewed emissions penalty at $185 a tonne (Rennert et al. 2022) gives 0.28 × 185 = $53 billion, and 0.03 − 53 ÷ 869 = −0.03. Life-cycle work for packaging points the same way: substitutes weigh about 4.5 times as much, and plastic's global-warming potential is 26.2% of theirs (Franklin Associates 2018). A Danish study finds a conventional cotton bag must be reused about 7,100 times to match a plastic bag across all 16 environmental indicators (Bisinella et al. 2018).\n\nRange used: −$0.42 to $0.30 per $1, on a full cost of $869 billion a year.","cost":"The full cost is $869 billion a year.\n- **Public outlay: $0.**\n- **Administration: about $0.12 billion.** Canada's ban costs around C$5 per person per year (2021 dollars). Scaled to 8.0 billion people (United Nations 2022) that is about C$40 billion, or about US$29 billion at 0.73 US$ per C$. Government enforcement (C$0.9 million) and business administration (C$0.1 million) are 0.43% of Canada's annual C$234 million. 0.0043 × 29 = about $0.12 billion.\n- **Private compliance: about $28.9 billion.** The rest of the scaled Canadian cost: consumer substitution, waste management and manufacturers' lost profit.\n- **Output loss: $840 billion.** The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) finds its most ambitious plastics package lowers world output by about 0.8% (OECD 2022). 0.8% × $105 trillion (Visual Capitalist 2023) = $840 billion. That package uses a plastics tax rising to $750 a tonne by 2030 and $1,500 by 2060, plus a 33% higher packaging tax. A ban that cuts use by the same amount is unlikely to cost less than a tax, so $840 billion is a floor for the ban.\n\nThe single-use mandates are a separate instrument, so their cost is added. Any overlap is at most about $29 billion, 3% of the total. Lost industry output is not added, because it sits inside the output loss. For scale, United States plastics shipments were $550.7 billion in 2024, with 1,066,500 direct jobs (Plastics Industry Association 2025).","strength":"Grade B-. The range is built from regulators' own impact analyses in Canada and England, adjusted with a peer-reviewed life-cycle study (Meng, Brandão and Cullen 2024) and peer-reviewed evidence on substitution (Taylor 2019). The low end uses an industry-commissioned valuation (Trucost 2016), which on its own would rate C+. No study prices a global ban.","difficulty":"Hard. It needs a binding agreement among many countries. Treaty talks in Geneva in August 2025, with delegates from 183 countries, \"adjourned early on 15 August without consensus on a text of the instrument\" (UNEP 2025). Production caps were among the issues under negotiation. After the chair resigned, the resumed one-day session on 7 February 2026 was organisational only, held to elect officers, with no substantive negotiation (Waste & Recycling Magazine 2026).","who_benefits":"The ban is regressive. Bag bans and fees weigh most on low-income shoppers (Morris and Seasholes 2014). England's straw-ban assessment expects 60% of the higher costs to pass to consumers (Defra 2020). The OECD finds the bulk of the costs of ambitious action fall on non-OECD countries; Sub-Saharan Africa's output falls 2.8% below baseline (OECD 2022).","counter":"The strongest counter-case is that waste policy can save money. Lau et al. (2020) find that a scenario of reuse, redesign and recycling could cut plastic flows into the ocean by more than 80% by 2040 with existing technology. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP 2023) finds a shift to a circular economy saves about $1.27 trillion, plus about $3.25 trillion of avoided damage, to 2040. Both are left out of the range because they score packages led by reuse and recycling, not a ban, and neither counts the extra emissions of heavier substitutes. They show that well-designed waste policy can pay. They do not show that a ban can.\n\nThe verdict rests on what replaces plastic. The low end counts the natural-capital cost of alternatives at $533 billion a year against $139 billion for plastics (Trucost 2016), a study commissioned by the American Chemistry Council. If only the peer-reviewed penalty of Meng, Brandão and Cullen (2024) applied, valued at $185 a tonne, the low end would rise from −0.42 to −0.03. That is still negative. Canada's own appraisal, which prices no substitution penalty at all, gives only 0.31. A ban would leave the Worst tier only if substitutes emitted no more than plastic, and even then it would sit in the Bad tier.","references":["Bisinella, V., P. F. Albizzati, T. F. Astrup, and A. Damgaard. 2018. *Life Cycle Assessment of Grocery Carrier Bags.* Environmental Project No. 1985. Danish Environmental Protection Agency. https://www2.mst.dk/udgiv/publications/2018/02/978-87-93614-73-4.pdf.","Broughel, J., and W. K. Viscusi. 2017. *Death by Regulation: How Regulations Can Increase Mortality Risk.* Research summary. Mercatus Center at George Mason University. https://mercatus.org/media/65351/download.","Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra). 2020. *Impact Assessment on the Proposal to Ban the Supply of Plastic Drinking Straws to the End User in England.* UK Impact Assessment 2020 No. 36. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukia/2020/36/pdfs/ukia_20200036_en.pdf.","Environment Agency (Edwards, C., and J. M. Fry). 2011. *Life Cycle Assessment of Supermarket Carrier Bags: A Review of the Bags Available in 2006.* Report SC030148. Environment Agency. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a7bff74ed915d01ba1ca7c7/scho0711buan-e-e.pdf.","Environment and Climate Change Canada. 2022. *Single-use Plastics Prohibition Regulations (SOR/2022-138): Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement.* Canada Gazette, Part II, Vol. 156, No. 13. https://gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p2/2022/2022-06-22/html/sor-dors138-eng.html.","Franklin Associates. 2018. *Life Cycle Impacts of Plastic Packaging Compared to Substitutes in the United States and Canada: Theoretical Substitution Analysis.* Prepared for the American Chemistry Council. Franklin Associates, a Division of ERG. https://www.symphonyenvironmental.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Franklin-LCA-Apr-2018.pdf.","Lau, W. W. Y., Y. Shiran, R. M. Bailey, et al. 2020. \"Evaluating Scenarios toward Zero Plastic Pollution.\" *Science* 369 (6510): 1455–1461. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aba9475.","Meng, F., M. Brandão, and J. M. Cullen. 2024. \"Replacing Plastics with Alternatives Is Worse for Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Most Cases.\" *Environmental Science & Technology.* https://doi.org/10.1021/acs.est.3c05191.","Morris, J., and B. Seasholes. 2014. *How Green Is That Grocery Bag Ban? An Assessment of the Environmental and Economic Effects of Grocery Bag Bans and Taxes.* Policy Study 437. Reason Foundation. https://reason.org/wp-content/uploads/files/how_green_bag_ban.pdf.","Nordhaus, W. D. 2019. \"Climate Change: The Ultimate Challenge for Economics.\" *American Economic Review* 109 (6): 1991–2014. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.109.6.1991.","OECD. 2022. *Global Plastics Outlook: Policy Scenarios to 2060.* Paris: OECD Publishing. https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/global-plastics-outlook_aa1edf33-en.html.","Plastics Industry Association. 2025. *2025 Size and Impact Report: U.S. Plastics Industry Remains Robust, Impactful, and Vital.* Plastics Industry Association. https://www.plasticsindustry.org/?p=15530.","Rennert, K., F. Errickson, et al. 2022. \"Comprehensive Evidence Implies a Higher Social Cost of CO2.\" *Nature* 610: 687–692. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-022-05224-9.","Taylor, R. L. C. 2019. \"Bag Leakage: The Effect of Disposable Carryout Bag Regulations on Unregulated Bags.\" *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management* 93: 254–271. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2019.01.001.","Trucost. 2016. *Plastics and Sustainability: A Valuation of Environmental Benefits, Costs, and Opportunities for Continuous Improvement.* Prepared for the American Chemistry Council; as reported by Recycling Today. https://www.recyclingtoday.com/news/trucost-plastics-savings.","United Nations. 2022. \"Global Issues: Population.\" United Nations. https://www.un.org/en/global-issues/population.","United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). 2023. *Turning off the Tap: How the World Can End Plastic Pollution and Create a Circular Economy.* UNEP. https://www.unep.org/resources/turning-off-tap-end-plastic-pollution-create-circular-economy.","United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). 2024. *Emissions Gap Report 2024: No More Hot Air ... Please!* As summarised by IISD SDG Knowledge Hub. https://sdg.iisd.org/news/unprecedented-cuts-needed-to-keep-15oc-alive-emissions-gap-report-2024/.","United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). 2025. \"Talks on Global Plastic Pollution Treaty Adjourn without Consensus.\" Press release, 15 August 2025. https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/press-release/talks-global-plastic-pollution-treaty-adjourn-without-consensus.","Visual Capitalist. 2023. \"Visualizing the $105 Trillion World Economy in One Chart.\" Visual Capitalist, summarising IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2023. https://www.visualcapitalist.com/visualizing-the-105-trillion-world-economy-in-one-chart/.","Waste & Recycling Magazine. 2026. \"INC-5.3: The Third Part of the Fifth Session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee to Develop an International Legally Binding Instrument on Plastic Pollution.\" Waste & Recycling Magazine (Canada). https://wasterecyclingmag.ca/?p=21143."]},"8":{"policy":"The Green New Deal bundles a crash programme to replace fossil energy with a federal job guarantee, universal health care, support for displaced fossil-fuel workers and clean-energy finance for low-income countries. Here every Western nation adopts the United States package: the United States, Canada, the 27 European Union members, the United Kingdom, Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, Australia and New Zealand. Together they produce $58,287 billion a year, 1.99 times United States output, and emit 8,669 million tonnes of carbon dioxide, 1.77 times the United States (World Bank 2026; Global Carbon Project 2025).","why_on_list":"It is an official proposal: House Resolution 109, introduced in the United States Congress in 2019.","evidence":"The package is enormous. The American Action Forum puts its United States cost at $51 trillion to $93 trillion over 2020-2029, most of it health care and the job guarantee (Holtz-Eakin et al. 2019). The Heritage Foundation finds an output loss of over $15 trillion through 2040 and household electricity bills about 30% higher (Dayaratna and Loris 2019). Across the West, outlays come to about a third of output. That is more than four times the most extra revenue the United States could raise at the peak of its Laffer curve, 7.4% of output, and ten times the figure of 3.1% for 14 European Union countries (Trabandt and Uhlig 2012). At that scale each extra dollar of tax may cost about $2 in lost output (Feldstein 1999). The climate gain is small and uncertain. Because only the West cuts, emissions leak abroad: estimates run from 12% (Böhringer, Balistreri and Rutherford 2012) to 130%, where \"GHG control policies in the industrialized countries actually lead to higher global emissions\" (Babiker 2005). Job-guarantee pay is worth about half its cost to the workers (Jalan and Ravallion 2003). The output loss slows poor economies and adds an estimated 42,088 to 163,676 infant deaths a year. Each dollar spent destroys between $1.19 and $1.34 of value. Once the cost of raising the taxes that fund it is counted, the range is −$1.38 to −$1.19 per $1.","ratio":"Figures are billions of dollars a year for all Western nations. United States estimates are scaled by 1.99. Health-care outlays are transfers, worth $1 to recipients per $1. Taxes to fund the outlays cost $2.0 in lost output per $1 raised, at both ends (Feldstein 1999).\n\n**Low end: −$1.34 per $1.**\n- Health-care transfers: 3,600 × 1.99 = 7,164.\n- Job-guarantee value: 0.5 × 4,460 × 1.99 = 4,438.\n- Climate: 8.669 Gt × $36 (Nordhaus 2019) × (1 − 1.30) = −93.6. At 130% leakage, world emissions rise.\n- Less winter deaths from dearer energy: 204.8 (Chirakijja, Jayachandran and Ong 2024).\n- Less output loss: Heritage 714 × 1.99 = 1,421.\n- Less tax deadweight: 2.0 × 9,290 × 1.99 = 36,974.\n- Less infant deaths in poor countries: 32.4.\n- Costs (outlays, administration and compliance): 20,220.\n- Ratio: (7,164 + 4,438 − 93.6 − 204.8 − 1,421 − 36,974 − 32.4) ÷ 20,220 = −1.34.\n\n**High end: −$1.19 per $1.**\n- Health-care transfers: 7,164.\n- Job-guarantee value, at the lower job-guarantee cost: 677.\n- Climate: 8.669 Gt × $66 (Barrage and Nordhaus 2024) × (1 − 0.12) = 503.5.\n- Less winter deaths: 204.8.\n- Less tax deadweight on the lower outlay estimate: 2.0 × 5,110 × 1.99 = 20,338.\n- Costs: 10,227.\n- Ratio: (7,164 + 677 + 503.5 − 204.8 − 20,338) ÷ 10,227 = −1.19.\n\nInfant deaths. The output loss is 2.44% of Western output. A 1-point fall in United States growth cuts developing-country growth by 0.6 points (Kose et al. 2017); a G7 shock cuts it by about 1.4 points (Huidrom, Kose and Ohnsorge 2017). Developing-country output therefore falls 1.5% to 3.4%. Each 1% fall adds 0.24 to 0.40 infant deaths per 1,000 births (Baird, Friedman and Schady 2011), on about 119.9 million births a year (World Bank 2025). That is 42,088 to 163,676 deaths a year, at $198,000 each.\n\nCross-check. Canada's Parliamentary Budget Officer finds that its own, much smaller, climate plan lowers 2030 real output by 1.4% (Parliamentary Budget Officer 2021). Output produced by job-guarantee workers is not valued, because no published estimate exists for a national job guarantee.\n\nRange used: −$1.34 to −$1.19 per $1, on a full cost of $30,515 billion a year.\n\n**After the cost of raising taxes.** Each $1 of public spending costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven and Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999). As for the other transfer entries, the burden is subtracted from benefits. The outlays already carry nearly $2 of deadweight per $1 at both ends, but administration, $382 billion a year at the low end, did not. Low end: (−27,123.8 − 2.0 × 382) ÷ 20,220 = −27,887.8 ÷ 20,220 = −1.38. At the high end the cost outside the outlays is at most $58 billion; even if all of it were administration, the high end would move only from −1.19 to −1.20, so it stays at −1.19. **Range after tax finance: −1.38 to −1.19.**","cost":"The full cost is $30,515 billion a year, about half of Western output. Each United States figure is multiplied by 1.99.\n- **Public outlays: $18,487 billion.** United States: 9,290 (American Action Forum): energy 1,230, job guarantee 4,460, health care 3,600.\n- **Administration: $382 billion.** United States: 192. The Works Progress Administration spent 4.3% of its budget on administration and supervision in 1937-38 (Works Progress Administration 1938); that share is applied to the job guarantee.\n- **Private compliance: $1,351 billion.** United States: 679. Vehicles 509, energy storage 100 and transmission 70 (Turner and Lassman 2019). The vehicle cost is scaled to about 133 million households (U.S. Census Bureau 2024).\n- **Output and welfare loss: $10,295 billion.** United States: 5,173. Heritage's output loss of 714, plus tax deadweight at 48 cents per $1 of outlays (Ballard, Shoven and Whalley 1985): 0.48 × 9,290.\n\nThe cost total uses 48 cents of deadweight so that it stays comparable with published figures. The ratio uses Feldstein's $2.","strength":"Grade B. The parameters that drive the ratio are peer-reviewed: the social cost of carbon (Nordhaus 2019; Barrage and Nordhaus 2024), the heating-mortality link (Chirakijja, Jayachandran and Ong 2024) and the deadweight of taxation (Ballard, Shoven and Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999). The cost quantities themselves come from policy institutes (American Action Forum, Heritage Foundation, Competitive Enterprise Institute), which on their own would rate C+. No study computes a benefit-cost ratio for the Green New Deal. The Heritage model itself could simulate no more than a 58% cut in carbon dioxide by 2050.","difficulty":"Hard. There is no precedent anywhere. It would replace the United States fossil-fuel energy system and add $5 trillion to $9 trillion a year of federal outlays (Holtz-Eakin et al. 2019). The resolution failed 0-57 in the Senate on 26 March 2019 (NBC News 2019).","who_benefits":"The energy core is regressive. It raises household electricity spending about 30% (Dayaratna and Loris 2019) and costs a typical household more than $70,000 in the first year in most states studied, and more than $100,000 in Alaska (Turner and Lassman 2019). Cheaper heating saves lives among the poor and elderly, so dearer energy falls hardest on them (Chirakijja, Jayachandran and Ong 2024). The job guarantee, health care, worker support and foreign clean-energy finance are transfers toward lower-income groups. Single-payer financing would give the most relief to lower-income households (Galvani et al. 2020). No study models the net effect once energy costs and the taxes that fund the package are counted.","counter":"The counter-case comes from three directions. Hänsel et al. (2020) update the Nordhaus model and find limiting warming below 2°C economically optimal, with carbon prices above $100 a tonne. Galvani et al. (2020) find single-payer health care would cut national health spending 13%, more than $450 billion a year, and save more than 68,000 lives a year. Rennert et al. (2022) put the social cost of carbon at $185 a tonne. Hänsel et al. model an efficient carbon price, not this package of mandates and spending. Galvani et al. assume large administrative and price savings, so their result informs only the high end. Even at $185 a tonne the climate gain is small beside the cost of raising the money.\n\nThe financing term decides the verdict. Outlays of about 32% of Western output are more than four times the most the US can raise at the peak of the Laffer curve, 7.4% of GDP (Trabandt and Uhlig 2012). That is why each $1 is costed at Feldstein's (1999) deadweight loss of nearly $2, not the 34 to 48 cents measured for small changes (Ballard, Shoven and Whalley 1985). If the money could be raised at that smaller burden, the high end would turn positive but stay below 1, moving the policy from the Worst to the Bad tier.","references":["Babiker, M. H. 2005. \"Climate Change Policy, Market Structure, and Carbon Leakage.\" *Journal of International Economics* 65 (2): 421–445. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2004.01.003.","Baird, S., J. Friedman, and N. Schady. 2011. \"Aggregate Income Shocks and Infant Mortality in the Developing World.\" *Review of Economics and Statistics* 93 (3): 847–856. https://www2.gwu.edu/~iiep/assets/docs/papers/Baird_IIEPWP2010-7.pdf.","Ballard, C. L., J. B. Shoven, and J. Whalley. 1985. \"General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States.\" *American Economic Review* 75 (1): 128–138. https://doi.org/10.3386/w1043.","Barrage, L., and W. Nordhaus. 2024. \"Policies, Projections, and the Social Cost of Carbon: Results from the DICE-2023 Model.\" *PNAS* 121 (13): e2312030121. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2312030121.","Böhringer, C., E. J. Balistreri, and T. F. Rutherford. 2012. \"The Role of Border Carbon Adjustment in Unilateral Climate Policy: Overview of an Energy Modeling Forum Study (EMF 29).\" *Energy Economics* 34 (S2): S97–S110. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/role-border-carbon-adjustment-unilateral-climate-policy-insights-model-comparison-study.","Broughel, J., and W. K. Viscusi. 2017. *Death by Regulation: How Regulations Can Increase Mortality Risk.* Research summary. Mercatus Center at George Mason University. https://mercatus.org/media/65351/download.","Chirakijja, J., S. Jayachandran, and P. Ong. 2024. \"Inexpensive Heating Reduces Winter Mortality.\" *The Economic Journal* 134 (657): 402–417. https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/25681.html.","Dayaratna, K. D., and N. Loris. 2019. *Assessing the Costs and Benefits of the Green New Deal's Energy Policies.* Backgrounder No. 3427. Heritage Foundation. https://www.heritage.org/energy-economics/report/assessing-the-costs-and-benefits-the-green-new-deals-energy-policies.","Feldstein, M. 1999. \"Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax.\" *Review of Economics and Statistics* 81 (4): 674–680. https://doi.org/10.1162/003465399558391.","Galvani, A. P., A. S. Parpia, E. M. Foster, B. H. Singer, and M. C. Fitzpatrick. 2020. \"Improving the Prognosis of Health Care in the USA.\" *The Lancet* 395 (10223): 524–533. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(19)33019-3.","Global Carbon Project. 2025. \"CO2 Emissions Dataset (Fossil Fuels and Cement), 2024.\" Via Our World in Data. https://raw.githubusercontent.com/owid/co2-data/master/owid-co2-data.csv.","Hänsel, M. C., M. A. Drupp, D. J. A. Johansson, F. Nesje, C. Azar, M. C. Freeman, B. Groom, and T. Sterner. 2020. \"Climate Economics Support for the UN Climate Targets.\" *Nature Climate Change* 10: 781–789. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-020-0833-x.","Holtz-Eakin, D., et al. 2019. \"The Green New Deal: Scope, Scale, and Implications.\" American Action Forum. https://www.americanactionforum.org/research/the-green-new-deal-scope-scale-and-implications/.","Huidrom, R., M. A. Kose, and F. Ohnsorge. 2017. *How Important Are Spillovers from Major Emerging Markets?* Policy Research Working Paper 8093. World Bank. https://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/786391496863791206/pdf/WPS8093.pdf.","Jalan, J., and M. Ravallion. 2003. \"Estimating the Benefit Incidence of an Antipoverty Program by Propensity-Score Matching.\" *Journal of Business & Economic Statistics* 21 (1): 19–30. https://ideas.repec.org/a/bes/jnlbes/v21y2003i1p19-30.html.","Kose, M. A., C. Lakatos, F. Ohnsorge, and M. Stocker. 2017. *The Global Role of the U.S. Economy: Linkages, Policies and Spillovers.* Policy Research Working Paper 7962. World Bank. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/649771486479478785/pdf/WPS7962.pdf.","NBC News. 2019. \"Senate Fails to Advance Green New Deal as Democrats Protest McConnell 'Sham' Vote.\" NBC News, 26 March 2019. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/senate-fails-advance-green-new-deal-democrats-protest-mcconnell-sham-n987506.","Nordhaus, W. D. 2019. \"Climate Change: The Ultimate Challenge for Economics.\" *American Economic Review* 109 (6): 1991–2014. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.109.6.1991.","Parliamentary Budget Officer. 2021. *Beyond Paris: Reducing Canada's GHG Emissions by 2030.* Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer. https://www.pbo-dpb.ca/en/news-releases--communiques-de-presse/COM-2122-016--despite-additional-carbon-pricing-significant-emissions-reductio--malgre-la-tarification-accrue-du-carbone-le-canada-devra-reduire.","Rennert, K., F. Errickson, et al. 2022. \"Comprehensive Evidence Implies a Higher Social Cost of CO2.\" *Nature* 610: 687–692. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-022-05224-9.","Trabandt, M., and H. Uhlig. 2012. *How Do Laffer Curves Differ Across Countries?* International Finance Discussion Paper 1048. Federal Reserve Board. https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2012/1048/ifdp1048.pdf.","Turner, D., and K. Lassman. 2019. *What the Green New Deal Could Cost a Typical Household.* Competitive Enterprise Institute. https://cei.org/studies/what-the-green-new-deal-could-cost-a-typical-household/.","U.S. Census Bureau. 2024. \"Census Bureau Releases New Estimates on America's Families and Living Arrangements.\" Press release. https://census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2024/families-and-living-arrangements.html.","Works Progress Administration. 1938. *Report on Progress of the WPA Program, June 30, 1938.* US Works Progress Administration. https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/publications/wpa/wpaReports/1938_wpa_ReportProgressOfWPA.pdf.","World Bank. 2025. \"Crude Birth Rate and Total Population, Low and Middle Income Countries.\" World Development Indicators, via FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. https://fred.stlouisfed.org/data/SPDYNCBRTINLMY.","World Bank. 2026. \"GDP (Current US$), NY.GDP.MKTP.CD, 2024.\" World Development Indicators. https://api.worldbank.org/v2/country/USA;CAN;EUU;GBR;NOR;CHE;ISL;AUS;NZL;WLD;LMY/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?date=2024&format=json."]},"9":{"policy":"The 15-minute city is a planning idea: daily needs within a short walk or ride of home. This version turns the C40 Cities \"ambitious\" consumption targets into binding rules for residents of the network's cities: no meat or dairy, three new clothing items a year, no private cars, and one short-haul return flight every three years. It adds low-emission zones, urban car bans and mandatory building retrofits. The C40 network covers 523 million people and about a quarter of the world economy, about $26,250 billion a year (C40 Cities 2015).","why_on_list":"It is an official proposal from city governments: the C40 report *The Future of Urban Consumption in a 1.5°C World* (C40 Cities, Arup and University of Leeds 2019). The report itself states that it does not advocate wholesale adoption of the ambitious targets.","evidence":"No study prices this bundle, so the ratio is built from its parts. The largest costs are what people lose. Giving up meat at home would take compensation of about 13.0% of output (Lusk and Norwood 2009). Car owners would \"need to be paid $11,197 to give up access to their privately owned vehicle for one year\" (Moody et al. 2021). Without cars, commutes slow: in United States metro areas, 24.2 minutes by car becomes 47.8 by public transport (U.S. Census Bureau 2011). Faster commuting raises city productivity about 2.9% for each 10% gain in speed (Prud'homme and Lee 1999), so slower commuting lowers it. The parts with real-world evidence give mixed results. Madrid's central car restriction cut pollution 19% and congestion 16%, but affected shoppers cut their in-person spending in the zone by 21% (Galdon-Sanchez et al. 2023). For home retrofits, \"the upfront investment costs are about twice the actual energy savings\" (Fowlie, Greenstone and Wolfram 2018). People also do not live 15-minute lives: the median United States resident makes only 14% of consumption trips locally (Abbiasov et al. 2024). Benefits from lower emissions, cleaner and safer streets and better buildings come to $295 billion to $776 billion a year. Costs run from $1,896 billion to $8,042 billion. Each dollar spent carrying out the rules destroys between $0.92 and $12.03 of value.","ratio":"The caps are rationing, so they are scored like price controls. Lost consumer value, lost output and induced deaths are subtracted from benefits. The cost base is the money spent to carry the rules out: administration plus mandatory retrofits. Figures are billions of dollars a year at C40 scale, with 125.5 million private vehicles (240 per 1,000 people).\n\n**Benefits, low end: $295 billion.**\n- Climate: the mandated categories save 20.5 Gt over 2017-2050 (food 10.5, clothing 4.3, private transport 3.8, aviation 1.9). Less the report's one-third rebound, that is 0.41 Gt a year × $36 (Nordhaus 2019) = 15.\n- Car externalities: 125.5 million cars × 11,026 miles (U.S. Department of Energy 2025) × 5 cents a mile (Parry, Walls and Harrington 2007) = 69.\n- Retrofits: ratio of 0.37 × 571 = 211 (Fowlie, Greenstone and Wolfram 2018).\n\n**Benefits, high end: $776 billion.**\n- Climate: all ambitious interventions, 0.97 Gt a year × $66 (Barrage and Nordhaus 2024) = 64.\n- Exhaust from banned cars: 125.5 million × 4.6 tonnes (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2024) × $66 = 38. The low end leaves this out because the C40 baseline already electrifies cars.\n- Car externalities at 10 cents a mile: 138.\n- Retrofits: 0.94 × 571 = 536.\n\n**Low end: −$12.03 per $1.**\n- (295 − meat 3,420 − car access 1,405 − slower travel 1,932 − aviation 130 − trade 560 − infant deaths 5.1) ÷ (administration 23.8 + retrofits 571) = −12.03.\n\n**High end: −$0.92 per $1.**\n- (776 − meat 273 − car access 276 − slower travel 708 − aviation 21 − trade 36 − infant deaths 0.20) ÷ (administration 11.6 + retrofits 571) = −0.92.\n\nInfant deaths. Lost trade lowers world income by 0.034% to 0.53%. Each 1% fall in income per person adds 0.24 to 0.40 infant deaths per 1,000 births (Baird, Friedman and Schady 2011), on about 119.9 million births a year (World Bank 2025). That is 987 to 25,563 deaths a year, at $198,000 each.\n\nCross-checks. Several costs are left out and would lower both ends: dairy and restaurant meat, the loss from fewer clothes, leisure flights, replacement transit and trips other than the commute. Diet changes are given no health benefit. The flows are steady annual values, so their ratio approximates a ratio of present values.\n\nRange used: −$12.03 to −$0.92 per $1, on a full cost of $8,042 billion a year at the high reading.","cost":"The full cost is $8,042 billion a year at the high reading and $1,896 billion at the low.\n- **Public outlay: $0 estimated.** Transit to replace 125 million cars is not priced; it would add.\n- **Administration: $11.6 billion to $23.8 billion.** The UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) put a personal carbon allowance at £1 billion to £2 billion a year to run for 61.4 million people (Defra 2008; Management in Practice 2009). Scaled by 8.5 times to C40 size.\n- **Private compliance: $1,120 billion to $5,396 billion.** Meat: 13.0% × $26,250 billion = $3,420 billion; the low end extends the small-change value linearly, $273 billion. Cars: 125.5 million × $11,197 = $1,405 billion; the low end nets out the roughly $9,000 a year owners save, 125.5 million × $2,197 = $276 billion. Retrofits: the European Union's renovation plan costs 2.17% of output (European Commission 2020), $571 billion at both ends.\n- **Output loss: up to $2,622 billion.** Slower travel: cars carry 51.4% of urban commutes worldwide and 18.8% in East Asia (Prieto-Curiel and Ospina 2024). A 49.4% fall in speed for car commuters lowers average speed 9.3% to 25.4%. × 0.29 × $26,250 billion = $708 billion to $1,932 billion. Aviation: $21 billion to $130 billion, from aviation's $1.1 trillion direct output and $4.1 trillion total footprint (Air Transport Action Group 2024). Trade: $36 billion to $560 billion, from lost clothing exports ($576 billion world total, Lu 2023) and meat exports (about $191 billion, FAO 2023), using trade-income effects of 0.5% to 2% per point of trade share (Frankel and Romer 1999).","strength":"Grade C-. No study prices this bundle. Personal caps on meat, dairy, clothing, flights and car ownership have never been applied at scale outside wartime rationing. The main cost terms are peer-reviewed but stretched: Lusk and Norwood (2009) call their full-removal figure far outside their data, and Moody et al. (2021) is a survey in four United States cities. The travel-speed effect applies a cross-city estimate to a change far larger than any observed. Some components rest on stronger evidence. The retrofit result comes from a randomised design (Fowlie, Greenstone and Wolfram 2018), and German low-emission zones yielded health benefits of roughly $2 billion for a fleet-upgrade cost of $1 billion (Wolff 2014).","difficulty":"Hard. Low-emission zones and renovation rules have precedents. Binding personal caps on meat, clothing, flights and car ownership have no modern peacetime precedent and would need a ration-tracking system. Defra's 2008 study put even a simpler personal carbon allowance at £1 billion to £2 billion a year to run in the UK alone, and the scheme was not pursued (Defra 2008). C40 itself does not advocate the ambitious targets.","who_benefits":"The rules are regressive. Higher local-trip use goes with higher experienced segregation for low-income residents (Abbiasov et al. 2024). Travel confined to the neighbourhood cuts access to city-wide job markets (Prud'homme and Lee 1999). Low-emission zones and car bans force owners of older vehicles to replace them first (Wolff 2014). Outside the cities, lost demand for clothing and meat falls on exporters, and lost trade means up to 25,563 more infant deaths a year in poor countries.","counter":"The strongest counter-case is that the planning side of the 15-minute city pays. Outer London's \"mini-Holland\" programme \"generates over £1bn health economic benefits for a programme cost of £100 m\" (Aldred et al. 2024). Germany's low-emission zones brought health benefits of about twice their cost (Wolff 2014). The Coalition for Urban Transitions (2019) projects that urban low-carbon measures costing $1.83 trillion a year would save $2.80 trillion in 2030. These are left out of the range. The London schemes are voluntary and do not price car bans or consumption caps. The coalition's figures cover cities' energy and building plans, scored under the Green New Deal entry, and rest on engineering projections; measured programmes realise about 51% of projected savings (Christensen et al. 2023), which turns the projected saving into a net cost.\n\nThe verdict comes from the caps, not the planning. At the low end, giving up meat alone costs $3,420 billion a year against $295 billion of benefits. The C40 report itself \"does not advocate for the wholesale adoption of these more ambitious targets\". If the targets stayed voluntary, these losses would fall away and the policy would reduce to planning measures of the kind that score 2 (Wolff 2014) to 200 (Aldred et al. 2024). As mandates, even the high end, which uses the smaller loss estimates, stays at −0.92.","references":["Abbiasov, T., C. Heine, S. Sabouri, A. Salazar-Miranda, P. Santi, E. Glaeser, and C. Ratti. 2024. \"The 15-Minute City Quantified Using Human Mobility Data.\" *Nature Human Behaviour* 8: 445–455. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-023-01770-y.","Air Transport Action Group. 2024. \"Facts & Figures (Aviation: Benefits Beyond Borders 2024).\" ATAG. https://atag.org/facts-figures.","Aldred, R., et al. 2024. \"Impacts of Active Travel Interventions on Travel Behaviour and Health: Results from a Five-Year Longitudinal Travel Survey in Outer London.\" *Journal of Transport & Health* 35: 101771. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214140524000173.","Baird, S., J. Friedman, and N. Schady. 2011. \"Aggregate Income Shocks and Infant Mortality in the Developing World.\" *Review of Economics and Statistics* 93 (3): 847–856. https://www2.gwu.edu/~iiep/assets/docs/papers/Baird_IIEPWP2010-7.pdf.","Barrage, L., and W. Nordhaus. 2024. \"Policies, Projections, and the Social Cost of Carbon: Results from the DICE-2023 Model.\" *PNAS* 121 (13): e2312030121. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2312030121.","Broughel, J., and W. K. Viscusi. 2017. *Death by Regulation: How Regulations Can Increase Mortality Risk.* Research summary. Mercatus Center at George Mason University. https://mercatus.org/media/65351/download.","C40 Cities. 2015. \"Press Release: Cities from India, Philippines and United Arab Emirates Join C40's Global Network.\" C40 Cities, 13 August 2015. https://www.c40.org/news/press-release-cities-from-india-philippines-and-united-arab-emirates-join-c40-s-global-network/.","C40 Cities, Arup, and University of Leeds. 2019. *The Future of Urban Consumption in a 1.5°C World.* Headline Report. C40 Cities. https://www.arup.com/globalassets/downloads/insights/arup-c40-the-future-of-urban-consumption-in-a-1-5c-world.pdf.","Christensen, P., P. Francisco, E. Myers, and M. Souza. 2023. \"Decomposing the Wedge between Projected and Realized Returns in Energy Efficiency Programs.\" *Review of Economics and Statistics* 105 (4): 798–817. https://e2e.uchicago.edu/pdf/workingpapers/WP046.pdf.","Coalition for Urban Transitions. 2019. *Climate Emergency, Urban Opportunity.* Coalition for Urban Transitions (Vivid Economics). https://urbantransitions.global/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Climate-Emergency-Urban-Opportunity-report.pdf.","Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra). 2008. Pre-feasibility study of personal carbon trading, as reported in \"UK Gov Torpedoes Personal Carbon Credit Plans.\" *The Register*, 11 May 2008. https://www.theregister.com/offbeat/2008/05/11/ukgov-torpedoes-personal-carbon-credit-plans/1268998.","European Commission. 2020. *A Renovation Wave for Europe.* COM(2020) 662. As summarised by the European Clean Hydrogen Observatory. https://observatory.clean-hydrogen.europa.eu/eu-policy/renovation-wave-europe.","FAO. 2023. *Trade of Agricultural Commodities 2005–2022.* FAOSTAT Analytical Brief 80. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. https://www.fao.org/3/cc9206en/cc9206en.pdf.","Fowlie, M., M. Greenstone, and C. Wolfram. 2018. \"Do Energy Efficiency Investments Deliver? Evidence from the Weatherization Assistance Program.\" *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 133 (3): 1597–1644. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjy005.","Frankel, J. A., and D. Romer. 1999. \"Does Trade Cause Growth?\" *American Economic Review* 89 (3): 379–399. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.89.3.379.","Galdon-Sanchez, J. E., R. Gil, F. Holub, and G. Uriz-Uharte. 2023. \"Social Benefits and Private Costs of Driving Restriction Policies: The Impact of Madrid Central on Congestion, Pollution, and Consumer Spending.\" *Journal of the European Economic Association* 21 (3): 1227–1267. https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/jeurec/v21y2023i3p1227-1267..html.","Lu, S. 2023. \"WTO Reports World Textiles and Clothing Trade in 2022.\" FASH455 Global Apparel & Textile Trade and Sourcing, University of Delaware. https://shenglufashion.com/2023/08/14/wto-reports-world-textiles-and-clothing-trade-in-2022/.","Lusk, J. L., and F. B. Norwood. 2009. \"Some Economic Benefits and Costs of Vegetarianism.\" *Agricultural and Resource Economics Review* 38 (2): 109–124. https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/55529/files/lusk%20-%20current.pdf.","Management in Practice. 2009. \"UK Population Hits Record 61 Million High.\" Management in Practice, 28 August 2009. https://managementinpractice.com/news/uk-population-hits-record-61-million-high/.","Moody, J., E. Farr, M. Papagelis, and D. R. Keith. 2021. \"The Value of Car Ownership and Use in the United States.\" *Nature Sustainability* 4 (9): 769–774. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-021-00731-5.","Nordhaus, W. D. 2019. \"Climate Change: The Ultimate Challenge for Economics.\" *American Economic Review* 109 (6): 1991–2014. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.109.6.1991.","Parry, I. W. H., M. Walls, and W. Harrington. 2007. \"Automobile Externalities and Policies.\" *Journal of Economic Literature* 45 (2): 373–399. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.45.2.373.","Prieto-Curiel, R., and J. P. Ospina. 2024. \"The ABC of Mobility.\" *Environment International.* https://www.downtoearth.org.in/news/world/how-does-the-urban-world-commute-study-finds-over-half-prefer-cars-95138.","Prud'homme, R., and C.-W. Lee. 1999. \"Size, Sprawl, Speed and the Efficiency of Cities.\" *Urban Studies* 36 (11): 1849–1858. https://doi.org/10.1080/0042098992638.","Rennert, K., F. Errickson, et al. 2022. \"Comprehensive Evidence Implies a Higher Social Cost of CO2.\" *Nature* 610: 687–692. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-022-05224-9.","U.S. Census Bureau (McKenzie, B., and M. Rapino). 2011. *Commuting in the United States: 2009.* American Community Survey Reports ACS-15. US Census Bureau. https://libraryarchives.metro.net/DPGTL/harvested/2011-Commuting-in-the-united-states-2009.pdf.","U.S. Department of Energy, Alternative Fuels Data Center. 2025. \"Average Annual Vehicle Miles Traveled by Major Vehicle Category.\" AFDC data table 10309, from FHWA Highway Statistics. https://afdc.energy.gov/data/10309.","U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2024. \"Greenhouse Gas Emissions from a Typical Passenger Vehicle.\" EPA Green Vehicle Guide. https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/greenhouse-gas-emissions-typical-passenger-vehicle.","Wolff, H. 2014. \"Keep Your Clunker in the Suburb: Low-Emission Zones and Adoption of Green Vehicles.\" *The Economic Journal* 124 (578): F481–F512. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12091.","World Bank. 2025. \"Crude Birth Rate and Total Population, Low and Middle Income Countries.\" World Development Indicators, via FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. https://fred.stlouisfed.org/data/SPDYNCBRTINLMY."]},"10":{"policy":"Private funders offer prizes and advance market commitments that pay out only when someone delivers a defined result. Three areas are covered: higher crop yields, cheaper clean-energy technology, and research into geoengineering. No taxpayer money is involved. The prize purse goes to whoever succeeds.","why_on_list":"It is an official proposal. Governments pledged to expand clean-energy research through Mission Innovation at the Paris climate summit in 2015, and the Copenhagen Consensus has repeatedly ranked research and development among the best climate investments.","evidence":"No study measures the return on prize money itself. The research these prizes would buy, however, has some of the highest returns in the literature. Galiana and Green (2012) find that more low-carbon energy research yields \"benefits ranging from 3 to 11 times higher than cost, depending on rate of success and time horizon.\" Agricultural research does better. Rosegrant et al. (2023) find a ratio of 33 for added farm research in the Global South, and Alston et al. (2011) find 21 to 32 for United States public agricultural research. A pull prize for heat-resilient crops returns at least 7.5 per dollar when aimed at the two best targets, West African maize and East African sorghum (Glennerster et al. 2024). Geoengineering research has the highest and most contested figures: Bickel and Lane (2012) estimate that \"each dollar spent could create $1,000 of benefits in economic terms.\" Prizes do induce innovation. Historical agricultural prizes raised high-quality patenting (Brunt, Lerner and Nicholas 2012), and the $1.5 billion pneumococcal vaccine commitment saved about 700,000 lives at about $83 per disability-adjusted life year (Kremer, Levin and Snyder 2020). Weighting the three areas equally gives $11.80 to $348 of benefit per dollar. The high end rests on the disputed geoengineering figure.","ratio":"Each area takes the best published return on research spending.\n\n**Low end: $11.80 per $1.**\n- Energy technology: 3 (Galiana and Green 2012).\n- Agricultural yields: 7.5, the lowest ratio for a heat-resilient-crop advance market commitment aimed at West African maize or East African sorghum, the two most cost-effective targets (Glennerster et al. 2024).\n- Geoengineering: 25, for stratospheric aerosols (Bickel and Lane 2009, as reported by Pielke 2009).\n- Ratio: (3 + 7.5 + 25) ÷ 3 = 11.8.\n\n**High end: $348 per $1.**\n- Energy technology: 11. The 2009 Copenhagen Consensus paper put about $100 billion a year of research at about 11 (Lomborg 2009).\n- Agricultural yields: 33 (Rosegrant et al. 2023), bracketed by 21 to 32 (Alston et al. 2011).\n- Geoengineering: about 1,000 per research dollar, for a research programme costing about a billion dollars in total (Bickel and Lane 2012).\n- Ratio: (11 + 33 + 1,000) ÷ 3 = 348.\n\nThe areas are weighted equally because prize money is paid only for results. It flows to whichever innovations succeed, and a funder can aim it at the highest-return areas rather than in proportion to existing research budgets.\n\nCross-checks. Weighting by the size of each research programme ($100 billion energy, $5.2 billion agriculture, about $0.1 billion geoengineering) gives (100 × 3 + 5.2 × 7.5 + 0.1 × 25) ÷ 105.3 = 3.2 at the low end and (100 × 11 + 5.2 × 33 + 0.1 × 1,000) ÷ 105.3 = 13.0 at the high end. The raw span is 3 to 1,000. Competing teams usually spend far more than the purse: the $10 million Ansari X Prize drew more than $100 million of team spending (Bays, Goland and Newsum 2009). Administration equal to the purse then adds about 10 ÷ 110 = 9% to the resource cost, giving 11.8 ÷ 1.1 = 10.7 to 348 ÷ 1.1 = 316. If the purse were the only research input, administration would halve the ratios, to 5.9 to 174.\n\nRange used: $11.80 to $348 per $1, on a full cost of $0.14 billion a year.","cost":"The full cost is about $0.14 billion a year.\n- **Public outlay: $0.** The money is voluntary and private.\n- **Administration: about $0.14 billion.** The XPRIZE rule of thumb is that operating costs equal the purse (Olson 2011). Current private climate pull funding is the Frontier commitment, $925 million over eight years, about $0.116 billion a year (McKinsey & Company 2022), plus the $100 million XPRIZE Carbon Removal purse over its roughly four-year run, about $0.025 billion a year (XPRIZE Foundation 2025). This is an upper bound, because advance market commitments need less administration than staged competitions.\n- **Private compliance: none.** Team spending is the research input whose returns the ratios measure.\n- **Output loss: none.** The purse itself is a transfer to the winners.","strength":"Grade B. The range rests mainly on Galiana and Green's Copenhagen Consensus models, published in a Cambridge University Press volume, with a peer-reviewed estimate for farm research (Rosegrant et al. 2023) and peer-reviewed evidence that prizes and advance market commitments induce innovation (Brunt, Lerner and Nicholas 2012; Kremer, Levin and Snyder 2020). It is not higher, because no study measures the return on prize money itself and the geoengineering figures are contested estimates from a policy centre. Alston et al. (2011) also note that their ratios correspond to real rates of return of 9% or 10% a year, much smaller than most published figures.","difficulty":"Easy. A single philanthropist or company can do it under existing law, and it has been done many times: the Ansari X Prize, the Frontier commitment in 2022, the pneumococcal vaccine commitment, and the $100 million XPRIZE Carbon Removal, funded by the Musk Foundation and awarded in April 2025 (XPRIZE Foundation 2025).","who_benefits":"The gains are broad. Prizes for crop yields are pro-poor: more farm research in the Global South would cut hunger 35% and food prices 16% after 35 years (Rosegrant et al. 2023). Cheaper clean energy and better knowledge of climate risk benefit everyone. No source measures the spread of gains across the combined programme. Nobody is forced to pay.","counter":"The case against rests on the geoengineering figure. Goes, Tuana and Keller (2011) find that fully substituting aerosol geoengineering for emission cuts fails a cost-benefit test over a wide range of scenarios, because of the risk of stopping abruptly and the damage the aerosols do themselves. Pielke (2009) calls Bickel and Lane's ratios \"precision without accuracy.\" Bickel and Agrawal (2013) reply that geoengineering may pass the test across many of the same scenarios. All three concern deployment, not research, so none sets an end of the range. Prizes themselves are also hard to judge. Williams (2012) writes that \"careful empirical evaluations of innovation inducement prizes are needed\", and only 23% of sponsors evaluate impact (Bays, Goland and Newsum 2009).\n\nWeighting decides how high the ratio goes. Weighting the three areas by the size of each source's research programme, rather than equally, gives 3.2 to 13.0 instead of 11.8 to 348, because energy research, at 3 to 11, dominates. If the purse were treated as the only research input, with administration equal to the purse, the ratios would halve to 5.9 to 174. Either change would pull the policy down from near the top of the list toward the Good tier. Even with geoengineering dropped entirely, energy and farm research return 3 to 33.","references":["Alston, J. M., M. A. Andersen, J. S. James, and P. G. Pardey. 2011. \"The Economic Returns to U.S. Public Agricultural Research.\" *American Journal of Agricultural Economics* 93 (5): 1257–1277. https://doi.org/10.1093/ajae/aar044.","Bays, J., T. Goland, and J. Newsum. 2009. \"Using Prizes to Spur Innovation.\" *McKinsey Quarterly*, July 2009. https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/using-prizes-to-spur-innovation.","Bickel, J. E., and S. Agrawal. 2013. \"Reexamining the Economics of Aerosol Geoengineering.\" *Climatic Change* 119: 993–1006. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-012-0619-x.","Bickel, J. E., and L. Lane. 2009. *An Analysis of Climate Engineering as a Response to Climate Change.* Copenhagen Consensus on Climate: Climate Engineering Assessment. Copenhagen Consensus Center. https://copenhagenconsensus.com/publication/fix-climate-climate-engineering-assessment-bickel-lane.","Bickel, J. E., and L. Lane. 2012. *Climate Engineering.* Third Copenhagen Consensus: Climate Engineering Assessment. Copenhagen Consensus Center. https://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/publication/third-copenhagen-consensus-climate-engineering-assessment-bickel-lane.","Brunt, L., J. Lerner, and T. Nicholas. 2012. \"Inducement Prizes and Innovation.\" *Journal of Industrial Economics* 60 (4): 657–696. https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jindec:v:60:y:2012:i:4:p:657-696.","Galiana, I., and C. Green. 2012. *Technology-led Mitigation.* Third Copenhagen Consensus: Climate Change Assessment Paper. Copenhagen Consensus Center; final version in B. Lomborg, ed., *Global Problems, Smart Solutions: Costs and Benefits* (Cambridge University Press, 2013). https://copenhagenconsensus.com/publication/third-copenhagen-consensus-technology-led-mitigation-assessment-galiana-green.","Glennerster, R., K. Emerick, A. Krahn, et al. 2024. *The Return to Investing in Climate-Resilient Crops.* Draft report. Market Shaping Accelerator, University of Chicago. https://marketshaping.uchicago.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/The-Return-to-Investing-in-Climate-Resilient-Crops.pdf.","Goes, M., N. Tuana, and K. Keller. 2011. \"The Economics (or Lack Thereof) of Aerosol Geoengineering.\" *Climatic Change* 109: 719–744. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-010-9961-z.","Kremer, M., J. Levin, and C. M. Snyder. 2020. \"Advance Market Commitments: Insights from Theory and Experience.\" *AEA Papers and Proceedings.* https://doi.org/10.1257/pandp.20201017.","Lomborg, B. 2009. Op-ed on the Copenhagen Consensus on Climate results. *Forbes*, 21 September 2009. https://www.lomborg.com/sites/default/files/imported/bl_op-ed_2009_sept_21_forbes.pdf.","McKinsey & Company. 2022. \"McKinsey Partners with Stripe, Alphabet, Shopify, and Meta on $925 Million Carbon Removal Commitment.\" New at McKinsey blog, 13 April 2022. https://www.mckinsey.com/about-us/new-at-mckinsey-blog/mckinsey-partners-with-stripe-alphabet-shopify-and-meta-on-$925-million-carbon-removal-commitment.","Olson, S. 2011. \"X-Prize Director Describes Incentive Prizes.\" Interview with Erika Wagner, X Prize Foundation. NextBigFuture, June 2011. https://www.nextbigfuture.com/2011/06/x-prize-director-describes-incentive.html.","Pielke, R. A., Jr. 2009. *A Perspective Paper on Climate Engineering.* Copenhagen Consensus on Climate. Copenhagen Consensus Center. https://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/admin/publication_files/resource-2753-2009.28.pdf.","Rosegrant, M. W., B. Wong, T. B. Sulser, N. Dubosse, and T. J. Lybbert. 2023. \"Benefit-Cost Analysis of Increased Funding for Agricultural Research and Development in the Global South.\" *Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis* 14 (S1). https://doi.org/10.1017/bca.2023.27.","Williams, H. 2012. \"Innovation Inducement Prizes: Connecting Research to Policy.\" *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 31 (3): 752–776. https://doi.org/10.1002/pam.21638.","XPRIZE Foundation. 2025. \"XPRIZE Makes History, Awards $100M Prize for Groundbreaking Carbon Removal Solutions.\" News release, April 2025. https://www.xprize.org/news/xprize-makes-history-awards-100m-prize-for-groundbreaking-carbon-removal-solutions."]},"11":{"policy":"Rent control caps how fast rents can rise on covered apartments. Cities and states already do it, from New York and San Francisco to St. Paul, Minnesota, which passed its law in 2021. The version scored here is a national cap covering all 46.8 million renter-occupied homes in the United States. It is a rule, not a spending programme.","why_on_list":"Rent control was chosen by public-opinion survey. In a 2024 survey experiment of about 5,000 urban and suburban voters, over 85% supported capping rents, and homeowners and renters alike backed price controls (Elmendorf, Nall, and Oklobdzija 2024). In the US General Social Survey's round of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), 73.9% say government should keep prices under control: 32.1% \"definitely\" and 41.8% \"probably\" (General Social Survey 2024).","evidence":"Rent control works for the tenants it covers. After San Francisco expanded rent control in 1994, covered tenants gained $7.621 billion over 1995-2012, about $423 million a year, and roughly a third of that came as buyout payments from landlords (Diamond, McQuade, and Qian 2018a). The same study finds that treated landlords cut their supply of rental housing by 15%, by converting to condominiums, selling to owner-occupiers or redeveloping. Citywide rents rose 7% in the draft and 5.1% in the published version, and renters as a whole lost about $5 billion (Diamond, McQuade, and Qian 2018b; 2019). In the authors' words, \"This is almost as large as the benefits accrued by the lucky beneficiaries of rent control\" (Diamond, McQuade, and Qian 2018a).\n\nOther natural experiments point the same way. St. Paul's 2021 law cut property values by 6-7%, or $1.57 billion, and a third of that loss, at least $518 million, was pure waste rather than a transfer to tenants (Ahern and Giacoletti 2022). When Cambridge, Massachusetts, ended rent control, the change added about $1.8 billion to the value of the city's housing over 1994-2004, nearly a quarter of all its housing appreciation, mostly on properties that were never controlled (Autor, Palmer, and Pathak 2014). In New York, controlled apartments end up with the wrong households, at a best estimate of $200 per apartment a year (Glaeser and Luttmer 1997; 2003). A 2024 review of the whole literature concludes that rent control slows rent growth in controlled units but brings wide-ranging adverse effects for society (Kholodilin 2024).\n\nEconomists agree. In 2012, 33 of 37 members of the Clark Center's panel of leading US economists, or 89%, disagreed that rent limits had improved affordable housing (Clark Center 2012). In 2024, about 80% rejected the claim that a national 5% cap would make middle-income Americans substantially better off (Clark Center 2024). The uncertainty lies in how much of each dollar survives. Every measured case leaves less than $1 of net benefit per $1 taken: between $0.05 and $0.62. Once the cost of raising the taxes that fund it is counted, the range is $0.04 to $0.62 per $1.","ratio":"No study publishes a benefit-cost ratio for rent control, so the ratio is built from natural experiments. It measures the value that reaches protected tenants, net of the harm to everyone else, administration and misallocation, per $1 taken from property owners and other renters. The transfer counts $1 for $1, with no extra weight for tenants.\n\n**Step 1: supply losses.**\n- Low base (San Francisco): tenant benefits $7.62 billion; welfare losses to all renters $5.0 billion. Ratio: (7.62 - 5.0) ÷ 7.62 = 0.34. Only 34 cents of each $1 survives as a gain for renters as a class, before counting landlords' own losses.\n- High base (St. Paul): 67% of the fall in property values is a transfer to tenants and 33% is deadweight loss. Ratio: 1 - 0.33 = 0.67. This is an upper bound, since tenants keep the transfer only while they stay.\n\n**Step 2: administration.** San Francisco's Rent Board costs $13.8 million a year against $423 million a year of benefits to the 1994 group alone. Share: 13.8 ÷ 423 = 3.3% of the transfer.\n- High: 0.67 - 0.033 = 0.64.\n- Low: Berkeley spends about $324 per unit against about $59.5 in San Francisco, 5.44 times as much. Share: 3.3% × 5.44 = 17.8%. Result: 0.34 - 0.18 = 0.16.\n\n**Step 3: misallocation.** New York data tabulated by Turner and Malpezzi (2003) put the landlord's cost of a rent-controlled unit at $122 a month, or $1,464 a year, in 1987. At 1993 prices (× 1.272) that is $1,862.\n- Low, with the best estimate of $200 a year: 200 ÷ 1,862 = 10.7%. Result: 0.16 - 0.107 = **0.05**.\n- High, with the lower bound of $40 a year: 40 ÷ 1,862 = 2.1%. Result: 0.64 - 0.021 = **0.62**.\n\n**Result: $0.05 to $0.62 of net benefit per $1 taken. Full cost: $15.2 billion a year.** Both ends are below 1.\n\nCross-checks. A 1968 New York study in Turner and Malpezzi's review finds tenants valued a $406 a year subsidy at $213, a transfer efficiency of 0.52; other studies in the same table run from 0.45 to 0.99. Cambridge confirms that controls depress the value of neighbouring homes, an externality the high end does not count. The three steps do not overlap: none of the supply studies measures who lives in the controlled units.\n\n**After the cost of raising taxes.** Each $1 of public spending costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven and Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999). As for the other transfer entries, the burden is subtracted from benefits. Rent boards are funded mainly by fees charged to landlords. In Berkeley, fees of $8.09 million cover 97% of an $8.33 million budget. Fees are part of the transfer already counted, so at most 2.9% of administration is paid from taxes. High end (San Francisco, funded by fees): no change, 0.62. Low end (Berkeley's cost level): 0.34 − 0.178 − 0.107 − 2.0 × (0.029 × 0.178) = 0.055 − 0.010 = 0.04. **Range after tax finance: 0.04 to 0.62.**","cost":"The full cost is **$15.2 billion a year**, all of it administration.\n\n- **Public outlay: $0.** There is no budget transfer, and rent boards are usually funded by fees on landlords.\n- **Administration: $15.2 billion.** Rent-board budgets per covered unit, scaled to the 46.8 million US renter-occupied units (U.S. Census Bureau 2026). Berkeley's budget for 2024-25 is $8.33 million for about 25,700 units: some 20,000 fully covered units paying a $344 fee plus about 5,700 partially covered units (City of Berkeley Rent Stabilization Board 2024). That is about $324 per unit, or $15.2 billion nationally, the high end used here. San Francisco's budget is $13.83 million for 232,263 units (219,125 dwelling units and 13,138 single-room-occupancy units), about $59.5 per unit, or $2.8 billion nationally (City and County of San Francisco 2024). As a cross-check, New York State's rent office has 350 staff for 1,064,049 rent-stabilised units (New York State Homes and Community Renewal 2025).\n- **Private compliance:** no published estimate. Registration fees are already inside the board budgets.\n- **Lost output:** the supply and welfare losses sit inside the ratio and have no national estimate.\n\nThe rent moved from owners to tenants is a transfer, not a cost. Total: 0 + 15.2 = $15.2 billion a year.","strength":"Grade: **B+**. The numbers come from peer-reviewed and National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) natural experiments that measure the size of gains and losses in San Francisco, Cambridge and St. Paul. They are turned into a ratio by direct arithmetic. No published benefit-cost study exists, so an A grade does not apply. The 2012 and 2024 expert panels and a 2024 peer-reviewed review all point the same way. The misallocation term mixes data years (a 1987 subsidy and 1993 misallocation) and cities, which holds the grade at B+.","difficulty":"Difficulty: **moderate**. Rent control is ordinary legislation at city or state level, with many precedents. A national cap would need an act of Congress, but no constitutional change.","who_benefits":"The tilt is **regressive**. In St. Paul, the tenants who gained most had higher incomes and were more likely to be white, while the owners who lost most had lower incomes and were more likely to be minorities (Ahern and Giacoletti 2022). In San Francisco, the lost rental supply raised rents for later, often younger and poorer, renters. The authors conclude: \"Rent control has actually fueled the gentrification of San Francisco, the exact opposite of the policy's intended goal\" (Diamond, McQuade, and Qian 2018a). They find 42% of the losses fall on future residents and 58% on people already living there; incumbents come out ahead on net (Diamond, McQuade, and Qian 2018b). The benefit goes to whoever holds the lease, regardless of need.","counter":"The strongest counter-case is a calibrated model of New York. Favilukis, Mabille and Van Nieuwerburgh (2023) find that affordability policies, rent control included, carry substantial insurance value, and that targeting the neediest can yield substantial net welfare gains despite supply and misallocation costs. In San Francisco, covered tenants gained $3,100 to $5,900 per person per year, and the authors note that losses could be reduced if rent insurance were provided by government rather than imposed on landlords (Diamond, McQuade and Qian 2018). The model is left out of the range because real rent caps are not targeted; in St. Paul, higher-income tenants gained most and lower-income owners lost most (Ahern and Giacoletti 2022).\n\nNo measured finding lifts rent control near 1. The high end of 0.62 already assumes that the whole capitalised loss in St. Paul, apart from its deadweight share, reaches tenants. The verdict would fall to Worst if Early (2000) were used: once higher uncontrolled rents are counted, the average regulated tenant in New York lost, which would put the low end near −0.83. The upper misallocation estimate of $200 to $2,000 per apartment (Glaeser and Luttmer 1997) would also push the low end well below zero. Only controls targeted at the neediest households, as in the New York model, could do better, and that is a different policy.","references":["Ahern, K. R., and M. Giacoletti. 2022. \"Robbing Peter to Pay Paul? The Redistribution of Wealth Caused by Rent Control.\" NBER Working Paper 30083. National Bureau of Economic Research. https://doi.org/10.3386/w30083.","Autor, D. H., C. J. Palmer, and P. A. Pathak. 2014. \"Housing Market Spillovers: Evidence from the End of Rent Control in Cambridge, Massachusetts.\" *Journal of Political Economy* 122 (3): 661-717. https://doi.org/10.1086/675536.","City and County of San Francisco, Rent Arbitration Board. 2024. *Rent Arbitration Board FY 2024-25 and FY 2025-26 Budget Memo.* City and County of San Francisco. https://www.sf.gov/sites/default/files/2024-02/Rent%20Arbitration%20Board%20FY24-26%20Budget%20Memo.pdf.","City of Berkeley Rent Stabilization Board. 2024. *FY 2024-2025 Budget, Staffing Model, and Expenditure Level (Item 7C, 20 June 2024).* City of Berkeley. https://rentboard.berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/documents/06-20-2024_RSB_ITEM%207C_ACTION_FY%202024-2025%20Budget%2C%20Staffing%20Model%2C%20and%20Exp.%20Level_FINAL_0.pdf.","Clark Center Economic Experts Panel. 2012. \"Rent Control.\" Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets, University of Chicago Booth School of Business, February 7. https://kentclarkcenter.org/surveys/rent-control/.","Clark Center Economic Experts Panel. 2024. \"National Rent Caps.\" Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets, University of Chicago Booth School of Business, July 23. https://kentclarkcenter.org/surveys/national-rent-caps/.","Diamond, R., T. McQuade, and F. Qian. 2018a. \"The Effects of Rent Control Expansion on Tenants, Landlords, and Inequality: Evidence from San Francisco.\" NBER conference paper f99478. https://conference.nber.org/conf_papers/f99478/f99478.pdf.","Diamond, R., T. McQuade, and F. Qian. 2018b. \"The Effects of Rent Control Expansion on Tenants, Landlords, and Inequality: Evidence from San Francisco.\" NBER Working Paper 24181. National Bureau of Economic Research. https://doi.org/10.3386/w24181.","Diamond, R., T. McQuade, and F. Qian. 2019. \"The Effects of Rent Control Expansion on Tenants, Landlords, and Inequality: Evidence from San Francisco.\" *American Economic Review* 109 (9): 3365-3394. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20181289.","Early, D. W. 2000. \"Rent Control, Rental Housing Supply, and the Distribution of Tenant Benefits.\" *Journal of Urban Economics* 48 (2): 185-204. https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/juecon/v48y2000i2p185-204.html.","Elmendorf, C. S., C. Nall, and S. Oklobdzija. 2024. \"What State Housing Policies Do Voters Want? Evidence from a Platform-Choice Experiment.\" *Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy* 5 (1). https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4811534.","Favilukis, J., P. Mabille, and S. Van Nieuwerburgh. 2023. \"Affordable Housing and City Welfare.\" *Review of Economic Studies* 90 (1): 293-330. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdac024.","General Social Survey. 2024. \"PRICECONGOVTS: Government Responsibility to Keep Prices under Control.\" GSS cumulative codebook, ISSP Role of Government module. NORC at the University of Chicago; UC Berkeley SDA. https://sda.berkeley.edu/sdaweb/docs/gss24rel3/DOC/hcbk0223.htm.","Glaeser, E. L., and E. F. P. Luttmer. 1997. \"The Misallocation of Housing Under Rent Control.\" NBER Working Paper 6220. National Bureau of Economic Research. https://doi.org/10.3386/w6220.","Glaeser, E. L., and E. F. P. Luttmer. 2003. \"The Misallocation of Housing Under Rent Control.\" *American Economic Review* 93 (4): 1027-1046. https://doi.org/10.1257/000282803769206188.","Kholodilin, K. A. 2024. \"Rent Control Effects through the Lens of Empirical Research: An Almost Complete Review of the Literature.\" *Journal of Housing Economics* 63: 101983. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhe.2024.101983.","New York State Homes and Community Renewal, Office of Rent Administration. 2025. *Office of Rent Administration 2025 Annual Report.* NYS HCR. https://hcr.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2025/12/ora_2025-annual-report_final.pdf.","Sims, D. P. 2007. \"Out of Control: What Can We Learn from the End of Massachusetts Rent Control?\" *Journal of Urban Economics* 61 (1): 129-151. https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/juecon/v61y2007i1p129-151.html.","Turner, B., and S. Malpezzi. 2003. \"A Review of Empirical Evidence on the Costs and Benefits of Rent Control.\" *Swedish Economic Policy Review* 10: 11-56. https://government.se/contentassets/6e57e1d818bb4b289ac512bb7d307fa5/bengt-turner--stephen-malpezzi-a-review-of-empirical-evidence-on-the-costs-and-benefits-of-rent-control.","U.S. Census Bureau. 2026. *Quarterly Residential Vacancies and Homeownership, Second Quarter 2026.* Housing Vacancy Survey press release. https://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/files/currenthvspress.pdf."]},"12":{"policy":"This policy caps prices. It covers two forms: anti-price-gouging laws that apply during emergencies, and general price controls on groceries or the whole economy. The cost is scored on the only economy-wide US precedent, the 1971-74 controls. Disaster-only laws are smaller and sit inside the same range per dollar.","why_on_list":"Price controls were chosen by public-opinion survey. In April 2026, 65% of 1,085 likely voters backed cracking down on grocery-store price gouging (Data for Progress 2026). In the US General Social Survey's round of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), 73.9% say government should keep prices under control (General Social Survey 2024).","evidence":"A price cap moves money from sellers to the buyers who still get the good. It also destroys value three ways: trades that no longer happen, goods that go to people and places that value them less, and time burned in queues. The best evidence comes from the US gasoline controls of the 1970s. Station-level data show the 1973-74 ceiling held prices 20% below normal and left a 9% shortfall; the lost trades cost about 2.0% of normal spending, and misallocation cost a further 2.2-17.7% (Albrecht, Tabarrok, and Whitmeyer 2026). Queues were worse still. Deacon and Sonstelie (1989) find: \"Rent seeking exhausts an estimated 116 percent of the rent transferred.\" Buyers lost more waiting in line than they saved at the pump.\n\nOther markets show the same pattern. Price ceilings on US natural gas caused allocative losses of $4.6 billion a year on average over 1950-2000, roughly tripling earlier estimates of the welfare loss (Davis and Kilian 2011). In Poland, controls on colour televisions cost 0.46% of gross domestic product (GDP), about ten times the classic deadweight triangle (Tarr 1994). After the 2010 Chile and 2011 Japan earthquakes, prices stayed stable but the number of goods for sale fell 32% and 17% (Cavallo, Cavallo, and Rigobon 2014). The 1971-74 controls cut the core price level by 3-4% by February 1974, but catch-up inflation after controls ended left it only 0-2% below where it would have been (Blinder and Newton 1981).\n\nEconomists are close to unanimous. In 2024, 88% of the Clark Center's panel of leading US economists agreed that widespread price controls create substantial economic distortions (Clark Center 2024). In 2012, 20 of the 29 panel members who took a position opposed Connecticut's anti-gouging bill (Clark Center 2012). The main uncertainty is the size of the misallocation loss. Counting everything, each $1 shifted from sellers to buyers destroys between 44 cents and $1.29 of value. Once the cost of raising the taxes that fund it is counted, the range is −$1.29 to −$0.44 per $1.","ratio":"The ratio measures the net value to buyers per $1 taken from sellers: (transfer - queuing - lost trades - misallocation - administration and compliance) ÷ transfer. All terms are in points of normal spending on the controlled good, calibrated to the 1973-74 gasoline controls.\n\n**Step 1: the transfer.** The ceiling was 20% below the normal price and buyers got 91% of the normal quantity. Transfer: 0.20 × 0.91 = 18.2 points.\n\n**Step 2: queuing.** Rent seeking burns 116% of the transfer (Deacon and Sonstelie 1989). Buyers' net gain: 18.2 - 1.16 × 18.2 = 18.2 - 21.11 = -2.91 points. Frech and Lee (1987) likewise find queuing costs could exceed the whole transfer, as summarised by Albrecht, Tabarrok, and Whitmeyer (2026).\n\n**Step 3: lost trades.** The deadweight triangle is 2.0 points.\n\n**Step 4: administration and compliance.** The 1971-74 controls cut the core price level by 3-4%. Applied to 1973 GDP of $1,425 billion, the transfer was at most $43-57 billion a year. Running and complying with the controls cost $0.08 billion plus $2.0 billion a year. Share: $2.08 billion ÷ $42.8 billion = 4.9% of the transfer, or 0.89 points.\n\n**Step 5: misallocation, and the two ends.** Misallocation runs from 2.2 to 17.7 points. It is a separate loss that exists even with zero queuing, so the two are added.\n- Low: (-2.91 - 2.0 - 17.7 - 0.89) ÷ 18.2 = -23.50 ÷ 18.2 = **-1.29**.\n- High: (-2.91 - 2.0 - 2.2 - 0.89) ÷ 18.2 = **-0.44**. Pairing the measured queuing loss with the lowest misallocation allows for some overlap between the two.\n\n**Result: each $1 moved destroys between $0.44 and $1.29 of value. Full cost: $45.0 billion a year.**\n\nCross-checks. In 1979 the average pump price was about 80 cents, the market-clearing price about $1.00 and the price including waiting time about $1.20 per gallon (Henderson n.d.). Buyers lost 20 cents against a 20-cent transfer, a ratio of about -1.0. For US natural gas over 1968-77, figures reported by Davis and Kilian (2011) give a $6.9 billion transfer against $9.3 billion of deadweight loss and $5.9 billion of allocative cost: (6.9 - 9.3 - 5.9) ÷ 6.9 = -1.20. For Polish televisions, a rent rectangle of 116 billion zlotys and a triangle of 14 billion give (116 - 116 - 14) ÷ 116 = -0.12, before any misallocation (Tarr 1994). Short, disaster-only laws sit inside the range: a federal gouging law after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita would have caused about $1.9 billion of welfare losses in September and October 2005 (Oil & Gas Journal 2007).\n\n**After the cost of raising taxes.** Each $1 of public spending costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven and Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999). As for the other transfer entries, the burden is subtracted from benefits. Only the administration of the Cost of Living Council, $80 million a year or 0.034 points on the 18.2-point scale, is paid from taxes; compliance is private. Low end: (−23.50 − 2.0 × 0.034) ÷ 18.2 = −1.295, still −1.29. High end: (−8.00 − 0.34 × 0.034) ÷ 18.2 = −0.440, still −0.44. **Range after tax finance: −1.29 to −0.44.**","cost":"The full cost is **$45.0 billion a year**, for general controls on the 1971-74 model.\n\n- **Public outlay: $0.**\n- **Administration: $1.7 billion.** John Dunlop, head of the Cost of Living Council, put the cost to taxpayers at nearly $200 million over about two and a half years (Bleiberg 1974). That is $80 million a year, or 0.0056% of 1973 GDP. Scaled to 2025 GDP of $30.9 trillion (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 2026), a factor of 21.65, it is $1.7 billion a year.\n- **Private compliance: $43.3 billion.** Dunlop put industry's cost at $721 million to $2 billion for the whole period; other sources put it at about $2 billion a year (Bleiberg 1974). The high end, 0.14% of 1973 GDP, scales to $43.3 billion a year. The low end would be $6.2 billion.\n- **Lost output:** shortages, queues and misallocation sit inside the ratio and have no modern economy-wide estimate.\n\nPrice cuts from sellers to buyers are transfers, not costs. Total: 0 + 1.7 + 43.3 = $45.0 billion a year. Disaster-only anti-gouging laws would cost a small fraction of this.","strength":"Grade: **B+**. Peer-reviewed historical natural experiments measure the losses: gasoline queues (Frech and Lee 1987; Deacon and Sonstelie 1989), natural gas (Davis and Kilian 2011), the 1971-74 controls (Blinder and Newton 1981) and disaster pricing (Cavallo, Cavallo, and Rigobon 2014). A 2026 working paper supplies the bounds on misallocation. No published benefit-cost ratio exists. Both ends rest on a peer-reviewed queuing estimate, with the Polish evidence as a cross-check, and expert opinion is strong and one-sided.","difficulty":"Difficulty: **moderate**. Price controls need only ordinary legislation. Many US states already have price-gouging statutes, and the 1971-74 programme shows economy-wide controls under an act of Congress. No constitutional change is needed.","who_benefits":"The effect is **broad**, with no clear tilt toward rich or poor. The transfer goes to whoever obtains the capped good, not to the poor in particular. Queues favour people whose time is cheap, misallocation sends goods to people who value them less, and stable prices after disasters came with 17-32% fewer goods on the shelves (Cavallo, Cavallo, and Rigobon 2014). Sellers pay through lower prices, and everyone pays through shortages.","counter":"The best counter-evidence comes from Argentina's targeted supermarket controls of 2007-15. Controlled goods stayed available, with no sign of shortages (Aparicio and Cavallo 2021). That suggests mild, negotiated controls do far less harm than the gasoline queues of the 1970s. Rockoff (1984) argues that temporary controls can reduce the unemployment and lost output that usually come with bringing inflation down. Neither gives a welfare estimate per $1 transferred, so neither can set an end of the range. Aparicio and Cavallo also find only a temporary effect on inflation, with firms launching new, higher-priced varieties, and this policy is not tied to a disinflation programme.\n\nThe verdict turns on queuing. The range assumes queues and extra purchases burn 116% of the transfer, as Deacon and Sonstelie (1989) measured for US gasoline. If controls caused no queues, as in Argentina, buyers would keep most of the 18.2-point transfer, the high end would turn positive, and the policy would move toward the Bad tier. No measured case shows zero queuing cost, and black markets, which are not priced, push the other way: the wartime Office of Price Administration imposed 259,966 sanctions (Higgs 2009).","references":["Albrecht, B. C., A. Tabarrok, and M. Whitmeyer. 2026. \"Chaos and Misallocation under Price Controls.\" arXiv working paper 2602.12066. https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.12066.","Aparicio, D., and A. Cavallo. 2021. \"Targeted Price Controls on Supermarket Products.\" *Review of Economics and Statistics* 103 (1): 60-71. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_00880.","Bleiberg, R. M. 1974. \"Farewell to Wage and Price Controls.\" *Imprimis* 3 (7). Hillsdale College. https://imprimis.hillsdale.edu/farewell-to-wage-and-price-controls-july-1974/.","Blinder, A. S., and W. J. Newton. 1981. \"The 1971-1974 Controls Program and the Price Level: An Econometric Post-Mortem.\" *Journal of Monetary Economics* 8 (1): 1-23. https://doi.org/10.3386/w0279.","Cavallo, A., E. Cavallo, and R. Rigobon. 2014. \"Prices and Supply Disruptions during Natural Disasters.\" *Review of Income and Wealth* 60: S449-S471. https://doi.org/10.3386/w19474.","Clark Center Economic Experts Panel. 2012. \"Price Gouging.\" Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets, University of Chicago Booth School of Business, May 2. https://kentclarkcenter.org/surveys/price-gouging/.","Clark Center Economic Experts Panel. 2024. \"Election Economic Policy Ideas.\" Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets, University of Chicago Booth School of Business, September 10. https://www.kentclarkcenter.org/surveys/election-economic-policy-ideas/.","Data for Progress. 2026. \"Voters Support a Progressive Agenda Focused on Lowering Costs and Taking On Corporations.\" Data for Progress blog, April 29. https://dataforprogress.org/blog/2026/4/29/voters-support-a-progressive-agenda-focused-on-lowering-costs-and-taking-on-corporations.","Davis, L. W., and L. Kilian. 2011. \"The Allocative Cost of Price Ceilings in the U.S. Residential Market for Natural Gas.\" *Journal of Political Economy* 119 (2): 212-241. https://www.nber.org/papers/w14030.","Deacon, R. T., and J. Sonstelie. 1989. \"The Welfare Costs of Rationing by Waiting.\" *Economic Inquiry* 27 (2): 179-196. https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/ecinqu/v27y1989i2p179-96.html.","Frech, H. E., III, and W. C. Lee. 1987. \"The Welfare Cost of Rationing-By-Queuing Across Markets: Theory and Estimates from the U.S. Gasoline Crises.\" *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 102 (1): 97-108. https://doi.org/10.2307/1884682.","General Social Survey. 2024. \"PRICECONGOVTS: Government Responsibility to Keep Prices under Control.\" GSS cumulative codebook, ISSP Role of Government module. NORC at the University of Chicago; UC Berkeley SDA. https://sda.berkeley.edu/sdaweb/docs/gss24rel3/DOC/hcbk0223.htm.","Henderson, D. R. n.d. Post on price controls and the 1979 gasoline shortage. *Econlib*. https://www.econlib.org/?p=80768.","Higgs, R. 2009. \"The Two-Price System: U.S. Rationing During World War II.\" The Independent Institute, April 28. https://www.independent.org/news/article.asp?id=2491.","Oil & Gas Journal. 2007. \"ACCF: Price-Gouging Legislation Could Be Costly.\" *Oil & Gas Journal* (reporting a CRA International study for the American Council for Capital Formation). https://www.ogj.com/general-interest/article/17228006/accf-price-gouging-legislation-could-be-costly.","Rockoff, H. 1984. *Drastic Measures: A History of Wage and Price Controls in the United States.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://ideas.repec.org/b/cup/cbooks/9780521244961.html.","Tarr, D. G. 1994. \"The Welfare Costs of Price Controls for Cars and Color Televisions in Poland: Contrasting Estimates of Rent-Seeking from Recent Experience.\" *World Bank Economic Review* 8 (3): 415-443. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/528531468776389780/pdf/The-welfare-costs-of-price-controls-for-cars-and-color-televisions-in-Poland-contrasting-estimates-of-rent-seeking-from-recent-experience.pdf.","U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 2026. \"Gross Domestic Product, Annual (GDPA).\" Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, FRED. https://fred.stlouisfed.org/data/GDPA."]},"13":{"policy":"Open borders means free movement of labor: removing the legal barriers to working and living in another country. Every high-income country would repeal its entry and work restrictions, so people could move to wherever their labour is worth most. It is a change in law, not a spending programme. The main cost is the real expense of moving. The reverse policy, strict border controls in every country, is scored alongside it as the mirror image.","why_on_list":"Open borders was chosen by public-opinion survey, measured by what people say they want for themselves. In the 2021 Gallup World Poll, nearly 900 million adults said they would like to move to another country permanently. Opinion inside rich countries runs the other way: in the 2024 Cooperative Election Study, 79% of Americans backed more border patrols (Cooperative Election Study team 2025).","evidence":"The same worker produces far more in a rich country than in a poor one. Identical low-skill workers from the median country earn at least 3.95 times as much in the United States as at home, a gain of at least PPP$13,600 a year in purchasing-power terms (Clemens, Montenegro, and Pritchett 2019). Removing migration barriers therefore promises the largest gain of any policy studied. Clemens (2011) reviews the models: \"For labor mobility barriers, the estimated gains are often in the range of 50–150 percent of world GDP.\" Removing all barriers to trade in goods, by contrast, yields 0.3-4.1% of world GDP.\n\nThe most careful single model is Borjas (2015). With world output of $70 trillion and workers four times as productive in the North as in the South, open borders would raise world output by $40.1 trillion. About 2.6 billion workers, or 5.6 billion people, would move. The key uncertainty is how much of their home country's lower productivity migrants carry with them. If none, the gain is largest; if a quarter, the gross gain falls to $24.2 trillion; if half, the gross gain falls to $8.8 trillion, less than the cost of moving, so the gain net of moving costs turns negative (Clemens and Pritchett 2019). Clemens and Pritchett (2019) find the evidence that migrants carry large fractions of origin productivity unsupported, which bounds that share at about a quarter. Other models agree on the order of magnitude. With estimated migration and visa costs and about 400 million movers, world GDP rises 7.0-17.9% (Docquier, Machado, and Sekkat 2015). Averaged over all workers in 40 less-developed countries, the net gain is $11,046 per worker a year against average income of $8,382 (Kennan 2013).\n\nThe restriction side has been measured directly. The 548 miles of US border wall built between 2006 and 2010 cut migration by about 311,000 people. Allen, Dobbin, and Morten (2024) find that \"high skill U.S. workers lose $21 (0.04%) a year, whereas low skill U.S. workers gain $9 (0.02%) a year due to the increased scarcity of low-skilled workers.\" Excluding almost 500,000 Mexican farm workers in 1964 did not raise native farm wages (Clemens, Lewis, and Postel 2018). The gains to protected workers are tiny; the losses to the people kept out are large.\n\nPublished models put the gain from open borders at roughly 35-57% of world output before moving costs. Moving billions of people is also very costly, so each $1 spent on moving returns $2.14 to $3.34. Run in reverse, strict border controls everywhere destroy between 97 cents and $1.31 for each $1 of enforcement.","ratio":"The benefit is the rise in world output when workers move to where they are most productive. The cost is the real resources spent on moving. Borjas (2015, Table 2) gives both from one model. It assumes world output of $70 trillion before migration, a North/South productivity ratio of 4, and a moving cost of 10 times a Southern worker's starting salary, discounted at 5%.\n\n**High end (migrants carry none of their origin productivity).**\n- Gross gain: $40.1 trillion. Gain net of moving costs: $28.1 trillion.\n- Moving costs: 40.1 - 28.1 = $12.0 trillion.\n- Ratio: 40.1 ÷ 12.0 = **3.34**.\n\n**Low end (migrants carry a quarter of their origin productivity).**\n- Gross gain: $24.2 trillion. Net gain: $12.9 trillion.\n- Moving costs: 24.2 - 12.9 = $11.3 trillion.\n- Ratio: 24.2 ÷ 11.3 = **2.14**.\n\nA carry-over of half cuts the gross gain to $8.8 trillion, less than the cost of moving, so the net gain turns negative in Borjas's table. The evidence reviewed by Clemens and Pritchett (2019) does not support such large carry-over, so a quarter sets the low end.\n\n**Scaling to today.** World GDP in 2025 was $118,350 billion (World Bank 2025). Moving costs: 12.0 ÷ 70 × 118,350 = $20,289 billion a year at the high-cost end and $19,105 billion at the low-cost end. The gross gain is $40.9-67.8 trillion.\n\n**Result: $2.14 to $3.34 per $1. Full cost: $20,288.6 billion a year.**\n\nCross-checks. Clemens (2011) reports full-removal gains of 50-150% of world GDP before moving costs, consistent with the gross gains here. Docquier, Machado, and Sekkat (2015), using estimated migration and visa costs, find world GDP rises 7.0-17.9% with far fewer movers. Kennan (2013) finds a net gain of $11,046 per worker a year against average income of $8,382 across 40 less-developed countries, a gain larger than current income.\n\n**The mirror image: strict border controls.** The reverse policy is every major destination country enforcing its border on the scale of the 2025-26 US build-up: the July 2025 reconciliation act (H.R. 1) and the 2026 Secure America Act. It is scored per migrant kept out, counting everyone affected, including the people kept out. It is context only and does not change the range above.\n- US workers: low-skill workers gain $9 a year across 47.6 million workers; high-skill workers lose $21 a year across 78.7 million (Allen, Dobbin, and Morten 2024; Bureau of Labor Statistics 2010). Over 311,000 migrants deterred, that is +$20,500 and -$79,000 per migrant.\n- The migrant's lost earnings: PPP$10,523 a year over a 20-year working life discounted at 3% (× 14.88) = $156,600, or $285,200 at 2024 prices (Clemens, Montenegro, and Pritchett 2019).\n- The budget: a $231,000 saving per migrant kept out (Hall 2016, reading National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2017) or a forgone contribution of $57,000 (Nowrasteh, Eckhardt, and Howard 2023).\n- Enforcement per migrant deterred: $10,600 for the 2006-10 wall, up to $533,400 under H.R. 1 ($170.7 billion ÷ 320,000 fewer residents in 2035; American Immigration Council 2025; Congressional Budget Office 2025).\n\nCase most favourable to restriction: (231,000 + 20,500 - 79,000 - 156,600) ÷ 10,600 = 1.50. Least favourable case: (20,500 - 79,000 - 57,000 - 285,200) ÷ 533,400 = -0.75. Income lost to a policy costs lives: about one statistical death per $99.3 million of cost (Broughel and Viscusi 2017), or $0.132 per $1 at a value of a statistical life of $13.1 million (HHS 2024). The net income change per $1 of enforcement is -21.3 in the first case and -1.64 in the second. Low: 1.50 - 0.132 × 21.3 = -1.31. High: -0.75 - 0.132 × 1.64 = -0.97. Each $1 of enforcement destroys between 97 cents and $1.31, on a cost of about $143.4 billion a year.","cost":"The full cost is **$20,288.6 billion a year**, all of it the cost of moving.\n\n- **Public outlay: $0.** Repealing entry restrictions needs no new spending.\n- **Administration and private compliance: $0.** Visa processing and employer paperwork would fall, not rise. No published estimate of transition administration exists.\n- **Moving costs: $20,288.6 billion.** Borjas (2015) puts moving costs at 12.0 ÷ 70 of world output, where each move costs 10 times a Southern worker's starting salary at a 5% discount. Applied to 2025 world GDP of $118,350 billion (World Bank 2025), that is $20,289 billion a year.\n\nStrict controls instead cost real money. The US build-up runs to about $143.4 billion a year over the 2025 budget: $59.9 billion of public outlay (American Immigration Council 2025; O'Herron 2026), $1.3 billion of administration, and $82.2 billion of lost global output (Edelberg, Veuger, and Watson 2026).","strength":"Grade: **B**. The range comes from a peer-reviewed general-equilibrium model that prices both the gain and the moving cost (Borjas 2015). Peer-reviewed estimates by Clemens (2011), Kennan (2013) and Docquier, Machado, and Sekkat (2015) confirm the scale. All are calibrated simulations of a policy never tried at world scale. The result also depends on how much productivity migrants carry with them. Both points hold the grade at B. The mirror-image score for restriction rests on a tightly estimated lower bound for the migrant's lost earnings (Clemens, Montenegro, and Pritchett 2019). Its fiscal term relies on think-tank readings of the National Academies model, but that term does not change the sign.","difficulty":"Difficulty: **hard**. Open borders would require every high-income country to repeal its entry and work restrictions. There is no modern precedent outside regional zones such as the European Union's single market. Restriction is far easier: each country can tighten its own border through ordinary law, and the United States has just done so.","who_benefits":"The gain is strongly **pro-poor**. Most of it goes to migrants and their home countries. In Borjas's model, Southern wages rise 143% while Northern wages fall 39.3%, and owners of capital gain $12.0 trillion (Borjas 2015). With smaller flows, natives of sending countries gain 26-79% while natives of the United States gain 0.3% and those of the European Union 2.1%; natives of the Gulf states lose 0.7% (Docquier, Machado, and Sekkat 2015). Kennan (2013) finds the fall in rich-country real wages is small and disappears as capital adjusts. Workers already in rich countries bear most of the risk.\n\nRestriction runs the other way. Would-be low-skill migrants give up at least PPP$10,500-13,600 a year (Clemens, Montenegro, and Pritchett 2019), and their families lose remittances: Mexico received $66.2 billion in 2023 (World Bank/KNOMAD 2024).","counter":"The strongest counter-evidence is Clemens and Pritchett (2019), who model productivity carried from home, slow assimilation and congestion. They conclude: \"On current evidence about the magnitudes of these parameters, dynamically efficient policy would not imply open borders but would imply relaxations on current restrictions.\" The study gives no dollar ratio, so it bounds the policy from above rather than setting a number. Moses and Letnes (2004) find full removal is worth 96.5% of world GDP when workers are equally productive everywhere, but only 9.6% when poor-country migrants are assumed far less productive. On public finances, Hall (2016), reading the National Academies model, puts the cost of a nonelderly immigrant without a high school diploma at $231,000 in present value. The range counts real output and moving costs, not tax transfers, so that figure does not enter.\n\nThe verdict turns on how much home-country productivity migrants carry with them. With none, the ratio is 3.34; with a quarter, it is 2.14. If migrants carried half, the gross gain would shrink to $8.8 trillion, below the cost of moving, and the net gain in Borjas's (2015) table would turn negative. That would move the policy from the Good tier to the Bad tier. Clemens and Pritchett find the evidence for such large carry-over unsupported, which is why the low end stops at a quarter.","references":["Allen, T., C. de C. Dobbin, and M. Morten. 2024. \"Border Walls.\" NBER Working Paper 25267 (November 2018, revised May 2024). National Bureau of Economic Research. https://doi.org/10.3386/w25267.","American Immigration Council. 2025. *What's in the Big Beautiful Bill? Immigration and Border Security Unpacked.* Fact sheet. American Immigration Council. https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/fact-sheet/big-beautiful-bill-immigration-border-security/.","Borjas, G. J. 2015. \"Immigration and Globalization: A Review Essay.\" *Journal of Economic Literature* 53 (4): 961-974. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.53.4.961.","Broughel, J., and W. K. Viscusi. 2017. *Death by Regulation: How Regulations Can Increase Mortality Risk.* Research summary. Mercatus Center at George Mason University. https://mercatus.org/media/65351/download.","Clemens, M. A. 2011. \"Economics and Emigration: Trillion-Dollar Bills on the Sidewalk?\" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 25 (3): 83-106. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.25.3.83.","Clemens, M. A., and L. Pritchett. 2019. \"The New Economic Case for Migration Restrictions: An Assessment.\" *Journal of Development Economics* 138: 153-164. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2018.12.003.","Clemens, M. A., C. E. Montenegro, and L. Pritchett. 2019. \"The Place Premium: Bounding the Price Equivalent of Migration Barriers.\" *Review of Economics and Statistics* 101 (2): 201-213. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_00776.","Clemens, M. A., E. G. Lewis, and H. M. Postel. 2018. \"Immigration Restrictions as Active Labor Market Policy: Evidence from the Mexican Bracero Exclusion.\" *American Economic Review* 108 (6): 1468-1487. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20170765.","Congressional Budget Office. 2024. *Effects of the Immigration Surge on the Federal Budget and the Economy.* CBO report, 23 July 2024. https://www.cbo.gov/publication/60569.","Congressional Budget Office. 2025. *An Update to the Demographic Outlook, 2025 to 2055.* CBO report, September 2025. https://www.cbo.gov/publication/61735.","Cooperative Election Study team. 2025. \"Cooperative Election Study 2024 Common Content.\" Harvard Dataverse. https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/X11EP6.","Docquier, F., J. Machado, and K. Sekkat. 2015. \"Efficiency Gains from Liberalizing Labor Mobility.\" *Scandinavian Journal of Economics* 117 (2): 303-346. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12097.","East, C. N., P. Luck, H. Mansour, and A. Velasquez. 2023. \"The Labor Market Effects of Immigration Enforcement.\" *Journal of Labor Economics* (IZA DP 11486). https://docs.iza.org/dp11486.pdf.","Edelberg, W., S. Veuger, and T. Watson. 2026. *Macroeconomic Implications of Immigration Flows in 2025 and 2026: January 2026 Update.* Brookings Institution / American Enterprise Institute. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/macroeconomic-implications-of-immigration-flows-in-2025-and-2026-january-2026-update.","Hall, J. B. 2016. \"Every Immigrant Without High School Degree Will Cost Taxpayers $640,000.\" Commentary. Heritage Foundation. https://www.heritage.org/immigration/commentary/every-immigrant-without-high-school-degree-will-cost-taxpayers-640000.","Kennan, J. 2013. \"Open Borders.\" *Review of Economic Dynamics* 16 (2): L1-L13. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2012.08.003.","Klein, P., and G. Ventura. 2009. \"Productivity Differences and the Dynamic Effects of Labor Movements.\" *Journal of Monetary Economics* 56 (8): 1059-1073. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2009.10.011.","Moses, J. W., and B. Letnes. 2004. \"The Economic Costs to International Labor Restrictions: Revisiting the Empirical Discussion.\" *World Development* 32 (10): 1609-1626. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2004.05.007.","National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (F. D. Blau and C. Mackie, eds.). 2017. *The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration.* National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/23550.","Nowrasteh, A., S. Eckhardt, and M. Howard. 2023. *The Fiscal Impact of Immigration in the United States.* White Paper. Cato Institute. https://www.cato.org/white-paper/fiscal-impact-immigration-united-states.","O'Herron, M. 2026. *ICE and Customs and Border Protection Budgets to Exceed $200 Billion.* Brennan Center for Justice. https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/ice-customs-and-border-protection-budgets-exceed-200-billion.","U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2010. *Women in the Labor Force: A Databook,* Table 8. BLS. https://www.bls.gov/cps/wlftable8-2010.htm.","U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation. 2024. *Standard Values for Regulatory Analysis, 2024.* HHS. https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cd2a1348ea0777b1aa918089e4965b8c/standard-ria-values.pdf.","World Bank. 2025. \"GDP (Current US$) - World (NY.GDP.MKTP.CD).\" World Development Indicators. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=1W.","World Bank/KNOMAD. 2024. \"Remittances Slowed in 2023, Expected to Grow Faster in 2024.\" Migration and Development Brief 40, press release, 26 June 2024. World Bank. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2024/06/26/remittances-slowed-in-2023-expected-to-grow-faster-in-2024."]},"14":{"policy":"Broad student-loan forgiveness cancels federal student debt for most borrowers. The model is the 2022 plan: up to $10,000 per borrower, or $20,000 for those who received Pell Grants. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) put that plan at about $400 billion in present value, roughly $40 billion a year over a decade. It is paid for by taxpayers.","why_on_list":"Student-loan forgiveness was chosen by public-opinion survey. In the 2024 Cooperative Election Study, a national survey of about 60,000 adults, 55.1% supported forgiving up to $20,000 of student debt per person (Cooperative Election Study team 2025).","evidence":"Forgiveness is a transfer. Each $1 of present-value debt cancelled is worth $1 to the borrower, and CBO's present-value scoring already allows for loans that would never have been repaid (CBO 2022). The Penn Wharton Budget Model put the cancellation at $469-519 billion over ten years (Smetters and Chen 2022). The money must be raised by taxes, and taxes cost the economy more than they raise. Central estimates put that extra cost at 33 cents per $1 of revenue (Ballard, Shoven, and Whalley 1985); for a rise in all income-tax rates it is nearly $2 (Feldstein 1999).\n\nForgiveness can also change behaviour. If students expect more cancellation, they borrow more. For the related SAVE repayment plan, Penn Wharton's ten-year cost rises from $342 billion with no change in borrowing to $475 billion with a medium response and $559 billion with the maximum (Chen and Smetters 2023). In 2024, 48% of student borrowers said they expect their debt to be forgiven (NBC Boston 2024). Much of any extra borrowing ends up in tuition: \"We find a pass-through effect on tuition of changes in subsidized loan maximums of about 60 cents on the dollar\" (Lucca, Nadauld, and Shen 2019).\n\nWho gains matters too. Measured in present value, full or partial forgiveness is regressive: the top tenth of earners gains as much as the bottom three tenths combined (Catherine and Yannelis 2023). No study publishes a benefit-cost ratio for broad forgiveness. Counting the cost of raising the money, and in the worst case the extra borrowing, each $1 forgiven yields between -1.39 and 0.67 of net value.","ratio":"Forgiveness is scored like other transfers on this list: ratio = (value to borrowers - excess burden × net fiscal cost) ÷ net fiscal cost. Value to borrowers is $1 per $1 of present-value debt cancelled.\n\n**Step 1: administration.** Running the programme and lender paperwork add about $0.02 billion a year, 0.05% of the $40 billion annual outlay. Net fiscal cost per $1: 1.0005.\n\n**Step 2: high end.** No extra borrowing, and an excess burden of 33 cents per $1 raised (Ballard, Shoven, and Whalley 1985).\n- (1 - 0.33 × 1.0005) ÷ 1.0005 = **0.67**.\n\n**Step 3: induced borrowing.** Penn Wharton's SAVE estimates show how much expected forgiveness adds to cost (Chen and Smetters 2023).\n- Medium response: (475 - 342) ÷ 342 = 39%.\n- Maximum response: (559 - 342) ÷ 342 = 63%.\n\n**Step 4: low end.** Maximum induced borrowing, and nearly $2 of deadweight loss per $1 raised (Feldstein 1999).\n- Net fiscal cost: 1 + 0.63 + 0.0005 = 1.635.\n- (1 - 2.0 × 1.635) ÷ 1.635 = **-1.39**.\n\n**Result: -1.39 to 0.67 per $1. Full cost: $120.0 billion a year.**\n\nSensitivity. With the medium 39% response the low end is (1 - 2.0 × 1.39) ÷ 1.39 = -1.28. With no induced borrowing it is (1 - 2.0 × 1.0005) ÷ 1.0005 = -1.00. Applying a permanent repayment plan's borrowing response to one-off cancellation holds only to the extent that borrowers expect forgiveness to recur. The tuition pass-through found by Lucca, Nadauld, and Shen (2019) is part of the same fiscal leak and is not added again. CBO's $400 billion is a present value, so interest on the borrowing that funds it is not added separately.","cost":"The full cost is **$120.0 billion a year**.\n\n- **Public outlay: $40 billion.** CBO put the 2022 plan at about $400 billion in present value, roughly $40 billion a year over ten years (CBO 2022). Penn Wharton's estimate is $47-52 billion a year (Smetters and Chen 2022).\n- **Administration: $0.008 billion.** The Education Department's 2024 debt-relief rule put one-time administrative costs at $13.0 million for systems and contractors plus $18.0 million for waiver processing: $31 million for about $147 billion of relief, or 0.021% (U.S. Department of Education 2024). At $400 billion that is about $84 million once, or $0.008 billion a year.\n- **Private compliance: $0.012 billion.** The same analysis puts paperwork for guaranty agencies and private lenders at $12.06 million a year.\n- **Lost output: $80 billion.** The excess burden of the taxes needed, at nearly $2 per $1: 2.0 × $40 billion = $80 billion a year.\n\nTotal: 40 + 0.008 + 0.012 + 80 = $120.0 billion a year. The extra borrowing that expected forgiveness induces enters the ratio, not this total.","strength":"Grade: **B**. The ratio is built from peer-reviewed estimates of the cost of raising taxes (Ballard, Shoven, and Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999), applied to official cost estimates from CBO and Penn Wharton. Peer-reviewed work measures who benefits (Catherine and Yannelis 2023). There is no direct benefit-cost study or experiment on broad forgiveness, so B+ or above does not apply. The low end also borrows a think-tank estimate of induced borrowing from a repayment plan and applies it by analogy to one-off cancellation.","difficulty":"Difficulty: **moderate**. In Biden v. Nebraska (June 30, 2023), the Supreme Court ruled 6-3 that the HEROES Act does not authorise mass cancellation (Supreme Court of the United States 2023). Broad forgiveness now needs ordinary legislation from Congress. Narrower discharges, such as income-driven repayment and Public Service Loan Forgiveness, show the mechanism already exists.","who_benefits":"The tilt is **regressive**. Measured in present value, the top income decile gains as much as the bottom three deciles combined (Catherine and Yannelis 2023). Expanding income-driven repayment is cheaper and more progressive than universal forgiveness, though it carries a risk of moral hazard at the school level (Catherine, Perez Clanton, and Yannelis 2024). The main counter-reading comes from Penn Wharton's table based on loan balances for the capped 2022 plan: \"About two-thirds of the benefit falls to households making $88,000 or less per year,\" and the top 5% get almost nothing (Smetters and Chen 2022). Taxpayers carry the cost.","counter":"The strongest counter-case is that relief changes lives. Di Maggio, Kalda and Yao (2020) find that borrowers whose private loans were voided by a legal accident cut their debt by 11%, had 24% fewer delinquent accounts, moved and changed jobs more, and earned about $3,000 more over three years. Extra earnings mean extra taxes. The study is not added because it covers a small group of defaulted private borrowers, not a broad federal programme, and the implied revenue is small next to the cost. Evidence from the 2020 payment pause points the other way: borrowers used the extra cash to take on more mortgage, auto and card debt, mostly those who were not behind on payments (Dinerstein, Yannelis and Chen 2024).\n\nTwo assumptions set the verdict. The first is the cost of raising the money. At the central excess burden of 33 cents per $1 (Ballard, Shoven and Whalley 1985), with no extra borrowing, the ratio is 0.67; at Feldstein's (1999) nearly $2, it is negative. The second is induced borrowing. If borrowers believed cancellation would never recur, the low end would rise from −1.39 to −1.00. The policy would leave the Worst tier only if the money could be raised at close to the central rate and future borrowing did not respond; even then it would sit in the Bad tier.","references":["Ballard, C. L., J. B. Shoven, and J. Whalley. 1985. \"General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States.\" *American Economic Review* 75 (1): 128-138. https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v75y1985i1p128-38.html.","Catherine, S., M. Perez Clanton, and C. Yannelis. 2024. \"The Distributional Effects of Student Loan Forgiveness: An Update on SAVE and the COVID-19 Moratorium.\" *National Tax Journal* 77 (3): 655-680. https://doi.org/10.1086/731537.","Catherine, S., and C. Yannelis. 2023. \"The Distributional Effects of Student Loan Forgiveness.\" *Journal of Financial Economics* 147 (2): 297-316. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2022.10.003.","CBO (Congressional Budget Office). 2022. *Costs of Suspending Student Loan Payments and Canceling Debt.* Letter, September 26. https://www.cbo.gov/publication/58494.","Chen, J., and K. Smetters. 2023. \"Biden's New Income-Driven Repayment ('SAVE') Plan: Budgetary Cost Estimate Update.\" Penn Wharton Budget Model, July 17. https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/p/2023-07-17-bidens-new-income-driven-repayment-save-plan/.","Cooperative Election Study team. 2025. \"Cooperative Election Study 2024 Common Content.\" Harvard Dataverse. https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/X11EP6.","Di Maggio, M., A. Kalda, and V. Yao. 2020. \"Second Chance: Life without Student Debt.\" NBER Working Paper 25810. National Bureau of Economic Research. https://doi.org/10.3386/w25810.","Dinerstein, M., C. Yannelis, and C.-T. Chen. 2024. \"Debt Moratoria: Evidence from Student Loan Forbearance.\" *American Economic Review: Insights* 6 (2): 196-213. https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20230032.","Feldstein, M. 1999. \"Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax.\" *Review of Economics and Statistics* 81 (4): 674-680. https://doi.org/10.3386/w5055.","Lucca, D. O., T. Nadauld, and K. Shen. 2019. \"Credit Supply and the Rise in College Tuition: Evidence from the Expansion in Federal Student Aid Programs.\" *Review of Financial Studies* 32 (2): 423-466. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhy069.","NBC Boston. 2024. \"Student Loan Forgiveness Expectations May Fuel More Borrowing, Expert Says.\" NBC Boston (CNBC), reporting Sallie Mae, *How America Pays for College 2024*. https://www.nbcboston.com/news/business/money-report/student-loan-forgiveness-expectations-may-fuel-more-borrowing-expert-says/3466182/.","Smetters, K., and J. Chen. 2022. \"Biden's Student Loan Forgiveness: Budgetary Costs and Distributional Impact.\" Penn Wharton Budget Model, August 26 (corrected October 4). https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/issues/2022/8/26/biden-student-loan-forgiveness.","Supreme Court of the United States. 2023. *Biden v. Nebraska*, No. 22-506. Opinion of June 30. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/22-506_nmip.pdf.","U.S. Department of Education. 2024. \"Student Debt Relief for the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking), Regulatory Impact Analysis.\" *Federal Register* 89 FR 27564, April 17. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-04-17/html/2024-07726.htm."]},"15":{"policy":"This policy blocks any rise in the Social Security or Medicare eligibility ages and any cut in scheduled benefits. Under current law the trust funds run short: Social Security's combined funds in the third quarter of 2034, when 83% of benefits would be payable, and Medicare's Hospital Insurance (HI) fund in the second quarter of 2033, at 89% (Social Security and Medicare Boards of Trustees 2026). Paying full benefits after that means new taxes or borrowing.","why_on_list":"Protecting these programmes was chosen by public-opinion survey, and it is among the most popular ideas tested. In the US General Social Survey's round of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), 87.5% say government should provide a decent standard of living for the old (General Social Survey 2024). In a 2024 YouGov poll of 4,038 voters, protecting Medicare and Social Security from funding cuts or higher eligibility ages had net support of +72 (YouGov 2024).","evidence":"The gap is large. The 2026 Trustees put the 75-year deficit at 4.42% of taxable payroll for Social Security and 0.56% for Medicare HI, together about 1.67% of GDP, or roughly $535 billion a year (Social Security and Medicare Boards of Trustees 2026). Social Security alone costs 5.3% of GDP in 2026, and its annual deficit rises from 0.8% of GDP in 2026 to 2.4% in 2085.\n\nBenefits are a transfer: each $1 is worth $1 to the retiree who receives it. The cost lies in raising that $1. Taxes cost the economy more than they raise, from 33 cents per $1 in central estimates (Ballard, Shoven, and Whalley 1985) to nearly $2 for a rise in all income-tax rates (Feldstein 1999). Blocking a higher retirement age also forgoes extra work. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) finds that raising the full retirement age from 67 to 70 would cut Social Security spending by about 13% and enlarge the economy by slightly more than 1% in the long run (CBO 2012; Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget 2012). People do respond to such changes. After the 1983 law raised the normal retirement age (NRA), Mastrobuoni (2009) finds: \"The evidence suggests that the mean retirement age of the affected cohorts has increased by about half as much as the increase in the NRA.\"\n\nThe range depends on what is blocked and how the money is raised. Blocking an across-the-board benefit cut, financed with low-cost taxes, keeps most of each $1. Blocking an age rise, financed with high-cost taxes, destroys more than it delivers. The ratio runs from -1.27 to 0.66.","ratio":"Benefits are scored like other transfers on this list: ratio = (1 - excess burden × net fiscal cost) ÷ net fiscal cost. Net fiscal cost includes administration and the fiscal externality of lower work.\n\n**Step 1: the work effect of blocking an age rise.**\n- Raising the full retirement age to 70 cuts Social Security spending about 13%. Social Security costs 5.3% of GDP. Benefits kept by blocking it: 13% × 5.3% = 0.69% of GDP.\n- The change would enlarge the economy by about 1%. CBO's rule of thumb returns about 0.25 of extra GDP as revenue (0.5% of GDP on 2% more GDP). Taxes forgone: 0.25 × 1.0 = 0.25% of GDP.\n- Fiscal externality: 0.25 ÷ 0.69 = 0.36 per $1 of benefits kept.\n\n**Step 2: administration.** Administration adds 0.53% of benefits.\n\n**Step 3: high end.** Blocking across-the-board benefit-formula cuts, which barely change work (fiscal externality about 0), financed at 33 cents per $1 (Ballard, Shoven, and Whalley 1985).\n- (1 - 0.33 × 1.0053) ÷ 1.0053 = **0.66**.\n\n**Step 4: low end.** Blocking an age rise (fiscal externality 0.36, net fiscal cost 1.365), financed at nearly $2 per $1 (Feldstein 1999).\n- (1 - 2.0 × 1.365) ÷ 1.365 = **-1.27**.\n\n**Result: -1.27 to 0.66 per $1. Full cost: $1,927.8 billion a year.**\n\nMiddle case. Blocking an age rise financed at 33 cents per $1 gives (1 - 0.33 × 1.365) ÷ 1.365 = 0.40. The financing cost is subtracted in the ratio and the work effect enters through the fiscal externality, so neither is counted twice. The choice of cost base (the 75-year gap, the current annual deficit or the post-2034 shortfall) changes the annual cost but not the ratio.","cost":"The full cost is **$1,927.8 billion a year**, as a 75-year average.\n\n- **Public outlay: $535 billion.** The 2026 Trustees' 75-year deficits, 4.42% of payroll for Social Security and 0.56% for Medicare HI, come to about 1.67% of GDP (Social Security and Medicare Boards of Trustees 2026).\n- **Administration: $2.8 billion.** Social Security spends 0.4% of its cost on administration ($6.95 billion in 2025; Social Security Administration 2026), and Medicare HI about 1.3% ($5.9 billion of $444.2 billion; Congressional Research Service 2026). Splitting the gap 86% to Social Security and 14% to HI: 535 × (0.863 × 0.004 + 0.137 × 0.0133) = $2.8 billion. This is an upper bound, since larger benefits to the same people add little administration.\n- **Private compliance:** none identified; payroll reporting does not change.\n- **Lost output: $1,390 billion.** First, blocking a rise in the retirement age to 70 forgoes about 1% of GDP, some $320 billion a year at the $32.0 trillion 2026 GDP implied by the Trustees (CBO 2012). This is lost output, not lost welfare, since retirees gain leisure. Second, the excess burden of the taxes needed at nearly $2 per $1: 2.0 × 535 = $1,070 billion.\n\nTotal: 535 + 2.8 + 1,390 = $1,927.8 billion a year. Using only the 2026 cash deficit (0.8% of GDP) and the 33-cent excess burden, the total would be far smaller, about $340 billion.","strength":"Grade: **B**. The ratio combines a peer-reviewed natural experiment on retirement behaviour (Mastrobuoni 2009), CBO's macroeconomic estimates and the Trustees' official fiscal gap with peer-reviewed estimates of the cost of raising taxes. No published benefit-cost ratio exists for keeping current-law benefits. The work feedback comes from CBO's model rather than a measured welfare change, so the grade sits below B+.","difficulty":"Difficulty: **moderate**. Keeping current benefit rules needs no change at all. Paying full scheduled benefits after 2034 for Social Security and 2033 for Medicare HI needs ordinary legislation to raise payroll taxes or transfer general revenue. Congress has done this before, in the 1977 and 1983 amendments. No constitutional change is needed.","who_benefits":"The effect is **broad**. Benefits go to nearly all retirees and disabled workers. Elderly poverty moves roughly one for one with benefits, so cuts would raise poverty (Engelhardt and Gruber 2006), which favours the poor. But benefits rise with lifetime earnings, and the cost falls on current workers through payroll taxes. The net effect is broad rather than clearly pro-poor.","counter":"The strongest counter-case is that benefits keep older people out of poverty. Engelhardt and Gruber (2006) find that cutting benefits would significantly raise elderly poverty, with poverty moving roughly one for one with benefits. An analysis that weighted income to the poor more heavily would count that as a gain. The ratio here values transfers at $1 per $1 without weights, so the finding informs who benefits rather than the ratio. The work response, the other key input, rests on a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) model rather than a measured change in welfare, although Mastrobuoni (2009) confirms that when the 1983 law raised the normal retirement age, retirement ages rose by about half the increase.\n\nThe verdict depends on what is blocked and how the money is raised. Blocking across-the-board benefit cuts, which barely change work, gives 0.66 at the central excess burden of 33 cents per $1. Blocking an age rise at that rate gives 0.40. Only at Feldstein's (1999) nearly $2 of deadweight per $1 does the ratio fall to −1.27. If the shortfall were raised at the central rate, the policy would move from the Worst to the Bad tier. It would need distributional weights, of the kind Engelhardt and Gruber's poverty finding supports, to reach 1.","references":["Ballard, C. L., J. B. Shoven, and J. Whalley. 1985. \"General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States.\" *American Economic Review* 75 (1): 128-138. https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v75y1985i1p128-38.html.","CBO (Congressional Budget Office). 2012. *Raising the Ages of Eligibility for Medicare and Social Security.* Issue Brief, January 10. https://www.cbo.gov/publication/42683.","Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget. 2012. \"Raising Eligibility Ages Is Good for the Budget...and the Economy.\" CRFB blog, January 11. https://crfb.org/blogs/raising-eligibility-ages-good-budgetand-economy.","Congressional Research Service. 2026. *Medicare's Financial Status.* R43122, updated July 27. Library of Congress. https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/2026-07-27_R43122_8dd6f85a239b62fe1b5c4bc6beeabd061d455f39.pdf.","Engelhardt, G. V., and J. Gruber. 2006. \"Social Security and the Evolution of Elderly Poverty.\" In *Public Policy and the Income Distribution*, edited by A. Auerbach, D. Card, and J. Quigley. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. https://doi.org/10.3386/w10466.","Feldstein, M. 1999. \"Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax.\" *Review of Economics and Statistics* 81 (4): 674-680. https://doi.org/10.3386/w5055.","General Social Survey. 2024. \"AIDOLDGOVTS: Government Responsibility to Provide a Decent Standard of Living for the Old.\" GSS cumulative codebook, ISSP Role of Government module. NORC at the University of Chicago; UC Berkeley SDA. https://sda.berkeley.edu/sdaweb/docs/gss24rel3/DOC/hcbk0223.htm.","Mastrobuoni, G. 2009. \"Labor Supply Effects of the Recent Social Security Benefit Cuts: Empirical Estimates Using Cohort Discontinuities.\" *Journal of Public Economics* 93 (11-12): 1224-1233. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.07.009.","Social Security Administration, Office of the Chief Actuary. 2026. \"Administrative Expenses as a Percentage of Total Cost (OASI, DI, OASDI).\" https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/STATS/admin.html.","Social Security and Medicare Boards of Trustees. 2026. *Status of the Social Security and Medicare Programs: A Summary of the 2026 Annual Reports.* Social Security Administration, Office of the Chief Actuary. https://www.ssa.gov/oact/TRSUM/index.html.","YouGov. 2024. \"TLP / Blueprint Poll: Biden and Trump Economic Proposals.\" YouGov for Blueprint and The Liberal Patriot, March 29-April 5. https://blueprint2024.com/polling/tlp-biden-trump-economics/."]},"16":{"policy":"Every major country would require its billionaires to pay tax each year equal to at least 2% of their wealth. Income taxes they already pay count toward the 2%, so only the shortfall is new. The proposal was written for the G20 in 2024 and covers the world's roughly 3,000 billionaires (Zucman 2024). Countries could collect it through a wealth tax, a presumptive income tax or a broader income tax.","why_on_list":"The tax was chosen by public-opinion survey. In a 2024 Ipsos survey across 17 G20 countries, 68% backed a wealth tax on wealthy people to fund major changes to the economy, and 11% opposed it. Support was 67% in the United States, 67% in France and 68% in Germany (Ipsos for Earth4All and the Global Commons Alliance 2024).","evidence":"About 2,800 billionaires owned $14.2 trillion in 2024. Their current tax is equivalent to 0.3% of their wealth, so a 2% minimum adds 1.7% of wealth: $242 billion a year if perfectly enforced, or $193 billion if a fifth is lost to avoidance and evasion (Zucman 2024). That money is a transfer. It leaves billionaires and reaches governments dollar for dollar, so it is neither a gain nor a cost in itself.\n\nThe costs come from how people respond. Wealth can be hidden, moved, given away or valued down. A well-designed 1% wealth tax shrinks the declared base by 7% to 17% (Advani and Tarrant 2021). In Switzerland, where banks do not report financial wealth to the tax authorities, a 1-point cut in a canton's rate raised reported wealth by at least 43% after six years (Brülhart et al. 2022). In Denmark the very wealthy held 31% more taxable wealth eight years after their rate was cut from 2.2% to 1% (Jakobsen et al. 2020).\n\nA tax on wealth also means less capital is built, which lowers output and the yield of other taxes. The Penn Wharton Budget Model projects that a US tax of 2% above $50 million and 3% above $1 billion would cut GDP by 1.2% and average hourly wages by 1.2% by 2050 (Huntley and Ricco 2021). Valuing and collecting the tax adds administrative and private costs.\n\nNo benefit-cost study of a wealth tax exists, so the tax is scored like the other transfer policies, by the cost of raising each $1 of revenue. A general-equilibrium estimate puts that cost at 34 to 48 cents per $1 (Ballard, Shoven, and Whalley 1985); an estimate that counts tax avoidance puts it at nearly $2 (Feldstein 1999). With 34 cents at one end and $2 at the other, each $1 collected yields between -1.12 and 0.60 of net value. Evidence specific to wealth taxes gives a similar range, -0.55 to 0.72. The published range therefore runs from a $1.12 loss to a 60-cent gain per $1 collected: at its high end the tax returns about 60 cents per $1 it moves; at its low end it destroys more than it collects. Once the cost of raising the taxes that fund it is counted, the range is −$1.20 to $0.59 per $1.","ratio":"The revenue is a transfer, so the ratio takes the net-damage form used for the other transfer policies: ratio = (transfer - excess burden - administration - private compliance) ÷ transfer, all per $1 of wealth tax collected.\n\n**Step 1: the tax base.** Billionaires owned $14.2 trillion in 2024 and already pay tax equal to 0.3% of it. The minimum tax adds 1.7% of wealth: $242 billion with perfect enforcement (Zucman 2024).\n\n**Step 2: excess burden.** The same convention as the student-loan and Social Security entries applies, whatever the size of the transfer. The high end uses a marginal welfare cost of 34 cents per $1 of revenue, the bottom of a 34 to 48 cent range (Ballard, Shoven, and Whalley 1985). The low end uses nearly $2 per $1 (Feldstein 1999). Feldstein's measure is built on how the taxable base responds, which is the same channel through which wealth is hidden, moved or valued down, and on the revenue lost as a result. So the wealth-tax base response and the revenue lost from other taxes are not added on top. The revenue is about 0.22% of world GDP, far inside the most that capital taxes can raise, 2.3% of GDP in the US (Trabandt and Uhlig 2011), so the rule that applies Feldstein's figure at both ends of very large programmes does not apply.\n\n**Step 3: administration.** The Wealth Tax Commission costed a one-off 5% UK tax; fixed costs spread over a smaller take are scaled to a 1.7% rate (Advani, Chamberlain, and Summers 2020).\n- High end: the central estimate of 1% of revenue × 5 ÷ 1.7 = 0.029.\n- Low end: 1.4% of revenue at a £10 million threshold × 5 ÷ 1.7 = 0.041.\n\n**Step 4: private compliance.** Valuation, filing and disputes.\n- High end: 0.06% of taxable assets at a £10 million threshold ÷ 1.7% = 0.035.\n- Low end: 0.13%, the highest estimate in the Commission's costing, ÷ 1.7% = 0.076.\n\n**Step 5: the two ends.**\n- High: 1 - 0.34 - 0.029 - 0.035 = **0.60**.\n- Low: 1 - 2.0 - 0.041 - 0.076 = **-1.12**.\n\n**Result: -1.12 to 0.60 per $1. Full cost: $423.6 billion a year.**\n\nLost output is not subtracted again. Penn Wharton's GDP loss of 1.63 per $1 of revenue is the output counterpart of the excess burden, so it is counted in the full cost and not in the ratio, as in the student-loan, Social Security, Medicare for All and basic-income entries.\n\nSensitivity. The range can also be built from wealth-tax evidence instead of the income-tax excess burden, with the declared base shrinking as W = W0 × e^(-s × 0.017). At the high end, a 7% fall in the base for a 1% tax (Advani and Tarrant 2021) gives s = 7.26, revenue of $213.9 billion and an average excess burden of 0.064; Penn Wharton's macro feedback, (2,390 - 2,025) ÷ 2,390 = 0.153 (Huntley and Ricco 2021), is lost revenue from other taxes. 1 - 0.064 - 0.153 - 0.029 - 0.035 = 0.72. At the low end, the Swiss response less the 21% of it due to house prices (Brülhart et al. 2022) gives s = ln(1.43) × 0.79 ÷ 0.01 = 28.3, revenue of $149.7 billion and a marginal excess burden of x ÷ (1 - x) = 0.924; in a US growth model, 51% of a capital-tax change pays for itself (Trabandt and Uhlig 2011). 1 - 0.924 - 0.51 - 0.041 - 0.076 = -0.55. With the average excess burden instead, that end is 0.09; with the European self-financing share of 79%, -0.83; with Penn Wharton's full output loss in place of both terms, -0.75. As a cross-check, the Danish long-run elasticity of 1.15 for the very wealthy (Jakobsen et al. 2020), with the net return cut from 7.2% to 5.5%, implies a long-run base of (5.5 ÷ 7.2)^1.15 = 0.73 of its untaxed level.\n\n**After the cost of raising taxes.** Each $1 of public spending costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven and Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999). As for the other transfer entries, the burden is subtracted from benefits. The wealth-tax revenue is counted in full as the transfer, so the government's cost of running the tax must be paid from other taxes and carries the same burden. Low end: 1 − 2.0 − 0.041 − 0.076 − 2.0 × 0.041 = −1.20. High end: 1 − 0.34 − 0.029 − 0.035 − 0.34 × 0.029 = 0.59. **Range after tax finance: −1.20 to 0.59.**","cost":"The full cost is **$423.6 billion a year**, all at full enforcement.\n\n- **Public outlay: $0.** The tax raises revenue, and revenue is a transfer.\n- **Administration: $10.0 billion.** The Wealth Tax Commission's highest government cost, 1.4% of revenue at a £10 million threshold, scaled to a 1.7% rate gives 4.1%: 0.041 × 242 = $10.0 billion (Advani, Chamberlain, and Summers 2020). For comparison, the US Ultra-Millionaire Tax Act of 2021 set aside $10 billion a year of extra Internal Revenue Service funding, 70% of it for the wealth tax (Huntley and Ricco 2021).\n- **Private compliance: $18.5 billion.** Valuing assets, filing and disputes at 0.13% of $14.2 trillion. At 0.06%, the figure for the £10 million threshold, it would be $8.5 billion.\n- **Lost output: $395.1 billion.** Penn Wharton's US tax cuts GDP by 1.2% in 2050 while raising 0.735% of GDP in 2031, so output falls by 1.63 per $1 of revenue: 1.63 × 242 = $395.1 billion (Huntley and Ricco 2021). This is an upper bound, since the revenue share grows as wealth outpaces GDP.\n\nTotal: 0 + 10.0 + 18.5 + 395.1 = $423.6 billion.","strength":"Grade: **B**. The two ends rest on peer-reviewed estimates of the cost of raising tax revenue (Ballard, Shoven, and Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999), the same as the other transfer entries, applied to the proposal's own revenue estimate. The wealth-tax responses behind the sensitivity come from peer-reviewed natural experiments in Switzerland, Denmark and Sweden and a peer-reviewed review that reconciles them (Brülhart et al. 2022; Jakobsen et al. 2020; Advani and Tarrant 2021). Administration and compliance costs come from a UK commission's costing. No peer-reviewed benefit-cost study of a wealth tax exists, and no country has taxed billionaires at this scale.","difficulty":"Difficulty: **hard**. The tax needs a binding agreement among many countries. In 2024 the G20 finance ministers committed only to seek to engage cooperatively, with full respect for each country's tax sovereignty, to ensure that the very richest are effectively taxed (G20 Finance Ministers 2024). Twelve OECD countries had net wealth taxes in 1990 and four in 2017, with repeals justified by efficiency costs, capital flight and high administrative costs (OECD 2018). By 2021 only three still levied one (Scheuer and Slemrod 2021).","who_benefits":"The tilt is **broad**. The tax is paid by about 2,800 billionaires, whose effective tax rate would rise from about 22% to 39% of pre-tax income (Zucman 2024). The $193 billion to $242 billion a year it raises, depending on how much is lost to avoidance and evasion, can fund anything, so its benefits are as broad as the spending. Part of the cost reaches workers: Penn Wharton projects average hourly wages 1.2% lower by 2050 as less capital is built (Huntley and Ricco 2021).","counter":"The strongest counter-evidence is Guvenen et al. (2023). When returns differ across investors, a wealth tax falls on idle fortunes and spares productive ones. In their model, replacing the capital income tax with a wealth tax \"delivers a significantly higher average welfare.\" Swedish bunching estimates find small responses, elasticities of 0.09 to 0.27 (Seim 2017), which point to a ratio above the high end. Even Colombia's larger elasticity of 2 (Londoño-Vélez and Ávila-Mahecha 2024) gives 0.89 in the same form. These are set aside. Guvenen et al. study a swap, while the minimum tax is added on top of existing taxes. Bunching captures only people near the threshold and is thought to understate the full response.\n\nThe verdict turns on how much wealth is hidden, moved or valued down. The range charges the general income-tax burden of 34 cents to nearly $2 per $1. Built from wealth-tax evidence instead, it would run from −0.55 to 0.72 rather than −1.12 to 0.60, before the cost of raising taxes for administration. The policy would reach the Bad tier only if avoidance sat near the low end of the 7% to 17% base loss for a well-designed tax (Advani and Tarrant 2021). The Danish evidence, a long-run base 0.73 of its untaxed level for the very wealthy (Jakobsen et al. 2020), points against that.","references":["Advani, A., and H. Tarrant. 2021. \"Behavioural Responses to a Wealth Tax.\" *Fiscal Studies* 42 (3-4): 509-537. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-5890.12283.","Advani, A., E. Chamberlain, and A. Summers. 2020. *A Wealth Tax for the UK: Wealth Tax Commission Final Report.* Wealth Tax Commission. https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/centres/cage/news/a-wealth-tax-for-the-uk.pdf.","Ballard, C. L., J. B. Shoven, and J. Whalley. 1985. \"General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States.\" *American Economic Review* 75 (1): 128-138. https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/1043.html.","Brülhart, M., J. Gruber, M. Krapf, and K. Schmidheiny. 2022. \"Behavioral Responses to Wealth Taxes: Evidence from Switzerland.\" *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* 14 (4): 111-150. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20200258.","Feldstein, M. 1999. \"Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax.\" *Review of Economics and Statistics* 81 (4): 674-680. https://doi.org/10.1162/003465399558391.","G20 Finance Ministers. 2024. *The Rio de Janeiro G20 Ministerial Declaration on International Tax Cooperation.* July 26. https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/G20/20240726.D3E.html.","Guvenen, F., G. Kambourov, B. Kuruscu, S. Ocampo, and D. Chen. 2023. \"Use It or Lose It: Efficiency and Redistributional Effects of Wealth Taxation.\" *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 138 (2): 835-894. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjac047.","Huntley, J., and J. Ricco. 2021. \"Budgetary and Economic Effects of Senator Elizabeth Warren's Wealth Tax Legislation.\" Penn Wharton Budget Model, March 15. https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/issues/2021/3/15/budgetary-effects-of-senator-warren-wealth-tax.","Ipsos for Earth4All and the Global Commons Alliance. 2024. \"Tax the Rich, Say a Majority of Adults across 17 G20 Countries Surveyed.\" Earth4All, June 24. https://earth4all.life/news/tax-the-rich-say-g20-citizens/.","Jakobsen, K., K. Jakobsen, H. Kleven, and G. Zucman. 2020. \"Wealth Taxation and Wealth Accumulation: Theory and Evidence from Denmark.\" *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 135 (1): 329-388. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjz032.","Li, H., and K. Smith. 2020. \"Analysis of Sen. Warren and Sen. Sanders' Wealth Tax Plans.\" Tax Foundation, January 28. https://taxfoundation.org/research/all/federal/wealth-tax/.","Londoño-Vélez, J., and J. Ávila-Mahecha. 2024. \"Behavioral Responses to Wealth Taxation: Evidence from Colombia.\" NBER Working Paper 32134. National Bureau of Economic Research. https://doi.org/10.3386/w32134.","OECD. 2018. *The Role and Design of Net Wealth Taxes in the OECD.* OECD Tax Policy Studies 26. OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264290303-en.","Ricco, J., Z. He, and J. Huntley. 2019. \"Senator Elizabeth Warren's Wealth Tax: Projected Budgetary and Economic Effects.\" Penn Wharton Budget Model, December 12. https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/issues/2019/12/12/senator-elizabeth-warrens-wealth-tax-projected-budgetary-and-economic-effects.","Scheuer, F., and J. Slemrod. 2021. \"Taxing Our Wealth.\" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 35 (1): 207-230. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.35.1.207.","Seim, D. 2017. \"Behavioral Responses to Wealth Taxes: Evidence from Sweden.\" *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* 9 (4): 395-421. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20150290.","Trabandt, M., and H. Uhlig. 2011. \"The Laffer Curve Revisited.\" *Journal of Monetary Economics* 58 (4): 305-327. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2011.07.003.","Zucman, G. 2024. *A Blueprint for a Coordinated Minimum Effective Taxation Standard for Ultra-High-Net-Worth Individuals.* Report commissioned by the Brazilian G20 presidency. EU Tax Observatory. https://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/report-g20.pdf."]},"17":{"policy":"Medicare for All replaces private health insurance with one government plan that covers every American. Care is free at the point of use. The federal government pays providers and raises the money through taxes.","why_on_list":"It was selected by public opinion. In the 2022 Cooperative Election Study (CES), 66% of respondents supported it.","evidence":"No published benefit-cost study of single payer exists, so the ratio is built from official and academic estimates. They agree on one thing: federal spending would rise by $1.5 trillion to $3.0 trillion a year by 2030 (Congressional Budget Office 2020). They disagree on whether total national health spending would rise or fall. The Urban Institute finds a rise of $720 billion (Blumberg et al. 2019). A Lancet study finds a 13% saving, about $450 billion a year, and adds that \"ensuring health care access for all Americans would save more than 68,000 lives and 1.73 million life-years every year compared with the status quo\" (Galvani et al. 2020). Most new spending replaces premiums and out-of-pocket costs, so it is a transfer. The damage comes from raising it. New taxes of 5 to 10% of GDP sit at or past the peak of the Laffer curve, where each $1 raised costs about $2 of lost output (Feldstein 1999). Queues add a further cost. Canada's single-payer system had a median wait of 30.0 weeks from referral to treatment in 2024 (Moir and Barua 2024b). Counting lives saved, waiting time and the cost of the taxes, each $1 destroys 57 to 77 cents of value.","ratio":"The new federal spending counts as $1 to households per $1, in both benefit and cost. The excess burden of tax financing and the waiting cost are subtracted from benefits. Any rise in national health spending is added to the cost base. Life-years are valued at the Institute for Clinical and Economic Review (ICER 2023) thresholds of $100,000 and $150,000.\n\n**Excess burden.** At the peak of the Laffer curve the United States can raise at most about 7.4% of GDP in extra revenue (Trabandt and Uhlig 2012). The 34-cent burden measured for small tax changes (Ballard, Shoven and Whalley 1985) does not hold at this scale; near the peak the burden can exceed 300% of revenue (Browning 1987). New federal spending of $1.5-2.8 trillion is 5-10% of GDP, so both ends use Feldstein's (1999) $2 per $1.\n\n**Waiting cost.** Canadians lost time valued at C$10.6 billion a year (Moir and Barua 2024a). Scaled per person: C$10.6 billion × (343.0 million ÷ 40.05 million) = C$90.8 billion. At 1.3973 Canadian dollars per US dollar, that is $65.0 billion a year, subtracted at both ends.\n\n**Low end (Urban Institute design).** Federal spending +$2,800 billion; national spending +$720 billion. Life-years: 1.73 million × $100,000 = $173 billion, which generously assumes the Lancet mortality gain.\n- Ratio: (2,800 + 173 - 2.0 × 2,800 - 65.0) ÷ (2,800 + 720) = **-0.76**.\n\n**High end (Lancet design).** Federal cost $1,500 billion, the low end of the Congressional Budget Office range. Savings $450 billion. Life-years: 1.73 million × $150,000 = $259.5 billion.\n- Ratio: (1,500 + 450 + 259.5 - 2.0 × 1,500 - 65.0) ÷ 1,500 = **-0.57**.\n\nThe range is -0.76 to -0.57. The full cost is $5,843.0 billion a year.\n\nCross-checks. The Congressional Budget Office's five options span national-spending changes of -$0.7 trillion to +$0.3 trillion in 2030, between the two cases. Blahous (2018) puts added federal spending at $32.6 trillion over 2022-31, assuming providers accept payment cuts of more than 40%; that points to the low end. The Council of Economic Advisers (2018) estimates a 9% fall in GDP. That measures the same tax distortion, so it is not added to the ratio.","cost":"The full cost is $5,843.0 billion a year.\n- Public outlay: $2,940 billion. The Congressional Budget Office's Option 5, the design closest to current bills, adds about $3.0 trillion in 2030 (Blahous 2021).\n- Administration: $60 billion, at Medicare fee-for-service's rate of about 2% on $3.0 trillion. The Congressional Budget Office assumes 1.5-1.6%.\n- Private cost of waiting: $65.0 billion, from the Canadian analogy above.\n- GDP loss: $2,778 billion, the Council of Economic Advisers' 9% applied to 2025 GDP of $30.86 trillion. This is the high-end published estimate.\n\nSum: 2,940 + 60 + 65.0 + 2,778 = $5,843.0 billion. Provider billing costs sit inside national health spending, already in the ratio.","strength":"Grade B-. The range rests on official Congressional Budget Office estimates and think-tank models from the Urban Institute and the Mercatus Center. It adds one peer-reviewed modelling study (Galvani et al. 2020) whose savings the official and Urban estimates do not replicate. Coverage does save lives in quasi-experimental work: Medicaid expansion cut mortality among near-elderly adults by 9.4% (Miller, Johnson and Wherry 2021). No peer-reviewed benefit-cost study of single payer exists. The waiting cost is a think-tank estimate for Canada applied by analogy.","difficulty":"Moderate by the rubric. It needs ordinary federal legislation, and Canada and Taiwan's 1995 single payer are modern precedents. Politically it is near the hard end. It replaces employer insurance for about 150 million people and needs roughly $1.5-3 trillion a year in new federal revenue.","who_benefits":"Gains go mostly to the uninsured and underinsured, who are disproportionately low-income. Covering low-income adults through Medicaid cut their mortality (Miller, Johnson and Wherry 2021) and cut their medical debt (Finkelstein et al. 2012). Financing through broad taxes is typically more progressive than premiums. Taxpayers and workers pay through the higher tax burden and slower growth.","counter":"The strongest counter-case is that single payer saves both money and lives. Galvani et al. (2020) estimate it cuts national health spending by about 13%, more than $450 billion a year, and prevents more than 68,000 deaths a year. Across its options, the Congressional Budget Office (2020) finds national health spending changes by −$0.7 trillion to +$0.3 trillion in 2030. The high end already counts Galvani's savings and lives. The Oregon Health Insurance Experiment found that Medicaid raised use of care and cut medical debt, but a follow-up found no significant change in measured physical-health markers over two years (Finkelstein et al. 2012). Mortality gains as large as Galvani's are therefore uncertain.\n\nThe verdict comes from financing. New federal spending of $1.5 to $2.8 trillion is 5% to 10% of US GDP, at or beyond the 7.4% the US can raise at the peak of the Laffer curve (Trabandt and Uhlig 2012). Each $1 is therefore charged nearly $2 of deadweight loss (Feldstein 1999). If the money could be raised at the 34 cents measured for small changes (Ballard, Shoven and Whalley 1985), the high end would rise above 1 and the policy would leave the Worst tier. Two unpriced costs push the other way: health lost to delayed care, and how providers respond to payment cuts of more than 40% (Blahous 2019).","references":["Baird, S., J. Friedman, and N. Schady. 2011. \"Aggregate Income Shocks and Infant Mortality in the Developing World.\" *Review of Economics and Statistics* 93 (3): 847-856. https://www2.gwu.edu/~iiep/assets/docs/papers/Baird_IIEPWP2010-7.pdf.","Ballard, C. L., J. B. Shoven, and J. Whalley. 1985. \"General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States.\" *American Economic Review* 75 (1): 128-138. https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/1043.html.","Blahous, C. 2018. *The Costs of a National Single-Payer Healthcare System.* Mercatus Center Working Paper, 30 July 2018. https://www.mercatus.org/research/working-papers/costs-national-single-payer-healthcare-system.","Blahous, C. 2019. *Testimony before the House Committee on Rules, Hearing on H.R. 1384, the Medicare for All Act of 2019.* U.S. House of Representatives, 30 April 2019. https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/109356/witnesses/HHRG-116-RU00-Wstate-BlahousC-20190430.pdf.","Blahous, C. 2021. *Understanding CBO's Medicare for All Cost Estimates.* Mercatus Center Policy Brief, 12 April 2021. https://www.mercatus.org/research/policy-briefs/understanding-cbos-medicare-all-cost-estimates.","Blumberg, L. J., J. Holahan, M. Buettgens, et al. 2019. *Comparing Health Insurance Reform Options: From \"Building on the ACA\" to Single Payer.* Urban Institute / Commonwealth Fund, 16 October 2019. https://www.commonwealthfund.org/press-release/2019/new-analysis-projects-cost-coverage-impacts-single-payer-plan-and-other-health.","Broughel, J., and W. K. Viscusi. 2017. *Death by Regulation: How Regulations Can Increase Mortality Risk.* Research summary. Mercatus Center at George Mason University. https://mercatus.org/media/65351/download.","Browning, E. K. 1987. \"On the Marginal Welfare Cost of Taxation.\" *American Economic Review* 77 (1): 11-23. https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v77y1987i1p11-23.html.","Congressional Budget Office. 2020. *How CBO Analyzes the Costs of Proposals for Single-Payer Health Care Systems That Are Based on Medicare's Fee-for-Service Program.* Working Paper 2020-08, 10 December 2020. https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56811.","Council of Economic Advisers. 2018. *The Opportunity Costs of Socialism.* Executive Office of the President. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/The-Opportunity-Costs-of-Socialism.pdf.","Feldstein, M. 1999. \"Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax.\" *Review of Economics and Statistics* 81 (4): 674-680. https://ideas.repec.org/a/tpr/restat/v81y1999i4p674-680.html.","Finkelstein, A., S. Taubman, B. Wright, et al. 2012. \"The Oregon Health Insurance Experiment: Evidence from the First Year.\" *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 127 (3): 1057-1106. https://doi.org/10.3386/w17190.","Galvani, A. P., A. S. Parpia, E. M. Foster, B. H. Singer, and M. C. Fitzpatrick. 2020. \"Improving the Prognosis of Health Care in the USA.\" *The Lancet* 395 (10223): 524-533. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(19)33019-3.","Institute for Clinical and Economic Review. 2023. *2023 Value Assessment Framework.* ICER. https://icer.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/ICER_2023_VAF_For-Publication_092523.pdf.","Miller, S., N. Johnson, and L. R. Wherry. 2021. \"Medicaid and Mortality: New Evidence from Linked Survey and Administrative Data.\" *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 136 (3): 1783-1829. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjab004.","Moir, M., and B. Barua. 2024a. *The Private Cost of Public Queues for Medically Necessary Care, 2024.* Fraser Institute, 2 May 2024. https://www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/private-cost-of-public-queues-for-medically-necessary-care-2024.","Moir, M., and B. Barua. 2024b. *Waiting Your Turn: Wait Times for Health Care in Canada, 2024 Report.* Fraser Institute, 12 December 2024. https://www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/waiting-your-turn-wait-times-for-health-care-in-canada-2024.","Trabandt, M., and H. Uhlig. 2012. *How Do Laffer Curves Differ Across Countries?* International Finance Discussion Paper 1048. Federal Reserve Board. https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2012/1048/ifdp1048.pdf.","U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation. 2024. *Standard Values for Regulatory Analysis, 2024.* HHS. https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cd2a1348ea0777b1aa918089e4965b8c/standard-ria-values.pdf."]},"18":{"policy":"A universal basic income (UBI) pays every adult a regular cash amount, with no conditions. The global version sets it at each country's poverty line and funds it permanently through taxes. The International Labour Organization (ILO) puts the cost at about 32.7% of world GDP (Ortiz et al. 2018).","why_on_list":"It was selected by public opinion, which is split. In Pew's 2020 survey, 45% of Americans favoured a $1,000-a-month UBI and 54% opposed it (Gilberstadt 2020). In Dalia's 2017 poll, 68% of EU respondents said they would vote for one (Basic Income Earth Network 2017).","evidence":"The best evidence on how people respond comes from a randomized US trial. OpenResearch paid 1,000 people $1,000 a month for three years, against 2,000 controls on $50 a month (Vivalt et al. 2024). The authors report: \"For every dollar received, total household income excluding the transfers fell by about 28 cents, and total individual income fell by around 16 cents.\" Partners cut their hours about as much as recipients did. Delivering the money costs 4 to 25 cents per $1 on top. The deeper problem is scale. A scheme costing a third of world GDP is far beyond what taxes can raise cheaply. At that size each $1 of tax costs about $2 of lost output (Feldstein 1999). A dynamic model finds a labour-tax-financed UBI cuts long-run GDP by 12.9% (Daruich and Fernández 2020). Each $1 paid out returns between minus $1.26 and minus $1.09.","ratio":"The ratio is built per $1 paid out. A transfer is worth its face value to the person who receives it, so the benefit is $1. The cost to the public purse is larger than $1, because recipients earn less and pay less tax, and because delivery costs money.\n\n**Formula:** BCR = (1 - excess burden × net fiscal cost) ÷ net fiscal cost.\n\n**Excess burden.** At the peak of the Laffer curve, the United States can raise at most about 7.4% of GDP in extra revenue and the EU-14 about 3.1% (Trabandt and Uhlig 2012). The 34-cent burden measured for small changes (Ballard, Shoven and Whalley 1985) does not apply at this scale; near the peak the burden can exceed 300% of revenue (Browning 1987). A global UBI costs about 32.7% of world GDP, so both ends use Feldstein's (1999) $2 per $1.\n\n**Inputs.** Treated households received an extra $950 a month, or $11,400 a year. Household income excluding transfers fell by $4,215 a year in the raw survey measure (0.37 per $1) and by $3,228 in the preferred adjusted measure (0.28 per $1) (Vivalt et al. 2024). A labour-tax-financed UBI raises the average labour tax from 22% to about 27.8% (Daruich and Fernández 2020). Delivery costs $0.041 per $1 for Mexico's PROGRESA (Caldes, Coady and Maluccio 2004) and $0.25 per $1 for GiveDirectly (GiveDirectly 2024).\n\n**High end:**\n- Fiscal externality: 0.28 × 0.22 = 0.062.\n- Net fiscal cost: 1.062 + 0.041 = 1.103.\n- BCR: (1 - 2.0 × 1.103) ÷ 1.103 = **-1.09**.\n\n**Low end:**\n- Fiscal externality: 0.370 × 0.278 = 0.103.\n- Net fiscal cost: 1.103 + 0.25 = 1.353.\n- BCR: (1 - 2.0 × 1.353) ÷ 1.353 = **-1.26**.\n\nThe range is -1.26 to -1.09. The full cost is $56,420 billion a year.\n\nCross-checks. A universal government scheme would probably deliver nearer PROGRESA's 4 cents, which gives a low end of about -1.13. But a scheme this large needs far higher tax rates than the US scheme Daruich and Fernández model, so the low end's fiscal externality is likely understated. Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) score the randomized US Negative Income Tax experiments at a marginal value of public funds of -0.01. Daruich and Fernández find future generations would give up over 9% of lifetime consumption to avoid a UBI. Both point to net damage.","cost":"The full cost is $56,420 billion a year.\n- Public outlay: $34,300 billion. The ILO's 32.7% of GDP on world GDP of about $105 trillion (Ortiz et al. 2018; Visual Capitalist 2023). The ILO excludes administration.\n- Administration: $8,575 billion, at GiveDirectly's $0.25 per $1 delivered (0.25 × 34,300). GiveWell (2020) finds about 83% of GiveDirectly's spending reaches recipients overall.\n- Private compliance: none identified.\n- GDP loss: $13,545 billion, a 12.9% fall in GDP on world GDP (Daruich and Fernández 2020). This is the output counterpart of the excess burden already in the ratio, so it is not subtracted twice.\n\nSum: 34,300 + 8,575 + 13,545 = $56,420 billion. With low-end administration, the total before GDP loss is $35,706 billion.","strength":"Grade A-. The labour-supply response comes from a modern randomized trial (Vivalt et al. 2024). The cross-check comes from a peer-reviewed welfare analysis of the randomized Negative Income Tax experiments (Hendren and Sprung-Keyser 2020). The excess-burden and dynamic estimates are peer-reviewed (Feldstein 1999; Ballard, Shoven and Whalley 1985; Daruich and Fernández 2020). No study scores a global UBI directly, which keeps the grade below A.","difficulty":"Hard. A global scheme needs binding commitments from many countries. The ILO puts a poverty-line UBI at 32.7-39.4% of GDP on average and 62.3-79.1% of GDP in low-income countries (Ortiz et al. 2018). That is far above the 7.4% of GDP the United States could add at the peak of the Laffer curve.","who_benefits":"Benefits are broad, not targeted. Payments go to everyone, so most of the money reaches people who are not poor. Financing creates high implicit marginal tax rates on middle earners (Henderson 2019). Daruich and Fernández (2020) find that current adults gain 1.2%, while the long-run losses fall on future generations through lower capital and skills.","counter":"The strongest counter-case comes from cash trials in poor countries. In Kenya's GiveDirectly trial across 295 villages, \"Labor supply did not change overall, but shifted out of wage employment and towards self-employment\" (Banerjee et al. 2023). Net enterprise revenues rose 52%, and depression fell in all arms. One-off transfers into poor Kenyan villages had a local multiplier of about 2.4 (Egger et al. 2022). Finland's pilot for 2,000 unemployed people found a small employment gain and better wellbeing (VATT and Kela 2020). None of these tests a permanent, tax-financed, universal payment. The Kenyan money is donor-funded, with no tax distortion, and the multiplier is a local spending effect, not a welfare ratio.\n\nThe verdict comes from scale. A global payment costs about 32.7% of world GDP, more than four times the 7.4% of GDP the US can raise at the peak of the Laffer curve (Trabandt and Uhlig 2012). Each $1 is therefore charged nearly $2 of deadweight loss (Feldstein 1999). If the money could be raised at the 34 cents measured for small changes (Ballard, Shoven and Whalley 1985), with the trial's 28 cents of lost household earnings per $1 (Vivalt et al. 2024), the ratio would turn positive but stay below 1. Only a scheme small enough to be financed at that rate could move from the Worst to the Bad tier.","references":["Ballard, C. L., J. B. Shoven, and J. Whalley. 1985. \"General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States.\" *American Economic Review* 75 (1): 128-138. https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/1043.html.","Banerjee, A., M. Faye, A. Krueger, P. Niehaus, and T. Suri. 2023. \"Universal Basic Income: Short-Term Results from a Long-Term Experiment in Kenya.\" Working paper, 15 September 2023. NBER conference draft. https://conference.nber.org/conf_papers/f192616.pdf.","Basic Income Earth Network. 2017. \"Survey of 11,000 Europeans Finds 68% Would Vote for Basic Income.\" *BIEN News*, 1 May 2017 (reporting Dalia Research). https://basicincome.org/news/2017/05/survey-of-11000-europeans-finds-68-would-vote-for-basic-income/.","Browning, E. K. 1987. \"On the Marginal Welfare Cost of Taxation.\" *American Economic Review* 77 (1): 11-23. https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v77y1987i1p11-23.html.","Caldes, N., D. Coady, and J. A. Maluccio. 2004. *The Cost of Poverty Alleviation Transfer Programs: A Comparative Analysis of Three Programs in Latin America.* FCND Discussion Paper 174 (published in *World Development* 34 (5), 2006). International Food Policy Research Institute. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2005.10.003.","Daruich, D., and R. Fernández. 2020. \"Universal Basic Income: A Dynamic Assessment.\" NBER Working Paper 27351 (published in *American Economic Review* 114 (1), 2024). National Bureau of Economic Research. https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w27351/revisions/w27351.rev0.pdf.","Egger, D., J. Haushofer, E. Miguel, P. Niehaus, and M. W. Walker. 2022. \"General Equilibrium Effects of Cash Transfers: Experimental Evidence From Kenya.\" *Econometrica* 90 (6). https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA17945.","Feldstein, M. 1999. \"Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax.\" *Review of Economics and Statistics* 81 (4): 674-680. https://www.nber.org/papers/w5055.","Gilberstadt, H. 2020. \"More Americans Oppose Than Favor the Government Providing a Universal Basic Income for All Adult Citizens.\" Pew Research Center Short Reads, 19 August 2020. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/08/19/more-americans-oppose-than-favor-the-government-providing-a-universal-basic-income-for-all-adult-citizens/.","GiveDirectly. 2024. \"Where Your Donations Go.\" GiveDirectly. https://www.givedirectly.org/where-your-donations-go.","GiveWell. 2020. \"GiveDirectly.\" November 2020 version. GiveWell. https://givewell.org/node/3473.","Henderson, D. R. 2019. \"Universal Basic Income, In Perspective.\" *Defining Ideas.* Hoover Institution. https://www.hoover.org/research/universal-basic-income-perspective.","Hendren, N., and B. Sprung-Keyser. 2020. \"A Unified Welfare Analysis of Government Policies.\" *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 135 (3): 1209-1318. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjaa006.","Ortiz, I., C. Behrendt, A. Acuña-Ulate, and Q. A. Nguyen. 2018. *Universal Basic Income Proposals in Light of ILO Standards: Key Issues and Global Costing.* ESS Working Paper No. 62. International Labour Office. https://www.ilo.org/media/413276/download.","Trabandt, M., and H. Uhlig. 2012. *How Do Laffer Curves Differ Across Countries?* International Finance Discussion Paper 1048. Federal Reserve Board. https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2012/1048/ifdp1048.pdf.","VATT Institute for Economic Research and Kela. 2020. \"Results of the Basic Income Experiment: Small Employment Effects, Better Perceived Economic Security and Mental Wellbeing.\" Press release. VATT. https://vatt.fi/en/-/results-of-the-basic-income-experiment-small-employment-effects-better-perceived-economic-security-and-mental-wellbeing.","Visual Capitalist. 2023. \"Visualizing the $105 Trillion World Economy in One Chart.\" Visual Capitalist (citing IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2023). https://www.visualcapitalist.com/visualizing-the-105-trillion-world-economy-in-one-chart/.","Vivalt, E., E. Rhodes, A. W. Bartik, D. E. Broockman, and S. Miller. 2024. \"The Employment Effects of a Guaranteed Income: Experimental Evidence from Two U.S. States.\" NBER Working Paper 32719. National Bureau of Economic Research. https://doi.org/10.3386/w32719."]},"19":{"policy":"Every country requires its residents to hold and use a government digital identity. The ID would be used to verify people for welfare, work and public services. It is a government rule rather than a spending programme, though building and running the systems costs money.","why_on_list":"It was selected by public opinion. A September 2025 YouGov poll found 42% of Britons supported the UK plan, with 45% opposed (YouGov 2025). An Ipsos UK poll in 2025 found 57% support for a national ID card.","evidence":"The best evidence comes from two randomized trials in India, both by Muralidharan, Niehaus and Sukhtankar. In Jharkhand, biometric checks were made compulsory for food rations. Corruption did not fall: leakage rose by an insignificant Rs 14 per ration card a month. Transaction costs for government, ration dealers and recipients rose by Rs 13.6 per card a month, a 7.8% increase. Nearly 300,000 people lost benefits (Muralidharan, Niehaus and Sukhtankar 2020). In Andhra Pradesh, a biometric smartcard payment system was rolled out carefully alongside the old one. Recipients' time savings alone, $4.3 million, exceeded the government's cost of $4.1 million (Muralidharan, Niehaus and Sukhtankar 2016). The two trials point in opposite directions. The authors conclude that results depend on how the mandate and the transition are managed. Each $1 returns between about minus $1.0 and $1.05, before counting privacy and surveillance risks. Once the cost of raising the taxes that fund it is counted, the range is −$1.94 to $0.78 per $1.","ratio":"Both ends come straight from the two randomized evaluations.\n\n**Low end (Jharkhand, compulsory authentication for food rations):**\n- Benefit: the change in leakage, a rise of Rs 14 per ration card a month.\n- Cost: extra transaction costs of Rs 13.6 per card a month.\n- Ratio: -14 ÷ 13.6 = -1.03, about **-1.0**.\n\n**High end (Andhra Pradesh biometric smartcards):**\n- Benefit: recipients' time savings, $4.3 million.\n- Cost: the government's cost of running the programme, $4.1 million.\n- Ratio: 4.3 ÷ 4.1 = **1.05**.\n\nThe smartcards also cut leakage of employment-scheme wages by $32.8 million a year, eight times the cost. That money mostly moved from corrupt officials back to the state, a transfer, so it is not counted.\n\nThe range before tax finance is -1.0 to 1.05. The full cost is $88.8 billion a year.\n\nPlatform costs. The Jharkhand low end already counts the extra costs of compulsory authentication to government, dealers and recipients. Adding the platform's own running cost to a negative ratio would pull it toward zero and understate the harm, so it is not done. The Andhra Pradesh high end compares time savings with the smartcard system's full delivery cost. A share of a national ID platform's running cost, 0.06-0.1% of GDP, is not included and would lower the high end somewhat.\n\nExclusion. In Jharkhand, the 23% of households not linked to the ID system at the start lost Rs 49 a month (12.6%). That averages 0.23 × 49 = Rs 11.3 per ration card a month. The average household's benefits were unchanged, so these losses already sit inside the measured Rs 14 rise in leakage. With an equity weight on excluded poor households, they would be added: -(14 + 11.3) ÷ 13.6 = -1.86.\n\n**After the cost of raising taxes.** Each $1 of public spending costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven and Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999). High end: the Andhra Pradesh government's $4.1 million implementation and operating cost is all public, so 1.05 ÷ (1 + 0.34 × 1.0) = 0.78. Low end: in the Jharkhand trial the government's share of the Rs 13.6 extra transaction cost is the electronic point-of-sale (ePOS) machines, Rs 6.2 per ration card per month; the rest falls on beneficiaries and ration dealers. Because the low end is negative, the burden is subtracted from the benefit, as for the transfer entries; adding it to the cost would pull a negative ratio toward zero. Low end: (−14 − 2.0 × 6.2) ÷ 13.6 = −1.94. **Range after tax finance: −1.94 to 0.78.**","cost":"The full cost is an illustrative global extrapolation of $88.8 billion a year, using the median of published estimates.\n- Build and enrolment: $4.8 billion a year. Published costs per registrant are $1.16 for India's Aadhaar (Gelb 2016), about $5 for schemes in poor countries (Gelb and Clark 2013), $7 in Gelb's (2016) model of a low-income country, and $4 to $11, midpoint $7.5 (World Bank 2018). The median is $6.0. For about 8.0 billion people (United Nations DESA 2022), amortised over 10 years, that is $4.8 billion a year. Most people already hold some ID, so this is high.\n- Operation and administration: $84 billion a year. Published running costs are 0.06% to 0.1% of GDP, midpoint 0.08% (World Bank 2018); 0.065% for Peru's national registry, RENIEC; and 0.11% in the steady state of Gelb's (2016) model. The median is 0.08%. At world GDP of about $105 trillion (Visual Capitalist 2023), that is $84 billion a year.\n- Private compliance: no published estimate.\n- GDP loss: none published.\n\nSum: 4.8 + 84 = $88.8 billion. Budget allocation is the most common way these systems are paid for (Gelb 2016), so the whole public cost is treated as paid from taxes. Cross-check: the UK's Office for Budget Responsibility puts the UK scheme at £1.8 billion over three years, about £0.6 billion a year (Office for Budget Responsibility 2025). Scaled per person, that is about $90 billion a year globally, close to this total. If the ID were also used to track personal carbon allowances, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra 2008) figure of £52 per person a year implies about $420 billion more.","strength":"Grade B+. Both ends are converted directly from peer-reviewed randomized evaluations that report costs and benefits (Muralidharan, Niehaus and Sukhtankar 2016, 2025). Applying Indian welfare evidence to a worldwide mandate is an analogy. The two trials point in opposite directions. The cost figures rest on thin data; as the World Bank (2018) notes, \"few data points exist and these figures may not apply to different types of systems or to all countries.\"","difficulty":"Moderate. Each country can mandate a digital ID through ordinary legislation, and India's Aadhaar shows that more than a billion people can be enrolled. A worldwide mandate still needs action in nearly every country, and rich democracies have retreated. In January 2026, \"The government has abandoned its plans to make digital ID compulsory in the verification of right to work\" (UKAuthority 2026). In July 2026 the incoming prime minister moved to scrap the UK scheme (ITV News 2026).","who_benefits":"The policy is regressive. Exclusion risk falls on the poor. About 45% of the poorest fifth in low-income countries lack ID, against 28% of the richest (World Bank ID4D 2019). Between 1.5 and 2 million Indian welfare recipients lost access at some point during the biometric rollout (Muralidharan, Niehaus and Sukhtankar 2025). Governments and honest recipients gain where a system is run well, as in Andhra Pradesh.","counter":"The strongest counter-case is the size of the prize. McKinsey projects that consent-based, privacy-protecting \"good\" digital ID could unlock value equal to 3% to 13% of GDP by 2030 (White et al. 2019). In Andhra Pradesh, biometric smartcards cut leakage in the rural jobs programme by $32.8 million a year, eight times their cost (Muralidharan, Niehaus and Sukhtankar 2016). These are left out of the ratio. McKinsey's figure is a consultancy projection of potential, not an evaluation of a mandate. A 2012 appraisal of Aadhaar by India's National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (NIPFP) finds a ratio of 2.55, but its benefits are fiscal savings from less leakage. These, like the Andhra Pradesh leakage savings, are transfers, money moved from corrupt officials to the state.\n\nThe verdict turns on how the mandate is introduced. The careful Andhra Pradesh rollout, run alongside the old system, returned 1.05 from time savings alone, or 0.78 once the cost of raising the taxes that pay for it is counted. The abrupt Jharkhand mandate returned about −1.0, and −1.94 after that cost. Even if every country managed the transition as Andhra Pradesh did, the policy would reach only the Bad tier. If the losses of the 23% of households not linked to the system were weighted as harm to the poor, the low end before tax finance would fall to −1.86.","references":["Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. 2008. *Synthesis Report on the Findings from Defra's Pre-Feasibility Study into Personal Carbon Trading.* Defra, April 2008. https://www.flemingpolicycentre.org.uk/Synthesis.pdf.","Gelb, A., and J. Clark. 2013. *Identification for Development: The Biometrics Revolution.* Working Paper 315. Center for Global Development. https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/1426862_file_Biometric_ID_for_Development.pdf.","Gelb, A. 2016. \"Modelling the Costs of an ID System.\" Presentation, ID4Africa 2016 Annual Meeting, Kigali. Center for Global Development. https://id4africa.com/2016/presentations/2-4-1_Center_for_Global_Development_Alan_Gelb.pdf.","Government of India, Ministry of Finance (Press Information Bureau). 2025. \"India's DBT: Boosting Welfare Efficiency.\" Press release, 21 April 2025, citing BlueKraft Digital Foundation. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2123192&reg=48&lang=2.","Hancock, A. 2024. \"Digital ID Isn't for Everybody, and That's Okay.\" *Deeplinks*, 25 September 2024. Electronic Frontier Foundation. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/09/digital-id-isnt-everybody-and-thats-okay.","Harper, J. 2018. *The New National ID Systems.* Policy Analysis No. 831. Cato Institute. https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/new-national-id-systems.","ITV News. 2026. \"Burnham to Scrap Digital ID to Focus on Cost of Living in 'Reset of Priorities.'\" ITV News, 18 July 2026. https://www.itv.com/news/2026-07-18/burnham-to-scrap-digital-id-to-focus-on-cost-of-living-in-reset-of-priorities.","Muralidharan, K., P. Niehaus, and S. Sukhtankar. 2016. \"Building State Capacity: Evidence from Biometric Smartcards in India.\" *American Economic Review* 106 (10): 2895-2929. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20141346.","Muralidharan, K., P. Niehaus, and S. Sukhtankar. 2020. \"Identity Verification Standards in Welfare Programs: Experimental Evidence from India.\" NBER Working Paper 26744. National Bureau of Economic Research. https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w26744/w26744.pdf.","Muralidharan, K., P. Niehaus, and S. Sukhtankar. 2025. \"Identity Verification Standards in Welfare Programs: Experimental Evidence from India.\" *Review of Economics and Statistics* 107 (2). https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01296.","National Institute of Public Finance and Policy. 2012. *A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Aadhaar.* NIPFP Macro/Finance Group, New Delhi. https://macrofinance.nipfp.org.in/releases/uid_cba.html.","Office for Budget Responsibility. 2025. \"UK Digital ID Plan Gets a Price Tag at Last - £1.8B.\" *The Register*, 28 November 2025, reporting the OBR *Economic and Fiscal Outlook.* https://www.theregister.com/2025/11/28/digital_id_cost/.","UKAuthority. 2026. \"Government Drops Mandatory Digital ID for Right to Work.\" UKAuthority, 14 January 2026. https://www.ukauthority.com/articles/government-drops-mandatory-digital-id-for-right-to-work.","United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 2022. \"World Population to Reach 8 Billion on 15 November 2022.\" Press release. United Nations. https://www.un.org/en/desa/world-population-reach-8-billion-15-november-2022.","Visual Capitalist. 2023. \"Visualizing the $105 Trillion World Economy in One Chart.\" Visual Capitalist (citing IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2023). https://www.visualcapitalist.com/visualizing-the-105-trillion-world-economy-in-one-chart/.","White, O., A. Madgavkar, J. Manyika, D. Mahajan, J. Bughin, M. McCarthy, and O. Sperling. 2019. *Digital Identification: A Key to Inclusive Growth.* McKinsey Global Institute. https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/tech-and-ai/our-insights/digital-identification-a-key-to-inclusive-growth.","World Bank ID4D. 2019. *Identification for Development (ID4D) Overview Brochure.* World Bank. https://id4d.worldbank.org/sites/id4d.worldbank.org/files/2019-05/ID4D_Overview_Brochure_English_20190508.pdf.","World Bank (T. Koshy, P. Jayaram, R. Menon, N. Jain, U. Prajapat, and K. Chandra). 2018. *Understanding Cost Drivers of Identification Systems.* World Bank ID4D. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/702641544730830097/pdf/Understanding-Cost-Drivers-of-Identification-Systems.pdf.","YouGov. 2025. \"Do You Support or Oppose the Proposal to Introduce a Digital ID Card System in Britain?\" YouGov daily results, 26 September 2025. https://yougov.com/en-gb/daily-results/20250926-aaac5-1."]},"20":{"policy":"Medicare negotiates the prices it pays for some of its highest-spend drugs, under the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) of 2022. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) runs the process. Negotiated prices for the first 10 drugs take effect in 2026 and for the next 15 in 2027.","why_on_list":"It was selected by public opinion. In the 2022 Cooperative Election Study (CES), 85.9% supported it, and KFF found 85% support.","evidence":"Lower negotiated prices mainly move money from drug makers to Medicare and its enrollees. That transfer is not a gain to society on its own. The real gains and losses lie elsewhere. On the gain side, enrollees save $1.5 billion out of pocket in 2026 on the first 10 drugs and $685 million in 2027 on the next 15 (CMS 2024, 2025a). A Quarterly Journal of Economics study finds that Medicare patients facing higher drug costs take fewer medicines and die sooner (Chandra, Flack and Obermeyer 2024). Applied to these savings, that is about 3,583 deaths averted a year. On the loss side, lower prices mean less money for research. The Congressional Budget Office expects 13 fewer new drugs out of about 1,300 over 30 years, about 1% (Congressional Budget Office 2023b). The health gain is an extrapolation, and without it the high end falls below 1. Each $1 returns between 57 cents and $2.80. Once the cost of raising the taxes that fund it is counted, the range is $0.54 to $2.79 per $1.","ratio":"Benefit: savings to taxpayers and enrollees, plus health gains from lower out-of-pocket costs, minus lost innovation. Cost: manufacturers' revenue loss plus administration.\n\n**Formula:** BCR = (savings + health gains - lost innovation) ÷ (manufacturer revenue loss + administration).\n\n**Inputs.**\n- Savings: the Congressional Budget Office puts deficit reduction at $98.5 billion over 2022-31 and $25 billion in 2031 (Congressional Budget Office 2022, 2023a). This is also the manufacturers' revenue loss. In a fully phased-in model, brand revenue falls $10.9 billion a year after manufacturers raise launch prices (Cogan, Heil and Mulligan 2025).\n- Administration: the $3 billion appropriation over 10 years is $0.3 billion a year.\n- Lost innovation: 13 fewer drugs over 30 years is 0.43 a year. Dubois et al. (2015) find that \"$2.5 billion is required in additional revenue to support the invention of one new chemical entity.\" That gives $1.1 billion a year. Cogan, Heil and Mulligan's own method gives $4.5 billion a year.\n- Health gains: Chandra, Flack and Obermeyer (2024) find deaths rise 0.0164 percentage points a month for each $100 a month cut in a patient's drug budget. That is about one death per $610,000 of out-of-pocket cost. Enrollee savings are $1.5 billion + $685 million = $2.185 billion a year. Then $2.185 billion ÷ $610,000 = 3,583 deaths averted a year. At a value of a statistical life of $13.1 million (HHS 2024), that is $46.9 billion.\n\n**Low end** (no health gains, because the Congressional Budget Office has not assessed patients' health outcomes):\n- (10.9 - 4.5) ÷ (10.9 + 0.3) = **0.57**.\n\n**High end:**\n- (25 + 46.9 - 1.1) ÷ (25 + 0.3) = **2.80**.\n\nThe range is 0.57 to 2.8. The full cost is $4.81 billion a year.\n\nCross-checks. Without the health gains, the high end would be (25 - 1.1) ÷ (25 + 0.3) = 0.94. Valuing a lost drug at the revenue it needs is a floor, since patients usually gain more than the seller earns. Lost innovation is valued as a health harm, so the mortality cost of lost income applies only to the administration cost.\n\n**After the cost of raising taxes.** Each $1 of public spending costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted, an extra $0.34 to $2.00 (Ballard, Shoven and Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999). The low end uses the higher burden and the high end the lower one. Only the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services' implementation budget of $0.3 billion a year is paid from taxes; manufacturers' reporting cost is private. That is 0.3 of 11.2 (0.0268) of the cost at the low end and 0.3 of 25.3 (0.0119) at the high end. Low end: 0.571 ÷ (1 + 2.0 × 0.0268) = 0.54. High end: 2.80 ÷ (1 + 0.34 × 0.0119) = 2.79. **Range after tax finance: 0.54 to 2.79.**","cost":"The full cost is $4.81 billion a year.\n- Public outlay: none beyond administration. Price cuts are transfers.\n- Administration: $0.3 billion a year, from the IRA's $3 billion implementation fund, with $2.845 billion of outlays over 2022-31 (Congressional Budget Office 2022).\n- Private compliance: $0.013 billion a year. Manufacturers report 47,620 hours a year for the 2028 negotiation cycle (CMS 2025b) and 17,000 hours for negotiation data elements (CMS 2023). The 64,620 hours are valued at an assumed $200 an hour, about $13 million.\n- Lost innovation: $4.5 billion a year (Cogan, Heil and Mulligan 2025). At the Congressional Budget Office's 13 fewer drugs, it would be $1.1 billion.\n\nSum: 0.3 + 0.013 + 4.5 = $4.81 billion. Lower prices move about $10.9-25 billion a year from manufacturers to Medicare and enrollees. That is a transfer, not a cost to society. Litigation costs have not been estimated by any source.","strength":"Grade B-. The high end rests on official Congressional Budget Office and CMS estimates. These are converted with peer-reviewed figures: Dubois et al. (2015) for the value of a lost drug and Chandra, Flack and Obermeyer (2024) for health gains, applied by extrapolation. Chandra and colleagues study a sharp change in coverage at age 65, not a price cut. The low end rests on think-tank modelling. With official estimates as the best sources, the grade is B-.","difficulty":"Moderate. It needed ordinary federal legislation, the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, and CMS now runs it. Adding more drugs, or extending negotiation to commercial insurance, would need new legislation.","who_benefits":"Benefits are broad. Savings are spread across Medicare enrollees and taxpayers. Part D households save about $51 (middle income) to $65 (upper income) a year, under 0.1% of income (Cogan, Heil and Mulligan 2025). The cost of fewer future drugs falls on future patients generally. Drug makers lose revenue.","counter":"The strongest counter-case is lost innovation. Philipson and Durie (2021) find that the drug-pricing provisions of an earlier bill (H.R. 5376) would mean 135 fewer new drugs and 331.5 million US life-years lost through 2039. On their method, lost innovation costs $196.3 billion a year, against savings of $25 billion in 2031, which would make the policy strongly negative. It is not used because it implies about ten times the loss of drugs that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects, 13 fewer of about 1,300 over 30 years. Some of that work is also partly funded by the drug industry (Chicago Policy Review 2024). The CBO further expects manufacturers to set higher launch prices, which cuts savings on new drugs.\n\nThe verdict rests on health gains. Without them, the high end is 0.94 and the whole range sits below 1, in the Bad tier. With them, it reaches 2.80, or 2.79 after the cost of raising taxes. The gain comes from Chandra, Flack and Obermeyer (2024), who find that Medicare patients facing smaller drug budgets \"consume fewer drugs and die more\". They study a sharp loss of coverage at age 65, and applying that to lower negotiated prices is an extrapolation. If lost innovation were valued at the Hoover paper's $4.5 billion a year rather than $1.1 billion at the high end too, the ratio would fall further.","references":["Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. 2023. \"Agency Information Collection Activities: Negotiation Data Elements and Drug Price Negotiation Process (CMS-10847).\" *Federal Register* 88 FR, 3 July 2023, doc. 2023-14176. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2023-07-03/pdf/2023-14176.pdf.","Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. 2024. *Negotiated Prices for Initial Price Applicability Year 2026.* Fact sheet and infographic. CMS. https://www.cms.gov/files/document/infographic-negotiated-prices-maximum-fair-prices.pdf.","Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. 2025a. *Negotiated Prices for Initial Price Applicability Year 2027.* Fact sheet. CMS. https://www.cms.gov/files/document/fact-sheet-negotiated-prices-ipay-2027.pdf.","Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. 2025b. \"Agency Information Collection Activities: Drug Price Negotiation for Initial Price Applicability Year 2028 (CMS-10849; OMB 0938-1452).\" *Federal Register*, public inspection 2025-20748. https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-20748.pdf.","Chandra, A., E. Flack, and Z. Obermeyer. 2024. \"The Health Costs of Cost Sharing.\" *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 139 (4): 2037-2082. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjae015.","Chicago Policy Review. 2024. \"The Future of Medicare Drug Price Negotiation and Pharmaceutical Innovation.\" *Chicago Policy Review*, 22 January 2024. https://chicagopolicyreview.org/2024/01/22/the-future-of-medicare-drug-price-negotiation-and-pharmaceutical-innovation/.","Cogan, J. F., D. Heil, and C. B. Mulligan. 2025. *Medicare Drug Price Regulation: Small Savings, Large Innovation Losses.* Hoover Institution, March 2025. https://www.hoover.org/research/medicare-drug-price-regulation-small-savings-large-innovation-losses.","Congressional Budget Office. 2022. *Estimated Budgetary Effects of Public Law 117-169, to Provide for Reconciliation Pursuant to Title II of S. Con. Res. 14.* CBO cost estimate, 7 September 2022. https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2022-09/PL117-169_9-7-22.pdf.","Congressional Budget Office. 2023a. *How CBO Estimated the Budgetary Impact of Key Prescription Drug Provisions in the 2022 Reconciliation Act.* CBO report, February 2023. https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2023-02/58850-IRA-Drug-Provs.pdf.","Congressional Budget Office (P. Swagel). 2023b. *Letter to Chairman Jodey Arrington and Rep. Michael Burgess on the Effects of P.L. 117-169 on New Drug Development.* CBO, 21 December 2023. https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2023-12/59792-Letter.pdf.","Dubois, P., O. de Mouzon, F. Scott Morton, and P. Seabright. 2015. \"Market Size and Pharmaceutical Innovation.\" *RAND Journal of Economics* 46 (4): 844-871. https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12113.","Philipson, T. J., and T. Durie. 2021. *Issue Brief: The Impact of HR 5376 on Biopharmaceutical Innovation and Patient Health.* University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute / EC-CHC, 30 November 2021. https://ecchc.economics.uchicago.edu/2021/11/30/issue-brief-the-impact-of-hr-5376-on-biopharmaceutical-innovation-and-patient-health.","U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation. 2024. *Standard Values for Regulatory Analysis, 2024.* HHS. https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cd2a1348ea0777b1aa918089e4965b8c/standard-ria-values.pdf."]},"21":{"policy":"Pay for routine childhood vaccines in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) and raise coverage to the 2030 targets. The costed package covers nine vaccines in 80 countries: pentavalent, human papillomavirus (HPV), Japanese encephalitis, measles, measles-rubella, meningitis A, pneumococcal, rotavirus and yellow fever. National governments and donors pay, mostly through national immunization programmes and Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance. The programme cost is about $1.5 billion a year.","why_on_list":"It is one of the health \"best buys\" named by the Copenhagen Consensus Center, the Disease Control Priorities project (third edition, DCP3), the World Health Organization (WHO) and GiveWell. All four rank childhood vaccination among the most cost-effective things a health budget can buy.","evidence":"Few policies have been studied as often, and few studies agree as well. Patenaude, Sriudomporn and Mak (2023) cost a scale-up of nine vaccines in 80 countries for 2023-2030 and find benefits of $762.2 billion against costs of $7.58 billion. That is about $101 of benefit per $1, the figure the Copenhagen Consensus uses. Two earlier studies in *Health Affairs* reach the same verdict with different data. Ozawa et al. (2016) find a net return of about 16 times cost when only treatment costs and lost work are counted, and 44 when the full value of longer lives is counted. Adding back the dollar spent, that is about 17 and 45 of benefit per $1. Sim et al. (2020) report that \"using the cost-of-illness approach, return on investment for one dollar invested in immunization against our ten pathogens was 26.1 for the ninety-four countries from 2011 to 2020 and 19.8 from 2021 to 2030.\" Valuing lives saved, they get 51.0 and 52.2. The pattern is clear: 17 to 26 when only medical costs and lost output count, 45 to 101 when lives are valued. Each vaccine's efficacy rests on randomized trials, so the uncertainty lies in how lives are valued, not in whether the vaccines work. The Copenhagen Consensus package saves about 523,000 lives a year. After adding the overhead of the donor channel, the ratio runs from $14.4 to $94 per $1. Once the cost of raising the taxes that fund it is counted, the range is $4.81 to $72.40 per $1.","ratio":"The ratio compares the value of illness and deaths averted with the cost of buying and delivering the vaccines. The source costs already include delivery inside each country, so only the overhead of the international funding channel is added.\n\n**Overhead rates.** Gavi's 2023 accounts show $2,025 million of direct country programme spending. Around it sit $86 million of Secretariat implementation, $209 million of partners' implementation and $65 million of overhead.\n\n- All non-direct spending: 86 + 209 + 65 = 360. Share: 17.8%.\n- Secretariat implementation plus overhead: 86 + 65 = 151. Share: 7.5%.\n\n**Low end (14.4).** Ozawa et al. (2016) count only the cost of illness and find a net return of 16, so benefits are 16 + 1 = 17 times cost. All of their cost is programme spending, so the full 17.8% is added.\n\n- Ratio: 17 ÷ 1.178 = 14.4.\n\n**High end (94).** Patenaude, Sriudomporn and Mak (2023) value years of life saved, with an 8% discount rate.\n\n- Benefits: $762.2 billion. Costs: $7.58 billion. Ratio: 762.2 ÷ 7.58 = 100.5.\n- Programme share of the cost: 1.5 ÷ 1.7 = 0.882. The rest is parents' time, which carries no agency overhead.\n- Overhead at the lower rate: 100.5 ÷ (1 + 0.075 × 0.882) = 94.3, rounded to 94.\n\n**Cost.** Programme $1.5 billion + channel overhead $0.27 billion + parents' time $0.2 billion = $1.97 billion a year.\n\nThe adjustment touches costs only; benefits are left as published. Other estimates sit inside the range. Sim et al. (2020) give 19.8 and 52.2 for 2021-30. Ozawa et al. (2016) give a net return of 44 on a full-income basis, about 45 of benefit per $1. Copenhagen Consensus 2012 (Jamison et al. 2012) gave 20, and the Post-2015 Consensus panel gave expanded immunization $60 per $1.\n\n**After the cost of raising taxes.** Each $1 of public spending costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted, an extra $0.34 to $2.00 (Ballard, Shoven and Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999). The low end uses the higher burden and the high end the lower one. The low end counts all programme spending as public. At the high end, only the programme share of the cost (0.882, plus its 7.5% overhead) is paid from taxes; parents' time is not. Low end: 14.43 ÷ 3.00 = 4.81. High end: 100.5 ÷ (1 + 0.075 × 0.882 + 0.34 × 0.882 × 1.075) = 100.5 ÷ 1.3885 = 72.4. **Range after tax finance: 4.81 to 72.4.**","cost":"The full cost is $1.97 billion a year.\n\n- **Programme: $1.5 billion.** The Copenhagen Consensus (2025) puts the package at $1.7 billion a year, of which $0.2 billion is parents' time. Patenaude, Sriudomporn and Mak (2023) cost the vaccines, injection supplies and freight. Their delivery costs include staff, the cold chain, transport, buildings, programme management, training, social mobilization and disease surveillance. Country-level administration is therefore already inside this figure.\n- **Channel overhead: $0.27 billion.** This is Gavi's own cost of running the money: Secretariat implementation, technical help from partners and general overhead. At the higher rate: 1.5 × 0.178 = 0.27.\n- **Household cost: $0.2 billion.** Parents' time to bring children for vaccination. It is already in the Copenhagen Consensus ratio, so it changes the cost but not the ratio.\n\nAs a cross-check, the present-value cost of $7.58 billion for 2023-2030 works out to about $0.95 billion a year in discounted terms. The last children are the most expensive. GiveWell (2025) estimates \"about $146 to vaccinate an infant\" through cash incentives in northern Nigeria, at about $4,500 per life saved.","strength":"Grade: A+. Several independent peer-reviewed studies, using different methods, datasets and decades, agree that benefits are many times costs. Patenaude, Sriudomporn and Mak (2023), Ozawa et al. (2016) and Sim et al. (2020) disagree on the size of the return, not its sign. The health effect of each vaccine rests on randomized controlled trials. This is as strong as the evidence for a policy gets.","difficulty":"Rating: moderate. Nothing has to be invented. The model already works: national immunization programmes backed by Gavi. What is needed is sustained money from donors and governments. The hard part is the last stretch. In 2024, 85% of infants worldwide completed three doses of the diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis (DTP) vaccine, and measles coverage was 84% for the first dose and 76% for the second (WHO and UNICEF 2025). Coverage has stalled. There were 14.3 million \"zero-dose\" children who never received a single vaccine, 4 million more than the target for staying on track. Many live in conflict zones and remote areas.","who_benefits":"Rating: pro-poor. The children left out are the poorest. In the words of WHO and UNICEF (2025): \"A quarter of the world's infants live in just 26 countries affected by fragility, conflict, or humanitarian crises, yet they make up half of all unvaccinated children globally.\" Averted deaths drive most of the benefit, and they are mostly young children in low-income countries (Patenaude, Sriudomporn and Mak 2023). Donors and national taxpayers pay the programme cost. Parents give up a small amount of time.","counter":"The case for a lower verdict rests on how lives are valued and where. Counting only medical costs and lost work, Ozawa et al. (2016) find a ratio of about 17, and Sim et al. (2020) find 19.8 for 2021-30, against 101 when lives saved are valued (Patenaude, Sriudomporn and Mak 2023). Two United States studies give lower figures still. Carrico et al. (2022) find 7.5 for society and 2.8 for payers; Zhou et al. (2024) find 10.9 and 3.3. They are left out because they describe a rich country with low child mortality, not an aid-funded scale-up in poorer countries. They still confirm that vaccines pay for themselves even where children rarely die.\n\nThe verdict depends on which valuation holds. The low end already rests on the cost-of-illness figure: after overhead and the cost of raising taxes it is 4.81. If that narrower valuation were right, rather than the value-of-life figure of 101, the policy would sit in the Good tier rather than near the top. The other risk is cost. Coverage has stalled at 85% for the third dose of diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis vaccine, with 14.3 million infants receiving no dose (WHO and UNICEF 2025). If the children still unreached cost far more to vaccinate than the average child, returns would fall.","references":["Carrico, J., E. M. La, S. E. Talbird, et al. 2022. \"Value of the Immunization Program for Children in the 2017 US Birth Cohort.\" *Pediatrics* 150 (3): e2021056007. https://doi.org/10.1542/peds.2021-056007.","Copenhagen Consensus Center (Post-2015 Consensus expert panel). 2015. *Post-2015 Consensus: Smart Development Goals.* Presentation of benefit per dollar by target. Copenhagen Consensus Center. https://copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/post-2015_presentation_3.pdf.","Copenhagen Consensus Center. 2025. *Best Things First: The 12 Most Efficient Solutions for the World's Poorest.* Folded leaflet, web version. Copenhagen Consensus Center. https://copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/2025-10/BTF%20Folded%20Leaflet%20WEB.pdf.","Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance. 2024. *Gavi Alliance 2023 Annual Financial Report.* Geneva: Gavi. https://www.gavi.org/sites/default/files/2024-06/Gavi-Alliance-2023-Annual-Financial-Report.pdf.","GiveWell. 2025. *Our Top Charities.* GiveWell. https://www.givewell.org/charities/top-charities.","Jamison, D. T., P. Jha, R. Laxminarayan, and T. Ord. 2012. *Infectious Disease, Injury, and Reproductive Health.* Copenhagen Consensus 2012 Challenge Paper. Copenhagen Consensus Center. https://copenhagenconsensus.com/publication/third-copenhagen-consensus-infectious-disease-assessment-jamison-jha-et-al.","Ozawa, S., S. Clark, A. Portnoy, S. Grewal, L. Brenzel, and D. G. Walker. 2016. \"Return On Investment From Childhood Immunization In Low- And Middle-Income Countries, 2011-20.\" *Health Affairs* 35 (2): 199-207. https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2015.1086.","Patenaude, B., S. Sriudomporn, and J. Mak. 2023. \"Sustainable Development Goal Halftime Project: Benefit-Cost Analysis Using Methods from the Decade of Vaccine Economics Model.\" *Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis* 14 (S1): 136-180. https://doi.org/10.1017/bca.2023.11.","Sim, S. Y., E. Watts, D. Constenla, L. Brenzel, and B. N. Patenaude. 2020. \"Return On Investment From Immunization Against 10 Pathogens In 94 Low- And Middle-Income Countries, 2011-30.\" *Health Affairs* 39 (8): 1343-1353. https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2020.00103.","WHO and UNICEF. 2025. \"Global Childhood Vaccination Holds Steady, yet over 14 Million Infants Remain Unvaccinated.\" WUENIC 2024 estimates, press release. https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/global-childhood-vaccination-holds-steady-yet-over-14-million-infants-remain.","Zhou, F., T. C. Jatlaoui, A. J. Leidner, et al. 2024. \"Health and Economic Benefits of Routine Childhood Immunizations in the Era of the Vaccines for Children Program - United States, 1994-2023.\" *Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report* 73 (31): 682-685. https://doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm7331a2."]},"22":{"policy":"Scale up cheap generic drugs that prevent and treat heart attacks and strokes in low-income and lower-middle-income countries. The package covers aspirin at the onset of a heart attack, blood-pressure medicines, and combination regimens such as the \"polypill\", which joins blood-pressure drugs with a statin. Delivery runs through primary care. Governments and donors pay about $2.4 billion a year.","why_on_list":"It is a health \"best buy\" for the Copenhagen Consensus Center, the Disease Control Priorities project (third edition, DCP3) and the World Health Organization (WHO) Best Buys list for noncommunicable diseases. Heart attacks and strokes are now among the leading causes of death in many poor countries.","evidence":"The drugs work, and they cost little. In the TIPS-3 trial, a polypill plus aspirin lowered major cardiovascular events against placebo, with a hazard ratio of 0.69 (Yusuf et al. 2021). Watkins, Ahmed and Pickersgill (2023) rank aspirin for a suspected heart attack as a \"best investment\", with a ratio above 15 in both low-income and lower-middle-income countries. Their full package of best investments costs $19 billion over 2023-2030, averts 12 million deaths and returns 23 per $1. The Copenhagen Consensus Post-2015 panel put aspirin therapy for heart attacks at $63 per $1, blood-pressure medication at $47 and a combined stroke and heart-attack pill at $7. Nugent (2015) finds 31 to 153 for aspirin, 7 to 34 for hypertension management and 3 to 17 for long-term multi-drug prevention. The range is wide because each study puts a different value on a healthy year of life. At the bottom, WHO (2018) counts only economic output and averted health spending and finds $3.29 per $1 for drug therapy. That figure leaves out the value of lives saved, so it is a floor. After adding the overhead of the donor channel, the ratio runs from $3.1 to $59 per $1. Once the cost of raising the taxes that fund it is counted, the range is $1.02 to $44 per $1.","ratio":"The ratio compares health and economic gains with the cost of drugs, screening and follow-up. The source costs already include delivery inside each country, so only the overhead of the international funding channel is added. United Nations (UN) agencies charge 8% on earmarked donor funds and 7% on thematic funds (Executive Boards 2018).\n\n**Low end (3.1).** WHO (2018), using the method of Bertram et al. (2018), finds $3.29 per $1 for drug therapy and counselling for people at high cardiovascular risk. It counts only output and averted health spending.\n\n- Ratio: 3.29 ÷ 1.08 = 3.05, rounded to 3.1.\n\n**High end (59).** The Post-2015 Consensus panel put aspirin therapy for heart attacks at $63 per $1. Cheap acute aspirin is the single best item in the package.\n\n- Ratio at the lower overhead rate: 63 ÷ 1.07 = 58.9, rounded to 59.\n\n**Cost.** Programme $2.4 billion + channel overhead $0.19 billion + household cost $0 = $2.59 billion a year.\n\nThe adjustment touches costs only; benefits are left as published. Before overhead the components span 3.3 to 63. Routine blood-pressure drugs sit in the middle, at 7 to 47. Multi-drug and polypill regimens sit lowest, at 3 to 17 (Nugent 2015). Nugent and Brouwer (2015) find that tobacco taxes combined with a multi-drug regimen for high-risk people return 7 per $1. The full package of Watkins, Ahmed and Pickersgill (2023) scores 23.\n\n**After the cost of raising taxes.** Each $1 of public spending costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven and Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999). The low end uses the higher burden and the high end the lower one. The whole cost behind the ratio is public spending. Low end: 3.05 ÷ 3.00 = 1.02. High end: 58.9 ÷ 1.34 = 44.0. **Range after tax finance: 1.02 to 44.**","cost":"The full cost is $2.59 billion a year.\n\n- **Programme: $2.4 billion.** Watkins, Ahmed and Pickersgill (2023) cost the best-investment package at $19 billion over 2023-2030, about $2.4 billion a year. It is a rough proxy. It includes a few items outside heart disease, such as early breast cancer and epilepsy care, and leaves out the lower-return heart drugs. Their clinical unit costs already carry a 17% markup for programme management above the facility, plus ancillary facility costs (multipliers of 1.17, 1.257 and 1.488 by platform). WHO's $3.29 return uses a costing tool that adds \"related health system costs\" such as infrastructure and staff to drugs and supplies (WHO and UNDP 2019).\n- **Channel overhead: $0.19 billion.** The standard UN cost-recovery charge on earmarked donor money. At the higher rate: 2.4 × 0.080 = 0.19.\n- **Household cost: none counted.** Patients' travel and time are not reported separately in these sources.\n\nA larger 70% programme markup used for tuberculosis programmes was not applied, because it belongs to stand-alone disease programmes. Cross-checks: the WHO HEARTS package costs about $18 to $44 per person treated per year (Moran et al. 2022). The Copenhagen Consensus bundle for noncommunicable diseases costs $4.4 billion a year, and Nugent's five interventions about $8.5 billion a year.","strength":"Grade: A. Several peer-reviewed benefit-cost studies support the policy (Watkins, Ahmed and Pickersgill 2023; Bertram et al. 2018; Nugent and Brouwer 2015). Their effect sizes come from randomized-trial meta-analyses of aspirin, blood-pressure drugs and statins, and from polypill trials such as TIPS-3. It falls short of A+ because the published ratios for each component differ by a factor of ten, and they depend heavily on the value placed on a healthy year of life.","difficulty":"Rating: moderate. The drugs are generic and cheap. The WHO HEARTS programme already runs in dozens of countries. What is hard is everything around the pill: screening people who feel well, bringing them back, and keeping them on treatment for years. In TIPS-3, about 42% of participants had stopped the polypill regimen by the end of the trial (Yusuf et al. 2021). A sustained scale-up of primary care is needed, not a one-off campaign.","who_benefits":"Rating: broad. Adults with high blood pressure or heart disease gain, across all income groups in low-income and lower-middle-income countries. Free drugs paid for by governments or donors help poorer patients who cannot buy them. But diagnosis and continuing care tend to reach better-off urban patients first. The sources do not show that the gains are concentrated on the poorest. Donors and national taxpayers pay.","counter":"The counter-evidence cuts both ways. Nugent (2015) puts aspirin for heart attacks at 153 per $1. That figure values a healthy year of life at $5,000 with a 3% discount rate, well above the Copenhagen Consensus 2023 values of $995 to $4,440 at 8%, so the panel's 63 is used instead. On the other side, the WHO floor of $3.29 per $1 counts only economic output and averted health spending, not the value of lives saved, so the true low end is probably higher. Adherence pulls the other way: in the TIPS-3 trial, 43% of participants were not taking the polypill by the end (Yusuf et al. 2021), and real-world programmes may do worse.\n\nThe verdict depends on the mix of drugs. Aspirin for a suspected heart attack scores 31 to 153 (Nugent 2015), routine blood-pressure drugs about 7 to 47, and multi-drug or polypill regimens 3 to 17. A programme led by acute aspirin and routine blood-pressure drugs would sit well inside the Excellent tier. One built mainly on polypills would sit lower, in the Good tier or below. Real-world adherence below the trial's would pull the result the same way.","references":["Bertram, M. Y., et al. 2018. \"Investing in Non-Communicable Diseases: An Estimation of the Return on Investment for Prevention and Treatment Services.\" *The Lancet* 391 (10134): 2071-2078. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(18)30665-2.","Copenhagen Consensus Center (Post-2015 Consensus expert panel). 2015. *Post-2015 Consensus: Smart Development Goals.* Presentation of benefit per dollar by target. Copenhagen Consensus Center. https://copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/post-2015_presentation_3.pdf.","Executive Boards of UNDP/UNFPA/UNOPS, UNICEF and UN-Women. 2018. *Joint Comprehensive Proposal on the Cost-Recovery Policy.* DP/FPA-ICEF-UNW/2018/1. United Nations. https://aa.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/board-documents/main-document/EN-Joint_report_on_cost_recovery.pdf.","Moran, A. E., M. Farrell, D. Cazabon, R. Garg, et al. 2022. \"Building the Health-Economic Case for Scaling up the WHO-HEARTS Hypertension Control Package in Low- and Middle-Income Countries.\" *Revista Panamericana de Salud Publica* 46: e140. https://doi.org/10.26633/RPSP.2022.140.","Nugent, R. 2015. *Post-2015 Consensus: Health Perspective - Non-Communicable Diseases.* Post-2015 Consensus perspective paper. Copenhagen Consensus Center. https://copenhagenconsensus.com/publication/post-2015-consensus-health-perspective-non-communicable-diseases-nugent.","Nugent, R., and E. Brouwer. 2015. \"Economic Benefit-Cost Analysis of Select Secondary Prevention Interventions in LMIC.\" *Global Heart* 10 (4): 319-321. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gheart.2015.09.002.","Watkins, D., S. Ahmed, and S. Pickersgill. 2023. \"Best Investments in Chronic, Noncommunicable Disease Prevention and Control in Low- and Lower-Middle-Income Countries.\" *Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis* 14 (S1): 255-271. https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/jbcoan/v14y2023is1p255-271_10.html.","World Health Organization and United Nations Development Programme. 2019. *Non-Communicable Disease Prevention and Control: A Guidance Note for Investment Cases.* WHO/NMH/NMA/18.97. UN Interagency Task Force on NCDs. https://www.unnutrition.org/wp-content/uploads/NCD-investment-case-guidance-note-2019.pdf.","World Health Organization. 2018. *Saving Lives, Spending Less: A Strategic Response to Noncommunicable Diseases.* WHO/NMH/NVI/18.8. Geneva: WHO. https://alertas.directoriolegislativo.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/WHO-NMH-NVI-18.8-eng.pdf.","Yusuf, S., P. Joseph, A. Dans, et al. (TIPS-3 Investigators). 2021. \"Polypill with or without Aspirin in Persons without Cardiovascular Disease.\" *New England Journal of Medicine* 384: 216-228. https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa2028220."]},"23":{"policy":"Expand the three core tools against malaria in Africa. Hand out more insecticide-treated bed nets. Give young children in the Sahel preventive drugs during the rainy season, known as seasonal malaria chemoprevention (SMC). Subsidize artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACT) so that sick children get effective treatment. The costed scale-up needs about $1.4 billion a year from donors and governments.","why_on_list":"It is a health \"best buy\" for the Copenhagen Consensus Center, the Disease Control Priorities project (third edition, DCP3) and GiveWell. GiveWell's two malaria charities are among its top-rated programmes.","evidence":"Malaria still killed about 610,000 people in 2024, mostly African children (WHO 2025). The tools to stop it are proven. Bhatt et al. (2015) estimate that control efforts \"averted 663 (542–753 credible interval) million clinical cases since 2000,\" and that insecticide-treated nets \"were by far the largest contributor (68% of cases averted).\" Shretta and Anye (2023) cost a 10-point rise in net coverage in 29 African countries at $5.7 billion over 2023-2030. It averts 1,337,069 deaths and yields benefits of $275.4 billion, a ratio of 48. Copenhagen Consensus 2012 (Jamison et al. 2012) found that subsidizing treatment returns about 35 per $1. Hallett et al. (2025) find that the best mix of spending on HIV, tuberculosis and malaria returns up to $19 of health value per $1. That covers three diseases at once, so it is a cautious floor for malaria's best tools. GiveWell (2025) puts the cost at about $4,000 per life saved for SMC and $5,500 for nets. The main risk is that rising drug and insecticide resistance could erode these gains. After adding the overhead of the donor channel, the ratio runs from $17.4 to $45 per $1. Once the cost of raising the taxes that fund it is counted, the range is $5.81 to $33.60 per $1.","ratio":"The ratio compares lives saved, work days regained and health spending avoided with the cost of nets, drugs and their delivery. The source costs already include delivery inside each country, so only the overhead of the international funding channel is added. The Global Fund's operating expenses were 9.0% of grant spending in 2023 and 6.7% in 2024. These are the higher and lower overhead rates.\n\n**Low end (17.4).** Hallett et al. (2025) find up to $19 of health value per $1 across the HIV, tuberculosis and malaria portfolio.\n\n- Ratio at the higher overhead rate: 19 ÷ 1.090 = 17.4.\n\n**High end (45).** Shretta and Anye (2023) cost a 10-point scale-up of nets at an 8% discount rate.\n\n- Benefits: $275.4 billion (lives saved $225.9 billion, productivity $41.7 billion, health-system savings $7.7 billion).\n- Costs: $5.7 billion. Ratio: 275.4 ÷ 5.7 = 48.\n- Ratio at the lower overhead rate: 48 ÷ 1.067 = 45.0.\n\n**Cost.** Programme $1.4 billion + channel overhead $0.13 billion + household cost $0 = $1.53 billion a year.\n\nThe adjustment touches costs only; benefits are left as published. Other estimates fall inside the range. The Post-2015 Consensus panel put \"halve malaria infections\" at $36 per $1. Copenhagen Consensus 2012 gave the treatment subsidy about 35. Seasonal chemoprevention has no published ratio in these sources, but its cost per life saved is close to that of nets.\n\n**After the cost of raising taxes.** Each $1 of public spending costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven and Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999). The low end uses the higher burden and the high end the lower one. The whole cost behind the ratio is public spending. Low end: 17.43 ÷ 3.00 = 5.81. High end: 45.0 ÷ 1.34 = 33.6. **Range after tax finance: 5.81 to 33.6.**","cost":"The full cost is $1.53 billion a year.\n\n- **Programme: $1.4 billion.** The Copenhagen Consensus net scale-up costs $1.1 billion a year (Copenhagen Consensus Center 2025). The treatment subsidy adds about $0.3 billion a year (Jamison et al. 2012). Shretta and Anye (2023) cost the nets, their distribution and the communication that gets people to use them. They do not include active surveillance. Seasonal chemoprevention adds little: about $3.63 per child per season in the ACCESS-SMC programme. GiveWell puts it at about $7 per child protected and about $6 per net.\n- **Channel overhead: $0.13 billion.** The Global Fund Secretariat's operating costs. At the higher rate: 1.4 × 0.090 = 0.13.\n- **Household cost: none counted.** Time to collect nets is not costed in the sources.\n\nThe total funding gap is much larger. WHO (2025) reports $3.9 billion spent in 2024 against a target of $9.3 billion, a shortfall of about $5.4 billion a year. Filling all of it would likely return less per dollar than the costed scale-ups.","strength":"Grade: A. Peer-reviewed benefit-cost studies (Shretta and Anye 2023; Hallett et al. 2025) rest on randomized trials of nets, seasonal chemoprevention and combination treatment. Large observational studies confirm the effect at scale (Bhatt et al. 2015; ACCESS-SMC Partnership 2020). In seven countries, SMC gave 88% protection in the 28 days after each round. It falls short of A+ because there is essentially one benefit-cost study per tool rather than several independent ones.","difficulty":"Rating: moderate. The delivery channels already exist: the Global Fund, the US President's Malaria Initiative, national malaria programmes, the Against Malaria Foundation and Malaria Consortium. The obstacle is money. Only 42% of the required funding was found in 2024 (WHO 2025). Scale-up has been done before. SMC grew from 170,000 children per cycle in 2012 to 54 million in 2024, and several countries have been certified malaria-free.","who_benefits":"Rating: pro-poor. About 95% of malaria deaths occur in the WHO African Region, and about 75% of those are children under five (WHO 2025). The burden falls on the poorest rural households. The gains also reach incomes. Sarma et al. (2019) find that a 10% fall in malaria incidence goes with a 0.27% rise in income per person, and that \"greater average income gains would be achieved among poorer and higher endemic countries.\" Donors and national taxpayers pay.","counter":"The narrowest reading of the evidence is the main counter-case. Hallett et al. (2025) find $3.50 of direct economic benefit per $1 when no value is placed on lives saved. It is left out of the range because every other health estimate values lives, but it still shows a positive return on the narrowest test. The larger risk is resistance. The World Health Organization (WHO 2025) reports that cases rose to 282 million and deaths to 610,000 in 2024, and names drug resistance a key threat. If nets and drugs lose power, future returns will fall below the trial-based estimates. That risk has no ratio, so it is noted rather than used to set the range.\n\nThe verdict turns on how lives are valued and on the cost of raising the money. The low end comes from Hallett et al.'s portfolio figure of $19 per $1, cut by overhead and by nearly $2 of deadweight for each $1 of tax, giving 5.81. If the direct-economic figure of $3.50 were the right measure, the ratio would drop to the low single digits and out of the Excellent tier. Seasonal chemoprevention could lift it. GiveWell puts its cost at about $4,000 per life saved, against $5,500 for nets, but it has no published benefit-cost ratio.","references":["ACCESS-SMC Partnership. 2020. \"Effectiveness of Seasonal Malaria Chemoprevention at Scale in West and Central Africa: An Observational Study.\" *The Lancet* 396 (10265): 1829-1840. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)32227-3.","Bhatt, S., D. J. Weiss, E. Cameron, et al. 2015. \"The Effect of Malaria Control on Plasmodium falciparum in Africa between 2000 and 2015.\" *Nature* 526: 207-211. https://doi.org/10.1038/nature15535.","Copenhagen Consensus Center (Post-2015 Consensus expert panel). 2015. *Post-2015 Consensus: Smart Development Goals.* Presentation of benefit per dollar by target. Copenhagen Consensus Center. https://copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/post-2015_presentation_3.pdf.","Copenhagen Consensus Center. 2025. *Best Things First: The 12 Most Efficient Solutions for the World's Poorest.* Folded leaflet, web version. Copenhagen Consensus Center. https://copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/2025-10/BTF%20Folded%20Leaflet%20WEB.pdf.","GiveWell. 2025. *Our Top Charities.* GiveWell. https://www.givewell.org/charities/top-charities.","Hallett, T. B., N. A. Menzies, S. Resch, C. Pretorius, J. Stover, J. S. Su, P. Winskill, et al. 2025. \"The Case for Optimal Investment in Combating HIV, Tuberculosis, and Malaria: A Global Modelling Study.\" *The Lancet* 406 (10500): 261-270. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(25)00831-1.","Jamison, D. T., P. Jha, R. Laxminarayan, and T. Ord. 2012. *Infectious Disease, Injury, and Reproductive Health.* Copenhagen Consensus 2012 Challenge Paper. Copenhagen Consensus Center. https://copenhagenconsensus.com/publication/third-copenhagen-consensus-infectious-disease-assessment-jamison-jha-et-al.","Sarma, N., E. Patouillard, R. E. Cibulskis, and J.-L. Arcand. 2019. \"The Economic Burden of Malaria: Revisiting the Evidence.\" *American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene* 101 (6): 1405-1415. https://doi.org/10.4269/ajtmh.19-0386.","Shretta, R., and R. N. Anye. 2023. \"An Investment Case for the Scale-up and Use of Insecticide-Treated Nets Halfway into the SDG Targets.\" *Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis* 14 (S1): 16-54. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-benefit-cost-analysis/article/an-investment-case-for-the-scaleup-and-use-of-insecticidetreated-nets-halfway-into-the-sdg-targets/6D7B343AD211E9DC2684689965F6868A.","The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. 2025. *Annual Financial Report 2024.* Geneva: The Global Fund. https://archive.theglobalfund.org/media/sqilcy4b/archive_2024-annual-financial_report_en.pdf.","World Health Organization. 2025. *World Malaria Report 2025: Partner Briefing.* WHO Global Malaria Programme. https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/malaria/world-malaria-reports/world-malaria-report-2025-partner-briefing-eng.pdf."]},"24":{"policy":"Close the most harmful vitamin and mineral gaps in poor countries. Add iron, zinc and vitamin A to staple foods such as flour, and iodine to salt. Give pregnant women a daily multiple-micronutrient tablet in place of iron and folic acid alone, with calcium. Give young children vitamin A capsules. The costed package, focused on South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, costs about $0.5 billion a year.","why_on_list":"It is a health \"best buy\" for the Copenhagen Consensus Center and GiveWell, with support from the Disease Control Priorities project (third edition, DCP3).","evidence":"Micronutrients cost cents to a few dollars per person a year, and the returns are large. Larsen, Hoddinott and Razvi (2023) find that switching pregnant women from iron and folic acid to multiple micronutrients returns 37.5 per $1 at an 8% discount rate. Adding calcium gives 18.6 to 23.9. Fortifying flour with iron returns 8 at a 3% discount rate and 7 at 6% (Horton, Alderman and Rivera 2008). Iodizing salt returns 30 at 3%, falling to 12 at 6%. Horton and Ross (2003) find a median of 6 across 10 countries for iron fortification when only physical productivity is counted, and 36 when cognitive gains are added. For vitamin A, a Cochrane review found \"a 12% observed reduction in the risk of all-cause mortality\" for children given supplements (Imdad et al. 2022). GiveWell (2025) estimates about $3,500 per life saved for vitamin A supplements, among its most cost-effective programmes. The main uncertainty is whether old gains still hold where deficiency has fallen. After adding the overhead of the donor channel, the ratio runs from $5.6 to $35 per $1. Once the cost of raising the taxes that fund it is counted, the range is $1.85 to $26.20 per $1.","ratio":"The ratio compares gains in survival, health and future earnings with the cost of nutrients and their delivery. The source costs already include delivery inside each country, so only the overhead of the international funding channel is added. United Nations (UN) agencies charge 8% on earmarked donor funds and 7% on thematic funds (Executive Boards 2018).\n\n**Low end (5.6).** Horton and Ross (2003) find a median ratio of 6 for iron fortification, counting only gains in physical productivity.\n\n- Ratio at the higher overhead rate: 6 ÷ 1.08 = 5.6.\n\n**High end (35).** Larsen, Hoddinott and Razvi (2023) find 37.5 for multiple micronutrients in pregnancy, at an 8% discount rate.\n\n- Ratio at the lower overhead rate: 37.5 ÷ 1.07 = 35.0.\n\n**Cost.** Programme $0.5 billion + channel overhead $0.04 billion + household cost $0 = $0.54 billion a year.\n\nThe adjustment touches costs only; benefits are left as published. Other figures fall inside the range. The Copenhagen Consensus scale-up figures for South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa give iron flour fortification $1,336 million of benefits for $167 million of cost: 1,336 ÷ 167 = 8.0. Salt iodization gives $570 million for $19 million: 570 ÷ 19 = 30. The Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN 2019) puts fortification overall at 27 per $1. The whole Copenhagen Consensus nutrition package scores 18.\n\n**After the cost of raising taxes.** Each $1 of public spending costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven and Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999). The low end uses the higher burden and the high end the lower one. The whole cost behind the ratio is public spending. Low end: 5.56 ÷ 3.00 = 1.85. High end: 35.05 ÷ 1.34 = 26.2. **Range after tax finance: 1.85 to 26.2.**","cost":"The full cost is $0.54 billion a year.\n\n- **Programme: $0.5 billion.** The sum of the costed parts. Iron flour fortification at 50% coverage costs $167 million a year, and salt iodization at 80% coverage $19 million (Copenhagen Consensus Center, n.d.). Multiple micronutrients for pregnant women cost about $84 million a year and calcium about $216 million (Larsen, Hoddinott and Razvi 2023). Total: 0.167 + 0.019 + 0.084 + 0.216 = 0.486, rounded to $0.5 billion.\n- **Channel overhead: $0.04 billion.** The standard UN cost-recovery charge on earmarked donor money. At the higher rate: 0.5 × 0.080 = 0.04.\n- **Household cost: none added.** The fortification figures are total resource costs, including the share borne by millers and salt producers.\n\nFortification is very cheap: about $0.05 per person per year for iodine and $0.12 for iron. Horton, Alderman and Rivera (2008) note that the actual ingredients are \"only about 20% of this total\"; the rest is equipment and processing. Delivering supplements through antenatal care adds $0.50 to $1.45 per pregnant woman. Two items are not costed: zinc and vitamin A in fortification, and wider vitamin A capsule coverage at about $2 per child per year (GiveWell 2025). Much of the fortification cost falls on millers and is passed on to consumers.","strength":"Grade: A. Peer-reviewed benefit-cost studies support the policy (Larsen, Hoddinott and Razvi 2023; Horton and Ross 2003). They rest on randomized trials and meta-analyses. The Cochrane review of vitamin A pooled 19 mortality trials with about 1.2 million children and rated the evidence high-certainty (Imdad et al. 2022). It falls short of A+ for two reasons. The largest single vitamin A trial found no significant effect on deaths, and no benefit-cost study covers the exact iron, zinc and vitamin A fortification bundle.","difficulty":"Rating: easy. A single health ministry or food regulator can require fortification under existing food-standards law. More than 60 countries already have iodized salt in at least 70% of households. Supplements in pregnancy and vitamin A capsules move through existing antenatal care and child-health days, and one donor or ministry can pay for them. The total bill is about $0.5 billion a year.","who_benefits":"Rating: pro-poor. Deficiency is concentrated in poor households that rely on cheap staples with few nutrients. Eighty percent of undernourished children live in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. Supplements for mothers and children run through public programmes that reach low-income families. Donors and governments pay for supplements. For fortification, millers pay at first and pass a small cost on to consumers.","counter":"The largest single trial is the main counter-evidence. DEVTA, which gave vitamin A to preschool children in north India, found a mortality ratio of 0.96, with a 95% confidence interval of 0.89 to 1.03, which is not statistically significant (Awasthi et al. 2013). It suggests the benefit may now be smaller where deficiency and child deaths have fallen. DEVTA is already pooled in the Cochrane estimate of 12% lower child mortality (Imdad et al. 2022), so it lowers the grade rather than setting the range. The Post-2015 Consensus panel put reducing child malnutrition at $45 per $1, but that covers a wider stunting package, including feeding and deworming, not micronutrients alone.\n\nThe verdict depends on which nutrients are delivered and what they are credited with. Multiple micronutrient supplements for pregnant women return 37.5 (Larsen, Hoddinott and Razvi 2023), and salt iodization about 30. Iron fortification counted on physical productivity alone returns 6, the source of the low end; with cognitive benefits it reaches 36 (Horton and Ross 2003). If a programme leaned on iron fortification and its cognitive gains did not materialise, the result would fall toward the low end of 1.85, in the Mid tier, after overhead and the cost of raising taxes. If those gains hold, the low end rises with them.","references":["Awasthi, S., R. Peto, et al. (DEVTA team). 2013. \"Vitamin A Supplementation Every 6 Months with Retinol in 1 Million Pre-School Children in North India: DEVTA, a Cluster-Randomised Trial.\" *The Lancet* 381 (9876): 1469-1477. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(12)62125-4.","Copenhagen Consensus Center (Post-2015 Consensus expert panel). 2015. *Post-2015 Consensus: Smart Development Goals.* Presentation of benefit per dollar by target. Copenhagen Consensus Center. https://copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/post-2015_presentation_3.pdf.","Copenhagen Consensus Center. 2025. *Best Things First: The 12 Most Efficient Solutions for the World's Poorest.* Folded leaflet, web version. Copenhagen Consensus Center. https://copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/2025-10/BTF%20Folded%20Leaflet%20WEB.pdf.","Copenhagen Consensus Center. n.d. *Micronutrient Fortification and Biofortification Challenge.* Guide to Giving. Copenhagen Consensus Center. https://copenhagenconsensus.com/guide-giving/micronutrient-fortification-and-biofortification-challenge.","Executive Boards of UNDP/UNFPA/UNOPS, UNICEF and UN-Women. 2018. *Joint Comprehensive Proposal on the Cost-Recovery Policy.* DP/FPA-ICEF-UNW/2018/1. United Nations. https://aa.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/board-documents/main-document/EN-Joint_report_on_cost_recovery.pdf.","GiveWell. 2025. *Our Top Charities.* GiveWell. https://www.givewell.org/charities/top-charities.","Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition. 2019. *Food Fortification Brief.* Citing G. Garrett et al. 2019. GAIN. https://www.gainhealth.org/sites/default/files/publications/final_food-fortification-brief.pdf.","Horton, S., and J. Ross. 2003. \"The Economics of Iron Deficiency.\" *Food Policy* 28: 51-75 (corrigendum 2007). https://doi.org/10.1016/S0306-9192(02)00070-2.","Horton, S., H. Alderman, and J. A. Rivera. 2008. *Micronutrient Fortification (Iron and Salt Iodization).* Copenhagen Consensus 2008 Best Practice Paper. Copenhagen Consensus Center. https://copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/bpp_fortification.pdf.","Imdad, A., E. Mayo-Wilson, M. R. Haykal, A. Regan, J. Sidhu, A. Smith, and Z. A. Bhutta. 2022. \"Vitamin A Supplementation for Preventing Morbidity and Mortality in Children from Six Months to Five Years of Age.\" *Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews* 2022 (3): CD008524. https://doi.org/10.1002/14651858.CD008524.pub4.","Larsen, B., J. Hoddinott, and S. Razvi. 2023. \"Investing in Nutrition: A Global Best Investment Case.\" *Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis* 14 (S1): 235-254. https://doi.org/10.1017/bca.2023.22."]},"25":{"policy":"Raise excise taxes on cigarettes and alcohol in low-income and lower-middle-income countries. Higher prices cut smoking and heavy drinking, especially among the young and the poor, and raise revenue. This is a rule, not a spending programme. The only real costs are collecting the tax, policing smuggling and marking legal packs.","why_on_list":"It is a health \"best buy\" for the Copenhagen Consensus Center, the Disease Control Priorities project (third edition, DCP3) and the World Health Organization (WHO) Best Buys list for noncommunicable diseases.","evidence":"Price is the strongest lever on tobacco use. Jha and Peto (2014) put the price elasticity of cigarettes at about -0.4: doubling the real price cuts smoking by about a third and still raises revenue. For alcohol, a meta-analysis of 112 studies finds an elasticity of -0.51 (Wagenaar, Salois and Komro 2009). Watkins, Ahmed and Pickersgill (2023) find that tobacco excise taxes return 100 per $1 in lower-middle-income countries and alcohol taxes 53 in low-income countries. In India alone, they estimate $35 billion of benefits and 910,000 lives saved for an implementation cost of $5.7 million a year. WHO (2018) counts only output and averted health spending and finds $7.43 per $1 for tobacco and $9.13 for alcohol. The big uncertainty is how to treat the pleasure smokers give up. Ignoring it, the tobacco ratio reaches 620 to 1,300; counting it, about 100. The low end of 2.9 adds generous costs for collection, enforcement and secure tax stamps, and assumes smuggling eats 10% of the health gain. Even then, benefits exceed costs. Once the cost of raising the taxes that fund it is counted, the range is $1.47 to $98.20 per $1.","ratio":"The ratio compares health gains with the real resource costs of the tax. Tax revenue itself is a transfer from smokers and drinkers to government, not a benefit or a cost.\n\n**High end (100).** Watkins, Ahmed and Pickersgill (2023), from their replication data, at an 8% discount rate for 2023-2030 across low-income and lower-middle-income countries:\n\n- Tobacco tax benefits: $51.31 billion.\n- Costs: implementation $0.045 billion + a charge for pleasure smokers forgo $0.462 billion = $0.507 billion.\n- Ratio: 51.31 ÷ 0.507 = 101.2. The published headline, 100, sets the high end.\n- Alcohol tax, for comparison: 2.94 ÷ (0.029 + 0.026) = 53.3.\n\n**Low end (2.9).** Start from the same base case and make it harsher.\n\n- Benefits cut by 10% for illicit cigarettes: 0.9 × 51.31 = 46.18.\n- Add the upper-bound yearly costs of collection ($0.80 billion), enforcement ($0.45 billion) and secure stamps ($1.21 billion), or $2.46 billion a year, over eight years using an annuity factor of 6.206.\n- Costs: 0.045 + 0.462 + 6.206 × 2.46 = 15.79.\n- Ratio: 46.18 ÷ 15.79 = 2.9.\n\n**Cost.** Public outlay $0 + administration and enforcement $1.26 billion + industry compliance $1.21 billion = $2.47 billion a year.\n\nOther estimates fall inside the range. WHO (2018) gives 7.43 for tobacco and 9.13 for alcohol. The Post-2015 Consensus panel put \"increase tobacco prices 125%\" at $22 per $1, and Nugent (2015) gave tobacco taxes 10 to 52. The paper's text describes a larger charge for forgone pleasure than its code applies. Applying a full 90% offset would give 0.1 × 1,134 = 113, still above 101, so the high end is not overstated.\n\n**After the cost of raising taxes.** Each $1 of public spending costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted, an extra $0.34 to $2.00 (Ballard, Shoven and Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999). The low end uses the higher burden and the high end the lower one. Consumers' lost enjoyment and the tax stamps the industry pays for are private costs. The public costs are implementation and, at the low end, tax collection ($0.80 billion a year) and enforcement against illicit trade ($0.45 billion a year). They are 0.494 of the cost at the low end and 0.0888 at the high end. Low end: 2.92 ÷ (1 + 2.0 × 0.494) = 1.47. High end: 101.2 ÷ (1 + 0.34 × 0.0888) = 98.2. **Range after tax finance: 1.47 to 98.2.**","cost":"The full cost is $2.47 billion a year, an upper bound for low-income and lower-middle-income countries.\n\n- **Public outlay: $0.** The tax raises money rather than spending it.\n- **Administration and enforcement: $1.26 billion.** Three parts. First, implementing the tax increases: $0.0739 billion in present value ÷ 6.206 = $0.012 billion a year (Watkins, Ahmed and Pickersgill 2023). Second, collection, using the WHO (2021) ratio for lower-middle-income countries of 1.6 per 100 collected, applied to India's projected $50 billion a year of extra tobacco revenue: 0.016 × 50 = $0.80 billion. Third, enforcement against smuggling at about 0.9% of revenue, the United Kingdom ratio of roughly £90 million a year of enforcement staff against about £10 billion of tobacco revenue (World Bank Group 2019): 0.009 × 50 = $0.45 billion.\n- **Industry compliance: $1.21 billion.** Encrypted tax stamps paid by industry. The extra cost per 1,000 packs rises from $0.42 to $8.20 (WHO 2021), applied to about 155.6 billion packs a year. That pack count scales world consumption of about 6 trillion cigarettes by the population share of these countries, 4.065 billion of 7.837 billion.\n\nEach part is an upper bound. Average collection and enforcement ratios overstate the marginal cost of raising an existing tax. India's $5.7 million a year shows how small that marginal cost can be. Alcohol taxes cost less than I$0.10 per person to implement (Chisholm et al. 2018). Many smokers in these countries use bidis or smokeless tobacco, so the stamp cost is also high. Revenue lost to smuggling, $40 to $50 billion a year worldwide, is a transfer and is not counted.","strength":"Grade: A. Peer-reviewed benefit-cost studies support the policy (Watkins, Ahmed and Pickersgill 2023; Bertram et al. 2018, which underlies the WHO returns). The health effects rest on price elasticities from meta-analyses of many quasi-experimental and econometric studies (Wagenaar, Salois and Komro 2009; Jha and Peto 2014). It falls short of A+ for two reasons. The ratio swings from about 100 to 1,300 depending on how forgone pleasure is treated, and there are no randomized trials.","difficulty":"Rating: moderate. Each country needs only an ordinary tax law, and there are many precedents. The Philippines, Turkey and South Africa have all raised tobacco excise sharply. The obstacles are political. In 2018 only 38 countries, covering 14% of the world's population, had sufficiently high tobacco taxes (WHO 2021). WHO names tobacco industry interference as a major stumbling block. Fears of smuggling are the other common objection.","who_benefits":"Rating: pro-poor. The poor quit more when prices rise, so they gain the most health. Among 500 million male smokers in 13 middle-income countries, a 50% price rise would give the poorest fifth 6.7 times more years of life than the richest fifth (Global Tobacco Economics Consortium 2018). It would keep 8.8 million men out of extreme poverty. The same study finds that \"the bottom income group would get 31% of the life years saved and 29% each of the averted disease costs and averted catastrophic health expenditures, while paying only 10% of the additional taxes.\" Poor smokers who do not quit still pay more. As a share of cash spending, the tax falls hardest on them (Remler 2004).","counter":"The counter-evidence suggests the ratio could be higher still. Watkins, Ahmed and Pickersgill (2023) report tobacco tax ratios of 620 in low-income and 1,300 in lower-middle-income countries when smokers' lost enjoyment is not counted as a cost. Their own headline keeps that charge, and the range follows them. Remler (2004) raises a different objection: cigarette taxes heavily burden poor smokers who do not quit, whatever measure is used. That does not change the ratio, but it qualifies the pro-poor label. On health gains, the poorest 20% still gain 6.7 times more life-years than the richest 20% (Global Tobacco Economics Consortium 2018).\n\nThe low end depends on enforcement costs. It subtracts 10% of the health gain for smuggling and adds upper-bound collection, enforcement and secure-stamp costs of $2.46 billion a year. With only the published implementation costs, the ratio is about 100; with the upper-bound costs it falls to 2.9, and to 1.47 once the cost of raising the taxes that pay for collection and enforcement is counted. Where these costs land decides whether the tax sits in the Mid tier or near the top of the list. A large rise in smuggling would push it lower, but the World Bank Group (2019) finds that \"tax increases do not necessarily lead to substantial and sustained increases in illicit tobacco consumption\".","references":["Bertram, M. Y., et al. 2018. \"Investing in Non-Communicable Diseases: An Estimation of the Return on Investment for Prevention and Treatment Services.\" *The Lancet* 391 (10134): 2071-2078. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(18)30665-2.","Chisholm, D., D. Moro, M. Bertram, C. Pretorius, G. Gmel, et al. 2018. \"Are the 'Best Buys' for Alcohol Control Still Valid? An Update on the Comparative Cost-Effectiveness of Alcohol Control Strategies at the Global Level.\" *Journal of Studies on Alcohol and Drugs* 79 (4): 514-522. https://doi.org/10.15288/jsad.2018.79.514.","Copenhagen Consensus Center (Post-2015 Consensus expert panel). 2015. *Post-2015 Consensus: Smart Development Goals.* Presentation of benefit per dollar by target. Copenhagen Consensus Center. https://copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/post-2015_presentation_3.pdf.","Global Tobacco Economics Consortium (P. Jha, S. Mishra, V. Ulep, P. Marquez, A. Fuchs, D. T. Jamison, et al.). 2018. \"The Health, Poverty, and Financial Consequences of a Cigarette Price Increase among 500 Million Male Smokers in 13 Middle Income Countries: Compartmental Model Study.\" *BMJ* 361: k1162. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.k1162.","Jha, P., and R. Peto. 2014. \"Global Effects of Smoking, of Quitting, and of Taxing Tobacco.\" *New England Journal of Medicine* 370: 60-68. https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMra1308383.","Nugent, R. 2015. *Post-2015 Consensus: Health Perspective - Non-Communicable Diseases.* Post-2015 Consensus perspective paper. Copenhagen Consensus Center. https://copenhagenconsensus.com/publication/post-2015-consensus-health-perspective-non-communicable-diseases-nugent.","Remler, D. K. 2004. \"Poor Smokers, Poor Quitters, and Cigarette Tax Regressivity.\" *American Journal of Public Health* 94 (2): 225-229. https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.94.2.225.","Wagenaar, A. C., M. J. Salois, and K. A. Komro. 2009. \"Effects of Beverage Alcohol Price and Tax Levels on Drinking: A Meta-Analysis of 1003 Estimates from 112 Studies.\" *Addiction* 104 (2): 179-190. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1360-0443.2008.02438.x.","Watkins, D., S. Ahmed, and S. Pickersgill. 2023. \"Best Investments in Chronic, Noncommunicable Disease Prevention and Control in Low- and Lower-Middle-Income Countries.\" *Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis* 14 (S1): 255-271. https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/jbcoan/v14y2023is1p255-271_10.html.","World Bank Group. 2019. *Confronting Illicit Tobacco Trade: A Global Review of Country Experiences.* WBG Global Tobacco Control Program. Washington, DC: World Bank. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/677451548260528135/pdf/133959-REPL-PUBLIC-6-2-2019-19-59-24-WBGTobaccoIllicitTradeFINALvweb.pdf.","World Health Organization. 2018. *Saving Lives, Spending Less: A Strategic Response to Noncommunicable Diseases.* WHO/NMH/NVI/18.8. Geneva: WHO. https://alertas.directoriolegislativo.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/WHO-NMH-NVI-18.8-eng.pdf.","World Health Organization. 2021. *WHO Technical Manual on Tobacco Tax Policy and Administration.* Geneva: WHO. https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240019188."]},"26":{"policy":"Give schoolchildren in areas with intestinal worms a cheap pill once or twice a year, delivered through their schools. No child is tested first. Everyone in the school is treated. The aim is to reach most of the 870 million children at risk of worm infection in low- and middle-income countries.","why_on_list":"It is one of the health \"best buys\" named by the Copenhagen Consensus Center and by the development-economics handbook Disease Control Priorities, third edition (DCP3).","evidence":"Intestinal worms sap children's nutrition and keep them out of school. The best evidence comes from the Primary School Deworming Project in Kenya, a randomized trial that phased treatment into schools and then followed the children for two decades. Ten years on, Baird et al. (2016) found that men who had been eligible as boys \"work 17% more hours each week, spend more time in non-agricultural self-employment, are more likely to hold manufacturing jobs, and miss one fewer meal per week.\" The twenty-year follow-up by Hamory et al. (2021) puts the annualised social internal rate of return at 37%. DCP3 reads the Kenyan results as long-run benefits worth more than 100 times the cost (Ahuja et al. 2017). The Copenhagen Consensus best-practice paper is far more cautious: about $6 of benefit per $1 for preschool children (Hall and Horton 2008). The gap between those two numbers is the uncertainty. The wider trial record is disputed, and a Cochrane review finds little effect on short-run nutrition and school outcomes. The ratio therefore runs from a conservative $6 to $100 per $1, on a programme that costs under $0.3bn a year. Once the cost of raising the taxes that fund it is counted, the range is $2 to $74.60 per $1.","ratio":"Low end. Hall and Horton (2008) find that for pre-school children \"each dollar spent results in about $6 of benefits.\" Ratio: 6.\n\nHigh end. DCP3 reports the net present value of the long-run educational and economic benefits from the Kenyan trial as more than 100 times the cost (Ahuja et al. 2017). Ratio: 100.\n\nCost. About $0.30 per child per treatment. Treating most of the 870 million at-risk children costs under $0.3bn a year. No overhead is added, because delivery through schools is already inside the per-treatment cost and the drugs are largely donated.\n\nResult: $6 to $100 per $1, at a full cost of $0.3bn a year.\n\nCross-checks. Hall and Horton (2008) also say that in high-infection countries the benefits can be up to 60 times the costs. DCP3 gives an annualised internal rate of return of 32% to 51%, depending on whether health spillovers are counted (Ahuja et al. 2017). Baird et al. (2016) estimate a conservative financial internal rate of return of 32%. Hamory et al. (2021) give a conservative annualised social internal rate of return of 37%: 40.7% on earnings gains and 36.7% on consumption gains. At a 10% discount rate, the social net present value is US$ PPP (purchasing power parity) 230.71 on earnings and 467.90 on consumption per child. All of these sit inside the range.\n\n**After the cost of raising taxes.** Each $1 of public spending costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven and Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999). The low end uses the higher burden and the high end the lower one. The whole cost behind the ratio is public spending. Low end: 6 ÷ 3.00 = 2.0. High end: 100 ÷ 1.34 = 74.6. **Range after tax finance: 2 to 74.6.**","cost":"The full cost is about $0.3bn a year, all of it public outlay. DCP3 puts school-based treatment at about $0.30 per child per treatment, including delivery costs, and estimates that most of the 870 million at-risk children could be treated for less than $300 million a year (Ahuja et al. 2017). The two standard drugs, albendazole and mebendazole, are donated to national health ministries through the World Health Organization (WHO) for all school-age children in endemic countries (WHO 2023). Hall and Horton (2008) give an even lower delivery cost, 15 to 25 cents a round. No administrative overhead or private cost is added.","strength":"Grade B+. The high end rests on a long-run cluster-randomized trial with peer-reviewed economic returns (Baird et al. 2016; Hamory et al. 2021). The low end rests on a Copenhagen Consensus best-practice paper. The grade is not an A because the wider trial evidence is contested. A Cochrane review of mass treatment finds no clear gain in many short-run outcomes. The long-run Kenyan results are strong but come mainly from one setting.","difficulty":"Easy. Schools already exist. Treatment happens once or twice a year. The pills are cheap and largely donated. WHO recommends periodic treatment for all at-risk people in endemic areas without testing each person first (WHO 2023). That removes the need to diagnose each child.","who_benefits":"The gains go to the poor. The children treated live in poor, high-infection areas. In the Kenyan trial the benefits showed up years later as higher earnings and consumption for the same children as adults. Males in treatment schools ate one more meal per week on average (Baird et al. 2016). WHO counts 654 million school-age children living where these parasites are intensively transmitted (WHO 2023). The cost falls on health budgets and donors, and it is small.","counter":"The Cochrane review is the main counter-evidence. Taylor-Robinson et al. (2015) conclude that \"there is quite substantial evidence that deworming programmes do not show benefit in terms of average nutritional status, haemoglobin, cognition, school performance, or death.\" The review covers short-run outcomes, so it is left out of the range. It is the reason the low end uses the conservative Copenhagen figure of $6 per $1 for preschool children rather than the long-run trial returns.\n\nThe verdict rests on one long-run trial in Kenya. Its 20-year follow-up finds an annualised social return of 37% (Hamory et al. 2021), and benefits more than 100 times the cost (Ahuja et al. 2017). Whether those adult earnings gains repeat in other places, with different worm loads, is the open question. If they did not, the case would fall back on the Copenhagen figure, which is 2.0 after the cost of raising taxes, at the bottom of the Good tier. If they do, deworming stays among the best buys on the list.","references":["Ahuja, A., S. Baird, J. H. Hicks, M. Kremer, and E. Miguel. 2017. \"Economics of Mass Deworming Programs.\" In *Disease Control Priorities*, 3rd ed., Vol. 8, Ch. 29. https://www.dcp-3.org/sites/default/files/chapters/DCP3%20CAHD_Ch%2029.pdf","Baird, S., J. H. Hicks, M. Kremer, and E. Miguel. 2016. \"Worms at Work: Long-run Impacts of a Child Health Investment.\" *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 131 (4): 1637-1680. https://nber.org/papers/w21428","Hall, A., and S. Horton. 2008. *Deworming: Best Practice Paper.* Copenhagen Consensus Guide to Giving. Copenhagen Consensus Center. https://copenhagenconsensus.com/guide-giving/deworming","Hamory, J., E. Miguel, M. Walker, M. Kremer, and S. Baird. 2021. \"Twenty-Year Economic Impacts of Deworming.\" *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 118 (14): e2023185118. https://haushofer.ne.su.se/ec2303/Lecture%206%20-%20Health/Hamory_Miguel_Walker_Kremer_Baird_PNAS_2021.pdf","Taylor-Robinson, D. C., N. Maayan, K. Soares-Weiser, S. Donegan, and P. Garner. 2015. \"Deworming Drugs for Soil-Transmitted Intestinal Worms in Children: Effects on Nutritional Indicators, Haemoglobin, and School Performance.\" *Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews.* https://doi.org/10.1002/14651858.CD000371.pub6","World Health Organization. 2023. *Soil-Transmitted Helminth Infections.* Fact sheet. WHO. https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/soil-transmitted-helminth-infections"]},"27":{"policy":"Fund modern contraception, including pills, injectables, implants, intrauterine devices and counselling, for the roughly 214 million women in poor countries who want to avoid pregnancy but are not using a modern method. The cost is about $3.6bn a year. A sub-policy, paying for girls to finish secondary school, is assessed alongside it but kept out of the headline ratio.","why_on_list":"It is one of the health \"best buys\" named by the Copenhagen Consensus Center and by Disease Control Priorities, third edition (DCP3).","evidence":"Kohler and Behrman (2015) estimate that universal access to contraception would mean 640,000 fewer newborn deaths, 150,000 fewer maternal deaths and 600,000 fewer children losing their mothers each year (Lomborg 2019). Counting health alone, each dollar returns about $40. Adding a demographic dividend from smaller families, worth $288 billion a year, brings the total to $120 per $1. A later peer-reviewed study across 55 low- and lower-middle-income countries, at an 8% discount rate, finds $22 per $1 for family planning alone (Madise et al. 2023). Ghana's national study lands in between: 33.6 for married women and 29.3 for unmarried women (Amporfu et al. 2020). The spread comes from two choices: how much of the demographic dividend to count, and which discount rate to use. Real-world programmes back the mechanism. In Matlab, Bangladesh, an outreach programme cut fertility by about 17% for some two decades, with better health for women and children (Joshi and Schultz 2013). In Colombia, \"family planning explains only about 10% of Colombia's fertility decline,\" yet it let women postpone first births, study longer and work more (Miller 2010). The schooling sub-policy has its own randomized trial in Ghana, where scholarships delayed childbearing and cut infant deaths sharply. Once the cost of raising the taxes that fund it is counted, the range is $6.79 to $83.70 per $1.","ratio":"Low end. Madise et al. (2023) give a benefit-cost ratio of 22 for the family planning package alone. The programme cost already includes country-level delivery and management, so only the overhead of the international donor channel is added. The United Nations (UN) standard cost-recovery charge on earmarked donor funds is 8% (Executive Boards of UNDP/UNFPA/UNOPS, UNICEF and UN-Women 2018). Ratio: 22 ÷ 1.08 = 20.4.\n\nHigh end. Kohler and Behrman (2015) give $120 per $1 for eliminating unmet need for modern contraception. The lower UN overhead rate for thematic contributions, 7%, is used here. Ratio: 120 ÷ 1.07 = 112.1, rounded to 112.\n\nCost. Programme spending: $3.6bn. Donor-channel overhead: 3.6 × 0.080 = $0.29bn. Household cost: not separately costed. Full cost: 3.6 + 0.29 = $3.89bn a year.\n\nResult: $20.4 to $112 per $1, at a full cost of $3.89bn a year. The adjustment changes costs only, not benefits.\n\nCross-checks. The health-only figure of $40 per $1 and the Ghana results of 33.6 and 29.3 all sit inside the range. The schooling sub-policy returns less. The Ghana trial gives a conservative $4.1 per $1 of long-run government cost (Duflo et al. 2026), and Copenhagen work puts secondary completion at about $4 and girls' schooling and later-marriage programmes at about $5 (Psacharopoulos 2015; Copenhagen Consensus Center 2015). Bundled in at its cost, about $15bn a year, the combined ratio would fall to roughly (3.6 × 22 + 15 × 4.1) ÷ 18.6 = 7.6 at the low end and (3.6 × 120 + 15 × 10) ÷ 18.6 = 31 at the high end. The 10 is the bottom of the 10 to 110 times range reported when scholarships are targeted at girls (Duflo et al. 2024). That is why the sub-policy is kept separate.\n\n**After the cost of raising taxes.** Each $1 of public spending costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven and Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999). The low end uses the higher burden and the high end the lower one. The whole cost behind the ratio is public spending. Low end: 20.37 ÷ 3.00 = 6.79. High end: 112.1 ÷ 1.34 = 83.7. **Range after tax finance: 6.79 to 83.7.**","cost":"The full cost is about $3.89bn a year. The $3.6bn comes from Kohler and Behrman, as reported by Lomborg (2019), and rests on the Guttmacher Institute's \"Adding It Up\" costing. That method adds programme and system costs to the direct cost of services: programme management, staff supervision, monitoring and evaluation, training, outreach, supply systems and health information systems (Sully et al. 2020). Madise et al. (2023) likewise cost staff, consumables, overheads and supervision. The added $0.29bn is the donor channel's own overhead at the UN cost-recovery rate. Users' travel and time are not separately costed in these sources. For scale, donor funding for family planning was about $1.27 billion in 2017 (Lomborg 2019).\n\nThe schooling sub-policy is costed apart and left out. Four years of senior high school cost about $505 per girl, including forgone wages, or about $126 a year (Duflo et al. 2024). Across 122 million out-of-school girls (UNESCO 2024), that is about $15bn a year. This is an upper bound, since many of those girls are of primary age.","strength":"Grade A. The low end is a peer-reviewed benefit-cost estimate (Madise et al. 2023). It agrees with the Copenhagen Post-2015 work and the Ghana study. Quasi-experimental evidence from Bangladesh and Colombia shows that access to family planning changes fertility, health and women's lives (Joshi and Schultz 2013; Miller 2010). The schooling sub-policy rests on a randomized trial of 2,064 youths, now followed for 15 years (Duflo, Dupas and Kremer 2021; Duflo et al. 2026).","difficulty":"Moderate. The policy needs a sustained scale-up in funding. The target is about $3.6bn a year. Donor funding was around $1.27 billion in 2017, below its 2014 peak of $1.43 billion (Lomborg 2019). Working models exist, such as the Matlab outreach programme in Bangladesh and Profamilia in Colombia. The schooling sub-policy is a larger, budget-heavy build-out, though Ghana's scholarships provide a tested model.","who_benefits":"The gains go mainly to the poor. Unmet need is concentrated among poorer women in high-fertility, low-income countries. The 55 countries in Madise et al. (2023) are all low- or lower-middle-income. Matlab showed long-run gains for women's and children's health in rural Bangladesh (Joshi and Schultz 2013). In Ghana the scholarships were means-tested. Female recipients earned 20% to 30% more (J-PAL 2024), and the trial reports that \"This represents a halving of under-one and under-three mortality in our sample\" among their children (Duflo et al. 2026). Governments and donors pay.","counter":"Pritchett (1994) argues that women's desired family size, not access to contraception, explains most of the difference in fertility between countries. If so, supplying contraception would do less to cut births, and the demographic dividend would shrink. That dividend is most of the $120 per $1 figure; health benefits alone are worth about $40 per $1 (Lomborg 2019). The study gives no benefit-cost ratio, which is why the low end rests on the much lower 22 of Madise et al. (2023). The Matlab programme in Bangladesh points the other way: fertility stayed about 17% lower for two decades, with better health for women and children (Joshi and Schultz 2013).\n\nThe verdict turns on the dividend and on scope. If Pritchett is right and the dividend is close to zero, the health benefit of about $40 per $1 still clears the Excellent threshold before the cost of raising taxes. Bundling girls' secondary education into the policy would lower it, because schooling returns about $4.1 per $1 (Duflo, Dupas, Spelke and Walsh 2026); the combined ratio would fall to roughly 7.6 to 31. Only the narrow family-planning package, valued at an 8% discount and funded at nearly $2 of deadweight per $1 of tax, brings the low end down to 6.79, in the Good tier.","references":["Amporfu, E., E. Arthur, J. Novignon, and B. Wong. 2020. *Costs and Benefits of Family Planning in Ghana.* Ghana Priorities. Copenhagen Consensus Center and National Development Planning Commission, Ghana. https://copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/gp_a4_family_planning_final.pdf","Copenhagen Consensus Center. 2015. *Post-2015 Consensus: Gender Equality.* Targets summary. Copenhagen Consensus Center. https://copenhagenconsensus.com/post-2015-consensus/gender-equality","Duflo, E., P. Dupas, and M. Kremer. 2021. *The Impact of Free Secondary Education: Experimental Evidence from Ghana.* NBER Working Paper 28937. https://doi.org/10.3386/w28937","Duflo, E., P. Dupas, E. Spelke, and M. Walsh. 2024. \"Subsidising Secondary Education Has Huge Benefits for This Generation and the Next.\" VoxDev. https://voxdev.org/topic/education/subsidising-secondary-education-has-huge-benefits-generation-and-next","Duflo, E., P. Dupas, E. Spelke, and M. Walsh. 2026. \"Intergenerational Impacts of Secondary Education: Experimental Evidence from Ghana.\" *American Economic Review* 116 (9): 3586-3621. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20241001","Executive Boards of UNDP/UNFPA/UNOPS, UNICEF and UN-Women. 2018. *Joint Comprehensive Proposal on the Cost-Recovery Policy.* DP/FPA-ICEF-UNW/2018/1. United Nations. https://aa.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/board-documents/main-document/EN-Joint_report_on_cost_recovery.pdf","J-PAL. 2024. *Multigenerational Benefits to Secondary Schooling in Ghana.* Evaluation summary. Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab. https://www.povertyactionlab.org/evaluation/returns-secondary-schooling-ghana","Joshi, S., and T. P. Schultz. 2013. \"Family Planning and Women's and Children's Health: Long-Term Consequences of an Outreach Program in Matlab, Bangladesh.\" *Demography* 50: 149-180. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13524-012-0172-2","Kohler, H.-P., and J. R. Behrman. 2015. *Post-2015 Consensus: Population and Demography Assessment.* Copenhagen Consensus Center. https://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/post-2015-consensus/populationanddemography","Lomborg, B. 2019. \"Why Family Planning Is a Smart Investment.\" *Jordan Times* (syndicated). https://www.jordantimes.com/opinion/bj%C3%B8rn-lomborg/why-family-planning-smart-investment","Madise, N., A. Nandi, B. Wong, and S. Razvi. 2023. \"Achieving Maternal and Neonatal Mortality Development Goals Effectively: A Cost-Benefit Analysis.\" *Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis* 14 (S1): 206-234. https://doi.org/10.1017/bca.2023.24","Miller, G. 2010. \"Contraception as Development? New Evidence from Family Planning in Colombia.\" *The Economic Journal* 120 (545): 709-736. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02306.x","Pritchett, L. H. 1994. \"Desired Fertility and the Impact of Population Policies.\" *Population and Development Review* 20 (1): 1-55. https://doi.org/10.2307/2137629","Psacharopoulos, G. 2015. *Post-2015 Consensus: Education.* Targets summary. Copenhagen Consensus Center. https://copenhagenconsensus.com/post-2015-consensus/education","Sully, E. A., A. Biddlecom, J. E. Darroch, et al. 2020. *Adding It Up: Investing in Sexual and Reproductive Health 2019. Methodology Report.* Guttmacher Institute. https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/adding-it-up-investing-in-sexual-reproductive-health-2019-methodology.pdf","UNESCO. 2024. \"Progress on Girls' Access to Education: What the New UNESCO Data Reveals.\" https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/progress-girls-access-education-what-new-unesco-data-reveals"]},"28":{"policy":"Upgrade basic hospitals and health centres in 55 low- and lower-middle-income countries so that every birth has trained staff, clean delivery, drugs to stop bleeding, antibiotics, newborn resuscitation and steroids for preterm labour. Coverage of basic emergency obstetric and newborn care rises from 68% to 90%. The policy covers care at birth in facilities only. Family planning is counted separately under policy 27.","why_on_list":"It is one of the health \"best buys\" named by the Copenhagen Consensus Center and by Disease Control Priorities, third edition (DCP3).","evidence":"Most of the gain is newborn lives. The best estimate comes from a peer-reviewed benefit-cost analysis across 55 low- and lower-middle-income countries (Madise et al. 2023). It finds $83 of benefit per $1 for basic emergency obstetric and newborn care alone. Adding caesarean capability, the comprehensive package, gives $65 per $1. The wider bundle that also includes family planning would avert 161,000 maternal deaths and 1.2 million newborn deaths a year. In that bundle, \"Newborn lives saved generates the largest welfare impact by far, with an estimated benefit of $238 billion per year\" (Madise et al. 2023). The intervention effects come from the trial-based evidence collected in the Lancet Every Newborn series. That series finds that existing interventions could avert 71% of neonatal deaths, most of them through better care at birth in facilities (Bhutta et al. 2014). The title's 65% target sits inside that evidence: Madise's 1.2 million averted out of 2.16 million neonatal deaths is about 56%, and Bhutta's full coverage reaches 71%. The often-quoted ratio of 87 is left out because it includes family planning and its demographic dividend. The result is a narrow range of 62 to 80. Once the cost of raising the taxes that fund it is counted, the range is $28.50 to $66.50 per $1.","ratio":"Low end. Madise et al. (2023) give 65 for comprehensive emergency obstetric and newborn care. The source cost already includes country-level delivery and management, so only the international donor channel's overhead is added. The United Nations (UN) standard cost-recovery charge on earmarked donor funds is 8% (Executive Boards of UNDP/UNFPA/UNOPS, UNICEF and UN-Women 2018). It applies only to the financial share of the cost, 2.8 ÷ 4.9 = 0.571. The rest is mothers' time. Ratio: 65 ÷ (1 + 0.08 × 0.571) = 62.2, rounded to 62.\n\nHigh end. Madise et al. (2023) give 83 for basic emergency obstetric and newborn care alone. The lower UN rate of 7% is used. Ratio: 83 ÷ (1 + 0.07 × 0.571) = 79.8, rounded to 80.\n\nCost. Public outlay: $2.4bn. Donor-channel overhead: 2.4 × 0.080 = $0.19bn. Mothers' time: $2.1bn. Full cost: 2.4 + 0.19 + 2.1 = $4.69bn a year.\n\nResult: $62 to $80 per $1, at a full cost of $4.69bn a year. The adjustment changes costs only, not benefits.\n\nCross-checks. Benefits are valued at $2,983 per statistical life-year, the project standard for these countries. The study uses an 8% discount rate (Lomborg 2023b). If stillbirths averted were valued like newborn deaths, the bundle's ratio would rise to 159 (Madise et al. 2023). Bhutta et al. (2014) put universal coverage at an incremental running cost of $5.65 billion a year, of which $3.66 billion is facility-based care.\n\n**After the cost of raising taxes.** Each $1 of public spending costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted, an extra $0.34 to $2.00 (Ballard, Shoven and Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999). The low end uses the higher burden and the high end the lower one. Only the financial share of the cost (0.571, plus its overhead) is paid from taxes; mothers' time is not. Low end: 65 ÷ (1 + 0.08 × 0.571 + 2.0 × 0.571 × 1.08) = 65 ÷ 2.2790 = 28.5. High end: 83 ÷ (1 + 0.07 × 0.571 + 0.34 × 0.571 × 1.07) = 83 ÷ 1.2477 = 66.5. **Range after tax finance: 28.5 to 66.5.**","cost":"The full cost is about $4.69bn a year. The Copenhagen Consensus puts the maternal and newborn package at $4.9bn a year for 2023 to 2030, including $2.1bn for mothers' time (Lomborg 2023a; Copenhagen Consensus Center 2025). That leaves $2.8bn of financial cost for governments and donors. The package includes family planning. Madise et al. (2023) cost that part at 68.6 million extra women times $6.43 each ($2.89 drugs, $2.14 staff, $0.65 hospital, $0.75 supervision), about $0.44bn a year. Facility care alone is therefore about $2.8bn - $0.4bn = $2.4bn a year. This is approximate, because it mixes 2020 and 2023 dollars. The costing includes staff, consumables, equipment and overheads, a 15% supervision add-on, mothers' travel and demand-generation payments. The $0.19bn is the donor channel's own overhead. Mothers' time, $2.1bn, is an upper bound, since it also covers family planning users.","strength":"Grade A. The ratios come from a peer-reviewed benefit-cost analysis (Madise et al. 2023), summarised in the same journal issue (Lomborg 2023b). Its intervention effects come from the trial-based Lives Saved Tool evidence in the Lancet Every Newborn series (Bhutta et al. 2014). Two well-defined packages, scored with one consistent method, give a narrow range.","difficulty":"Moderate. This is a health-system build-out, not a single switch. Birth facilities in 55 countries need staff, equipment and supplies. In the 37 countries where fewer than 70% of births happen in facilities, the costing adds a cash incentive for facility births, modelled on India's Janani Suraksha Yojana programme (Madise et al. 2023). Precedent exists. Sustained government and donor funding is the hard part.","who_benefits":"The gains go to the poor. The 55 countries carry around 90% of the world's maternal and neonatal deaths (Madise et al. 2023). In 2019, low- and lower-middle-income countries alone saw 2.16 million neonatal deaths and 275,000 maternal deaths. The welfare loss from these deaths is about 5.5% of those countries' gross domestic product (GDP). Mothers and newborns gain most. Governments and donors pay the financial cost, and mothers give time to travel to and stay at facilities.","counter":"Broader packages score lower. Madise et al. (2023) find 36 for the entire continuum of care, 7 for antenatal care and 6 for care around conception. Stenberg et al. (2014) find that an extra $5 per person per year across 74 high-burden countries, about $30 billion a year, yields up to nine times its value. Both are left out because they cover far wider scopes than facility obstetric and newborn care. The headline 87 is left out too, because it includes family planning, scored as policy 27, and its demographic dividend. Valuing stillbirths averted would push the other way, raising the bundle's ratio to 159.\n\nNo plausible finding moves this policy out of the top tier. Even comprehensive emergency care at 65, after overhead and nearly $2 of deadweight for each $1 of tax, gives 28.5. Only a much smaller health gain than modelled could pull it below 10. The model's gain is not out of line with the wider evidence. Madise's 1.2 million averted newborn deaths are about 56% of neonatal deaths in these countries, below the 71% that Bhutta et al. (2014) find universal coverage of existing interventions could avert.","references":["Bhutta, Z. A., J. K. Das, R. Bahl, J. E. Lawn, R. A. Salam, V. K. Paul, M. J. Sankar, H. Blencowe, et al. 2014. \"Can Available Interventions End Preventable Deaths in Mothers, Newborn Babies, and Stillbirths, and at What Cost?\" *The Lancet* 384 (9940): 347-370. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(14)60792-3","Copenhagen Consensus Center. 2025. *Best Things First.* Folded leaflet, web version. Copenhagen Consensus Center. https://copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/2025-10/BTF%20Folded%20Leaflet%20WEB.pdf","Executive Boards of UNDP/UNFPA/UNOPS, UNICEF and UN-Women. 2018. *Joint Comprehensive Proposal on the Cost-Recovery Policy.* DP/FPA-ICEF-UNW/2018/1. United Nations. https://aa.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/board-documents/main-document/EN-Joint_report_on_cost_recovery.pdf","Lomborg, B. 2023a. *Best Things First*, Ch. 3: \"Do the Smartest Solutions First.\" Manuscript, Table 3.1. Copenhagen Consensus Center. https://copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/2023-05/Ch%203%20Do%20the%20Smartest%20Solutions%20First.pdf","Lomborg, B. 2023b. \"Save 4.2 Million Lives and Generate $1.1 Trillion in Economic Benefits for Only $41 Billion: Introduction to the Special Issue on the Most Efficient Policies for the Sustainable Development Goals.\" *Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis* 14 (S1): 1-15. https://doi.org/10.1017/bca.2023.32","Madise, N., A. Nandi, B. Wong, and S. Razvi. 2023. \"Achieving Maternal and Neonatal Mortality Development Goals Effectively: A Cost-Benefit Analysis.\" *Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis* 14 (S1): 206-234. https://doi.org/10.1017/bca.2023.24","Stenberg, K., H. Axelson, P. Sheehan, I. Anderson, A. M. Gulmezoglu, M. Temmerman, et al. 2014. \"Advancing Social and Economic Development by Investing in Women's and Children's Health: A New Global Investment Framework.\" *The Lancet* 383 (9925): 1333-1354. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(13)62231-X"]},"29":{"policy":"Find and treat far more tuberculosis (TB) cases in low- and lower-middle-income countries. The package follows the Stop TB Partnership's Global Plan for 2023 to 2030: rapid molecular tests, screening of high-risk groups, full treatment courses, prevention for contacts of patients, and work with private clinics. It does not depend on new vaccines.","why_on_list":"It is one of the health \"best buys\" named by the Copenhagen Consensus Center and by Disease Control Priorities, third edition (DCP3).","evidence":"TB still kills over 1.2 million people a year (World Health Organization 2025). Standard diagnosis and treatment work: national programmes already cure 88% of drug-susceptible cases. The problem is reach and money. A peer-reviewed Copenhagen Consensus study models the full Global Plan against current trends (Pretorius et al. 2023). Incremental costs come to $56.4 billion and benefits to $2,595 billion, in present value at an 8% discount rate, with effects counted to 2050. That gives a benefit-cost ratio (BCR) of 46.0. The plan would avert 27.3 million deaths between 2023 and 2050, about 1 million a year, at $2,063 per death averted. The authors test other baselines, discount rates and cost assumptions and report that these \"still yield robustly high BCRs, in the range of 28–84\" (Pretorius et al. 2023). An earlier Copenhagen study of a similar target found $43 per $1 (Vassall 2015). After adding donor overhead, the range is 26 to 79. Once the cost of raising the taxes that fund it is counted, the range is $9.54 to $61.70 per $1.","ratio":"Low end. The lowest case in Pretorius et al. (2023) includes new vaccines and their research and development costs: 27.7. The study's costs already include country-level delivery and programme management, so only the overhead of the international donor channel is added. The rate is the Global Fund's operating expenses as a share of grant spending: 9.0% in 2023 (Global Fund 2025). It applies to the financed share of the cost, 5.2 ÷ 6.2 = 0.839. Ratio: 27.7 ÷ (1 + 0.090 × 0.839) = 25.8, rounded to 26.\n\nHigh end. The highest case measures the plan against a baseline that includes COVID-19 disruption, at a 5% discount rate: 83.9. The lower Global Fund rate of 6.7% (2024) is used. Ratio: 83.9 ÷ (1 + 0.067 × 0.839) = 79.4, rounded to 79.\n\nCost. Public outlay: $5.2bn. Donor-channel overhead: 5.2 × 0.090 = $0.47bn. Non-financial \"enabler\" cost borne by patients and households: $1.0bn. Full cost: 5.2 + 0.47 + 1.0 = $6.67bn a year.\n\nResult: $26 to $79 per $1, at a full cost of $6.67bn a year. The adjustment changes costs only, not benefits.\n\nCross-checks. Other cells in the study fall inside the range: 55.4 at a 5% discount rate, 36.6 at 12%, 34.0 with research and development costs, and 71.0 against the disruption baseline. Vassall (2015) costed a target of 95% fewer TB deaths and 90% lower incidence at $8.1bn a year, with annual benefits of $344,647 million and a ratio of $43 per $1, saving about 1.3 million lives a year.\n\n**After the cost of raising taxes.** Each $1 of public spending costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted, an extra $0.34 to $2.00 (Ballard, Shoven and Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999). The low end uses the higher burden and the high end the lower one. Only the financed share of the cost (0.839, plus its overhead) is paid from taxes; the $1.0 billion of non-financial enabler cost is not. Low end: 27.7 ÷ (1 + 0.090 × 0.839 + 2.0 × 0.839 × 1.090) = 27.7 ÷ 2.9045 = 9.54. High end: 83.9 ÷ (1 + 0.067 × 0.839 + 0.34 × 0.839 × 1.067) = 83.9 ÷ 1.3606 = 61.7. **Range after tax finance: 9.54 to 61.7.**","cost":"The full cost is about $6.67bn a year. The Copenhagen Consensus lists TB at a total cost of $6.2bn a year for 2023 to 2030, of which $1.0bn is a non-financial enabler cost (Lomborg 2023). Governments and donors must therefore finance $5.2bn a year. This matches the year-by-year costs in Pretorius et al. (2023): $4.4 billion in 2023, a peak of $7.1 billion in 2027, and $5.2 billion in 2030. Those costs include health-system costs and programme costs, with programme costs set as a 70% markup on direct service costs, based on spending data reported to the World Health Organization (WHO). The added $0.47bn is the donor channel's own overhead.","strength":"Grade A. The range comes from a peer-reviewed Copenhagen Consensus benefit-cost analysis (Pretorius et al. 2023). It agrees with the earlier Copenhagen estimate of 43 and with the positive, older World Bank estimates. The health effects rest on the trial-established efficacy of standard TB drugs and diagnostics.","difficulty":"Moderate. The machinery exists. In 2024, 8.3 million people were newly diagnosed and treated, about 78% of those who fell ill (World Health Organization 2025). Money is the gap. As WHO puts it, \"only US$5.9 billion was available for prevention, diagnosis, and treatment--just over a quarter of the US$22 billion annual target set for 2027\" (World Health Organization 2025). Closing it needs a sustained funding scale-up, not a new invention.","who_benefits":"The gains go to the poor. TB affected an estimated 10.7 million people in 2024 (World Health Organization 2025). Its deaths are concentrated in low- and lower-middle-income countries, and the roughly 1 million deaths averted each year in the model are all in those countries (Pretorius et al. 2023). Governments and donors pay the financial cost. Patients and families bear the non-financial enabler cost.","counter":"The older World Bank estimate is lower. Laxminarayan et al. (2007) found that the benefits of the earlier Global Plan to Stop TB, for tuberculosis (TB), exceeded costs by a factor of 15 in 22 high-burden countries and 9 in the Africa region. It is left out of the range because it covers an older plan with older costs and values benefits differently from the 8% discount standard used across this block. It still confirms that TB control pays. The newer results come from a model, depend on the plan being fully funded, and assume programmes deliver at scale. In 2024 only $5.9 billion was available against a target of $22 billion a year by 2027 (World Health Organization 2025).\n\nThe low end, 9.54, sits just below the Excellent threshold. It uses the paper's lowest sensitivity case, 27.7 with vaccine and research costs included, and nearly $2 of deadweight for each $1 of tax. If the main specification of 46.0 held instead, the low end would sit well above 10. If programmes delivered only the older World Bank returns of 9 to 15, before overhead and the cost of raising taxes, the policy would fall to the Good tier.","references":["Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. 2025. *Annual Financial Report 2024.* The Global Fund, Geneva. https://archive.theglobalfund.org/media/sqilcy4b/archive_2024-annual-financial_report_en.pdf","Laxminarayan, R., E. Klein, C. Dye, K. Floyd, S. Darley, and O. Adeyi. 2007. *Economic Benefit of Tuberculosis Control.* Policy Research Working Paper 4295. World Bank. https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-4295","Lomborg, B. 2023. *Best Things First*, Ch. 3: \"Do the Smartest Solutions First.\" Manuscript, Table 3.1. Copenhagen Consensus Center. https://copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/2023-05/Ch%203%20Do%20the%20Smartest%20Solutions%20First.pdf","Pretorius, C., N. Arinaminpathy, S. Mandal, S. Sahu, M. Pai, R. Mathiasson, and B. Wong. 2023. \"One Million Lives Saved Per Year: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Global Plan to End Tuberculosis, 2023-2030 and Beyond.\" *Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis* 14 (S1): 337-354. https://doi.org/10.1017/bca.2023.13","Vassall, A. 2015. *Post-2015 Consensus: Health - Infectious Diseases.* TB perspective paper summary. Copenhagen Consensus Center. https://copenhagenconsensus.com/post-2015-consensus/health-infectious-diseases","World Health Organization. 2025. \"Global Gains in Tuberculosis Response Endangered by Funding Challenges.\" News release, November 12, 2025. https://www.who.int/news/item/12-11-2025-global-gains-in-tuberculosis-response-endangered-by-funding-challenges"]},"30":{"policy":"Offer free, voluntary medical male circumcision (VMMC) to HIV-negative adult men in the Southern African countries with the highest HIV rates. The target is 90% coverage in the five hyperendemic countries, those where more than 15% of adults have HIV: Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. The modelled period is 2015 to 2030.","why_on_list":"It is one of the health \"best buys\" named by the Copenhagen Consensus Center and by GiveWell, the charity evaluator.","evidence":"The core evidence is experimental. Three randomized trials, in South Africa, Kenya and Uganda, found that circumcision cuts a man's risk of acquiring HIV by about 60%. In the South African trial of 3,274 young men, HIV incidence was 0.85 per 100 person-years in the circumcised group against 2.1 in the control group (Auvert et al. 2005). The procedure is done once, lasts for life and costs under $100. A Copenhagen Consensus study values the life-years gained and finds a benefit-cost ratio between 7.4 and 56.4, depending on the discount rate and the value placed on a year of life (Geldsetzer et al. 2015). The Copenhagen summary headline is $28 per $1 (Copenhagen Consensus Center 2015). Savings on future HIV treatment alone exceed the cost. One model found that scaling up across 13 countries would cost $2 billion and save $16.51 billion in averted care (Njeuhmeli et al. 2011). The main uncertainty is that returns fall as HIV incidence falls, and incidence has declined in many places. The range after donor overhead is 6.8 to 53. Once the cost of raising the taxes that fund it is counted, the range is $2.26 to $39.40 per $1.","ratio":"Low end. Geldsetzer et al. (2015) find 7.4 at a 5% discount rate, valuing a year of life at $1,000. The cost already includes country-level delivery and management, so only the overhead of the international donor channel is added. The rate is the Global Fund's operating expenses as a share of grant spending, 9.0% in 2023 (Global Fund 2025). Ratio: 7.4 ÷ 1.090 = 6.8.\n\nHigh end. Geldsetzer et al. (2015) find 56.4 at a 3% discount rate, valuing a year of life at $5,000. The lower Global Fund rate of 6.7% (2024) is used. Ratio: 56.4 ÷ 1.067 = 52.9, rounded to 53.\n\nCost. Public outlay: $0.03bn. Donor-channel overhead: 0.03 × 0.090 = $0.0027bn. Household cost: not costed. Full cost: 0.03 + 0.0027 = $0.033bn a year, about $33 million.\n\nResult: $6.8 to $53 per $1, at a full cost of $0.033bn a year. The adjustment changes costs only, not benefits.\n\nCross-checks. The other two cells in Geldsetzer et al. (2015) are 11.3 and 37.0, both inside the range. The Copenhagen summary gives annual benefits of $818 million against annual costs of $30 million: 818 ÷ 30 = 27.3, reported as 28. These ratios value only life-years. Haacker et al. (2016) look at money alone: one circumcision at age 20 in South Africa saves a net $617 at a 5% discount rate, a financial rate of return of 14.5%.\n\n**After the cost of raising taxes.** Each $1 of public spending costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven and Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999). The low end uses the higher burden and the high end the lower one. The whole cost behind the ratio is public spending. Low end: 6.79 ÷ 3.00 = 2.26. High end: 52.86 ÷ 1.34 = 39.4. **Range after tax finance: 2.26 to 39.4.**","cost":"The full cost is about $0.033bn a year. The Copenhagen summary puts the programme at $30 million a year, with $35 million in the outcome document. Geldsetzer et al. (2015) put the additional cost over current coverage at $451.9 million at a 3% discount rate to $524.7 million at 5% over 2015 to 2030, or about $30 million to $35 million a year. Each circumcision costs $65.85 to $95.15 (Njeuhmeli et al. 2011). Those unit costs include direct costs (consumables, staff, training) and indirect costs (capital, maintenance, utilities, support and management overhead), plus waste-management and supply-chain costs. They exclude the cost of creating demand, for which no global estimate was found. The added $0.0027bn is the donor channel's own overhead. Donors such as the United States President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the Global Fund currently pay.","strength":"Grade A. The protective effect comes from randomized controlled trials. In South Africa, \"This RR corresponds to a protection of 60% (95% CI: 32%–76%),\" where RR is the relative risk and CI the confidence interval (Auvert et al. 2005). The economics come from peer-reviewed evaluations (Njeuhmeli et al. 2011; Haacker et al. 2016; Bansi-Matharu et al. 2023) and a Copenhagen Consensus benefit-cost study. The evidence for the effect is very strong. The size of the payoff depends on local HIV incidence.","difficulty":"Moderate. The cost is tiny and the model is proven: national VMMC programmes run across 13 eastern and southern African countries (Njeuhmeli et al. 2011). Circumcision \"is a one-off intervention that lasts for life,\" unlike drugs that must be taken continuously (Geldsetzer et al. 2015). The bottlenecks are demand and money. Low demand, especially among older men, is a key reason coverage stays low. International assistance funds 80% of HIV prevention programmes in low- and middle-income countries, and cuts in 2025 put that funding at risk, according to the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS 2025).","who_benefits":"The gains go to the poor. The target countries are those where HIV is a leading cause of lost life and income. Men gain first. Women gain later, as fewer of their sexual partners are infected and their own infection rates fall substantially (Geldsetzer et al. 2015). Donors and national health budgets pay, and the sums are small.","counter":"Falling HIV incidence is the main counter-evidence. Bansi-Matharu et al. (2023) compare five models across sub-Saharan Africa and find continued circumcision cost-effective in 68% of setting scenarios: 62% where incidence is below 0.1 per 100 person-years, rising to 95% above 1.0. The study gives no benefit-cost ratio, so it is left out of the range. It does show that returns fall with incidence, so the high end, based on 2015 estimates, is optimistic for today's lower-incidence settings. Antiretroviral therapy scores 3.0 to 16.6 in the same Copenhagen study, but that is a different intervention.\n\nThe verdict depends on where the programme runs and how a year of life is valued. At $1,000 per life-year and a 5% discount, the ratio before overhead is 7.4; at $5,000 and 3%, it is 56.4 (Geldsetzer et al. 2015). In settings where incidence has fallen below 0.1 per 100 person-years, returns sit nearer the low end of 2.26, in the Good tier. Health-system savings alone push the other way: each circumcision at age 20 in South Africa saves a net $617 at a 5% discount (Haacker, Fraser-Hurt and Gorgens 2016).","references":["Auvert, B., D. Taljaard, E. Lagarde, J. Sobngwi-Tambekou, R. Sitta, and A. Puren. 2005. \"Randomized, Controlled Intervention Trial of Male Circumcision for Reduction of HIV Infection Risk: The ANRS 1265 Trial.\" *PLoS Medicine* 2 (11): e298. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.0020298","Bansi-Matharu, L., E. Mudimu, R. Martin-Hughes, et al. 2023. \"Cost-Effectiveness of Voluntary Medical Male Circumcision for HIV Prevention across Sub-Saharan Africa: Results from Five Independent Models.\" *The Lancet Global Health* 11 (2): e244-e255. https://doi.org/10.1016/S2214-109X(22)00515-0","Copenhagen Consensus Center. 2015. *Post-2015 Consensus: Health - Infectious Diseases.* Targets summary. Copenhagen Consensus Center. https://copenhagenconsensus.com/post-2015-consensus/health-infectious-diseases","Geldsetzer, P., D. E. Bloom, S. Humair, and T. Bärnighausen. 2015. *Benefits and Costs of the HIV/AIDS Targets for the Post-2015 Development Agenda.* Post-2015 Consensus Health Perspective. Copenhagen Consensus Center working paper. https://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/health_perspective_-_geldsetzer_-_hiv.pdf","Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. 2025. *Annual Financial Report 2024.* The Global Fund, Geneva. https://archive.theglobalfund.org/media/sqilcy4b/archive_2024-annual-financial_report_en.pdf","Haacker, M., N. Fraser-Hurt, and M. Gorgens. 2016. \"Effectiveness of and Financial Returns to Voluntary Medical Male Circumcision for HIV Prevention in South Africa: An Incremental Cost-Effectiveness Analysis.\" *PLOS Medicine* 13 (5): e1002012. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002012","Njeuhmeli, E., S. Forsythe, J. Reed, M. Opuni, L. Bollinger, N. Heard, et al. 2011. \"Voluntary Medical Male Circumcision: Modeling the Impact and Cost of Expanding Male Circumcision for HIV Prevention in Eastern and Southern Africa.\" *PLoS Medicine* 8 (11): e1001132. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1001132","UNAIDS. 2025. *AIDS, Crisis and the Power to Transform: UNAIDS Global AIDS Update 2025.* UNAIDS. https://www.unaids.org/en/UNAIDS-global-AIDS-update-2025"]},"31":{"policy":"Replace pay-as-you-go Social Security with funded personal retirement accounts. Each worker saves into an account they own, and the old system is phased out. Benefits already promised to retirees and older workers continue to be paid during the switch.","why_on_list":"It comes from the Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom of the World index, Area 1, which measures the size of government. A state-run pension paid from current taxes is one of the largest items in that area. Funded accounts move that spending from government into private saving.","evidence":"The best evidence comes from simulation models of the United States economy, not from field experiments. Feldstein and Samwick (1998) find that, in the long run, accounts funded with about 2.04% of payroll can replace the 12.4% payroll tax. The reason is simple: invested savings earn the return on capital, while a pay-as-you-go system earns only the growth of the wage base. Kotlikoff (1998) finds that the economy's capital stock rises 57%, output 17% and wages 10% in the long run. The catch is the transition. Today's workers must fund their own accounts and also keep paying for benefits already promised, a closed-group unfunded obligation of $55.6 trillion. That burden falls on people now aged 20 to 65, while the gains go mainly to the young and the unborn. Geanakoplos, Mitchell and Zeldes (1998) show that once that legacy debt is paid, the higher return largely disappears. Without extra saving, privatization mostly moves money between generations. The result is a ratio of $1.00 to $2.00 of benefit per $1 of transition cost.","ratio":"The ratio compares what later generations gain with what the transition generations pay to keep honouring promised benefits.\n\n**High end (2.0).** Feldstein and Samwick (1998) model a shift to Mandatory Individual Retirement Accounts. In the long run, 2.04% of payroll in accounts replaces the 12.4% tax, and the deadweight loss of taxes falls by 1.57% of payroll. Combined gain: 11.92% of payroll. In the early decades, workers pay an extra 0.82% of payroll in year 1, rising to 1.58% by year 15. Their worked family example uses a 3% discount rate:\n\n- Two 45-year-old parents lose $11,680 in present value.\n- Their two children gain more than $23,000.\n- Ratio: 23,000 ÷ 11,680 = 1.97, rounded to 2.0.\n\nIn their words, \"Although the forty-five-year-olds have a combined net present value loss of $11,680 (at a 3 percent discount rate), this is outweighed by the children's gains of more than $23,000\" (Feldstein and Samwick 1998).\n\n**Low end (1.0).** Geanakoplos, Mitchell and Zeldes (1998) find that paying the debt to current retirees and workers takes a permanent tax of about 3% of payroll. That cost cancels the higher return on accounts. As they put it, \"all of the gains to privatization would disappear in extra taxes to pay off the unfunded liability\" (Geanakoplos, Mitchell and Zeldes 1998). Benefits roughly equal costs: ratio 1.0.\n\n**Cross-checks.** Feldstein (1996) puts the net present-value gain of a funded system above $15 trillion, about 3% of future GDP a year. Kotlikoff (1998) measures the pure efficiency gain after fully compensating the transition generations. It ranges from 7.23% of lifetime income (cold-turkey switch) and 4.33% (consumption-tax financing) down to 1.08% (payroll-tax financing). With income-tax financing and strong benefit-tax linkage it becomes a 1.22% loss, so some designs dip slightly below 1. Both ends already net out the transition cost and account administration. Feldstein and Samwick assume a 9.0% return against the 9.30% actually reported, leaving 0.30 points of assets a year for administration.\n\nFinal range: **1.0 to 2.0**. Full cost: **$186.9 billion a year**.","cost":"The cost is $186.9 billion a year, in two parts.\n\n- **Transition financing: $169.0 billion.** Feldstein and Samwick (1998) require an extra 0.82% to 1.58% of taxable payroll. Taxable payroll in 2025 was about $10,670 billion ($1,322.6 billion in net payroll tax ÷ 0.124, 2026 Trustees Report). Steps: 0.0082 × 10,670 = $87 billion; 0.0158 × 10,670 = $169 billion. The high end is used. Much of this is saving credited to workers' own accounts, so it overstates the true resource cost. It is shown because it is the fiscal burden of the switch.\n- **Administration: $17.9 billion.** Diamond (1999) puts a government-organised account system at $40 to $50 per worker per year. Inflated from 1999 to 2025 prices (factor 1.933), $50 becomes $96.6. Across 185 million covered workers that is $17.9 billion a year.\n\nThe Social Security Administration's existing administration, 0.4% of total cost, continues and is not new. No separate private compliance cost or output loss has been estimated. Total: 169.0 + 17.9 = $186.9 billion.","strength":"Grade B. The numbers come from published models in peer-reviewed journals and academic-press volumes: Feldstein (1996), Feldstein and Samwick (1998), Kotlikoff (1998), Kotlikoff, Smetters and Walliser (1999) and Cooley and Soares (1999). Kotlikoff, Smetters and Walliser (1999) confirm the pattern: privatization \"can substantially raise long-run living standards,\" but at the cost of losses to transition generations. A historical case supports the mechanism. Schmidt-Hebbel (1998) credits Chile's 1981 reform with about a quarter of the country's growth increase. It falls short of a higher grade because no natural experiment measures the gain directly, and the rate-of-return gain itself is disputed in serious work.","difficulty":"Moderate. It needs ordinary federal legislation, and Chile and other Latin American countries have done it. Politically it sits at the hard end of moderate. The 2005 United States personal-accounts proposal never reached a vote. Cooley and Soares (1999) find that every feasible transition uses debt that shifts cost to unborn generations, and that no majority supports a transition in its first periods.","who_benefits":"In the long run, gains reach all income classes. Kotlikoff (1998) finds poorer households gain more (about 10.1%) than richer ones (about 8.1%) under consumption-tax financing. The transition generations pay. Without compensation, the oldest cohorts lose up to about 26% of remaining lifetime welfare. Feldstein and Samwick (1998) find that the summed present value for everyone aged 20 to 65 at the switch is negative. Without a progressive floor, losing Social Security's progressive benefit formula could leave low earners worse off.","counter":"The strongest counter-case is that personal accounts create little new value. Diamond and Orszag (2005) argue that costs will rise by about 2.5% of GDP over 75 years and that modest benefit cuts and revenue increases can restore solvency. Orszag and Stiglitz (2001) challenge the claims that accounts raise saving, returns and labour-market efficiency. Gill, Packard and Yermo (2005) document coverage and fee problems in Latin America, where capital markets are weaker. None gives a ratio. Diamond and Orszag's central point, that account returns are offset by the debt owed to current retirees and workers, is already carried into the low end through Geanakoplos, Mitchell and Zeldes (1998).\n\nHow the transition is financed decides the tier. Kotlikoff (1998) finds the efficiency gain, after compensating the transition generations, ranges from 7.23% of lifetime income with an abrupt switch to 1.08% with payroll-tax financing. It turns into a 1.22% loss with income-tax financing and strong benefit-tax linkage. That design would push the ratio below 1, into the Bad tier. Consumption-tax financing, at 4.33%, points toward the high end of 2.0, at the edge of the Good tier. Fees pull the other way: Latin American account systems cost at least 1% of assets a year, far above the 0.30 points assumed.","references":["Board of Trustees, Federal OASDI Trust Funds. 2026a. *2026 OASDI Trustees Report, Section II.A (Highlights).* Social Security Administration, Office of the Chief Actuary. https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/2026/II_A_highlights.html.","Board of Trustees, Federal OASDI Trust Funds. 2026b. *2026 OASDI Trustees Report, Section II.B (Trust Fund Operations in 2025).* Social Security Administration. https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/2026/II_B_cyoper.html.","Board of Trustees, Federal OASDI Trust Funds. 2026c. *2026 OASDI Trustees Report, Section VI.F (Infinite-Horizon and Closed-Group Obligations).* Social Security Administration. https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/2026/VI_F_infinite.html.","Cooley, T. F., and J. Soares. 1999. \"Privatizing Social Security.\" *Review of Economic Dynamics* 2: 731–755. https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/tcooley/papers/pri_soc_sec.pdf.","Diamond, P. A. 1999. \"Administrative Costs and Equilibrium Charges with Individual Accounts.\" NBER Working Paper 7050. National Bureau of Economic Research. https://doi.org/10.3386/w7050.","Diamond, P. A., and P. R. Orszag. 2005. \"Saving Social Security.\" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 19 (2): 11–32. https://plosjournal.deepdyve.com/lp/american-economic-association/saving-social-security-SM6A6unK2v.","Feldstein, M. 1996. \"The Missing Piece in Policy Analysis: Social Security Reform (Richard T. Ely Lecture).\" *American Economic Review* 86 (2): 1–14. https://doi.org/10.3386/w5413.","Feldstein, M., and A. Samwick. 1998. \"The Transition Path in Privatizing Social Security.\" In *Privatizing Social Security*, edited by M. Feldstein. University of Chicago Press/NBER. https://www.nber.org/system/files/chapters/c6251/c6251.pdf.","Geanakoplos, J., O. S. Mitchell, and S. P. Zeldes. 1998. \"Would a Privatized Social Security System Really Pay a Higher Rate of Return?\" In *Framing the Social Security Debate*, edited by Arnold, Graetz, and Munnell, 137–156. Brookings Institution Press. https://doi.org/10.3386/w6713.","Gill, I. S., T. Packard, and J. Yermo. 2005. *Keeping the Promise of Social Security in Latin America.* World Bank and Stanford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1596/0-8213-5817-0.","Kotlikoff, L. J. 1998. \"Simulating the Privatization of Social Security in General Equilibrium.\" In *Privatizing Social Security*, edited by M. Feldstein, ch. 7. University of Chicago Press/NBER. https://www.nber.org/system/files/chapters/c6252/c6252.pdf.","Kotlikoff, L. J., K. Smetters, and J. Walliser. 1999. \"Privatizing Social Security in the United States: Comparing the Options.\" *Review of Economic Dynamics* 2 (3): 532–574. https://doi.org/10.1006/redy.1999.0068.","Orszag, P. R., and J. E. Stiglitz. 2001. \"Rethinking Pension Reform: Ten Myths About Social Security Systems.\" In *New Ideas About Old Age Security*, edited by Holzmann and Stiglitz. World Bank. https://business.columbia.edu/faculty/research/rethinking-pension-reform-ten-myths-about-social-security-systems.","Schmidt-Hebbel, K. 1998. \"Does Pension Reform Really Spur Productivity, Saving, and Growth?\" Central Bank of Chile Working Paper No. 33. Central Bank of Chile. https://ideas.repec.org/p/chb/bcchwp/33.html.","U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2026. \"Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items (CPIAUCSL), Annual Average.\" FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL."]},"32":{"policy":"Abolish the federal personal income tax and the corporate income tax. Repealing the 16th Amendment would stop the tax from being brought back. The lost revenue, about $3.1 trillion a year, is replaced mainly by shrinking government.","why_on_list":"It comes from the Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom of the World index, Area 1, which scores countries on the size of government, including top marginal tax rates. The income tax is the largest single source of federal revenue and the main lever on that score.","evidence":"Every dollar raised by income tax costs the economy more than a dollar. People work, save and invest less, and they spend time and money on filing. Estimates of that extra loss run from 13 cents per dollar (Ballard, Shoven and Whalley 1982) to about $2 per extra dollar raised (Feldstein 1999). Paperwork adds another $328.9 billion to $501.3 billion a year, or 11 to 16 cents per dollar raised (Hodge and Rock 2024). Natural experiments on top tax rates point the same way: Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) find that past rate increases cost $1.16 to $1.85 of welfare per $1 raised. On the corporate side, the 2017 tax cut raised investment 8 to 14% and long-run GDP about 0.9%, but recovered little of its revenue cost (Chodorow-Reich, Zidar and Zwick 2024). The key uncertainty sits on the other side of the ledger. Repeal pays only if the spending cut to replace the revenue is worth no more than $1 per $1. The result is $1.24 to $3.20 of benefit per $1 of revenue given up, with a central case near $1.50.","ratio":"The ratio is the benefit to taxpayers per $1 of income tax given up. The revenue is replaced by cutting government, and the forgone spending is valued at $1 per $1. Three parts add up:\n\nRatio = 1 + deadweight loss removed per $ + compliance cost removed per $ + administration removed per $.\n\n**Revenue at stake.** Fiscal year 2025 individual income tax: $2,656 billion. Corporate: $452 billion. Total: $3,108 billion, which is 59% of federal receipts ($5,235 billion) and 44% of outlays ($7,010 billion), according to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).\n\n**Administration avoided (both ends).** Internal Revenue Service (IRS) operations cost $19.0 billion in 2025. The income taxes' share: 0.59 × 19.0 = $11.2 billion. Per dollar: 11.2 ÷ 3,108 = 0.004.\n\n**Low end (1.24).**\n- Deadweight loss: 0.13. Ballard, Shoven and Whalley (1982) find that replacing the whole tax system with lump-sum taxes gains \"13 cents to 22 cents per dollar of revenue.\" The lower bound is used.\n- Compliance: income-tax forms only. Individual returns $145.4 billion + business returns $118.9 billion + depreciation $25.4 billion + estates and trusts $20.2 billion + pass-through deduction $19.0 billion = $328.9 billion. Per dollar: 328.9 ÷ 3,108 = 0.106.\n- Total: 1 + 0.13 + 0.106 + 0.004 = 1.24.\n\n**High end (3.2).**\n- Deadweight loss: 2.0. Feldstein (1999) finds that raising revenue by a proportional rate increase costs nearly $2 of deadweight loss per extra $1.\n- Compliance: all federal tax paperwork, $546.1 billion, less the $44.8 billion employer quarterly return still needed for payroll taxes = $501.3 billion. Per dollar: 501.3 ÷ 3,108 = 0.161.\n- Total: 1 + 2.0 + 0.161 + 0.004 = 3.17, rounded to 3.2.\n\nThe high end applies a marginal figure to the whole tax, so it is an upper bound.\n\n**Cross-checks.** Saez, Slemrod and Giertz (2012) give an illustrative excess burden of $0.38. With midpoint compliance ($415 billion ÷ $3,108 billion = 0.134), that gives 1 + 0.38 + 0.134 + 0.004 = 1.52. This sits between Hendren and Sprung-Keyser's (2020) values of 1.16 and 1.85. For the corporate tax alone, Chodorow-Reich, Zidar and Zwick (2024) find the 2017 cut lowered corporate revenue by about 40%, or 0.63% of GDP a year. Output gained per dollar of revenue: 0.9 ÷ 0.63 = 1.4 in the long run, and 0.44 ÷ 0.63 = 0.7 in the first decade.\n\nFinal range: **1.24 to 3.2**. Full cost: **$0 a year**.","cost":"The full cost is $0. Repeal needs no new spending, and revenue returned to taxpayers is a transfer, not a resource cost. No new bureaucracy is created: about $11.2 billion a year of IRS income-tax administration disappears. No published estimate of one-time IRS wind-down costs was found, and payroll-tax and excise collection continue. No private compliance is created; $328.9 billion to $501.3 billion a year is removed. These savings count as benefits in the ratio, not as negative costs. The $3,108 billion fiscal gap is closed by spending cuts, valued at $1 per $1 inside the ratio. If a national sales tax replaced the revenue instead, its collection and retailer compliance costs would offset part of the saving. Gray and Holtz-Eakin (2023) find such a tax would need a rate of at least 27.8% on a tax-inclusive basis.","strength":"Grade B+. The welfare-cost estimates are peer-reviewed. They include natural-experiment estimates for top rates (Hendren and Sprung-Keyser 2020), a quasi-experimental study of the 2017 corporate cut (Chodorow-Reich, Zidar and Zwick 2024), Feldstein's (1999) tax-return estimate, and the Ballard, Shoven and Whalley general-equilibrium model. Turning them into a ratio means extending them to full repeal, which no study has observed. That keeps it out of the A range.","difficulty":"Moderate. Ordinary federal legislation can abolish both taxes. The 16th Amendment permits an income tax but does not require one. Repealing it would only block a future return, and that step needs two-thirds of both Houses of Congress and ratification by three-fourths of the states. Precedents exist: the United States before 1913, states such as Texas and Florida, and the Gulf states. The hard part is scale. The tax raises about 59% of federal receipts, so it must be matched by spending cuts of about 44% or by other taxes.","who_benefits":"The income tax is the progressive part of the federal system, so repeal is regressive on its face. York and Watson (2023) find that \"The FairTax Act would be less progressive than the existing federal tax system as measured by income.\" Altig et al. (2001) find that reforms which shield the poor and older generations give much smaller output gains. Most of the corporate cut's gains went to capital: labour income rose by less than $1,000 per worker, against the $4,000 to $9,000 once predicted (Chodorow-Reich, Zidar and Zwick 2024). Higher earners and owners of capital gain most. Those who depend on the programmes that are cut pay.","counter":"The strongest counter-case is on the spending side. Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) show that some programmes, especially direct investment in children's health and education, return far more than $1 per $1. If the cuts that replace the revenue fall on those programmes, the ratio could fall below 1. The corporate evidence is also sobering: the 2017 investment response \"was far too small to offset the direct cost of the reform\" (Chodorow-Reich, Zidar and Zwick 2024). Coffey, McLaughlin and Peretto (2020) find large growth costs from regulation, and Jorgenson (2012) large gains from more efficient income taxation. Neither prices repeal of the income tax, so both are left out.\n\nTwo assumptions set the tier. The first is the deadweight loss removed. At the 13 cents per $1 that Ballard, Shoven and Whalley (1982) find for replacing the whole tax system with lump-sum taxes, the ratio is 1.24; at Feldstein's (1999) nearly $2, it is 3.2. The illustrative 38 cents of Saez, Slemrod and Giertz (2012) gives 1.52, in the Mid tier. The second is the value of the spending cut. The range assumes each $1 of spending cut was worth $1. If it was worth more, the ratio falls toward 1, and below it where the cuts land on the highest-return programmes.","references":["Altig, D., A. J. Auerbach, L. J. Kotlikoff, K. A. Smetters, and J. Walliser. 2001. \"Simulating Fundamental Tax Reform in the United States.\" *American Economic Review* 91 (3): 574–595. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.91.3.574.","Ballard, C. L., J. B. Shoven, and J. Whalley. 1982. \"The Welfare Cost of Distortions in the United States Tax System: A General Equilibrium Approach.\" NBER Working Paper 1043. Published as \"General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States,\" *American Economic Review* 75 (1): 128–138, 1985. https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/1043.html.","Bergh, A., and M. Henrekson. 2011. \"Government Size and Growth: A Survey and Interpretation of the Evidence.\" *Journal of Economic Surveys* 25 (5): 872–897. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6419.2011.00697.x.","Chodorow-Reich, G., O. Zidar, and E. Zwick. 2024. \"Lessons from the Biggest Business Tax Cut in US History.\" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 38 (3): 61–88. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.38.3.61.","Coffey, B., P. A. McLaughlin, and P. F. Peretto. 2020. \"The Cumulative Cost of Regulations.\" *Review of Economic Dynamics* 38: 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2020.03.004.","Congressional Budget Office. 2025. *Monthly Budget Review: Summary for Fiscal Year 2025.* CBO. https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2025-11/61307-MBR-FY25-final.pdf.","Feldstein, M. 1999. \"Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax.\" *Review of Economics and Statistics* 81 (4): 674–680. https://direct.mit.edu/rest/article/81/4/674/57158/Tax-Avoidance-and-the-Deadweight-Loss-of-the.","Gray, G., and D. Holtz-Eakin. 2023. *Evaluation and Macroeconomic Impact of the FairTax.* American Action Forum. https://www.americanactionforum.org/research/evaluation-and-macroeconomic-impact-of-the-fairtax/.","Hendren, N., and B. Sprung-Keyser. 2020. \"A Unified Welfare Analysis of Government Policies.\" *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 135 (3): 1209–1318. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjaa006.","Hodge, S. A., and C. Rock. 2024. \"Tax Complexity Now Costs the U.S. Economy Over $546 Billion Annually.\" Tax Foundation. https://taxfoundation.org/data/all/federal/irs-tax-compliance-costs/.","Internal Revenue Service. 2026. *IRS Budget and Workforce (IRS Data Book, FY2025, Table 6).* IRS Statistics of Income. https://www.irs.gov/statistics/irs-budget-and-workforce.","Jorgenson, D. W. 2012. *Comprehensive Tax Reform and U.S. Energy Policy.* Testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, June 12, 2012. https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Jorgenson%20Testimony.pdf.","National Archives. 1787. *The Constitution of the United States: A Transcription, Article V.* US National Archives and Records Administration. https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript.","Saez, E., J. B. Slemrod, and S. H. Giertz. 2012. \"The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review.\" *Journal of Economic Literature* 50 (1): 3–50. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.50.1.3.","York, E., and G. Watson. 2023. \"Fair Tax Plan: National Sales Tax (FairTax Act Analysis).\" Tax Foundation. https://taxfoundation.org/blog/fair-tax-national-sales-tax/."]},"33":{"policy":"Sell or transfer federal land, parks and natural resources to private owners or to trusts run for income. The federal government owns nearly one-third of the land area of the United States. The policy also gives radio spectrum full, tradable property rights, so owners can use their frequencies for any wireless service.","why_on_list":"It comes from the Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom of the World index, Area 2, which covers legal systems and property rights. Land and spectrum held and allocated by government are the largest assets outside private ownership.","evidence":"Land run for income earns far more than land run by federal agencies. Fretwell and Regan (2015) compare 2009-2013 accounts across four western states. State trust lands earned $14.51 for every $1 of management cost; the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) earned 73 cents. The gap holds across uses: trust lands earned $2.51 per $1 on timber and $138.08 per $1 on minerals. A peer-reviewed model of a transfer to Utah is less generous. Jakus et al. (2017) find a state could cover its management costs only with access to fossil fuels and timber at relatively high prices. Selling land also costs money: BLM spent 3.3% of proceeds to run its recent sales. Spectrum looks better still. Hazlett and Munoz (2009) find that 60 MHz more mobile spectrum in the United States would cut prices about 8% and raise consumer surplus about $8.8 billion a year. The main uncertainty is what the market cannot price: recreation and conservation value, which is large and unmeasured for a sale. The result is $1.66 to $10.00 of benefit per $1 of cost.","ratio":"No study computes a full welfare ratio for selling federal land. The range uses published revenue-per-management-dollar ratios for land run for income, then adds the one-time cost of selling it.\n\n**Land value.** A buyer pays the present value of net income: value = 12.46 × (revenue − cost), using 20 years at 5%.\n\n**Transaction cost.** BLM spent $3.17 million to run land sales that raised $95.7 million (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2008). Steps: 3.17 ÷ 95.7 = 3.3% of sale value.\n\n**Ratio.** 12.46 × revenue ÷ (12.46 × cost + 0.033 × 12.46 × (revenue − cost)). The 12.46 cancels, leaving revenue ÷ (cost + 0.033 × (revenue − cost)).\n\n**Low end (1.66).** Utah takes over 31.2 million acres and bears every federal cost (Jakus et al. 2017, with figures from Stambro 2014). In the high-energy-price case:\n- Revenue: $422.0 million. Cost: $248 million. Before sale costs: 422.0 ÷ 248 = 1.70.\n- Net income: 422.0 − 248 = 174.0.\n- With sale costs: 422.0 ÷ (248 + 0.033 × 174.0) = 422.0 ÷ 253.7 = 1.66.\n\n**High end (10.0).** Trust lands earn $14.51 per $1 of management cost (Fretwell and Regan 2015). As the authors put it, \"The states examined in this study earn an average of $14.51 for every dollar spent on state trust land management.\" With sale costs: 14.51 ÷ (1 + 0.033 × 13.51) = 14.51 ÷ 1.446 = 10.0. Sale costs cut the high end most, because management costs on trust land are small relative to its value.\n\n**Cross-checks.** The law behind BLM sales lets up to 20% of proceeds go to administration. At that ceiling the range is 1.49 to 3.9. In Utah's low-price case the ratio is 0.72. Spectrum is kept out of the headline because it is extrapolated, but it points higher. Freeing spectrum, scaled from the 2021 C-band auction (280 MHz; $3.3 billion relocation plus $9.7 billion accelerated-clearing payments), costs 13.0 × 60 ÷ 280 = $2.8 billion per 60 MHz. Ten years of benefit at 5% (annuity factor 7.72): 8.8 × 7.72 = $68 billion. Ratio: 68 ÷ 2.8 = 24. Counting relocation costs only ($0.71 billion per 60 MHz) gives about 96.\n\nFinal range: **1.66 to 10.0**. Full cost: **$3.0 billion a year**.","cost":"The full cost is $3.0 billion a year, all of it the administration of sales.\n\n- **Public outlay: none net.** Sales raise money; the 2021 C-band auction alone brought $80.9 billion in clock-phase bids (Kahn et al. 2021). The policy also ends federal land-agency losses: in 2010, three land agencies spent $7.8 billion against $5.2 billion of revenue (Edwards and O'Toole 2012).\n- **Administration: $3.0 billion a year.** Sales cost 3.3% of proceeds. The Bureau of Economic Analysis values federal land at $1.8 trillion (Larson 2015, 2009 values). Steps: 0.033 × $1,800 billion = $59.4 billion one-time, spread over an assumed 20-year disposal programme = $3.0 billion a year. At the 20% ceiling it would be $18 billion a year.\n- **Private compliance and output loss:** no published estimates.\n\nSpectrum relocation costs are paid by buyers and sit inside the spectrum ratio.","strength":"Grade B. The low end comes from a peer-reviewed fiscal model (Jakus et al. 2017) and the high end from a comparison of official agency accounts by the Property and Environment Research Center (Fretwell and Regan 2015). Property-rights work on resource management (Anderson and Leal 2015) and peer-reviewed spectrum studies (Hazlett and Munoz 2009; Hazlett 2008) support the mechanism. No study prices full privatization including non-market values, so the grade goes no higher.","difficulty":"Hard. The policy dismantles the federal land agencies, which manage about one-third of United States land, and there is no modern precedent. Anderson, Smith and Simmons (1999) propose auctioning all public lands over 20 to 40 years. The spectrum part alone would be moderate: the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has run auctions since 1994 and already issues flexible-use licences. Full property rights in every band, including government bands, would still need major legislation.","who_benefits":"It depends on the design. Anderson, Smith and Simmons (1999) would auction land not for dollars but for public land share certificates given equally to every American, which spreads the gains widely. A plain cash auction would favour wealthy and extractive buyers and could cut free recreational access. Spectrum gains go mostly to consumers through lower wireless prices. Hazlett and Munoz (2009) cite evidence that consumer surplus from cellular licences was at least 10 times producer surplus.","counter":"The largest uncounted cost is non-market value. Haefele, Loomis and Bilmes (2016) put the total economic value of the National Park Service at about $92 billion a year. Outdoor recreation adds $639.5 billion of value added, 2.3% of GDP (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 2024). Neither study measures how much value would be lost under private or trust ownership, so neither enters the ratio. Utah's low-price case is the clearest downside: about $202.7 million of revenue against about $280 million of cost, including payments in lieu of taxes to counties, gives 0.72 (Stambro 2014). That case is a state takeover that keeps federal-style obligations, not a sale to private owners.\n\nCommodity prices and recreation value decide the tier. If oil and gas prices fell to Utah's low case, the low end would drop from 1.66 to 0.72, into the Bad tier. Transfer costs at the 20% legal ceiling, rather than the measured 3.3%, would give 1.49 to 3.9. If buyers kept only part of the recreation value, the loss could outweigh the gains: $92 billion a year from the parks alone compares with $7.8 billion spent by the three main land agencies (Edwards and O'Toole 2012). Spectrum sales, at about 24 per $1 (Hazlett and Munoz 2009), would lift the high end, but are left out because the figure is extrapolated.","references":["Anderson, T. L., and D. R. Leal. 2015. *Free Market Environmentalism for the Next Generation.* Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137443397.","Anderson, T. L., V. L. Smith, and E. Simmons. 1999. *How and Why to Privatize Federal Lands.* Cato Policy Analysis No. 363. Cato Institute. https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa363.pdf.","Edwards, C., and R. O'Toole. 2012. \"Reforming Federal Land Management.\" Cato Institute, DownsizingGovernment.org. https://www.cato.org/downsizing-government-essay/reforming-federal-land-management.","Fretwell, H., and S. Regan. 2015. *Divided Lands: State vs. Federal Management in the West.* PERC Public Lands Report. Property and Environment Research Center. https://www.perc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/150303_PERC_DividedLands.pdf.","Haefele, M., J. Loomis, and L. Bilmes. 2016. \"Total Economic Value of US National Park Service Estimated to Be $92 Billion: Implications for Policy.\" *George Wright Forum* 33 (3): 335–345. https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/total-economic-value-us-national-park-service-estimated-be-92-billion-implications.","Hazlett, T. W. 2008. \"Optimal Abolition of FCC Spectrum Allocation.\" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 22 (1): 103–128. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.22.1.103.","Hazlett, T. W., and R. E. Munoz. 2009. \"A Welfare Analysis of Spectrum Allocation Policies.\" *RAND Journal of Economics* 40 (3): 424–454. https://techliberation.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Hazlett.Munoz.RandJournalofEconomics.pdf.","Jakus, P. M., J. E. Stambro, M. Hogue, J. Downen, L. Pace, and T. C. Grijalva. 2017. \"Western Public Lands and the Fiscal Implications of a Transfer to States.\" *Land Economics* 93 (3): 371–389. https://doi.org/10.3368/le.93.3.371.","Kahn, C., S. Hanson, S. Giles, C. Freeberg, and L. Ribeiro. 2021. *The C-Band Spectrum Auction: Retrospective and Prospective Observations.* MITRE Corporation. https://www.mitre.org/news-insights/publication/c-band-spectrum-auction-retrospective-and-prospective-observations.","Larson, W. 2015. *New Estimates of Value of Land of the United States.* BEA Working Paper WP2015-3. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/papers/WP2015-3.pdf.","Stambro, J. E., with P. M. Jakus et al. 2014. \"An Analysis of a Transfer of Federal Lands to the State of Utah.\" *Utah Economic and Business Review* 74 (3). Bureau of Economic and Business Research, University of Utah. https://d36oiwf74r1rap.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/uebr2014no3.pdf.","U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 2024. *Outdoor Recreation Satellite Account, U.S. and States, 2023.* BEA News Release. U.S. Department of Commerce. https://bea.gov/news/2024/outdoor-recreation-satellite-account-us-and-states-2023.","U.S. Government Accountability Office. 2008. *Federal Land Management: Federal Land Transaction Facilitation Act Restrictions and Management Weaknesses Limit Future Sales and Acquisitions.* GAO-08-196. https://gao.gov/assets/a271917.html."]},"34":{"policy":"Give fishers individual transferable quotas (ITQs): a secure, sellable share of the total catch allowed in a fishery each year. A fixed share ends the race to fish first. The total catch is set low enough for stocks to recover, and quota holders can buy and sell shares.","why_on_list":"It comes from the Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom of the World index, Area 2, which covers legal systems and property rights. Most of the world's fisheries are still open access, with no one owning the right to the catch. Tradable quotas turn that common pool into a defined property right.","evidence":"Open-access fisheries are overfished, and the losses are large. The World Bank (2017a) estimates that the world's marine fisheries forgo about $83.3 billion a year in net benefits. In the bank's words, reform would boost the sector's profits \"from an estimated $3 billion a year to $86 billion\" (World Bank 2017b). Getting there requires global fishing effort to fall about 44%. Catch shares are a proven route to that cut. Across more than 11,000 fisheries, those with catch shares were about half as likely to collapse (Costello, Gaines and Lynham 2008). In British Columbia's halibut fishery, private harvesting rights brought gains in cost, revenue and product form, though they took years to appear (Grafton, Squires and Fox 2000). A global model finds rights-based reform would raise annual profit by $53 billion by 2050, with the median fishery recovering in under 10 years (Costello et al. 2016). The main uncertainties are the cost of running the system and how fast effort is cut. The result is $2.80 to $16 of benefit per $1 of cost. Once the cost of raising the taxes that fund it is counted, the range is $0.93 to $15.60 per $1.","ratio":"The ratio uses the World Bank's (2017a) global model, at a 5% discount rate over 20 years. Benefits are the present value of fishery net benefits on a reform path, compared with the current path. On the current path, with 2012 effort held constant, that present value is $514 billion. Costs are the temporary losses while stocks rebuild, plus the present value of running a rights-based system. The World Bank puts management cost at 1 to 14% of the value of landings; the ends keep those two shares, while the full cost uses the median of published estimates, 5.4%. Optimal landings are worth $140.6 billion a year, and the 20-year annuity factor at 5% is 12.46.\n\n**Low end (2.8): moderate path, effort cut 5% a year.**\n- Present value: $1,196 billion − $514 billion = $682 billion net gain.\n- Transition loss: $0.3 billion in the first year. Gross gain: 682 + 0.3 = $682.3 billion.\n- Management at 14%: 0.14 × 140.6 = $19.7 billion a year × 12.46 = $245 billion.\n- Ratio: 682.3 ÷ (0.3 + 245) = 2.8.\n\n**High end (16): rapid path, effort cut sharply until stocks recover.**\n- Present value: $1,465 billion − $514 billion = $951 billion net, after a $44 billion loss over the first four years.\n- Management at 1%: $1.4 billion a year × 12.46 = $17.5 billion.\n- Ratio: (951 + 44) ÷ (44 + 17.5) = 16.2, rounded to 16.\n\n**Cross-checks.** Combining the worst of each end, the rapid path's loss with 14% management, no cost recovery and $3.00 per $1 of tax, gives (951 + 44) ÷ (44 + 735) = 1.28, inside the range. Mangin et al. (2018) compare profit gains in 2050 with the extra cost of management, country by country. Moving all fisheries to catch shares has a global ratio of 9.3, or 7.0 when costs scale with revenue, and 2.8 even if every country paid the average cost of the five most expensive managers, $489 per tonne. The annual prize is $83.3 billion (95% confidence interval $49.7 billion to $104.9 billion): net benefits rise from $3.0 billion to $86.3 billion as effort falls about 44%. Costello et al. (2016) find a $53 billion annual profit gain by 2050, the same order of size. The World Bank does not prescribe ITQs specifically; it lists catch shares among tools that work, sometimes alongside community management. The ratio therefore applies to ITQ-type reform as the main route to the effort cut. It is global. United States federal fisheries already use catch shares widely, so the gain there is smaller.\n\nRange before tax finance: **2.8 to 16**. Full cost: **$18.6 billion a year**.\n\n**After the cost of raising taxes.** Each $1 of public spending costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted, an extra $0.34 to $2.00 (Ballard, Shoven and Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999). The low end uses the higher burden and the high end the lower one. Only the management cost is public, and only the part not recovered from fishers through levies is paid from taxes; the transition loss falls on fishers. The low end assumes no cost recovery, as in most countries (Mangin et al. 2018), so 0.999 of the cost is tax-financed. The high end uses New Zealand's 63% recovery (Wyatt 2000), which leaves 0.37 of the $17.5 billion management cost, or 0.105 of the cost, tax-financed. Low end: 2.78 ÷ (1 + 2.0 × 0.999) = 0.93. High end: 16.18 ÷ (1 + 0.34 × 0.105) = 15.6. **Range after tax finance: 0.93 to 15.6.**","cost":"The full cost is $18.6 billion a year worldwide during the transition, and $7.6 billion a year after it.\n\n- **Management, monitoring and enforcement: $7.6 billion a year.** Fourteen published estimates put this cost at 0.5% to 20% of the value of landings, with a median of 5.4% and a mean of 7.1%. They run from under 0.5% for the US surfclam and ocean quahog quotas and 1.4% for Alaska's halibut and sablefish quotas (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2005), through about 3% in Iceland and 10% in Norway, to 15% to 25% in Newfoundland (Arnason, Hannesson and Schrank 2000). New Zealand spends 4% (Metzner and Harte 2008), and the World Bank range is 1 to 14% (World Bank 2017a). The median on optimal landings: 0.054 × $140.6 billion = $7.6 billion. About half is recovered from fishers through levies, the median of published recovery shares, and half is paid from taxes. Levies are transfers, so they are not counted again. Much of this is already spent under current management, so the true increase is smaller.\n- **Lost output during rebuilding: $11.0 billion a year.** The rapid path loses $44 billion over four years: 44 ÷ 4 = $11.0 billion a year. The moderate path loses $0.3 billion in its first year.\n- **Public outlay: none beyond management.** Handing out quota is a transfer.\n\nTotal: 7.6 + 11.0 = $18.6 billion.","strength":"Grade B+. Peer-reviewed natural comparisons measure the gain from catch shares directly: Costello, Gaines and Lynham (2008) on collapse rates across more than 11,000 fisheries, and Grafton, Squires and Fox (2000) on the British Columbia halibut natural experiment. A peer-reviewed global model sizes the prize (Costello et al. 2016). The ratio itself is built from the World Bank's official model rather than a peer-reviewed cost-benefit study, which keeps it below A-.","difficulty":"Moderate. In one country it takes ordinary legislation or regulation, and there are many precedents: New Zealand, Iceland, and United States catch-share programmes such as British Columbia and Alaska halibut. Globally it is harder. Fishing effort must fall about 44%, and the World Bank warns of very high adjustment costs for displaced fishers.","who_benefits":"The gains are concentrated. The World Bank (2017a) notes that benefits go to the relatively few fishers who stay in. Displaced vessel owners and crews bear most of the adjustment cost, and the public sector bears much of the management cost. Pinkerton and Edwards (2009) find that, in the British Columbia halibut fishery, quota leasing moves income from active fishers to quota owners. Auctioned or community-held quotas could spread the gains more widely, but the evidence here is for quotas handed to existing fishers.","counter":"Essington (2010) finds that catch shares in North American fisheries markedly reduced year-to-year swings in exploitation, landings and discards. Yet \"The average levels of most indicators were unaffected by catch share implementation\", apart from discards. The gain is mainly stability, which cautions against the high end, but the study gives no economic value. Pinkerton and Edwards (2009) find that in British Columbia's halibut fishery, quota leasing reduces the benefits to active fishermen and to society. That bears on who receives the rents rather than on the total gain, so it informs who benefits, not the ratio.\n\nThe cost of running the system, who pays for it and the speed of reform decide the tier. The low end assumes management costs of 14% of the value of landings, a moderate path and no cost recovery from fishers, so taxpayers pay at nearly $2 of deadweight per $1: 0.93. The high end assumes 1%, a rapid path and New Zealand's 63% recovery: 15.6. Even the worst combination, the rapid path's $44 billion transition loss with 14% management costs and no recovery, gives 1.28. If fishers paid for management through levies, as for Alaska's halibut and sablefish quotas, the low end would rise back toward 2.8. If taxpayers paid the whole cost everywhere, the policy would slide toward the Mid tier.","references":["Arnason, R., R. Hannesson, and W. E. Schrank. 2000. \"Costs of Fisheries Management: The Cases of Iceland, Norway and Newfoundland.\" *Marine Policy* 24 (3): 233–243. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0308-597X(99)00029-9.","Costello, C., D. Ovando, T. Clavelle, et al. 2016. \"Global Fishery Prospects under Contrasting Management Regimes.\" *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 113 (18): 5125–5129. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1520420113.","Costello, C., S. D. Gaines, and J. Lynham. 2008. \"Can Catch Shares Prevent Fisheries Collapse?\" *Science* 321 (5896): 1678–1681. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1159910.","Essington, T. E. 2010. \"Ecological Indicators Display Reduced Variation in North American Catch Share Fisheries.\" *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 107 (2): 754–759. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0907252107.","Grafton, R. Q., D. Squires, and K. J. Fox. 2000. \"Private Property and Economic Efficiency: A Study of a Common-Pool Resource.\" *Journal of Law and Economics* 43 (2): 679–713. https://doi.org/10.1086/467469.","Mangin, T., C. Costello, J. Anderson, R. Arnason, M. Elliott, S. D. Gaines, R. Hilborn, E. Peterson, and R. Sumaila. 2018. \"Are Fishery Management Upgrades Worth the Cost?\" *PLOS ONE* 13 (9): e0204258. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0204258.","Metzner, R., comp., with M. Harte. 2008. *Report of the Expert Consultation on Low-Cost Fisheries Management Strategies and Cost Recovery.* FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Report 853. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. https://www.fao.org/docrep/pdf/011/i0405e/i0405e02.pdf.","Pinkerton, E., and D. N. Edwards. 2009. \"The Elephant in the Room: The Hidden Costs of Leasing Individual Transferable Fishing Quotas.\" *Marine Policy* 33 (4): 707–713. https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/marpol/v33y2009i4p707-713.html.","U.S. Government Accountability Office. 2005. *Individual Fishing Quotas: Management Costs Varied and Were Not Recovered as Required.* GAO-05-241. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-GAO-05-241/html/GAOREPORTS-GAO-05-241.htm.","World Bank. 2017a. *The Sunken Billions Revisited: Progress and Challenges in Global Marine Fisheries.* Environment and Sustainable Development series. World Bank. https://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0919-4.","World Bank. 2017b. \"Giving Oceans a Break Could Generate $83 Billion in Additional Benefits for Fisheries.\" Press release, February 14, 2017. World Bank. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2017/02/14/giving-oceans-a-break-could-generate-83-billion-in-additional-benefits-for-fisheries.","Wyatt, N. 2000. \"Why Recover Costs? Cost Recovery and Property Rights in New Zealand.\" In *Use of Property Rights in Fisheries Management*, edited by R. Shotton. FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 404/1. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. https://www.fao.org/4/x8985e/x8985e0e.htm."]},"35":{"policy":"Abolish the Federal Reserve and central-bank fiat money. Return to a neutral reserve standard, such as gold, bitcoin or a floating basket of commodities, with money issued by competing banks under free banking. Competing currencies become legal tender. The policy assumes the major economies adopt the standard together, as most did before 1914.","why_on_list":"It comes from the Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom of the World index, Area 3, which scores countries on sound money: money growth, inflation and the freedom to hold other currencies. A neutral reserve currency is the furthest step on that measure.","evidence":"Money tied to a commodity brought stable prices for a long time. A consumer basket costing $100 in 1790 cost $108 in 1913; prices then rose about 24-fold under the Fed by 2008, an average inflation of about 3.4% a year (Selgin, Lastrapes and White 2012). Inflation is a tax on money holders. A sustained 4% inflation costs 0.41% of output a year (Dotsey and Ireland 1996), and its interaction with the tax code adds about 1% of GDP (Feldstein 1997). Banking crises since 1973 have been twice as frequent as under the classical gold standard (Bordo et al. 2001). Countries sharing gold traded far more with each other: 18 to 57% more in one study, 60% more in another (Mitchener and Weidenmier 2008; Lopez-Cordova and Meissner 2003). Governments that kept to gold also borrowed more cheaply (Bordo and Rockoff 1996). Against these gains sits the real cost of holding gold or reserves, between 0.05% and 0.5% of GDP a year. The main risk is a rigid money supply in a deep slump, as in the 1930s. The result is $6.40 to $144 of benefit per $1 of cost.","ratio":"All figures are a percentage of United States GDP a year. The view is global, so the extra return the United States earns on dollar reserves is a transfer between countries, not a gain or cost to the world. Benefits come through four channels.\n\n**1. Inflation.** Low: a sustained 4% inflation costs 0.41% of output a year when money is measured as currency (Dotsey and Ireland 1996). High: Lagos and Wright (2005) find that \"going from 10% to 0% inflation can be worth between 3% and 5% of consumption.\" Scaled to the Fed-era average of about 3.4%, that is about 1.0%. Feldstein (1997, 1999) adds about 1% of GDP a year for the interaction of inflation with the tax code, counted at the high end only.\n\n**2. Banking crises.** The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010) puts the annual chance of a crisis at about 4.5%. Halving it, as under the gold standard, cuts it by 2.25 points. Each point is worth 0.2% to 0.6% of output. Steps: 2.25 × 0.2 = 0.45% of GDP; 2.25 × 0.6 = 1.35% of GDP.\n\n**3. Trade.** United States trade is 25.0% of GDP (World Bank 2025). Low: an 18% rise (Mitchener and Weidenmier 2008) adds 0.18 × 25.0 = 4.5 points of trade. High: Estevadeordal, Frantz and Taylor (2003) find that applying the 1913 gold standard in 1870 would have made trade about 30% higher, adding 7.5 points. Frankel and Romer (1999) find each point of trade raises income by at least 0.5%. Steps: 4.5 × 0.5 = 2.25% of GDP; 7.5 × 0.5 = 3.75% of GDP.\n\n**4. Borrowing costs.** Gold adherence lowered sovereign spreads by about 40 basis points (Bordo and Rockoff 1996). On foreign-held federal debt of 29.3% of GDP, that is 0.12% of GDP. It is counted at the high end only.\n\n**Costs.** The cost is the real resource cost of the commodity or free-banking system (Watts and Snyder 2015). Meltzer's estimate, as reviewed there, is 0.5% of GDP. The measured United States classical gold standard of 1879-1913 cost 0.249%. White's free banking, with 2% gold reserves, costs 0.05%. Fiat money has its own cost in private gold hoarding, 0.014% of GDP a year since Bretton Woods, which is netted off at the low end.\n\n**Low end (6.4).** (0.41 + 0.45 + 2.25 + 0) ÷ (0.5 − 0.014) = 3.11 ÷ 0.486 = 6.4.\n\n**High end (144).** (1.0 + 1.0 + 1.35 + 3.75 + 0.12) ÷ 0.05 = 7.22 ÷ 0.05 = 144.\n\n**Cross-checks.** Using the measured cost of the classical gold standard, the central case is about 25. Lopez-Cordova and Meissner's 60% trade effect and Estevadeordal, Frantz and Taylor's estimate that adopting gold raised trade about 42% both sit above the 18% used at the low end.\n\nFinal range: **6.4 to 144**. Full cost: **$154.3 billion a year**.","cost":"The full cost is $154.3 billion a year, all of it the private cost of holding the reserve commodity.\n\n- **Public outlay: $0.** Closing the Fed needs no budget outlay. Lost Fed remittances to the Treasury are a transfer.\n- **Administration: $0.** No new agency is created. Bank supervision passes to existing regulators, so no net change is entered.\n- **Private resource cost: $154.3 billion.** Meltzer's 0.5% of GDP, the high end of the estimates reviewed by Watts and Snyder (2015), is used. Steps: 0.005 × $30,861 billion (2025 GDP) = $154.3 billion. The measured classical gold standard (0.249%) would cost $76.8 billion; free banking (0.05%) $15.4 billion.\n\nThe United States Treasury already holds a large gold stock, which would reduce the one-time cost of acquiring reserves. No published estimate of transition output loss exists.","strength":"Grade B. The estimates come from peer-reviewed historical studies of the gold standard's effects on trade (Lopez-Cordova and Meissner 2003; Estevadeordal, Frantz and Taylor 2003), borrowing costs (Bordo and Rockoff 1996) and crises (Bordo et al. 2001), and from peer-reviewed models of the cost of inflation (Lagos and Wright 2005; Lucas 2000). No modern economy has tried it, and the Depression-era evidence cuts the other way, so the grade stops at B.","difficulty":"Hard. It dismantles a major, entrenched institution with no modern precedent. No advanced economy has run without a central bank since Canada created the Bank of Canada in 1935 (Bordo, Redish and Rockoff 2015). The competing-currencies part alone would be moderate: it needs only ordinary legal-tender and tax changes, and El Salvador offers a 2021 precedent.","who_benefits":"The gains are broad. Inflation is a tax on everyone who holds money (Lucas 2000), and banking crises hit output and jobs across the whole economy. Savers and households that rely on cash gain most. Debtors and the Treasury lose the transfer they now receive from inflation and money creation.","counter":"Three findings point the other way. An International Monetary Fund study finds that any harm to trade from exchange-rate volatility \"would appear to be fairly small and is by no means a robust, universal finding\" (Clark, Tamirisa and Wei 2004). Friedman (1960) put the cost of a full commodity standard at about 2.5% of national product. Most serious, countries that left gold early in the 1930s recovered faster (Bernanke 1995). These are kept outside the range. Later measurement of the actual classical gold standard found a cost of 0.249% of GDP, and the policy uses fractional reserves rather than a full commodity standard. No study estimates how often a 1930s-type episode would recur under a modern commodity standard.\n\nTrade and cost decide the tier. The low end counts a trade gain of 2.25% of GDP. With no trade gain, the ratio falls to 1.8, in the Mid tier. With Friedman's full-commodity cost, it falls to about 0.3, in the Bad tier. In the other direction, with the measured classical gold-standard cost, the central case is about 25. A repeat of the 1930s, when staying on gold deepened the slump, is the largest unpriced risk and would pull every figure down.","references":["Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 2010. *An Assessment of the Long-Term Economic Impact of Stronger Capital and Liquidity Requirements.* Bank for International Settlements. https://www.fsb.org/uploads/r_100818a.pdf.","Bernanke, B. S. 1995. \"The Macroeconomics of the Great Depression: A Comparative Approach.\" *Journal of Money, Credit and Banking* 27 (1): 1–28. https://www.nber.org/papers/w4814.","Bordo, M., B. Eichengreen, D. Klingebiel, and M. S. Martinez-Peria. 2001. \"Is the Crisis Problem Growing More Severe?\" *Economic Policy* 16 (32): 52–82. https://academic.oup.com/economicpolicy/article-abstract/16/32/52/2366404.","Bordo, M. D., A. Redish, and H. Rockoff. 2015. \"Why Didn't Canada Have a Banking Crisis in 2008 (or in 1930, or 1907, or ...)?\" *Economic History Review*. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0289.665.","Bordo, M. D., and H. Rockoff. 1996. \"The Gold Standard as a 'Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval.'\" *Journal of Economic History* 56 (2): 389–428. https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/jechis/v56y1996i02p389-428_01.html.","Clark, P., N. Tamirisa, and S.-J. Wei. 2004. *Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade Flows: Some New Evidence.* International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/external/np/res/exrate/2004/eng/051904.pdf.","Dotsey, M., and P. Ireland. 1996. \"The Welfare Cost of Inflation in General Equilibrium.\" *Journal of Monetary Economics* 37 (1): 29–47. https://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/working_papers/1994/wp_94-4.","Estevadeordal, A., B. Frantz, and A. M. Taylor. 2003. \"The Rise and Fall of World Trade, 1870–1939.\" *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 118 (2): 359–407. https://www.nber.org/papers/w9318.","Feldstein, M. 1997. \"The Costs and Benefits of Going from Low Inflation to Price Stability.\" NBER Working Paper 5469. In *Reducing Inflation*, edited by Romer and Romer. https://doi.org/10.3386/w5469.","Feldstein, M. 1999. \"Capital Income Taxes and the Benefit of Price Stability.\" NBER Working Paper 6200. In *The Costs and Benefits of Price Stability.* University of Chicago Press/NBER. https://doi.org/10.3386/w6200.","Frankel, J. A., and D. Romer. 1999. \"Does Trade Cause Growth?\" *American Economic Review* 89 (3): 379–399. https://eml.berkeley.edu/~dromer/papers/AER_June99.pdf.","Friedman, M. 1960. *A Program for Monetary Stability.* Fordham University Press. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Program_for_Monetary_Stability.","Lagos, R., and R. Wright. 2005. \"A Unified Framework for Monetary Theory and Policy Analysis.\" *Journal of Political Economy* 113 (3): 463–484. https://doi.org/10.1086/429804.","Lopez-Cordova, J. E., and C. M. Meissner. 2003. \"Exchange-Rate Regimes and International Trade: Evidence from the Classical Gold Standard Era.\" *American Economic Review* 93 (1): 344–353. https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v93y2003i1p344-353.html.","Lucas, R. E., Jr. 2000. \"Inflation and Welfare.\" *Econometrica* 68 (2): 247–274. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00109.","Mitchener, K. J., and M. Weidenmier. 2008. \"Trade and Empire.\" *Economic Journal* 118 (533): 1805–1834. https://www.nber.org/papers/w13765.","Selgin, G., W. D. Lastrapes, and L. H. White. 2012. \"Has the Fed Been a Failure?\" *Journal of Macroeconomics* 34 (3). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2012.02.003.","Watts, T., and L. Snyder. 2015. \"Current Evidence on the Resource Costs of Irredeemable Paper Money.\" *Cato Journal* 35 (2). https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/2015/5/cj-v35n2-15.pdf.","World Bank. 2025. \"Trade (% of GDP), NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS.\" World Development Indicators. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS."]},"36":{"policy":"The United States would close federal deposit insurance and bar government rescues of failed banks. Depositors and creditors would carry their own risk. Banks could still buy private deposit insurance. The change is a law change, not a spending programme.","why_on_list":"The policy comes from the Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom of the World index, under Areas 3 and 5, which cover money and the regulation of credit. Government guarantees of bank deposits and bank creditors are state involvement in credit, so their removal is on the list.","evidence":"The case for abolition rests on market discipline. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) studied 61 countries from 1980 to 1997, with 40 systemic crises. They find that explicit deposit insurance makes banking crises more likely, and that \"the adverse impact of deposit insurance on bank stability tends to be stronger the more extensive is the coverage offered to depositors, and where the scheme is funded and run by the government rather than the private sector.\" The effect fades where institutions are strong. History points the same way. Calomiris and Jaremski (2019) show that early-1900s state insurance schemes let insured banks take more insolvency risk during the First World War farm boom; when prices fell, the insurance systems collapsed with high losses. Calomiris (1990) finds that voluntary mutual-liability schemes worked while compulsory state schemes failed.\n\nThe case against is just as serious. Bank-run theory shows that a sound bank can fail if depositors panic, and that a government guarantee can stop the panic (Diamond and Dybvig 1983). A recent calibrated model finds that the first dollars of cover are the most valuable of all (Dávila and Goldstein 2023). Put the two sides together and the ratio runs from 0.5 to 5.5. It straddles 1. The sign of the effect is contested, and that uncertainty is the whole story of this policy.","ratio":"No published study gives a benefit-cost ratio for abolishing deposit insurance. The ratio is built from published inputs. The benefit is crises avoided because guarantees no longer weaken market discipline. The cost is the welfare lost when depositors lose protection and runs become more common.\n\n**High end.**\n- Crisis risk: Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache estimate that cutting US coverage to Swiss levels would have lowered the predicted probability of the 1980 US banking crisis from 4.3% to 2.5%. That is 1.8 points a year.\n- Crisis size: Laeven and Valencia (2018) put the output loss of the 2007 US crisis at 30% of trend GDP.\n- Expected avoided loss: 0.018 × 0.30 = 0.54% of GDP a year.\n- In 2025 dollars (GDP $30,861bn): 0.0054 × 30,861 = $166.6bn a year.\n- Cost of losing cover: Dávila and Goldstein (2023) find that \"an increase in coverage of $100,000 is associated with a welfare gain of $13.2 billion for the whole banking sector.\" That is 9.46 basis points of $14 trillion of bank assets, or 13.2 ÷ 14,770 = 0.089% of 2008 GDP. Taking this as the value of the first $100,000 of cover: 0.00089 × 30,861 = $27.5bn.\n- Running cost of private replacement insurance: $2.9bn a year.\n- Total cost: 27.5 + 2.9 = $30.4bn.\n- Ratio: 166.6 ÷ 30.4 = **5.5**.\n\nThis is an upper bound. Gains from cover are highest at low coverage, so full abolition costs more than losing a middle slice. And the destabilising effect of insurance is insignificant where institutions are strong, as in the United States.\n\n**Low end.**\n- Direct resolution costs that guarantees created since 1934: the savings and loan crisis, $153bn (Curry and Shibut 2000); 2008 bailouts, about $500bn (Lucas 2019); Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank, $16.3bn (FDIC 2023). Total: about $669bn over about 90 years, or $7.4bn a year.\n- Cost: the same $13.2bn a year plus $2.9bn of private-insurance operating cost.\n- Ratio: 7.4 ÷ (13.2 + 2.9) = 0.46, rounded to **0.5**. Before administration the ratio is 0.56.\n\nThe range is therefore 0.5 to 5.5, with a full cost of $2.9bn a year.","cost":"The full cost is $2.9bn a year. Repeal needs no new public spending, because the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is funded by bank premiums. Even the losses from protecting uninsured depositors at Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank were recovered from banks: by statute the FDIC must recoup such losses through special assessments on insured institutions (FDIC 2023).\n\nThe $2.9bn is the operating cost of private replacement insurance. If private insurers wrote cover priced like the FDIC's 2024 assessment revenue of $11.6bn (FDIC 2025), at the property-casualty industry's underwriting expense ratio of 24.8% (National Association of Insurance Commissioners 2024), their costs would be 0.248 × 11.6 = $2.9bn a year. The FDIC's own 2024 fund operating expenses of $2.43bn are not counted as a saving, because much of that work is supervision that would continue at another agency. Premiums are a price for risk, not a resource cost. The welfare cost of weaker protection and more runs sits in the ratio's denominator and is not counted twice. Depositors lost about 30% in a typical failure before the FDIC existed (Correia, Luck and Verner 2024).","strength":"Grade B. Each input comes from strong work: a peer-reviewed cross-country panel, peer-reviewed historical studies and peer-reviewed models. But the ratio itself is assembled from those inputs rather than published, and the inputs disagree on the sign of the effect. That rules out a higher grade.","difficulty":"Hard. The policy dismantles a major federal institution in place since 1933. It also ends the implicit too-big-to-fail guarantee, a funding subsidy worth up to $70bn a year to large US banks (International Monetary Fund 2014). No large advanced economy runs without deposit insurance today. New Zealand, the last holdout in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, introduced a NZ$100,000 Depositor Compensation Scheme on 1 July 2025.","who_benefits":"The effects are mixed. Ending bailouts removes transfers that mostly went to bank creditors and shareholders, about $500bn in 2008-09 (Lucas 2019), and ends the funding subsidy to the largest banks. Taxpayers gain. Ending deposit insurance, though, shifts risk onto ordinary depositors, who are the least able to monitor banks. Neither effect falls clearly on the poor or the rich.","counter":"The strongest evidence against abolition is Dávila and Goldstein (2023). They put optimal US coverage in 2008 at about $381,000 and find that \"the welfare gains from having a deposit insurance system at all are very large.\" On its own, their estimate implies a ratio below 1 for full abolition. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) show in theory that government deposit insurance can produce better contracts. Egan, Hortaçsu and Matvos (2017) find that uninsured deposits flee distressed banks while insured deposits stay, so banks can be very fragile. Neither gives a welfare figure for abolition. Dávila and Goldstein's estimate is used as the cost at both ends, so their case sits inside the range rather than outside it.\n\nThe verdict depends on how much insurance itself causes crises. The high end of 5.5 assumes that cutting US coverage to Swiss levels lowers the yearly chance of a crisis from 4.3% to 2.5% (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 2002). The same authors find the effect insignificant where institutions are strong, as in the US. If that held, the benefit would shrink to the direct bailout costs alone, giving about 0.5, in the Bad tier. Correia, Luck and Verner (2024) cut the other way: runs can be ruled out as a plausible cause in more than 80% of bank failures before federal deposit insurance.","references":["Anginer, D., A. Demirgüç-Kunt, and M. Zhu. 2014. \"How Does Deposit Insurance Affect Bank Risk? Evidence from the Recent Crisis.\" *Journal of Banking and Finance* 48: 312-321. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.09.013","Calomiris, C. W. 1990. \"Is Deposit Insurance Necessary? A Historical Perspective.\" *Journal of Economic History* 50 (2): 283-295. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050700036433","Calomiris, C. W., and M. Jaremski. 2019. \"Stealing Deposits: Deposit Insurance, Risk-Taking, and the Removal of Market Discipline in Early 20th-Century Banks.\" *Journal of Finance* 74 (2): 711-754. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12753","Correia, S., S. Luck, and E. Verner. 2024. \"Why Do Banks Fail? Bank Runs Versus Solvency.\" *Liberty Street Economics*, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2024/11/why-do-banks-fail-bank-runs-versus-solvency/","Curry, T., and L. Shibut. 2000. \"The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and Consequences.\" *FDIC Banking Review* 13 (2). https://corpora.tika.apache.org/base/docs/govdocs1/436/436487.pdf","Dávila, E., and I. Goldstein. 2023. \"Optimal Deposit Insurance.\" *Journal of Political Economy* 131 (7): 1676ff. https://doi.org/10.1086/723633","Demirgüç-Kunt, A., and E. Detragiache. 2002. \"Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability? An Empirical Investigation.\" *Journal of Monetary Economics* 49 (7): 1373-1406. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3932(02)00171-X","Diamond, D. W., and P. H. Dybvig. 1983. \"Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity.\" *Journal of Political Economy* 91 (3): 401-419. https://doi.org/10.1086/261155","Egan, M., A. Hortaçsu, and G. Matvos. 2017. \"Deposit Competition and Financial Fragility: Evidence from the US Banking Sector.\" *American Economic Review* 107 (1): 169-216. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20150342","Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 2023. \"FDIC Finalizes $16.3 Billion Special Assessment to Recover Loss from SVB and Signature Bank Failures.\" Davis Polk and Wardwell client update summarising the FDIC final rule of 16 November 2023. https://www.davispolk.com/insights/client-update/fdic-finalizes-163-billion-special-assessment-recover-loss-svb-and-signature","Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 2025. *2024 Annual Report, Section II: Financial Highlights.* FDIC. https://fdic.gov/financial-reports/2024-annual-report-section2-financial-highlights","International Monetary Fund. 2014. \"Big Banks Benefit From Government Subsidies.\" *IMF Survey*, on *Global Financial Stability Report*, April 2014, chapter 3. https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/sopol033114a","Laeven, L., and F. Valencia. 2018. *Systemic Banking Crises Revisited.* IMF Working Paper 18/206. International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2018/09/14/Systemic-Banking-Crises-Revisited-46232","Lucas, D. 2019. \"Measuring the Cost of Bailouts.\" *Annual Review of Financial Economics* 11: 85-108. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-financial-110217-022532","National Association of Insurance Commissioners. 2024. *U.S. Property and Casualty and Title Insurance Industries: 2024 Mid-Year Results.* NAIC Financial Regulatory Services. https://content.naic.org/sites/default/files/pc-and-title-2024mid-year-industry-report.pdf"]},"37":{"policy":"Abolish all tariffs and import quotas, without waiting for other countries to do the same. Repeal anti-dumping and countervailing duties. Simplify border paperwork so goods clear customs faster. No budget outlay is needed; it is a law change.","why_on_list":"The Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom of the World index measures the freedom to trade internationally in its Area 4. Tariffs, quotas and border red tape are the main items scored there, so their removal is on the list.","evidence":"Free trade is among the best-evidenced policies in economics. The Copenhagen Consensus has asked the same question three times: what is the return on full global trade liberalisation? Each time, counting growth effects, the answer has been in the hundreds or thousands of dollars per dollar of cost. Anderson (2012) puts the present value of benefits from completing the Doha round at $12 trillion to $64 trillion, against adjustment costs below $400 billion. Anderson (2015) finds ratios of 1,300 to 2,800 globally once growth effects are counted.\n\nThe growth effect is not just a model assumption. Wacziarg and Welch (2008) find that \"countries that liberalized their trade regimes experienced average annual growth rates that were about 1.5 percentage points higher than before liberalization.\" Frankel and Romer (1999) find that a 1-point rise in the trade share raises income per person by roughly 0.5% to 2%. The costs of protection are also measured directly. The 2018 US tariffs passed fully into domestic prices and cost US buyers of imports $51 billion, or 0.27% of GDP (Fajgelbaum et al. 2020).\n\nThe stakes today are real. The Tax Foundation finds that the remaining US tariffs cut long-run GDP by 0.4% and cost $820 per household in 2026 (York and Durante 2026). The Budget Lab at Yale (2026) puts the average statutory tariff rate at 11.0%, rising to 11.8% by the end of 2026, and household costs at about $1,100 a year. The main uncertainty is the size of the growth effect, and how much of a global gain one country captures by acting alone. Even the narrowest peer-reviewed estimate is well above 1. The ratio runs from 90 to 2,800.","ratio":"Both ends use Copenhagen Consensus estimates of full global liberalisation that include growth effects.\n\n**Low end: 90.**\n- Anderson (2012): \"The net present value of the future benefits of a Doha agreement ranges from $12 trillion to $64 trillion. The costs are less than $400 billion in present value terms.\"\n- His reported global benefit-cost ratio is 90 to 180 (140 to 250 for developing countries).\n- The floor, **90**, is the low end.\n\n**High end: 2,800.**\n- Anderson (2015; 2018) adds growth effects: reform lifts growth rates by one-fifth for a time, tapering back by 2050.\n- Global ratio: 1,300 at a 5% discount rate, 2,800 at 3%. Developing countries: 2,100 to 4,700.\n- The top, **2,800**, is the high end.\n\n**Cross-checks.** Anderson and Winters (2008) give 269 to 1,121 with dynamic gains and 17 to 80 without. The narrow static Halftime estimate of Feyrer et al. (2023), with a global ratio of 11 and 5 to 7 for high-income countries, is kept as counter-evidence. Two sub-policies are reported but not averaged in. Repealing anti-dumping duties returns 2 to 14 (U.S. International Trade Commission 1995; Gallaway, Blonigen and Flynn 1999). Trade facilitation returns 11 to 640, set against the World Trade Organization's estimated gains (2015) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) implementation costs of EUR 3.5 million to EUR 19 million per country (Moïsé 2013).\n\nOne country acting alone captures a smaller share of these global gains. But the US losses from current tariffs, about $30bn to $120bn a year, are recurring, and repeal removes them at near-zero budget cost. Anderson's ratios already put adjustment costs in the denominator. The range is 90 to 2,800, with a full cost of $32.1bn a year.","cost":"The full cost is $32.1bn a year.\n\n- **Public outlay: $0.** Repealing tariffs and quotas needs no spending; resistance to trade reform is almost never about treasury outlays (Anderson 2012). Lost tariff revenue, about $1.4 trillion to $1.9 trillion over ten years, is a transfer from consumers to government, not a resource cost.\n- **Administration: about $0.02bn a year** for the United States to implement trade facilitation (Moïsé 2013).\n- **Private compliance:** no published estimate separate from trade facilitation.\n- **Adjustment costs: $32.1bn a year.** Displaced workers and firms bear costs below $400bn in present value for full global liberalisation (Anderson 2012). Spread over 20 years at 5%: 400 ÷ 12.46 = $32.1bn a year.\n\nTotal: 0.02 + 32.1 = $32.1bn a year. These adjustment costs are already the denominator of the Copenhagen Consensus ratios, so they are not added twice.","strength":"Grade A. The ratios are peer-edited Copenhagen Consensus estimates, published in book form by Cambridge University Press. The growth effect behind them rests on peer-reviewed quasi-experimental and instrumental-variable studies. Even the narrowest peer-reviewed estimate (Feyrer et al. 2023) is above 1. The sub-policies rate a little lower: B for anti-dumping repeal (one peer-reviewed general-equilibrium model) and A- for trade facilitation (one peer-reviewed benefit-cost analysis).","difficulty":"Moderate. One country acting alone needs only ordinary tariff legislation. There are working precedents. Hong Kong charges no tariff on any import or export (Hong Kong Trade and Industry Department). Singapore, New Zealand's unilateral tariff cuts and Britain's 1846 repeal of the Corn Laws show it can be done. Anti-dumping repeal needs Congress to repeal Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930. Customs reform can proceed under existing authority, since the Trade Facilitation Agreement has been in force since 2017. The Supreme Court struck down the emergency-powers tariffs in *Learning Resources v. Trump* on 20 February 2026, but other statutory tariff powers remain (York and Durante 2026).","who_benefits":"The poor gain most. Anderson (2015) finds ratios of 2,100 to 4,700 for developing countries, against 1,300 to 2,800 globally, and 160 million fewer people in extreme poverty by 2030. Feyrer et al. (2023) find a ratio of about 100 for low and lower-middle-income countries, against about 5 for high-income ones. Inside the United States, tariffs work as a consumption tax of about $1,100 per household a year (Budget Lab at Yale 2026). Removing them helps lower-income households most relative to income. The costs fall on workers and firms in protected industries, who bear the adjustment.","counter":"Feyrer et al. (2023) give the narrowest estimate. They model a 5% rise in world trade, static and first-year only, and find benefits of $700bn against costs of $100bn, a ratio of 11 globally and about 5 for high-income countries. Lomborg (2023) notes that \"almost all costs hit high-income countries.\" The authors say their ratios sit at the low end of the plausible range. The study is left out because it measures a partial rise in trade, not full free trade. Egger and Nelson (2011) find that anti-dumping duties since 1948 have had negative but modest effects, which makes anti-dumping repeal a small add-on rather than a driver of the range.\n\nThe growth effect decides how high the ratio goes, not whether it clears the top tier. Without dynamic gains, Anderson and Winters (2008) find 17 to 80; with them, 269 to 1,121. Even the static figures clear 10. The verdict would fall a tier only if one country acting alone captured a small share of the global gain, and its own gain matched the high-income figure of about 5 in Feyrer et al. (2023). For the United States the stakes are concrete: remaining tariffs cut long-run GDP by 0.4% (York and Durante 2026).","references":["Anderson, K. 2012. *Trade Barriers.* Copenhagen Consensus 2012 Challenge Paper. Copenhagen Consensus Center. https://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/publication/trade-barriers","Anderson, K. 2015. *Benefits and Costs of the Trade Targets for the Post-2015 Development Agenda.* Post-2015 Consensus Assessment Paper. Copenhagen Consensus Center. https://copenhagenconsensus.com/publication/post-2015-consensus-trade-assessment-anderson","Anderson, K. 2018. \"Benefits and Costs of the Trade Targets for the Post-2015 Development Agenda.\" Chapter 9 in *Prioritizing Development: A Cost Benefit Analysis of the UN's SDGs*, edited by B. Lomborg. Cambridge University Press. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/prioritizing-development/benefits-and-costs-of-the-trade-targets-for-the-post2015-development-agenda/6C7F2BE259D803132AA9E70957AAEC06","Anderson, K., and L. A. Winters. 2008. *The Challenge of Reducing International Trade and Migration Barriers.* Copenhagen Consensus 2008 Challenge Paper. Copenhagen Consensus Center. https://copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/imported/cp_subsidiesandtradebarrierscc08vol2.pdf","Budget Lab at Yale. 2026. *The State of U.S. Tariffs: August 24, 2026.* Yale University. https://budgetlab.yale.edu/research/state-us-tariffs","Egger, P., and D. Nelson. 2011. \"How Bad Is Antidumping? Evidence from Panel Data.\" *Review of Economics and Statistics* 93 (4): 1374-1390. https://direct.mit.edu/rest/article/93/4/1374/57911/How-Bad-Is-Antidumping-Evidence-from-Panel-Data","Fajgelbaum, P. D., P. K. Goldberg, P. J. Kennedy, and A. K. Khandelwal. 2020. \"The Return to Protectionism.\" *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 135 (1): 1-55. https://www.nber.org/papers/w25638","Feyrer, J., V. Tyazhelnikov, B. Aleman-Castilla, and B. Wong. 2023. \"Benefit-Cost Analysis of Increased Trade: An Order-of-Magnitude Estimate of the Benefit-Cost Ratio.\" *Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis* 14 (S1). https://doi.org/10.1017/bca.2023.12","Frankel, J. A., and D. Romer. 1999. \"Does Trade Cause Growth?\" *American Economic Review* 89 (3): 379-399. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.89.3.379","Gallaway, M. P., B. A. Blonigen, and J. E. Flynn. 1999. \"Welfare Costs of the U.S. Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws.\" *Journal of International Economics* 49 (2): 211-244. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-1996(98)00063-4","Hong Kong Trade and Industry Department. n.d. \"Hong Kong's Trade Policy.\" Government of the Hong Kong SAR. https://www.tid.gov.hk/en/our_work/hk_participation_in_ito/hk_trade_policy.html","Lomborg, B. 2023. \"Save 4.2 Million Lives and Generate $1.1 Trillion in Economic Benefits for Only $41 Billion: Introduction to the Special Issue on the Most Efficient Policies for the Sustainable Development Goals.\" *Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis* 14 (S1): 1-15. https://doi.org/10.1017/bca.2023.32","Moïsé, E. 2013. *The Costs and Challenges of Implementing Trade Facilitation Measures.* OECD Trade Policy Papers. OECD. https://doi.org/10.1787/5k46hzqxt8jh-en","U.S. International Trade Commission. 1995. *The Economic Effects of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders and Suspension Agreements.* Investigation 332-344, Publication 2900. USITC. https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub2900.pdf","Wacziarg, R., and K. H. Welch. 2008. \"Trade Liberalization and Growth: New Evidence.\" *World Bank Economic Review* 22 (2): 187-231. https://academic.oup.com/wber/article-abstract/22/2/187/1736899","World Trade Organization. 2015. *World Trade Report 2015: Speeding Up Trade: Benefits and Challenges of Implementing the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement.* WTO. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres15_e/pr755_e.htm","York, E., and A. Durante. 2026. \"Trump Tariffs: Tracking the Economic Impact of the Trump Trade War.\" Tax Foundation, updated 10 September 2026. https://taxfoundation.org/research/federal-tax/trump-tariffs-trade-war/"]},"38":{"policy":"End subsidies for every energy source: oil, gas, coal, renewables, biofuels and nuclear. At the same time, reform nuclear licensing and open oil, gas and coal permitting, leasing, pipelines and liquefied natural gas (LNG) export approval. Lift the bans that stop development banks from financing gas and coal plants in poor countries. Every source then competes on its own costs.","why_on_list":"The Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom of the World index scores the size of government in Area 1, which includes subsidies, and regulation in Area 5, which includes permitting and licensing. Energy subsidies and energy permits sit squarely in both, so the package is on the list.","evidence":"The parts of this package pull in opposite directions. Ending fossil-fuel subsidies removes real waste. Davis (2014) finds that road-fuel subsidies totalled $110 billion in 2012, and that \"the total annual deadweight loss worldwide is $44 billion.\" That is 40 cents of pure loss for every subsidy dollar. Yet ending them cuts emissions less than expected: only 0.5 to 2.2 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide a year by 2030, a 1% to 5% cut (Jewell et al. 2018). In some models, removing oil and gas subsidies even pushes users toward coal.\n\nEnding renewable subsidies saves money but adds emissions, because the subsidies pay for real abatement. Opening federal leasing, shale gas and LNG exports adds output. The shale boom raised welfare for gas consumers and producers by $48 billion a year (Hausman and Kellogg 2015). The US Department of Energy (2024) finds that unconstrained LNG exports would raise GDP by $80 billion in 2050.\n\nCounting subsidies removed as transfers, each $1 returns $0.78 to $2.16. The result falls below 1 when renewable subsidies are treated as cheap abatement and the GDP loss from ending them is counted. It rises above 2 when subsidies are at their 2022 peak and the taxes that fund them are costly. Nuclear licensing reform and development-bank lending are described but not priced.","ratio":"All figures are annual global flows in billions of dollars. Subsidies removed are transfers, counted at $1 on both sides: taxpayers gain each dollar recipients lose. The ratio is (subsidies + efficiency gains + other gains − damages) ÷ (subsidies + other costs).\n\n**Emissions.** In million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent a year:\n- Ending fossil-fuel subsidies: −500 to −2,200 by 2030 (Jewell et al. 2018).\n- Ending renewable subsidies, treating the $166bn as the abatement it pays for: 166 ÷ 88 = +1,886 at the lowest cost per tonne ($88, Bistline, Mehrotra and Wolfram 2023), down to 166 ÷ 2,138 = +78 at the highest ($2,138, Abrell, Kosch and Rausch 2019).\n- Opening federal leasing: +100 after leakage (Prest 2022).\n- Unconstrained LNG exports: +22.9 (U.S. Department of Energy 2024).\n- Net: +1,509 at the low end and −1,999 at the high end.\n- Each tonne is valued at $66 for climate damage (Barrage and Nordhaus 2024) plus $57.5 for local air pollution (Parry, Veung and Heine 2014): $123.5 a tonne.\n\n**Low end.** Subsidies of $634bn in 2017 (International Renewable Energy Agency 2020).\n- Benefits: 634 + deadweight loss 44 (Davis 2014, road fuels only) + excess burden of the taxes that fund subsidies, 0.17 × 634 = 107.8 (Ballard, Shoven and Whalley 1985, lowest figure) + federal royalties 5 (Prest 2022) + LNG GDP 13 (NERA Economic Consulting 2018) − emission damages 1,509 × 123.5 = 186.4. Total: 617.4.\n- Costs: 634 + US GDP loss from ending clean-energy credits 160 (Energy Innovation 2025) + replacement nuclear licensing 0.995 (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2024). Total: 795.0.\n- Ratio: 617.4 ÷ 795.0 = **0.78**.\n\n**High end.** Subsidies of $1,447bn: explicit fossil-fuel subsidies in 2022 of 18% of $7 trillion = $1,260bn (Black, Liu and Parry 2023), plus $166bn for renewables and $21bn for nuclear.\n- Benefits: 1,447 + deadweight loss 0.40 × 1,260 = 504 + excess burden 0.56 × 1,447 = 810.3 (highest Ballard, Shoven and Whalley figure) + shale-gas welfare 48 (Hausman and Kellogg 2015) + LNG GDP 80 (U.S. Department of Energy 2024) + emission cut 1,999 × 123.5 = 246.9. Total: 3,136.2.\n- Costs: 1,447 + displaced-worker losses 4.39 + 0.995. Total: 1,452.4.\n- Ratio: 3,136.2 ÷ 1,452.4 = **2.16**.\n\nThe high end uses 2022 subsidies, a price-spike year. As a cross-check, the Copenhagen Consensus rates phasing out fossil-fuel subsidies at 15 per $1, counting only efficiency and environmental gains and not the subsidy as a transfer (Copenhagen Consensus Center 2015). The range is 0.78 to 2.16, with a full cost of $347.4bn a year.","cost":"The full cost is $347.4bn a year, excluding the subsidies themselves, which are transfers on both sides of the ratio.\n\n- **Public outlay: $0.** Ending subsidies lowers public spending.\n- **Administration: $0.995bn.** A replacement nuclear licensing system is costed at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's 2025 budget request of $994,946,000, most of it recovered from fees (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2024). No published estimate exists for oil, gas and LNG permitting administration.\n- **Private compliance:** none estimated.\n- **GDP loss: $160bn** in 2030 from ending US clean-energy tax credits, including about 790,000 fewer jobs (Energy Innovation 2025). The scenario also rescinds other federal programmes, so it is an upper bound. At the high end it is replaced by displaced-worker losses: 790,000 × 1.4 years of earnings (Davis and von Wachter 2011) × $49,504 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2025) = $54.8bn in present value, or 54.8 ÷ 12.46 = $4.39bn a year.\n- **External damage: $186.4bn.** The low-end net emission increase of 1,509 million tonnes at $123.5 a tonne.\n\nTotal: 0.995 + 160 + 186.4 = $347.4bn a year.","strength":"Grade B. The priced parts rest on peer-reviewed estimates of fuel-subsidy losses, emissions, abatement costs and leasing effects. A Copenhagen Consensus ratio of 15 for fossil-subsidy phase-out serves as a cross-check. But the ratio is assembled from several separate studies. It assumes renewable subsidies equal the resource costs they finance. And two of the four parts, nuclear licensing and development-bank finance, are not priced. That keeps the grade at B rather than B+.","difficulty":"Moderate. Each country can act alone through ordinary legislation. Fuel-subsidy reform has precedents in Indonesia (2015) and India (2014). Nuclear licensing, permitting and leasing changes are ordinary statutes. Lifting development-bank bans on fossil-fuel finance is a decision for each bank's board. No treaty is needed. The obstacle is that most governments must act. Members of the Group of Twenty pledged in 2009 to phase out inefficient fossil-fuel subsidies, yet explicit subsidies reached $1.3 trillion in 2022.","who_benefits":"The gains are broad. Energy subsidies flow mostly to better-off households. About 60% of US clean-energy tax credits went to the top income fifth (Borenstein and Davis 2016). The Copenhagen Consensus finds particularly high benefits for developing countries when the savings are recycled. Lifting development-bank bans matters for the poorest: for a $10 billion portfolio, \"A natural gas–only portfolio could provide electricity access to 90 million people versus 20–27 million people with a renewables-only portfolio\" (Moss and Leo 2014). The losers are poor households in subsidising countries, who lose price support in the short run, and US gas consumers, who pay about 4% more under unconstrained LNG exports (U.S. Department of Energy 2024).","counter":"A higher value of carbon cuts both ways. Rennert et al. (2022) put the social cost of carbon at $185 a tonne at a 2% discount rate, against the $66 used here. At $185, the low end's net rise in emissions would cost far more, and the high end's net cut would be worth more, widening the range in both directions. Lang (2017) finds that, had early learning rates continued, nuclear power could cost around 10% of what it does now and could have avoided up to 9.5 million deaths. That is a historical counterfactual, not an estimate of licensing reform today, so it is left out. Lee, Miguel and Wolfram (2020) find that demand for rural grid connections in Kenya fell sharply with price and consumption stayed very low, which weighs against large gains from financing fossil-fuel power in poor countries.\n\nThe verdict turns on what renewable subsidies buy. If each subsidy dollar buys abatement at the cheapest estimate, $88 a tonne (Bistline, Mehrotra and Wolfram 2023), ending them adds about 1,886 million tonnes a year, and the low case is 0.78. If it buys abatement at the dearest, $2,138 a tonne (Abrell, Kosch and Rausch 2019), ending them adds only 78 million tonnes, and the high case is 2.16. That one assumption moves the policy between the Bad and Good tiers.","references":["Abrell, J., M. Kosch, and S. Rausch. 2019. \"Carbon Abatement with Renewables: Evaluating Wind and Solar Subsidies in Germany and Spain.\" *Journal of Public Economics* 169: 172-202. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.11.007","Ballard, C. L., J. B. Shoven, and J. Whalley. 1985. \"General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States.\" *American Economic Review* 75 (1): 128-138. https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v75y1985i1p128-38.html","Barrage, L., and W. Nordhaus. 2024. \"Policies, Projections, and the Social Cost of Carbon: Results from the DICE-2023 Model.\" *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 121 (13): e2312030121. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2312030121","Bistline, J., N. Mehrotra, and C. Wolfram. 2023. \"Economic Implications of the Climate Provisions of the Inflation Reduction Act.\" *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, Spring 2023. NBER Working Paper 31267. https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w31267/w31267.pdf","Black, S., A. A. Liu, and I. W. H. Parry. 2023. *IMF Fossil Fuel Subsidies Data: 2023 Update.* IMF Working Paper 23/169. International Monetary Fund. https://doi.org/10.5089/9798400249006.001","Borenstein, S., and L. W. Davis. 2016. \"The Distributional Effects of US Clean Energy Tax Credits.\" *Tax Policy and the Economy* 30: 191-234. https://doi.org/10.1086/685597","Copenhagen Consensus Center. 2015. *Energy: Post-2015 Consensus.* Assessment paper by I. Galiana and A. Sopinka. Copenhagen Consensus Center. https://copenhagenconsensus.com/post-2015-consensus/energy","Davis, L. W. 2014. \"The Economic Cost of Global Fuel Subsidies.\" *American Economic Review* 104 (5): 581-585. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.5.581","Davis, S. J., and T. von Wachter. 2011. \"Recessions and the Costs of Job Loss.\" *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, Fall 2011. NBER Working Paper 17638. https://doi.org/10.3386/w17638","Energy Innovation Policy and Technology. 2025. *National IRA Rollback Update (March 2025).* Energy Innovation Policy and Technology LLC. https://dev-ei.thisisvisceral.com/wp-content/uploads/National-IRA-Rollback-Update-March-2025_FINAL.pdf","Hausman, C., and R. Kellogg. 2015. \"Welfare and Distributional Implications of Shale Gas.\" *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, Spring 2015. NBER Working Paper 21115. https://doi.org/10.3386/w21115","International Renewable Energy Agency. 2020. *Energy Subsidies: Evolution in the Global Energy Transformation to 2050.* By M. Taylor. IRENA, Abu Dhabi. https://www.irena.org/publications/2020/Apr/Energy-Subsidies-2020","Jewell, J., D. McCollum, J. Emmerling, C. Bertram, D. E. H. J. Gernaat, V. Krey, L. Paroussos, et al. 2018. \"Limited Emission Reductions from Fuel Subsidy Removal Except in Energy-Exporting Regions.\" *Nature* 554 (7691): 229-233. https://doi.org/10.1038/nature25467","Lang, P. A. 2017. \"Nuclear Power Learning and Deployment Rates; Disruption and Global Benefits Forgone.\" *Energies* 10 (12): 2169. https://doi.org/10.3390/en10122169","Lee, K., E. Miguel, and C. Wolfram. 2020. \"Experimental Evidence on the Economics of Rural Electrification.\" *Journal of Political Economy* 128 (4): 1523-1565. https://doi.org/10.1086/705417","Moss, T., and B. Leo. 2014. *Maximizing Access to Energy: Estimates of Access and Generation for the Overseas Private Investment Corporation's Portfolio.* Center for Global Development Working Paper. https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/maximizing-access-energy-opic_1.pdf","NERA Economic Consulting. 2018. *Macroeconomic Outcomes of Market Determined Levels of U.S. LNG Exports.* Prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy. https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2018/06/f52/Macroeconomic%20LNG%20Export%20Study%202018.pdf","Parry, I. W. H., C. Veung, and D. Heine. 2014. *How Much Carbon Pricing Is in Countries' Own Interests? The Critical Role of Co-Benefits.* IMF Working Paper 14/174. International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=41924.0","Prest, B. C. 2022. \"Supply-Side Reforms to Oil and Gas Production on Federal Lands: Modeling the Implications for CO2 Emissions, Federal Revenues, and Leakage.\" *Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists* 9 (4): 681-720. https://doi.org/10.1086/718963","Rennert, K., F. Errickson, B. C. Prest, et al. 2022. \"Comprehensive Evidence Implies a Higher Social Cost of CO2.\" *Nature* 610: 687-692. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-022-05224-9","U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2025. *Occupational Employment and Wages - May 2024.* News release, 2 April 2025. U.S. Department of Labor. https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/ocwage_04022025.htm","U.S. Department of Energy. 2024. *2024 LNG Export Study: Energy, Economic, and Environmental Assessment of U.S. LNG Exports.* Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management. https://www.rff.org/publications/issue-briefs/unpacking-the-department-of-energys-report-on-us-liquefied-natural-gas-exports/","U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 2024. *Congressional Budget Justification: Fiscal Year 2025.* NUREG-1100, Volume 40. U.S. NRC. https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1100/v40/index.html"]},"39":{"policy":"Remove ten US regulations together as one package. They are occupational licensing, minimum wages, restrictive zoning, slow Food and Drug Administration (FDA) drug approval, the sugar program, community-bank compliance rules, the Jones Act's limits on coastal shipping, three Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rules whose own cost estimates exceed their benefits, compulsory collective bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and antitrust enforcement. The rules sit at federal, state and local level. Repealing them needs no new spending.","why_on_list":"The Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom of the World index scores the regulation of credit, labour and business in Area 5. The ten rules in this package are regulations of exactly that kind, so the package is on the list.","evidence":"Most items rest on strong evidence. Occupational licensing costs consumers $184 billion to $203 billion a year (Kleiner and Vorotnikov 2018; Kleiner 2015). Licensing does buy some quality: Kleiner and Soltas (2023) find that higher willingness to pay offsets 80% of the higher prices, and that cost sets the low end. Zoning is the largest and least certain item. Hsieh and Moretti (2019) find US GDP would be 3.7% higher with housing limits eased in New York, San Jose and San Francisco, and 8.9% higher if workers move freely. Greaney (2026) found errors in their code; in the corrected model \"the effect is two orders of magnitude smaller than what they report.\" Across the whole federal rulebook, Coffey, McLaughlin and Peretto (2020) estimate that the economy \"would have been nearly 25 percent larger by 2012\" had regulation stayed at 1980 levels. That study counts only output, so the health and environmental benefits of those rules have to be set against it. Even after subtracting the lowest credible estimate of those benefits, $277.2 billion a year, it gives the highest ratio. The three items added to the package are small. Ending antitrust enforcement saves $0.53 billion of budgets but loses up to $7.81 billion of consumer savings on the agencies' own figures. The package returns $1.28 to $26.37 per dollar of cost.","ratio":"The package is treated as one reform. The ratio is total yearly benefits over total yearly full costs, in billions of 2025 dollars. The low end pairs the lowest credible benefits with the highest costs; the high end uses the most favourable credible published estimates. Benefits and costs for each item:\n\n1. **Occupational licensing.** Benefit: consumer costs removed, $184bn (Kleiner and Vorotnikov 2018) to $203bn (Kleiner 2015). Cost: forgone quality, using the Kleiner and Soltas (2023) offsets: 184 ÷ 1.25 = 147.2 and 203 ÷ 1.67 = 121.6.\n2. **Minimum wage.** Reversing the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) $15 scenario, families above the poverty line gain about $16bn in real income and families below it lose $8bn (CBO 2019). Low benefit: 0.69 × 8 = 5.5 (Cengiz et al. 2019). Cost: 8.\n3. **Zoning.** Low: Greaney (2026), 0.037% of 2025 GDP of $30,861bn = $11.4bn. Hsieh and Moretti's (2019) headline, with workers only partly mobile, is 3.7%, or $1,141.9bn. High: their case with fully mobile workers, 8.9%: 0.089 × 30,861 = $2,746.7bn.\n4. **FDA drug approval.** Low: faster reviews under the Prescription Drug User Fee Act added $14bn to $31bn of social surplus, $3.2bn a year (Philipson et al. 2008). Peltzman (1973) finds the 1962 amendments act like a 5% to 10% tax on drug purchases: 10% × $467bn of 2024 drug spending (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2025) = $46.7bn. High: Gieringer (1985) puts the cost of FDA delay at 21,000 to 120,000 lives per decade, against about 5,000 casualties per decade that FDA review prevents. (120,000 − 5,000) ÷ 10 = 11,500 lives a year × $13.1m per statistical life = $150.65bn. It replaces Peltzman's figure rather than adding to it. Cost: $0 to $1.0bn a year for the upper bound on safety harm.\n5. **Sugar program.** Benefit: consumers save $2.5bn (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2023) to $4bn a year (Beghin 2022). Cost: producers lose $1.5bn to $2.5bn.\n6. **Bank compliance.** Benefit: community banks spent $4.5bn on compliance in 2014 (Dahl 2015); the Council of Economic Advisers (2019) puts the yearly net benefit of the 2018 relief act for small banks at almost $5bn. Cost: slightly higher crisis risk, $0.067bn a year, from CBO's $671m ten-year score of that act (CBO 2018).\n7. **Jones Act.** Benefit: national welfare rises by $0.656bn (U.S. International Trade Commission 2002) to $9.8bn a year (Grabow, Manak and Ikenson 2018). Cost: about 10,800 displaced maritime and shipbuilding workers at median pay of $71,860 lose 1.4 to 2.8 years of earnings (Davis and von Wachter 2011), $0.087bn to $0.174bn a year over 20 years at 5%.\n8. **EPA rules that fail their own test.** Three EPA major rules of 2007-2016 have agency costs above even their high benefit estimate (Office of Management and Budget 2017, Table A-2): Florida's numeric nutrient water-quality standards, the coal combustion residuals rule and the cooling-water intake rule. Repeal saves $1.27bn to $1.71bn of compliance a year and gives up $0.40bn to $0.48bn of health and environmental benefits.\n9. **Compulsory collective bargaining.** Low: 0, since Oklahoma's right-to-work law changed neither employment nor private-sector wages (Eren and Ozbeklik 2016). High: the deadweight loss of union wage-setting, 0.11% of wages (Vedder and Gallaway 2002), doubled for a labour-supply response and scaled to today's private-sector union share: 0.0011 × 2 × 0.374 × $12,976bn of wages = $10.67bn. Cost: 0; the union wage premium is a transfer.\n10. **Antitrust enforcement.** Benefit: enforcement budgets saved, $239.6m at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) plus $288.0m at the Department of Justice (DOJ) = $0.53bn. Cost: lost consumer savings, $0 (Crandall and Winston 2003) to $7.81bn on the agencies' own performance figures (FTC $5.37bn, DOJ $2.43bn).\n\n**Item totals.** Benefits: $213.6bn (low) to $3,148.1bn (high). Costs: $131.7bn (low) to $167.2bn (high).\n\n- Low end: 213.6 ÷ 167.2 = **1.28**.\n- High end, item by item: 3,148.1 ÷ 131.65 = 23.9.\n\n**High end from the aggregate study.** Coffey, McLaughlin and Peretto (2020) find that federal regulatory growth since 1980 left GDP about $4 trillion lower in 2012. That is 4,000 ÷ 16,254 = 24.61% of GDP; on 2025 GDP it is $7,594.8bn. It replaces the federal items it covers (sugar, bank compliance and the EPA rules), not adds to them. The state, local and pre-1980 items are added at their high values: 203 + 16 + 2,746.7 + 150.65 + 9.8 + 10.67 + 0.53 = 3,137.35. Benefits: 7,594.8 + 3,137.35 = 10,732.2.\n\nThe study measures output, not the health and environmental benefits that rules buy, so those benefits count as a cost of repeal, at the lowest credible estimate:\n\n- 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments: even if fine particles and ozone had no effect on deaths, non-fatal health and visibility benefits reach $137bn a year in 2006 dollars (EPA 2011), or $210.0bn today. Cox (2012) argues the mortality benefits that make up most of the EPA estimate are unproven.\n- Other agencies' major rules of 2007-2016: $41.0bn of low-end benefits (Office of Management and Budget 2017), plus 15% of the $64.9bn for energy-efficiency and fuel-economy rules, since Gayer and Viscusi (2013) find 85% to 87% of those benefits are buyers' own fuel savings: 41.0 + 9.7 = 50.7 in 2015 dollars, or $67.2bn.\n\nLost benefits: 210.0 + 67.2 = 277.2. Costs: 121.6 + 8 + 0.087 + 277.2 = 406.9.\n\n- High end: 10,732.2 ÷ 406.9 = **26.37**.\n\n**Cross-checks.** With Hsieh and Moretti's 3.7% in place of 8.9%, the high end is 22.4. With Coffey et al.'s $4 trillion carried forward by inflation alone ($5,533bn), it is 21.3. With agencies' own lost-benefit estimates ($299bn for the Clean Air Act Amendments and $140bn for other rules), it is 18.9. Leaving out lost benefits entirely would give 82.8, but that ignores what the rules buy. Two other aggregate estimates are smaller: Crain and Crain (2023) put the cost of federal regulation at $3.079 trillion a year, and the Competitive Enterprise Institute (Crews 2025) at $2.155 trillion; both count costs only. The range is 1.28 to 26.37, with a full cost of $167.2bn a year.","cost":"The full cost is $167.2bn a year at the low end of the ratio and $131.7bn on the item-by-item high end. Repealing the rules needs no new spending, no administration and no new compliance. The costs are forgone quality, lost health and environmental benefits, lost consumer savings and income transfers:\n\n- Forgone licensing quality: $121.6bn to $147.2bn (Kleiner and Soltas 2023).\n- Income lost by families below the poverty line after minimum-wage repeal: $8bn (CBO 2019).\n- Lost consumer savings from antitrust enforcement: $0 to $7.81bn (FTC and DOJ; Crandall and Winston 2003).\n- Sugar producers' lost surplus: $1.5bn to $2.5bn (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2023).\n- FDA safety bound: $0 to $1.0bn (Philipson et al. 2008).\n- Lost benefits of the three EPA rules: $0.40bn to $0.48bn (Office of Management and Budget 2017).\n- Displaced Jones Act workers' earnings losses: $0.087bn to $0.174bn.\n- Bank-crisis risk: $0.067bn (CBO 2018).\n- Compulsory bargaining: $0; the wage premium is a transfer, and lost worker voice is not priced.\n\nOn the aggregate high end, the sugar, bank and EPA costs give way to the lost non-market benefits of all post-1980 federal rules, $277.2bn, for a total cost of $406.9bn.","strength":"Grade B+. Most items rest on peer-reviewed natural experiments or structural models that measure the gain directly: licensing, minimum wages, zoning and drug approval. Official estimates from the Government Accountability Office, the CBO, the Office of Management and Budget, the FTC and the DOJ cover the sugar program, bank compliance, the EPA rules and antitrust. The high end leans on weaker ground: a peer-reviewed growth model whose measure of regulation has been challenged, Hsieh and Moretti's fully mobile case, and a 1985 estimate of lives lost to drug delay. Zoning, the largest item, rests on a model that a replication found to overstate the effect about a hundredfold. That keeps the grade below A.","difficulty":"Moderate. Each item needs ordinary legislation, rule repeal, or federal pre-emption of state licensing and local zoning. There are strong precedents: the airline, trucking and rail deregulation of 1978-80, Arizona's 2019 universal recognition of out-of-state occupational licences, Auckland's 2016 upzoning, 26 state right-to-work laws, and repeal of rules under the Congressional Review Act. The obstacle is the number of separate laws and the entrenched beneficiaries: incumbent homeowners, licensed professions, sugar growers, unions and the regulated industries' competitors.","who_benefits":"The gains are broad. Zoning and licensing reform favour lower-income newcomers and renters, who are kept out of high-wage cities and protected trades. FDA, sugar and Jones Act reform help consumers and patients widely. The losers are clear too. Minimum-wage repeal lowers income for families below the poverty line by $8bn a year, and ending compulsory bargaining lowers some union wages. Without antitrust enforcement some prices may rise. Licensed professions, sugar growers and maritime workers lose their protection, and people living near the plants covered by the three EPA rules lose some environmental protection.","counter":"Repealing EPA rules wholesale would lower the ratio, not raise it. On the Office of Management and Budget's (2017) tally, the 39 major EPA rules of 2007-2016 bring benefits of $195.8 billion to $705.7 billion a year against costs of $54.1 billion to $64.8 billion (2015 dollars). Putting all of them in the package would cut the low end to 0.26. Those benefits are open to question: the same report says they are \"mostly attributable to the reduction in public exposure to fine particulate matter,\" and Cox (2012) argues that link is unproven. Even with no mortality benefit, EPA (2011) puts the non-fatal benefits of the 1990 amendments at more than twice their cost. The high end has its own critics. Goldschlag and Tabarrok (2018) find that federal regulation, measured the same way as in Coffey et al. (2020), does not explain the decline in American business dynamism. Glaeser and Gyourko (2018) suggest that 2% of GDP may be an upper bound on the gains from easing land-use rules, and Greaney (2026) finds far less. If the aggregate study and the fully mobile zoning case are set aside, the high end is 11.7 and the package stays Good. If Greaney is right as well, it sits near the low end of 1.28, in the Mid tier, carried by licensing.","references":["Beghin, J. C. 2022. *Recapping the Effects of the U.S. Sugar Program.* American Enterprise Institute (excerpt, Yeutter Institute, University of Nebraska-Lincoln). https://yeutter-institute.unl.edu/research/faculty-research/recapping-effects-us-sugar-program","Cengiz, D., A. Dube, A. Lindner, and B. Zipperer. 2019. \"The Effect of Minimum Wages on Low-Wage Jobs.\" *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 134 (3): 1405-1454. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjz014","Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. 2025. *National Health Expenditure Fact Sheet.* CMS. https://www.cms.gov/data-research/statistics-trends-and-reports/national-health-expenditure-data/nhe-fact-sheet","Coffey, B., P. A. McLaughlin, and P. Peretto. 2020. \"The Cumulative Cost of Regulations.\" *Review of Economic Dynamics* 38: 1-21. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2020.03.004","Congressional Budget Office. 2018. *Cost Estimate: S. 2155, Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act.* CBO. https://www.cbo.gov/publication/53632","Congressional Budget Office. 2019. *The Effects on Employment and Family Income of Increasing the Federal Minimum Wage.* CBO. https://www.cbo.gov/publication/55410","Council of Economic Advisers. 2019. *The Economic Effects of Federal Deregulation since January 2017: An Interim Report.* Executive Office of the President. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/The-Economic-Effects-of-Federal-Deregulation-Interim-Report.pdf","Cox, L. A. 2012. \"Reassessing the Human Health Benefits from Cleaner Air.\" *Risk Analysis* 32 (5): 816-829. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6924.2011.01698.x","Crain, W. M., and N. V. Crain. 2023. *The Cost of Federal Regulation to the U.S. Economy, Manufacturing and Small Business.* National Association of Manufacturers. https://nam.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/NAM-3731-Crains-Study-R3-V2-FIN.pdf","Crandall, R. W., and C. Winston. 2003. \"Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer Welfare? Assessing the Evidence.\" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17 (4): 3-26. https://doi.org/10.1257/089533003772034871","Crews, C. W. 2025. *Ten Thousand Commandments 2025: An Annual Snapshot of the Federal Regulatory State.* Competitive Enterprise Institute. https://cei.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/10K_2025_v5.pdf","Dahl, D. 2015. \"Compliance Costs Community Banks $4.5 Billion Annually, Survey Shows.\" *On the Economy* (blog), Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2015/december/compliance-costs-community-banks-billions","Davis, S. J., and T. von Wachter. 2011. \"Recessions and the Costs of Job Loss.\" *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, Fall 2011. NBER Working Paper 17638. https://www.nber.org/papers/w17638","Eren, O., and S. Ozbeklik. 2016. \"What Do Right-to-Work Laws Do? Evidence from a Synthetic Control Method Analysis.\" *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 35 (1): 173-194. https://doi.org/10.1002/pam.21861","Federal Trade Commission. 2019. *FY2018 and FY2019 One-Page Performance Snapshots.* FTC. https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/2019-one-page-ftc-performance-snapshot/2019_performance_snapshot.pdf","Federal Trade Commission. 2022. *FY 2023 Congressional Budget Justification.* FTC. https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/P859900FY23CBJ.pdf","Gayer, T., and W. K. Viscusi. 2013. \"Overriding Consumer Preferences with Energy Regulations.\" *Journal of Regulatory Economics* 43 (3): 248-264. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-013-9210-2","Gieringer, D. H. 1985. \"The Safety and Efficacy of New Drug Approval.\" *Cato Journal* 5 (1): 177-201. https://cato.org/cato-journal/spring/summer-1985/safety-efficacy-new-drug-approval","Grabow, C., I. Manak, and D. J. Ikenson. 2018. *The Jones Act: A Burden America Can No Longer Bear.* Cato Policy Analysis 845. Cato Institute. https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/jones-act-burden-america-can-no-longer-bear","Greaney, B. 2026. \"Housing Constraints and Spatial Misallocation: Comment.\" *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics* 18 (2): 409-428. https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.20230141","Hsieh, C.-T., and E. Moretti. 2019. \"Housing Constraints and Spatial Misallocation.\" *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics* 11 (2): 1-39. https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.20170388","Kleiner, M. M., and E. J. Soltas. 2023. \"A Welfare Analysis of Occupational Licensing in U.S. States.\" *Review of Economic Studies* 90 (5): 2481-2516. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad015","Kleiner, M. M., and E. Vorotnikov. 2018. *At What Cost? State and National Estimates of the Economic Costs of Occupational Licensing.* Institute for Justice. https://ij.org/report/at-what-cost/","Kleiner, M. M. 2015. *Reforming Occupational Licensing Policies.* Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2015-01. https://www.hamiltonproject.org/publication/policy-proposal/reforming-occupational-licensing-policies/","Office of Management and Budget. 2017. *2017 Draft Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulations and Agency Compliance with the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act.* OMB, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/draft_2017_cost_benefit_report.pdf","Peltzman, S. 1973. \"An Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation: The 1962 Drug Amendments.\" *Journal of Political Economy* 81 (5): 1049-1091. https://doi.org/10.1086/260107","Philipson, T., E. R. Berndt, A. H. B. Gottschalk, and E. Sun. 2008. \"Cost-Benefit Analysis of the FDA: The Case of the Prescription Drug User Fee Acts.\" *Journal of Public Economics* 92 (5-6): 1306-1325. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.09.010","U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis via FRED. 2026. \"Gross Domestic Product (GDPA), annual.\" *FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis*. https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDPA","U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis via FRED. 2026. \"Wages and Salaries (A576RC1); GDP Implicit Price Deflator (A191RD3A086NBEA).\" *FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis*. https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/A576RC1","U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2026. *Union Members - 2025.* News release, February 18, 2026. https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/union2_02182026.htm","U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division. 2024. *FY 2025 Performance Budget, Congressional Justification.* DOJ. https://www.justice.gov/d9/2024-03/atr_fy_2025_presidents_budget_narrative_03.11.24.pdf","U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2011. *The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act from 1990 to 2020: Summary Report.* EPA Office of Air and Radiation. https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2015-07/documents/summaryreport.pdf","U.S. Government Accountability Office. 2023. *Sugar Program: Alternative Methods for Implementing Import Restrictions Could Increase Effectiveness.* GAO-24-106144. GAO. https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-24-106144","U.S. International Trade Commission. 2002. *The Economic Effects of Significant U.S. Import Restraints: Third Update 2002.* Publication 3519. USITC. https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub3519.pdf","Vedder, R., and L. Gallaway. 2002. \"The Economic Effects of Labor Unions Revisited.\" *Journal of Labor Research* 23 (1): 105-130. https://ideas.repec.org/a/tra/jlabre/v23y2002i1p105-130.html","Glaeser, E., and J. Gyourko. 2018. \"The Economic Implications of Housing Supply.\" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 32 (1): 3-30. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.32.1.3","Goldschlag, N., and A. Tabarrok. 2018. \"Is Regulation to Blame for the Decline in American Entrepreneurship?\" *Economic Policy* 33 (93): 5-44. https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/ecpoli/v33y2018i93p5-44..html"]},"40":{"policy":"Give the world's poor formal, tradable titles to the land and homes they already occupy. Build digital registries that record who owns what and keep them up to date. Enforce those rights so owners can invest in, borrow against and sell what they own. It is a government spending programme, costed here for Sub-Saharan Africa.","why_on_list":"The Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom of the World index measures the legal system and the security of property rights in Area 2. Secure, recorded ownership is the core of that area, so a programme to deliver it is on the list.","evidence":"About 1.1 billion adults, 23% of adults worldwide, report that they feel insecure about their land or property rights (Prindex 2024). The best cost-benefit study is a peer-reviewed Copenhagen Consensus analysis for Sub-Saharan Africa (Byamugisha and Dubosse 2023). It finds $18 back per dollar for rural titling and $30 to $45 for urban titling, at costs of $5 to $25 a parcel.\n\nField studies show why titles pay. In Peru, titling raised household work hours by 17% and cut child labour by 28% (Field 2007). In Buenos Aires, titled families built 12% more and their children got 0.69 more years of schooling (Galiani and Schargrodsky 2010). In Rwanda, households with regularised land were \"almost 10 percentage points more likely to make or maintain soil conservation investments,\" about double the change in the control group (Ali, Deininger and Goldstein 2014).\n\nThe doubt is about rural incomes. Systematic reviews find strong effects on investment and women's empowerment, but no consistent link to farm productivity, credit or income in Africa (Higgins et al. 2018; Lawry et al. 2017). Allowing for that, the range runs from about $6 to $23 per dollar. Once the cost of raising the taxes that fund it is counted, the range is $1.97 to $17.50 per $1.","ratio":"The base is Byamugisha and Dubosse (2023): Sub-Saharan Africa, an 8% discount rate and a 30-year horizon. Benefits rest on a 15% household wealth effect for rural land and a 25% rise in urban property values.\n\n**Inputs (present values).**\n- Rural titling: benefits $395.71bn, costs $21.72bn. Ratio 18.\n- Urban titling, at average house prices: benefits $236.93bn, costs $5.29bn. Ratio 45.\n- Urban titling, population-weighted: benefits $159.89bn. Ratio 30.\n\n**High end.**\n- Benefits: 395.71 + 236.93 = 632.64.\n- Costs: 21.72 + 5.29 = 27.01.\n- Ratio: 632.64 ÷ 27.01 = 23.4, shown as **23**.\n\nThe paper's own headline is 21, using population-weighted urban prices.\n\n**Low end.**\n- Rural benefits set to zero, following the systematic reviews that find no consistent income or productivity effect of rural titling in Africa (Higgins et al. 2018; Lawry et al. 2017; Jacoby and Minten 2007).\n- Urban benefits, population-weighted: 159.89.\n- All costs kept: 27.01.\n- Ratio: 159.89 ÷ 27.01 = 5.9, shown as **6**.\n\n**Cross-check.** Other Copenhagen Consensus country studies find higher ratios. Malawi's central estimate is 73, with a range of 18 to 138 (National Planning Commission Malawi et al. 2021). The range is 6 to 23, with a full cost of $2.7bn a year.\n\n**After the cost of raising taxes.** Each $1 of public spending costs $1.34 to $3.00 once the excess burden of the taxes that fund it is counted (Ballard, Shoven and Whalley 1985; Feldstein 1999). The low end uses the higher burden and the high end the lower one. The whole cost behind the ratio is public spending. Low end: 5.92 ÷ 3.00 = 1.97. High end: 23.44 ÷ 1.34 = 17.5. **Range after tax finance: 1.97 to 17.5.**","cost":"The full cost is $2.7bn a year. Byamugisha and Dubosse (2023) put undiscounted costs for Sub-Saharan Africa at $82.4bn over 30 years: $68.6bn rural and $13.8bn urban. That is about $2.7bn a year, all public outlay. It covers registration, digitisation, institutions and, above all, registry operation and upkeep.\n\nPer-parcel titling costs of $5 to $25 have been achieved in Rwanda, Malawi and Tanzania. Rwanda's pilot cost about $9.11 a parcel, since cut to about $5. Conventional approaches cost $20 to $60 a parcel for first-time adjudication alone, and much more in Africa (Ali, Deininger and Goldstein 2014). A global programme would cost more than the African figure; no sourced global total exists.","strength":"Grade A-. The ratio comes from one peer-reviewed benefit-cost analysis in the *Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis*. It is backed by strong quasi-experimental and natural-experiment studies in Peru, Argentina and Rwanda. But systematic reviews find mixed effects on income, especially in rural Africa. That keeps it short of a full A.","difficulty":"Moderate. It needs a sustained increase in funding, but there are working precedents. Rwanda's nationwide land tenure regularisation demarcated 4.8 million parcels in its first year (Ali, Deininger and Goldstein 2014). In Peru, \"between 1996 and 2003, the Peruvian government issued property titles to over 1.2 million urban households, the largest titling program targeted at urban squatters in the developing world\" (Field 2007). The practical obstacles are weak land administration, capture by local elites and keeping registries current where customary tenure is common.","who_benefits":"The poor gain most. The programme targets squatters, smallholders and female-headed households. In Rwanda, the effect on soil-conservation investment for female-headed households was about 19 percentage points, double that for men (Ali, Deininger and Goldstein 2014). The cost falls on public budgets, mainly through registry upkeep.","counter":"The strongest counter-evidence concerns rural titling in Africa. Jacoby and Minten (2007) find that in rural Madagascar a title had no significant effect on plot investment and little effect on productivity or land values. They conclude that formal titling should not be extended there unless new registration is quite inexpensive. Lawry et al. (2017) find effects markedly lower in Sub-Saharan Africa, and Deininger and Feder (2009) note little rigorous analysis of cost-effectiveness and long-term sustainability. These findings set the low end, which counts no rural benefit at all. They are kept out of the central estimate because Jacoby and Minten evaluate expensive conventional titling, not low-cost systematic registration.\n\nThe verdict turns on whether rural titles raise incomes. The Copenhagen Consensus rural benefit rests on a 15% wealth effect drawn from studies outside Africa. With it, the source ratio is 23; with urban benefits alone, it is 5.9. After the cost of raising taxes, the ends are 1.97 and 17.5. If rural titling in Africa delivered nothing, the policy would sit in the Good tier or lower. If registration costs fell to the $5 per parcel achieved in Rwanda (Ali, Deininger and Goldstein 2014), rather than the $10 to $25 assumed, the ratio would rise.","references":["Ali, D. A., K. Deininger, and M. Goldstein. 2014. \"Environmental and Gender Impacts of Land Tenure Regularization in Africa: Pilot Evidence from Rwanda.\" *Journal of Development Economics* 110: 262-275. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.12.009","Byamugisha, F. F. K., and N. Dubosse. 2023. \"The Investment Case for Land Tenure Security in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Cost-Benefit Analysis.\" *Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis* 14 (S1): 272-300. https://doi.org/10.1017/bca.2023.14","Deininger, K., and G. Feder. 2009. \"Land Registration, Governance, and Development: Evidence and Implications for Policy.\" *World Bank Research Observer* 24 (2): 233-266. https://doi.org/10.1093/wbro/lkp007","Field, E. 2007. \"Entitled to Work: Urban Property Rights and Labor Supply in Peru.\" *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 122 (4): 1561-1602. https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2007.122.4.1561","Galiani, S., and E. Schargrodsky. 2010. \"Property Rights for the Poor: Effects of Land Titling.\" *Journal of Public Economics* 94 (9-10): 700-729. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.06.002","Higgins, D., T. Balint, H. Liversage, and P. Winters. 2018. \"Investigating the Impacts of Increased Rural Land Tenure Security: A Systematic Review of the Evidence.\" *Journal of Rural Studies* 61: 34-62. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2018.05.001","Jacoby, H. G., and B. Minten. 2007. \"Is Land Titling in Sub-Saharan Africa Cost-Effective? Evidence from Madagascar.\" *World Bank Economic Review* 21 (3): 461-485. https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/lhm011","Lawry, S., C. Samii, R. Hall, A. Leopold, D. Hornby, and F. Mtero. 2017. \"The Impact of Land Property Rights Interventions on Investment and Agricultural Productivity in Developing Countries: A Systematic Review.\" *Journal of Development Effectiveness* 9 (1): 61-81. https://doi.org/10.1080/19439342.2016.1160947","National Planning Commission (Malawi), S. Razvi, B. Wong, et al. 2021. *A Cost-Benefit Note: Implementing the National Land Policy in Malawi. Technical Report.* Malawi Priorities. NPC Malawi, Copenhagen Consensus Center and AFIDEP. https://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/mp_land_tilting_report.pdf","Prindex. 2024. \"Alarming Trends in Global Tenure Insecurity.\" Reported by *Rural 21*, on the Prindex Global Tenure Security Report 2024. https://www.rural21.com/english/news/detail/article/alarming-trends-in-global-tenure-insecurity.html"]}}}